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Spreadsheet supplement for case 720378.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 220003.

After losing market share to low-priced competitors such as Harry's and Dollar Shave Club for several years, Gillette decided to fight back by launching new products and increasing advertising. When these efforts failed to stem the losses, Gillette decided to cut the prices on its razors and blades in April 2017. Bonnie Herzog, an equity analyst at Wells Fargo, must assess how the recently announced price cuts are likely to affect Gillette's earnings and its parent company's earnings (Procter & Gamble owns Gillette). As part of her analysis, Herzog must estimate the price elasticity of demand for Gillette's razors and blades. The case contains scanner data which allows students to calculate both price elasticities for a sample of Gillette products, and sufficient data to estimate the financial impact.

After spending more than 50 years creating a diversified industrial conglomerate that Fortune Magazine described as "arguably the most profitable conglomerate in America" in 2014, UTC's CEO Greg Hayes was under pressure from activist investors (Dan Loeb and Bill Ackman) to break the company into three standalone businesses in the spring of 2018. The activists claimed that a breakup would create at least $20 billion of incremental value (on top of a current market value of approximately $100 billion) and possibly a lot more. Hayes must decide whether a breakup makes sense-will it create value and, if so, how much value and why? What factors determine whether a conglomerate trades at a discount or a premium, and how big are those discounts and premiums likely to be?

Spreadsheet supplement for case 220018.

Impax Laboratories was a technology-based pharmaceutical company that used a "dual platform" strategy to sell both generic and branded treatments. While Impax had grown organically for most of its history, it was beginning to use major acquisitions for growth. In the early morning of June 21, 2016, the firm issued a press release announcing it was buying a portfolio of generic drugs from Teva for $586 million in cash. The leadership team (CEO, CFO, and Head of Investor Relations) was now preparing for a conference call with analysts and investors to describe the deal's acquisition price, strategic rationale, and financial impact. Like its first major acquisition-the acquisition of Tower Holdings in 2014 for $700 million-the Teva acquisition was expected to be immediately accretive (i.e., the firm's expected earnings per share in 2016 would increase). Was the leadership team ready to answer the full range of questions investors might ask and to explain the deal's strategic rationale and financial implications in compelling ways? And would investors react as favorably to the Teva announcement as they had when Impax announced the Tower Holdings acquisition-Impax closed up 12% that day?

IExplores events after Impax announced the acquisition of a portfolio of generic pharmaceutical products from Teva in June 2016.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 220030.

In August 2017, MoviePass dramatically lowered its subscription price from $50 per month to just $10 for up to one movie per day. The idea was to rapidly scale the business to the point where it could generate incremental revenue streams from related businesses (e.g., a share of ticket and concession revenues from theaters, advertising revenue from movie studios; and revenue from ride-sharing companies). Within two days, Moviepass had gotten 150k new subscribers; within six months, it had more than 2 million. But as of February 2018, the company faced three challenges: theaters were resisting the concept, investors were shorting the stock in record numbers as losses mounted, and competitors were beginning to appear. Could CEO Lowe convince investors that the company was viable and it could, indeed, monetize the growing subscriber base? At the same time, Lowe had to decide whether to raise subscription prices to cover the growing losses or keep prices low to grow the subscriber base as quickly as possible.

The a2 Milk Company (a2MC) became the most valuable company listed on the New Zealand stock exchange in 2018 by capitalizing on a biochemical discovery related to the protein composition of cow's milk. Because many people find the A1 protein difficult to digest, and that protein may be related to other health problems (e.g., diabetes), a2MC sells dairy products containing the A2 protein only primarily in Australia and China. With sales of NZ$730 million in 2017 and a desire to grow, a2MC formed a strategic relationship with Fonterra, the world's sixth largest dairy company, in February 2018. But one month later, Nestle, the world's largest dairy company, confirmed that it had begun selling A2 infant formula in China, and people speculated that it would start selling A2 products in Australia and New Zealand later in the year. a2MC's retiring CEO Geoffrey Babidge and newly appointed CEO Janyne Hrdlicka must decide how to respond to Nestle's entry. Can this successful entrant become an incumbent with a sustainable competitive advantage?

The a2 Milk Company (a2MC) became the most valuable company listed on the New Zealand stock exchange in 2018 by capitalizing on a biochemical discovery related to the protein composition of cow's milk. Because many people find the A1 protein difficult to digest, and that protein may be related to other health problems (e.g., diabetes), a2MC sells dairy products containing the A2 protein only primarily in Australia and China. With sales of NZ$730 million in 2017 and a desire to grow, a2MC formed a strategic relationship with Fonterra, the world's sixth largest dairy company, in February 2018. But one month later, Nestle, the world's largest dairy company, confirmed that it had begun selling A2 infant formula in China and people speculated that it would start selling A2 products in Australia and New Zealand later in the year. a2MC's retiring CEO Geoffrey Babidge and newly appointed CEO Janyne Hrdlicka must decide how to respond to Nestle's entry. Can this successful entrant become an incumbent with a sustainable competitive advantage?

In April 2018, the De Beers Group launched a pilot project called GemFair to create a new supply of ethically and environmentally sourced diamonds from artisanal and small-scale mines (ASM) in Sierra Leone. Whether this project would yield a meaningful supply of rough diamonds for De Beers, improve its ability to track diamonds accurately from African mines to consumers around the world, and simultaneously improve both the working conditions in mines and the prices received by local miners remained to be seen. This case is intended to be used in conjunction with and to follow another HBS case: The De Beers Group: Exploring the Diamond Reselling Opportunity (HBS #717-430).

In May 2018, the De Beers Group shocked the diamond industry when it announced it was launching a new fashion jewelry brand of laboratory-grown (synthetic) diamonds. The reaction was swift as people sought to understand the company's motivations: was it a "huge gamble" or a "Machiavellian masterstroke"? What was the objective of the new product launch, would it succeed, and how would this new business affect the Group's core business of selling natural (mined) diamonds? This case is intended to be used in conjunction with and to follow a related HBS case: The De Beers Group: Exploring the Diamond Reselling Opportunity (HBS #717-430).

Spreadsheet supplement to case 218095

Snap, the disappearing message app, went public at $17 per share on March 2, 2017, making its two 20-something founders the youngest self-made billionaires in the country. Over the next three weeks, 14 analysts made investment recommendations on Snap: two with buy recommendations, six with holds, and six with sells. When the "IPO quiet period" expired three weeks later, 16 more analysts-who worked at firms that were underwriters for the IPO-issued recommendations: 10 with buy and six with hold, with price targets ranging from $21 to $31 compared to a market price of $23. Elizabeth Kemp, the portfolio manager of a long-only technology fund at Sand Hill Road Capital, had bought 500,000 shares at the IPO price and had to decide whether to harvest her gain or to double down and buy more shares.

Analyzes Snap's value and analyst recommendations following the events described in the A case.

Analyzes Snap's value and analyst recommendations following the events described in the B case.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 718438.

Approximately 80% of the 9,000 wineries in the US breakeven or lose money. An even greater percentage lose money on an economic basis (i.e., after a charge for the capital employed). Tegan Passalacqua, a Californian winemaker who specializes in making "old vine" wine (i.e., wine from grape vines that are at least 60 and up to 100+ years old), appears to have defied these odds. By day, he is the head winemaker at Turley Wine Cellars, a leading Zinfandel producer. In his spare time, however, he makes premium wines under the Sandlands label using Turley's facilities and "forgotten" grape varieties such as Carignane, Mataro, and Chenin Blanc. The objective is to understand what makes the industry so challenging, why Passalacqua has succeeded to date, and whether his success will persist into the future. The case is set in December 2017, as Passalacqua and his wife Olivia were deciding whether to buy a building and develop a winery for the Sandlands wines at a cost of up to $500,000. Because they already owned an old vine vineyard (the Kirschenmann Vineyard in Lodi, CA) and have limited financial resources and time, they must decide whether to make this investment or to save their resources for another investment such as a second old-vine vineyard.