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This note explains how the People's Bank of China (PBOC) manages (some say manipulate) the dollar-yuan exchange rate. It discusses briefly the process of sterilization in China and the possible costs for the PBOC. Therefore, the note summarizes some of the main challenges the PBOC faces to contain inflation in China and to keep Chinese exports competitive.

Supplement to case 710008.

This case examines the evolution of inequality in Brazil in the last few years and generates two debates. First, the case discusses inequality and whether it is a problem or not for capitalist societies, in this case Brazil. Second, the case discusses some of the policies the Brazilian government has used to attack poverty and inequality.

Brazil's new president, Dilma Rousseff, had announced plans to sustain GDP growth above 5 percent annually and continue the country's leadership role among emerging economies. Between 2003 and 2010, Brazil benefited from strong economic growth and stable policies under the Lula administration. Brazil also increasingly led the BRICs (the fast-growing countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in multilateral negotiations, notably in the World Trade Organization's Doha Round. Yet Brazil's actions to enforce a compulsory license of a patented therapy for HIV/AIDS and its victory in a longstanding WTO dispute with the United States over cotton subsidies had created tensions with major trading partners. Entering office in January 2011, Rousseff had the opportunity to outline a new agenda for international trade. Specifically, she had to decide whether to seek completion of the Doha Round, which was in a stalemate due to disputes over global intellectual property rules and agricultural subsidies and tariffs, or to instead pursue regional trade agreements in South and Central America. Rousseff also pledged active government involvement in the economy, described in the case as "Brazilian capitalism," but it was unclear whether fiscal expansion coupled with conservative monetary policies would reduce bottlenecks to growth and further temper Brazil's high inequality.

Ian Delaney, CEO of Sherritt, a primarily a mining company, visited Cuba in the early 1990s to negotiate a deal to export nickel for their Canadian refineries. The case describes the difficulties of doing business in Cuba and the challenges Delaney overcame to turn Sherritt into a large diversified holding company that operates in mining, oil, utilities, telecomm, hotels, and others. Delaney did this while managing a relationship with an authoritarian regime with an anti-capitalist discourse.

Since emerging from decades of conflict in 2002, Angola has been growing at a scorching double-digit rate, led by its oil industry. But the nation remains beset with seemingly intractable problems: immense inequality, low life expectancy, a non-diversified economy, and constant grumblings of corruption. The global financial crisis and subsequent fall in state oil revenue drives a loan-seeking Angola towards either the IMF, who demand extensive reforms, or the Chinese, who seek to take a direct stake in the nation's recovery. The case explores the dynamics of post-conflict recovery as well as the challenges associated with a reliance on oil wealth, including the resource curse and Dutch disease.

On November 25, 2009, the city state of Dubai stunned markets by announcing that Dubai World, its flagship state holding company, would seek a six month "standstill" on at least $4 billion U.S. dollars of its $26 billion in debt obligations. This case describes Dubai's development strategy in detail and narrates how, as part of that strategy, a series of state-owned holding companies accumulated billions of dollars in debt. The A case ends as Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed, chairman of Dubai's Fiscal Committee, has to decide what to do about the financial troubles of Dubai World and other state-owned holding companies. The case presents Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed having to decide among three options: The Dubai government can guarantee the debt, they can renegotiate the debt, or walk away (i.e., default). The B case describes the decision and the reactions to this decision around the world and presents a new decision on the part of bond holders of Dubai's state-owned holding companies. The C case briefly analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Dubai's bankruptcy procedures, both for investors and for the holding companies of Dubai.

On November 25, 2009, the city state of Dubai stunned markets by announcing that Dubai World, its flagship state holding company, would seek a six month "standstill" on at least $4 billion U.S. dollars of its $26 billion in debt obligations. This case describes Dubai's development strategy in detail and narrates how, as part of that strategy, a series of state-owned holding companies accumulated billions of dollars in debt. The A case ends as Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed, chairman of Dubai's Fiscal Committee, has to decide what to do about the financial troubles of Dubai World and other state-owned holding companies. The case presents Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed having to decide among three options: The Dubai government can guarantee the debt, they can renegotiate the debt, or walk away (i.e., default). The B case describes the decision and the reactions to this decision around the world and presents a new decision on the part of bond holders of Dubai's state-owned holding companies. The C case briefly analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Dubai's bankruptcy procedures, both for investors and for the holding companies of Dubai.

On November 25, 2009, the city state of Dubai stunned markets by announcing that Dubai World, its flagship state holding company, would seek a six-month "standstill" on at least $4 billion U.S. dollars of its $26 billion in debt obligations. This case describes Dubai's development strategy in detail and narrates how, as part of that strategy, a series of state-owned holding companies accumulated billions of dollars in debt. The (A) case ends as Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed, chairman of Dubai's Fiscal Committee, has to decide what to do about the financial troubles of Dubai World and other state-owned holding companies. The case presents Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed having to decide among three options: the Dubai government can guarantee the debt, they can renegotiate the debt, or they can walk away (i.e., default). The B case describes the decision and the reactions to this decision around the world and presents a new decision on the part of bond holders of Dubai's state-owned holding companies. The C case briefly analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Dubai's bankruptcy procedures, both for investors and for the holding companies of Dubai.

In 2009 the management of Vale, a Brazilian diversified mining company and the largest iron ore producer in the world, was under pressure from at least two fronts. First, the emergence of China as the most important consumer of iron ore in the last few years had changed the pricing system for iron ore from long-term contracts based on negotiated "benchmark prices" to contracts based on spot prices, usually forcing mining companies to pay for shipping. Second, for Brazil's charismatic president, Lula, a former union leader, Vale's layoffs during the global financial crisis and its perceived move away from Brazil (as Vale increased its exports to China and purchased Chinese vessels to ship iron ore to Asia) were reasons to start an open campaign to pressure Vale and Agnelli to invest in integrated steel mills in Brazil. In October of 2009, the CEO of Vale, Roger Agnelli was going to meet with Lula and had to decide what to do to attenuate these political pressures. What could Agnelli do to deal with political pressures at home? Was the purchase of large vessels to ship iron ore to Asia a good decision at a time when the shipping industry had spare capacity?

In 2010, the bicentennial anniversary of Mexico's revolution against Spain, Mexican President Felipe Calderon hoped he could orchestrate several crucial reforms that Mexico needed. Mexico had not grown much over the course of the last decade, losing competitiveness to China and other Asian countries. Several of its institutions, including labor, education, healthcare, energy, and antitrust, seemed uncompetitive. But with a weaker peso and greater governmental attention to infrastructure, Calderon hoped that Mexico's higher-tech exports could recapture U.S. market share and make headway in Europe and Latin America.

By mid-2009 Colombian President Alvaro Uribe had ended decades of virtual civil war and strengthened the business climate, but he faced tough economic challenges. Though he had instituted prominent market reforms and brought inflation down sharply, Colombia seemed stuck in a middle ground, industrially behind Brazil or Chile but ahead of poorer Latin American countries. Traditional exports--coal, coffee, oil--still comprised more than half the total, while manufactured exports comprised only a fifth. Public investment in transport and other infrastructure--a perpetual obstacle to growth in mountainous Colombia--remained too low. A major ambition of Uribe or his possible like-minded successor was to secure U.S. Congressional approval of a free trade agreement signed in 2006. But would it really help Colombia diversify its economy? Colombia already had access to the U.S. market but still had a relatively closed economy compared with neighbors such as Mexico or Chile.

On October 18, 2007, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa announced his intention to migrate Petrobras' existing participation contracts to exploit oil reserves in Ecuador's Blocks 18 and 31 to servicing agreements under which Petrobras would be paid a production fee and reimbursed for investment costs but all recovered oil would belong to the government. Correa also announced a dramatic increase in corporate taxes and changes to other contracts to which Petrobras was a party. All foreign oil companies operating In Ecuador would be similarly affected and any company refusing to "renegotiate" its contracts would face a 100% tax on profits. How should Petrobras respond to Ecuador's riding roughshod over its contracts? Should Petrobras take the Ecuadorian government to arbitration? Or would it be better to pursue a negotiated solution similar to that reached in Bolivia a year earlier? How should Petrobras balance its fiduciary duties to and the best Interests of its shareholders with the interests of the Brazilian government? How should it communicate with its various constituencies?

This case describes the efforts of Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to improve liquidity in money markets during the subprime crisis. The case explains the four main new tools for monetary policy (or quantitative easing) the Federal Reserve has used between 2007 and 2009: the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).