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In late summer 2005, Hurricane Katrina - the worst natural disaster in U.S. history - wreaked havoc along the Gulf Coast, causing massive loss of life and property damage. (Just a few weeks later, Hurricane Rita would inflict even more suffering across much of the same area.) The evacuation of special needs individuals (e.g., the institutionalized, those with medical conditions, people without access to cars, etc.) from New Orleans was especially problematic, not simply in getting people out of the city but also in tracking who had gone where, letting their families know what had happened to them, caring for them properly in receiving areas, and repatriating them to their homes and loved ones.

In late summer 2005, Hurricane Katrina - the worst natural disaster in U.S. history - wreaked havoc along the Gulf Coast, causing massive loss of life and property damage. (Just a few weeks later, Hurricane Rita would inflict even more suffering across much of the same area.) The evacuation of special needs individuals (e.g., the institutionalized, those with medical conditions, people without access to cars, etc.) from New Orleans was especially problematic, not simply in getting people out of the city but also in tracking who had gone where, letting their families know what had happened to them, caring for them properly in receiving areas, and repatriating them to their homes and loved ones.

The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic posed enormous challenges for state health departments across the U.S. This case focuses on the experience of Tennessee - which endured an intense resurgence of the disease in late summer and early fall 2009 - and explores, in particular, how state health officials, working with their partners from local government and the private sector, mobilized in advance of this second wave of the disease. An array of preparedness efforts, such as the development of mechanisms for distributing vaccine, ultimately put the state in a strong position to deal with H1N1 come fall, but health officials still experienced considerable difficulty in several areas, including vaccine delivery, communicating with an anxious public, and managing a surge of patients seeking care.

In the spring of 2009, cases of a previously unidentified strain of influenza began appearing in Mexico and the southwestern U.S. Within just a few months, outbreaks of 2009 Novel H1N1 (commonly referred to as Swine Flu) were so widespread that the World Health Organization declared its first influenza pandemic in over forty years. This case focuses on how state health officials in Texas, which experienced some of the first cases of H1N1, organized a response to the disease in the face of considerable uncertainty regarding its contagiousness, lethality, and geographic spread.

On one side, a loose network of protesters made arrangements for dramatizing their opposition to the WTO and international trade practices. At the same time, public safety officials from local, state, and federal agencies developed security plans for the public areas near the locus of the ministerial meetings. Their aim was to ensure that the talks proceeded smoothly while preserving the activists' rights to peaceful protest. Throughout the planning process, local leaders operated on the assumption that the tolerant ethos of the Pacific Northwest would prevail. This assumption proved terribly wrong, however, when, on the opening day of the talks, law enforcement officials lost control of the crowds gathered outside the meeting venue. Readers are asked to consider what lessons can be drawn from this ultimately inadequate security planning process. How might security planners have thought differently about how to prepare for the conference? What should they have anticipated in advance? How could they have developed a better awareness of protesters' activities and plans? HKS Case Number 1897.0

On one side, a loose network of protesters made arrangements for dramatizing their opposition to the WTO and international trade practices. At the same time, public safety officials from local, state, and federal agencies developed security plans for the public areas near the locus of the ministerial meetings. Their aim was to ensure that the talks proceeded smoothly while preserving the activists' rights to peaceful protest. Throughout the planning process, local leaders operated on the assumption that the tolerant ethos of the Pacific Northwest would prevail. This assumption proved terribly wrong, however, when, on the opening day of the talks, law enforcement officials lost control of the crowds gathered outside the meeting venue. Readers are asked to consider what lessons can be drawn from this ultimately inadequate security planning process. How might security planners have thought differently about how to prepare for the conference? What should they have anticipated in advance? How could they have developed a better awareness of protesters' activities and plans? HKS Case Number 1897.1

On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, meteorologists in the US National Weather Service spotted a tropical depression in the southeastern Bahamas. As it strengthened into a tropical storm, weather officials gave it a name, Katrina, and closely tracked it as it turned into a hurricane, crossing south Florida and then moving into the Gulf of Mexico. There, fed by the gulf's warm waters, Katrina turned into a monster: a "Category five" hurricane, with winds gusting past 170 miles per hour and an unusually wide span of over 100 miles. Katrina initially appeared to be heading next for the Florida Panhandle, but on Friday it made a dramatic shift; it turned westward and appeared to take dead aim at one of the most storied and fragile cities in the US: New Orleans. With landfall expected on Monday morning, state, local, and federal emergency response officials sprang into action, following the roadmaps laid out in their emergency plans. This case tells the story of the lead-up to the storm, detailing the plans that officials would draw on to prepare for the hurricane's onslaught, the steps that were taken to evacuate and shelter hundreds of thousands of residents in metropolitan New Orleans, and the communications among different agencies and levels of government as the storm drew near; it shows officials concerned about the effects of the hurricane, but confident that their preparations were commensurate with the challenges that Katrina would pose. The case asks readers to consider why local, state, and federal governments all proved unready to respond effectively to a catastrophic event which had been long predicted. Part A can be taught alone or in tandem with Part B of the case, which describes the post-landfall response to the devastating impact of the hurricane; it would be useful in classes on emergency or strategic management as well as on intergovernmental relations. HKS Case Number 1914.3

On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, meteorologists in the US National Weather Service spotted a tropical depression in the southeastern Bahamas. As it strengthened into a tropical storm, weather officials gave it a name, Katrina, and closely tracked it as it turned into a hurricane, crossing south Florida and then moving into the Gulf of Mexico. There, fed by the gulf's warm waters, Katrina turned into a monster: a "Category five" hurricane, with winds gusting past 170 miles per hour and an unusually wide span of over 100 miles. Katrina initially appeared to be heading next for the Florida Panhandle, but on Friday it made a dramatic shift; it turned westward and appeared to take dead aim at one of the most storied and fragile cities in the US: New Orleans. With landfall expected on Monday morning, state, local, and federal emergency response officials sprang into action, following the roadmaps laid out in their emergency plans. This case tells the story of the lead-up to the storm, detailing the plans that officials would draw on to prepare for the hurricane's onslaught, the steps that were taken to evacuate and shelter hundreds of thousands of residents in metropolitan New Orleans, and the communications among different agencies and levels of government as the storm drew near; it shows officials concerned about the effects of the hurricane, but confident that their preparations were commensurate with the challenges that Katrina would pose. The case asks readers to consider why local, state, and federal governments all proved unready to respond effectively to a catastrophic event which had been long predicted. Part A can be taught alone or in tandem with Part B of the case, which describes the post-landfall response to the devastating impact of the hurricane; it would be useful in classes on emergency or strategic management as well as on intergovernmental relations. HKS Case Number 1915.3.

On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, meteorologists in the US National Weather Service spotted a tropical depression in the southeastern Bahamas. As it strengthened into a tropical storm, weather officials gave it a name, Katrina, and closely tracked it as it turned into a hurricane, crossing south Florida and then moving into the Gulf of Mexico. There, fed by the gulf's warm waters, Katrina turned into a monster: a "Category five" hurricane, with winds gusting past 170 miles per hour and an unusually wide span of over 100 miles. Katrina initially appeared to be heading next for the Florida Panhandle, but on Friday it made a dramatic shift; it turned westward and appeared to take dead aim at one of the most storied and fragile cities in the US: New Orleans. With landfall expected on Monday morning, state, local, and federal emergency response officials sprang into action, following the roadmaps laid out in their emergency plans. This case tells the story of the lead-up to the storm, detailing the plans that officials would draw on to prepare for the hurricane's onslaught, the steps that were taken to evacuate and shelter hundreds of thousands of residents in metropolitan New Orleans, and the communications among different agencies and levels of government as the storm drew near; it shows officials concerned about the effects of the hurricane, but confident that their preparations were commensurate with the challenges that Katrina would pose. The case asks readers to consider why local, state, and federal governments all proved unready to respond effectively to a catastrophic event which had been long predicted. Part A can be taught alone or in tandem with Part B of the case, which describes the post-landfall response to the devastating impact of the hurricane; it would be useful in classes on emergency or strategic management as well as on intergovernmental relations. HKS Case Number 1916.3

When Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast on Monday morning, August 29, it cut a wide swath of destruction in the area; but despite inflicting enormous damage, it initially appeared that the storm had spared low-lying New Orleans the worst of its wrath. But as Katrina moved on, it soon became clear to those who had not evacuated the city that something was going very wrong: almost every part of New Orleans began to flood, and by the next day roughly 80 percent of it would be under water. The rapidly rising floodwaters, the result of three major breaches in the levees protecting the city, created a massive humanitarian crisis. Tens of thousands of residents escaped to rooftops or attics, where they waited anxiously for rescue, or waded in waist-deep water to find shelter; many went to the Superdome, which was already packed with people who had waited out the storm there, or to other improvised shelters in the city. As the days dragged on, it would become increasingly apparent that almost every aspect of the response from state, local, and federal government was falling far short of what was needed: evacuees languished in squalid shelters or on highway overpasses waiting for buses that did not come; looting and more serious crimes were reported to be rampant; food, water, and medical care were in short supply. As public outrage grew, fed by TV footage of distraught storm victims, emergency response officials and political leaders, all the way up to President George W. Bush, found themselves scrambling to cope with the "ultra-catastrophe" that Katrina had visited on New Orleans. HKS Case Number 1844.0

When Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast on Monday morning, August 29, it cut a wide swath of destruction in the area; but despite inflicting enormous damage, it initially appeared that the storm had spared low-lying New Orleans the worst of its wrath. But as Katrina moved on, it soon became clear to those who had not evacuated the city that something was going very wrong: almost every part of New Orleans began to flood, and by the next day roughly 80 percent of it would be under water. The rapidly rising floodwaters, the result of three major breaches in the levees protecting the city, created a massive humanitarian crisis. Tens of thousands of residents escaped to rooftops or attics, where they waited anxiously for rescue, or waded in waist-deep water to find shelter; many went to the Superdome, which was already packed with people who had waited out the storm there, or to other improvised shelters in the city. As the days dragged on, it would become increasingly apparent that almost every aspect of the response from state, local, and federal government was falling far short of what was needed: evacuees languished in squalid shelters or on highway overpasses waiting for buses that did not come; looting and more serious crimes were reported to be rampant; food, water, and medical care were in short supply. As public outrage grew, fed by TV footage of distraught storm victims, emergency response officials and political leaders, all the way up to President George W. Bush, found themselves scrambling to cope with the "ultra-catastrophe" that Katrina had visited on New Orleans. HKS Case Number 1844.0

This case study tells the story of San Jose, California, one of the first 27 cities in the country to participate in a federal domestic preparedness program. Between 1997 and 1999, a specially created city task force mounted several full-scale terrorist attack exercises, but-despite the best of intentions-found all of them frustrating, demoralizing, and divisive, creating ill will between the exercise planners and the first responders. In response, the San Jose task force took a step back and analyzed their situation. In place of traditional full-scale exercises, San Jose drew on several existing prototypes to create a new "facilitated exercise" model that emphasized teaching over testing, and was much better received by first responders. For teaching flexibility, the case has been divided into three parts. Sequel 1 is a continuation of the main case study (1815.0) and is designed to be read in the middle of class. It describes the new facilitated exercise model in brief. Students could then be asked to assess the approach taken by San Jose. HKS Case Number 1815.1

This case study tells the story of San Jose, California, one of the first 27 cities in the country to participate in a federal domestic preparedness program. Between 1997 and 1999, a specially created city task force mounted several full-scale terrorist attack exercises, but-despite the best of intentions-found all of them frustrating, demoralizing, and divisive, creating ill will between the exercise planners and the first responders. In response, the San Jose task force took a step back and analyzed their situation. In place of traditional full-scale exercises, San Jose drew on several existing prototypes to create a new "facilitated exercise" model that emphasized teaching over testing, and was much better received by first responders. For teaching flexibility, the case has been divided into three parts. The main case describes San Jose's early experience, ending at a crucial moment, when the task force was forced to face the fact that its approach was not working. It is designed to spark a class discussion about what seems to be going awry, and how the problems might be solved. HKS Case Number 1815.0

This case study tells the story of San Jose, California, one of the first 27 cities in the country to participate in a federal domestic preparedness program. Between 1997 and 1999, a specially created city task force mounted several full-scale terrorist attack exercises, but-despite the best of intentions-found all of them frustrating, demoralizing, and divisive, creating ill will between the exercise planners and the first responders. In response, the San Jose task force took a step back and analyzed their situation. In place of traditional full-scale exercises, San Jose drew on several existing prototypes to create a new "facilitated exercise" model that emphasized teaching over testing, and was much better received by first responders. For teaching flexibility, the case has been divided into three parts. Sequel 2 is a continuation of both the main case study and Sequel 1(1815.0; 1815.1) and is designed as a "take away," to be given out at the end of class. It includes the reflections of the emergency service providers in San Jose about the facilitated exercise model. It would also be possible assign students to read all three parts before class, and to hold a retrospective discussion about how San Jose analyzed and responded to its problem. Funding provided by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative. HKS Case Number 1816.1

When the city of Boston applied to host the Democratic Party presidential nominating convention of July 2004, it did so in the belief that the event would bring the city both prestige and economic benefit. But by the time the convention was to be held, the terrible events of September 11, 2001 had intervened and, as a designated "national special security event," the convention was now subject to the tightest possible measures for security and protection. As a result, key sections of the city, and miles of roads, were virtually shut down in order to permit the convention to take place in the city's major indoor sports arena, and the event engendered complaints, not plaudits, from citizens and business owners alike. This case tells the story of the planning that preceded the convention, as federal officials by presidential directive in charge of national special security events found themselves having to balance expectations of a civic celebration with their own grave concerns about terrorist threats. The case is divided into three parts. Part A (1807.0) describes the elaborate planning process set up by the US Secret Service, which had overall responsibility for security planning for the convention, and the disputes among local, state and federal officials as to how draconian security measures had to be; it focuses in particular on two of the thorniest issues facing planners: whether to shut down a busy public transit station and a portion of a major interstate highway providing access to Boston from the north. Part B (1808.0) details the complex negotiations to resolve these and other security matters; the Epilogue (1808.1) provides a brief overview of the implementation of the security plan at the convention. HKS Case Number 1807.0.

When the city of Boston applied to host the Democratic Party presidential nominating convention of July 2004, it did so in the belief that the event would bring the city both prestige and economic benefit. But by the time the convention was to be held, the terrible events of September 11, 2001 had intervened and, as a designated "national special security event," the convention was now subject to the tightest possible measures for security and protection. As a result, key sections of the city, and miles of roads, were virtually shut down in order to permit the convention to take place in the city's major indoor sports arena, and the event engendered complaints, not plaudits, from citizens and business owners alike. This case tells the story of the planning that preceded the convention, as federal officials by presidential directive in charge of national special security events found themselves having to balance expectations of a civic celebration with their own grave concerns about terrorist threats. The case is divided into three parts. Part A (1807.0) describes the elaborate planning process set up by the US Secret Service, which had overall responsibility for security planning for the convention, and the disputes among local, state and federal officials as to how draconian security measures had to be; it focuses in particular on two of the thorniest issues facing planners: whether to shut down a busy public transit station and a portion of a major interstate highway providing access to Boston from the north. Part B (1808.0) details the complex negotiations to resolve these and other security matters; the Epilogue (1808.1) provides a brief overview of the implementation of the security plan at the convention. HKS Case Number 1808.1.

When the city of Boston applied to host the Democratic Party presidential nominating convention of July 2004, it did so in the belief that the event would bring the city both prestige and economic benefit. But by the time the convention was to be held, the terrible events of September 11, 2001 had intervened and, as a designated "national special security event," the convention was now subject to the tightest possible measures for security and protection. As a result, key sections of the city, and miles of roads, were virtually shut down in order to permit the convention to take place in the city's major indoor sports arena, and the event engendered complaints, not plaudits, from citizens and business owners alike. This case tells the story of the planning that preceded the convention, as federal officials by presidential directive in charge of national special security events found themselves having to balance expectations of a civic celebration with their own grave concerns about terrorist threats. The case is divided into three parts. Part A (1807.0) describes the elaborate planning process set up by the US Secret Service, which had overall responsibility for security planning for the convention, and the disputes among local, state and federal officials as to how draconian security measures had to be; it focuses in particular on two of the thorniest issues facing planners: whether to shut down a busy public transit station and a portion of a major interstate highway providing access to Boston from the north. Part B (1808.0) details the complex negotiations to resolve these and other security matters; the Epilogue (1808.1) provides a brief overview of the implementation of the security plan at the convention. HKS Case Number 1808.0.

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 on the Pentagon brought death and destruction to one of the nerve centers of American power, a site where top military officials came to work every day. When terrorists deliberately crashed a commercial jetliner into the southwest wall of this giant government landmark, it rendered a large portion of the building unstable and started a ferocious fire inside, where--rescuers hoped--Pentagon workers might be trapped but still alive. Despite the serious nature of the attack, the emergency response to the disaster was led by neither a high political official nor a four-star general. Instead, remarkably, the response and rescues at the Pentagon were led by James Schwartz, the assistant chief of a county fire department in the State of Virginia. A few hours into the emergency, Schwartz was, in fact, introduced to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as "the man who owns this ground" by one of Rumsfeld's own generals. This case describes the unprecedented emergency response operation and many of its key turning points and places it within the broader context of a national system in which authority is widely decentralized. Specifically, the case tells the story of how Arlington County, Virginia Fire Department used the "incident command system" to oversee the Pentagon emergency response and how it responded when the professional mandates of far higher-profile agencies--including the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Environmental Protection Agency--collided with those of the firefighting and rescue effort. Despite years of practice and preparation, fire officials would face a string of predicaments at the Pentagon emergency that had never been foreseen. The case can serve as a platform for discussion about inter-jurisdictional cooperation in emergency response and, by extension, cooperation across units of government in a wide variety of situations. HKS Case Number 1712.0

On October 21, 2001, a postal worker from a mail sorting facility in Washington, DC, died of inhalation anthrax-a disease virtually unseen for a century. The next day, a second employee from the same facility died. Fear of anthrax had already infected the public: media workers in Florida and New York City had contracted the disease. In addition, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) had received an anthrax-laden letter, his staff were all on antibiotics, and the Senate and House of Representatives buildings had closed for anthrax tests. This new threat re-ignited a sense of public panic. Virtually overnight, the United States Postal Service (USPS) found itself at the eye of a national security and public health storm. This case discusses how the USPS dealt with the anthrax crisis. HKS Case Number 1692.0.

In December 1999, only weeks after protests at the annual meeting of the World Trade Organization sparked violent protests which rocked the city, Seattle public safety officials face a new threat. An Algerian man has been arrested trying to cross the US border from Canada-in a car whose trunk is filled with enough explosions, says the FBI, to topple a multi-story building. What's more, the arrested man, Ahmed Ressam, had held a reservation at a motel just blocks from Seattle's most famous landmark, the Space Needle, in the Seattle Center, at which thousands of city residents and tourists are scheduled to celebrate the first New Year's Eve of the 21st century. This case examines the decision-making process of Seattle officials as they consider whether the possibility of terrorism should lead them to cancel the elaborate public celebrations scheduled to coincide with the dawn of the new millennium. Pair with full case (HKS488). HKS Case Number 1648.1.