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The NutraSweet Co. has very successfully marketed aspartame, a low-calorie, high-intensity sweetener, around the world. NutraSweet's position was protected by patents until 1987 in Europe, Canada, and Japan, and until the end of 1992 in the United States. The case series describes the competition that ensued between NutraSweet and the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) following HSC's entry into the aspartame market in 1987. Describes the subsequent move and countermove in both the marketplace and the courts. Also, discusses the business "game" that takes place at both the tactical and value levels. Ends with the final countdown to the expiration of NutraSweet's U.S. patent.

NutraSweet's worldwide patent-protected monopoly on aspartame, the low-calorie high-intensity sweetener, ended with the 1987 entry of the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) into the European market. Following the arrival of a challenger, NutraSweet acted to reduce sharply the price at which it offered aspartame to its European customers. NutraSweet's pricing move raised the question: were its actions in Europe a credible signal of how it would respond to entry in the U.S. market (where its patent was due to expire in late 1992)? This case explores some aspects of the game between a challenger (such as HSC) that is looking to enter a market and an established player in the market (such as NutraSweet) that may engage in signalling behavior.

In the mid-1980s, the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) was facing the decision whether to enter the European and Canadian aspartame markets, following the ending of NutraSweet's patents there. A major question facing HSC was whether NutraSweet would respond to entry in an accommodating, or an aggresive, manner. Thus, NutraSweet might initiate a price war in Europe or Canada as a warning to anyone considering entry into the U.S. market, once its patent expired there in 1992. On the other hand, such a response might simply be viewed as "water under the bridge" by the time the U.S. market opened up. In that case, NutraSweet might do better opting for a live-and-let-live approach in Europe and Canada. Given the uncertainty surrounding NutraSweet's reaction, HSC had to make its entry decision in a fog. This case explores some aspects of the game between a company that is established in a number of markets and companies that seek to enter those markets.

Harnischfeger, the market-share leader, is facing increasing competition in the portal crane industry. The key question facing the company is how to respond to the competitive threat without undermining the attractiveness of the industry. The case discusses a number of ways in which Harnischfeger can try to regain market-share without embarking on a price war.

Recent developments in the software business point to some of the reasons why companies offer their products or services in bundles. One is the opportunity to leverage market power, as Microsoft arguably has done by bundling applications software with its operating systems. Another reason for bundling is the economics of scope, as indicated by the emergence of software suites and the shift toward broad-line players (Microsoft, Lotus, and Borland-WordPerfect). But there appears to be still more to bundling: individual software programs continue to be offered in addition to suites, and suites are priced at a steep discount to the total price for the separate programs.

Describes the race to develop human insulin.

Describes Xerox's "rental only" policy for its machines during the period when it had a monopoly of the plain paper copier market and how that policy changed once it was faced with entry by IBM, Canon, Kodak, and others. Data on the breakdown of Xerox's revenues between sales and rentals are included.

Examines whether product proliferation can be used as a preemptive device--as alleged in the FTC's 1982 complaint against four manufacturers of ready-to-eat cereals.

Examines the pricing policy for a firm that is a monopoly supplier of a durable good. Lowering price over time in an attempt to increase market penetration seems desirable. But doing so may also cause some buyers to postpone their purchases. Describes these considerations in the context of a specific example that can be analyzed numerically.

Examines the choice of optimal product positioning in a differentiated goods market.

Begins with a description of the elements of post-deregulation competition in the commercial airline industry. This should facilitate a discussion of the use of quantitative methods to support a broad range of tactical and strategic airline decisions. The principal thrust of the case is on revenue management. First, there is a description of the principal pricing concepts, followed by two examples of pricing decisions facing American. Next, there is a discussion of the basic yield management concepts and comments on the challenges in their implementation. Finally, there is a brief write-up on the structure and future of the revenue management organization.