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In late September 1999, representatives from Telstri, Japan Telecom, and Teleglobe met to discuss the structure of the Australia-Japan Cable (AJC) project, a $520 million submarine cable system that would run from Australia to Japan. The sponsors, excited by the possibility of large returns, needed to move quickly to capitalize on the projected shortfall in Australia's broadband capacity. As telecommunications carriers, the sponsors needed additional capacity to serve their retail and wholesale customers. As cable system owners, they wanted to earn an appropriate return on their invested capital while mitigating ownership risks. The need to move quickly in the face of significant demand, competition, and technological uncertainty made it particularly risky to invest at this time.

Preston Resources, a small Australian gold mining company, bought the Bulong nickel mine for A$319 million in November 1998 and financed the acquisition by issuing a US$185 million (A$294 million) project bond. At the time, mining had been underway for several months, and construction of the processing plant was essentially complete. Almost from the beginning, however, a series of design and operating problems shut down production and required costly repairs. Although processing performance improved by late 2000, maintenance issues continued to plague the plant, and output remained significantly below forecast levels. This case, set in 2002, concerns the financial consequences of these problems, including a bond default in January 2000 and Preston's efforts to restructure the project debt.

Discusses the differences between private and social returns and describes an economic framework for assessing a project's social return [known as the economic rate of return (ERR)]. The framework begins by analyzing the impact of a new project on private financiers [the private return known as the financial rate of return (FRR)]. The framework then identifies other stakeholders who might be affected, directly or indirectly, by the project and examines the project's impact on each group. Assumes readers have a working knowledge of cost-benefit analysis, microeconomics, and basic valuation mechanics.

In September 1998, Paul Cooper, Tate & Lyle's finance director for international investments, asked the International Finance Corp. (IFC) to consider lending up to $45 million to finance a $90 million sugar mill in northern Vietnam. Ewen Cobban, an IFC agricultural specialist, was in charge of reviewing the proposal and making a loan recommendation to senior management. Cobban's main concerns were whether the plant was commercially viable and whether it had support from the government. He also feared that world sugar prices were falling and that sugar was a protected commodity. Before he could recommend approval, he had to determine whether they were temporary or permanent problems. Cobban also knew he would have to assess the project's developmental impact. The IFC only supported projects that contributed to sustainable development, and one of the key determinants of sustainability was the degree to which the project was "fair" to all parties involved. Thus, Cobban would need to assess not only the private returns, but also the social returns as measured by the project's economic rate of return (ERR). To do so, he would have to consider the various groups affected by the project and, where possible, quantify the impact on them.

Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. (AWSA) is a consortium of 18 firms that won a concession to build and operate Poland's first private toll road. In June 2000, AWSA's chief financial officer, Wojciech Gebicki, is preparing for a meeting with the projects' lead bankers to discuss concerns they have regarding the traffic forecasts and revenue projections. Based on their concerns, the bankers are asking the sponsors to inject an additional e60 to e90 million of equity into the deal, a sizeable increase given the projects' total cost of e934 million and the sponsor's current equity commitment of e235 million. This request presents a serious problem for Gebicki (AWSA) because the concession is scheduled to expire in six weeks if financing has not closed and because he has very few options available to address the problem. This case describes the deal structure and invites students to accept or dispute Gebicki's view that the major risks have been identified, assessed, and mitigated in such a way that the senior lenders are adequately protected without further equity support.

PPL Corp., an electric utility in Pennsylvania, needs to finance $1 billion of peaking plants as part of its new growth strategy. In February 2001, Steve May, director of finance for PPL's Global Division, is responsible for recommending a finance plan. After considering all the options, May decides that a synthetic lease is the best option, but he must decide whether to recommend a traditional or a limited recourse synthetic lease and how to structure the specific terms. The limited synthetic lease, in contrast to the traditional structure, requires a smaller corporate guarantee on the assets and has greater off-credit treatment, which is important given the company's growth strategy and limited debt capacity. However, finding investors willing to accept greater project risk will cost more and take more time. Timing is an issue for May because if he doesn't close the financing within the next two months, PPL will lose a valuable option to buy turbines for its peaking plants. Failure to exercise the option could delay the company's construction schedule, something PPL wants to avoid given the nationwide race to build new generating plants.

Spreadsheet to (9-201-068). Download only.

Spreadsheet to (9-202-045). Download only.

Spreadsheet to (9-201-068). Download only.

On June 6, 2000, the World Bank's and IFC's board of directors was scheduled to vote on whether to approve funding for the $4 billion Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline project. Although the project presented a unique opportunity to alleviate poverty in Chad, one of the poorest countries in the world, Chad had a president who had been labeled "warlord" and a history of civil war and oppression. This case describes the project, the setting, and the World Bank's reasons for participating in the deal--mainly an opportunity to alleviate poverty, enforce environmental standards, and minimize the impact on indigenous people. It also describes the very public and very ardent opposition to the project's environmental, social, and revenue management policies. Faced with a high-risk, but potentially high-return opportunity to improve conditions in Chad, students, as the directors, must decide whether to approve funding for the deal.

Supplements the (A) case.

In early 1999, Calpine Corp.'s CEO Pete Cartwright adopted an aggressive growth strategy with the goal of increasing the company's aggregate generating capacity from approximately 3,000 to 15,000 megawatts (MW) by 2004. He believed there was a fleeting opportunity to repower America given the inefficiency and age of current generating capacity as well as the recently granted ability to compete in wholesale power markets. To achieve the new goal, Calpine will have to build or acquire as many as 25 power plants at a total cost of $6 billion (approximately $500,000 per 1,000 MW). For a company with assets of $1.7 billion, a subinvestment grade debt rating, a debt-to-capitalization ratio of 79%, and an after-tax cash flow of $143 million in 1998, raising this much money was going to be a formidable challenge.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 201098

Supplements the (A) case.

In late 1999, the Walt Disney Co. and the Hong Kong government agreed to develop Hong Kong Disneyland, a HK$28 (U.S.$3.6) billion theme park and resort complex planned to open in late 2005. As part of the total financing package, the sponsors decided to raise HK$3.3 billion of non-recourse bank loans for construction and working capital, and selected Chase Manhattan Bank to underwrite and syndicate these facilities. This case concerns the process by which Chase successfully competed to lead this transaction. The key questions facing Chase were whether to bid at all, how to bid, and how to structure the syndication to meet the borrower's needs, its own profit objectives, and the market's expectation for an attractively priced credit. Includes a generic section about the process, participants, and economics of syndicated lending for students who are unfamiliar with syndicated lending. This is part of a module on Financing Projects in the Elective Curriculum (EC) course Large-Scale Investment (LSI). Although written for a course on project finance, it can easily be modified for courses on capital markets or financial institutions.

Supplements the (A) case.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 201072

Following the BP/Amoco merger in December 1998, CFO David Watson asked Bill Young to recommend when and under what circumstances the firm should use external project finance instead of internal corporate funds to finance new capital investments. As part of this assignment, Young and his team must review each firm's current policy regarding project finance and evaluate the various rationales used to justify its use. Following this review, his team created a new policy statement recommending that BP Amoco finance capital expenditures using corporate funds except in three special circumstances: mega projects, projects in politically volatile areas, and joint ventures with heterogeneous partners. Whether the general rule of using corporate funds and whether the specific exceptions to the rule are appropriate for the merged entity are subjects for class discussion.

British Petroleum and Amoco were the two largest members of the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), an 11-firm consortium that was spending $10 billion to develop oil fields in the Caspian Sea. As of March 1999, AIOC had completed a $1.9 billion development project known as Early Oil. The two companies, however, had financed their shares of this project in different ways: BP used internal funds (traditional, on-balance sheet corporate finance), whereas Amoco was one of five AIOC partners that raised $400 million of project finance. Following the BP/Amoco merger in December 1998, managers in the combined firm's finance group had to reassess the Early Oil financing strategy and determine the best way to finance its share of the $8 billion Full Field Development Project. Should it use internal funds, project finance, or a mixture of the two?