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In December 2017, during the celebrations of the third anniversary of his company, the founder and president of Dami Technology Co. Ltd. (Dami) reflected on the success of his entrepreneurship efforts since 2014. Using mobile Internet, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence technologies, Dami implemented a new rice supply chain from farm to table by developing smart kitchenware, such as rice buckets and rice cookers. Dami was the first company to accomplish this goal in the Chinese rice industry. By the end of 2017, Dami had created its own market in more than 30 of China’s major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Having achieved great success, Dami had two main options for its next phase of growth: (1) build a complete smart kitchen ecosystem using all available resources, or (2) partner with a Chinese home appliances giant and join a smart kitchen ecosystem.

In December 2017, during the celebrations of the third anniversary of his company, the founder and president of Dami Technology Co. Ltd. (Dami) reflected on the success of his entrepreneurship efforts since 2014. Using mobile Internet, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence technologies, Dami implemented a new rice supply chain from farm to table by developing smart kitchenware, such as rice buckets and rice cookers. Dami was the first company to accomplish this goal in the Chinese rice industry. By the end of 2017, Dami had created its own market in more than 30 of China's major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Having achieved great success, Dami had two main options for its next phase of growth: (1) build a complete smart kitchen ecosystem using all available resources, or (2) partner with a Chinese home appliances giant and join a smart kitchen ecosystem.

Shanghai Contron Information Technology Co., Ltd. was a small technology company in Shanghai, China, established in 2011. The company's main customer was the government, and sales management was the company's primary department. In a rapidly expanding market, the company moved very quickly from the start-up phase to the growth phase. In 2016, the company’s chief executive officer faced challenges in terms of obtaining, stimulating, and managing sales talent, and improving the leading role of the sales department. What could the chief executive officer do to address these challenges?

Shanghai Contron Information Technology Co., Ltd. was a small technology company in Shanghai, China, established in 2011. The company's main customer was the government, and sales management was the company's primary department. In a rapidly expanding market, the company moved very quickly from the start-up phase to the growth phase. In 2016, the company's chief executive officer faced challenges in terms of obtaining, stimulating, and managing sales talent, and improving the leading role of the sales department. What could the chief executive officer do to address these challenges?

On April 20, 2016, printer and ink maker Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) announced that it was being acquired and taken private by a consortium comprising China-based computer hardware company Apex Technology Co., Ltd. (Apex), as well as private equity firms PAG Asia Capital (PAG) and Legend Capital (Legend). On the same day, Apex formally announced its acquisition of Lexmark for the Chinese capital market. The announcement caused a huge sensation because Apex was a small company compared to Lexmark; Lexmark completed 2015 with US$3.6 billion in revenue—approximately 10 times the revenue of Apex. To raise enough money to pay for the acquisition, Apex had established the consortium with PAG and Legend, and borrowed a large sum of money from its controlling shareholder and banks. Although Apex had ultimately raised enough money to complete the acquisition, its satisfaction over this success soon gave way to pressing questions about financing. In order to dispel the doubts of regulators and the market, Apex needed to decide whether it should adjust its financing plan for the acquisition, and if so, how.

Student spreadsheet for case W18575

On April 20, 2016, printer and ink maker Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) announced that it was being acquired and taken private by a consortium comprising China-based computer hardware company Apex Technology Co., Ltd. (Apex), as well as private equity firms PAG Asia Capital (PAG) and Legend Capital (Legend). On the same day, Apex formally announced its acquisition of Lexmark for the Chinese capital market. The announcement caused a huge sensation because Apex was a small company compared to Lexmark; Lexmark completed 2015 with US$3.6 billion in revenue-approximately 10 times the revenue of Apex. To raise enough money to pay for the acquisition, Apex had established the consortium with PAG and Legend, and borrowed a large sum of money from its controlling shareholder and banks. Although Apex had ultimately raised enough money to complete the acquisition, its satisfaction over this success soon gave way to pressing questions about financing. In order to dispel the doubts of regulators and the market, Apex needed to decide whether it should adjust its financing plan for the acquisition, and if so, how.

Student Spreadsheet for product 9B18N016.

Instructor spreadsheet for product 8B18N016.

On July 7, 2015, a power fault during the evening commute led to a system-wide disruption on SMRT, Singapore's heavily used mass rapid transit lines. Train service on both lines was shut down for more than two hours, affecting more than 413,000 commuters. The public was outraged at the scale of the breakdown and how ineffectively it was handled. Detailed investigations revealed the breakdown to be a result of maintenance lapses, and SMRT was criticized for its failure to provide clear and timely information and instructions to passengers. Following the breakdown, the company embarked on a service recovery process encompassing various new initiatives. This case illustrates the tensions SMRT faced during and after the breakdown, and its journey to recover the public's confidence in is transit services.

On July 7, 2015, a power fault during the evening commute led to a system-wide disruption on SMRT, Singapore’s heavily used mass rapid transit lines. Train service on both lines was shut down for more than two hours, affecting more than 413,000 commuters. The public was outraged at the scale of the breakdown and how ineffectively it was handled. Detailed investigations revealed the breakdown to be a result of maintenance lapses, and SMRT was criticized for its failure to provide clear and timely information and instructions to passengers. Following the breakdown, the company embarked on a service recovery process encompassing various new initiatives. This case illustrates the tensions SMRT faced during and after the breakdown, and its journey to recover the public’s confidence in is transit services.

Many successful companies spend substantial time and effort engaging with potential consumers on social media sites. They determine how consumers spend their time online and develop interesting content to increase awareness and enjoyment of the brand-often only to lose those potential customers because the purchase process becomes too difficult once consumers have decided to buy the product. New technology recently introduced by third-party vendors allows companies to offer a sales option directly on social media websites such as Facebook and Instagram. In this article, we present the effects on the consumer decision process created by the 'Buy Now' option across the consideration, evaluation, purchase, and post-purchase stages. We compare and contrast three distinct decision models: (1) traditional media only, (2) traditional media and social media with only a communication capability, and (3) traditional media and social media with the added function of immediate purchase. We argue that though the possibility of buying on social media will decrease the number of brands considered and evaluated, the number of purchases and amount of brand advocacy will increase significantly due to the ease of purchase. We conclude with some recommendations on future research.

Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.

Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.

Developers Jonathan Rose and Adam Weinstein were trying to determine which of three proposals to submit to the city of New York in response to a RFP to create an affordable housing project in the South Bronx. The site, referred to as Via Verde, was a 1.5-acre triangular brownfield in one of the poorest neighborhoods in New York City. It was 2006 and the housing market was peaking but had not yet crashed. Both Rose and Weinstein were experienced developers of low-income housing, the former as CEO of the Jonathan Rose Companies, a national developer, and the latter as CEO of Phipps Houses, the largest non-profit developer and manager of low-income housing in NYC. The three proposal options differed in their risk and return profiles for the developers, and differed in how much they incorporated health-oriented, mixed-income living for the residents.

Few companies treat innovation in pricing as seriously as product innovation or business model innovation. However, after interviews with 50 executives and the analysis of pricing practices of 70 companies worldwide, our research suggests that innovation in pricing may be a company's most powerful--and, in many cases, least explored--source of competitive advantage. Innovation in pricing brings new-to-the-industry approaches to pricing strategies, to pricing tactics, and to the organization of pricing with the objective of increasing customer satisfaction and company profits; too many companies today see pricing as a win/lose proposition between themselves and their customers. Innovation in pricing breaks this deadlock and shows how to increase profits and customer satisfaction conjointly. As a result of our research, we present a canvas laying out more than 20 possible avenues for innovation in pricing, offering to any organization--regardless of size, industry, or nationality--a few key ideas on how to increase both profits and customer satisfaction.

In 2013, a successful entrepreneur in Eldoret, Kenya was considering her options. In 2007, after a history of operating several small businesses, only one of which failed, she founded Lilgaa Property Management Ltd., a real estate and property management business. She had focused her energies on the real estate industry in spite of its many challenges, which included corruption and lack of regulation, enforcement and trust. In 2013 she needed to decide how to grow her business, specifically, whether she could buy a building in Eldoret and rent it out or buy a plot of land on the outskirts of town and build a hotel; if the latter, would it cater to the middle or upper class? She had to assess the various elements of the business, political and social environments and consider the potential risks that could affect the outcome of her investment.

April 17, 2012, was a special day for SANY Group and for its founder Liang Wen'gen. Headquartered in Changsha, SANY Group had transformed itself in two decades from a small welding material factory in 1989 to a leading global construction equipment manufacturer with 5 industrial parks in China; 5 R&D and manufacturing bases in America, Germany, India, Brazil, and Indonesia; and 21 sales companies worldwide. SANY Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (SANY), SANY Group's major subsidiary, engaged in the construction equipment business and was number six on International Construction's 2012 Yellow Table, a ranking of the world's largest construction equipment manufacturers.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In many companies, pricing receives surprisingly little attention. Following work that included a study of pricing at 15 small and medium-sized companies, the authors conclude that most companies can improve their pricing capabilities -and thus their profitability -over time by taking a disciplined approach. The authors identify two key elements of pricing -price orientation and price getting -and five levels of pricing capabilities. They observe that the companies they studied that achieved better pricing had top managers who championed the development of pricing skills. While competition, costs and price sensitivity within a market affect the parameters within which companies set prices, superior pricing is almost always based on skill, the authors maintain. Companies differ substantially in their approach to price setting, but most fall into one of three buckets: cost-based pricing, competition-based pricing or customer value-based pricing. Customer value-based pricing uses data on the perceived customer value of the product as the main factor for determining the final selling price, and many scholars consider customer value-based pricing often to be a preferable approach to price setting for existing products. The authors argue that according to their research many companies can improve their pricing capabilities by cultivating their understanding of the value they bring their customers. But implementing customer value-based pricing is not easy, the authors caution. They find that developing and implementing a sophisticated, customer value-based pricing program is a multiyear project that demands a high degree of executive attention and requires substantial changes in processes and thinking within the company.

This case describes the financing decisions of a software company at difference stages of its development. Started from 1988 as an individual business, along with the "Reform and Open" policy of China, the firm has experienced tremendous growth, and has become a leading publicly listed software company with a more than 2.3 billion RMB revenue from principal business product sales as of 2009. The students are required to assess the capital requirement necessary to support the firm growth and the feasible financing tools available at each stage, and evaluate the firm financing decision. The students need to give an estimate of the stock price at the time of the case is taught. Identifying a long term strategic investment plan becomes a key consideration in structuring the firm's next-round financing to achieve the goal of 10 billion RMB business revenue set by the CEO of the firm.