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The Châteauform' case describes how Jacques Horovitz founded a unique concept in the saturated hotel and seminar market that existing hotel chains find difficult to copy and conquer. The case outlines why the new company has entered that market successfully and how Horovitz grew this concept by copying his success formula in other countries and for different target groups. Permanent questioning and reinvention were keys to the sustainability of Châteauform', which maintained the agility and nimbleness of a startup even though it had grown to a company with revenues exceeding €100 million and almost 1,000 employees. Key to the success of the Châteauform' model are some very original solutions to classic supply chain management quagmires in the service industry. The case describes how Horovitz successfully managed this growth. It is a good illustration of how to implement a strategy built on customer centricity and customer intimacy. An interesting element of this case study is the emphasis on managing by values rather than rules and on realigning the whole value chain to make sure the value creation is indeed managed at the customer level, forcing a corporate structure that is very innovative.

Supplement to case IMD761.

April 2013, Leuven (Belgium). Sitting behind his desk at the Headquarters of Materialise, the company he founded and still led as CEO, Wilfried Vancraen reminisced about the exciting last few years. It had taken 20 years to lead the company from pioneer in 3D printing technology to the ultimate industry accolade, the receipt in 2011 of the RTAM Industry Achievement Award for the extensive contributions the firm had made to additive manufacturing. Revenues reached the $90 million mark in 2013, with 1,000+ employees. The company was broadly diversified, catering to different markets in both B2B and B2C sectors and was a clear market leader in applications such as software for additive manufacturing and biomedical engineering, as well as in biomedical 3D printing activities. But the competitive landscape was evolving quickly. Many new service bureaus were opening up. Hype about 3D printing was growing in the media. The barriers to entry (technological and financial) were, but becoming steeper in machine and material manufacturing. Vertical integration was starting to appear with big 3D printing machine manufacturers starting to acquire service providers, software developers and material manufacturers. It was a bit early to judge the effectiveness and long-term effects of this emerging trend. Further consolidation was clearly in sight. For Materialise, the options were numerous. It could become the consolidator, acquiring and merging into other players. But with its unique portfolio of competencies and activities, it could as easily become a seller in the process. It could also continue to grow independently. There was also the issue of whether it should seek further financing from the public in an IPO. Being an established prized player in the industry opened up many opportunities...

As one of the larger and older family-held companies in the US, the J.M. Huber family business had strategically repositioned itself several times since it was founded in 1883. Visionary family leaders and a committed senior management team had transformed the group into an international player with leadership positions in niche markets in its various business portfolios. In 1993 the fourth generation of the family took over leadership of the company: Peter T. Francis became Chairman and CEO. He set a lofty goal for his tenure: "By the year 2010 J.M. Huber will be acknowledged as one of the best run companies in the United States". But times were not always kind. Several years after the company had levered up its balance sheet to complete the largest acquisition in its history, the economic crisis of 2007 hit many of its key markets hard, putting the group under pressure. With the crisis in fl bloom, Huber also faced another significant milestone in its 125-year-old history: the succession of Peter Francis. But true to form, the family rallied behind the company and turned this difficult moment into an opportunity to show its mettle. The Board of Directors did not shy away from the process and selected a non-family executive, Mike Marberry, as the next CEO. How did the Board support him as he took the reins in the midst of the global recession? And how did the family engaged fully with him and, based on his skillful execution, came to trust his vision for the future? After all, the firm had always succeeded in hard times, and they all wanted it be the case again. Learning objectives: Managing the family business and education of the next generation; owner's roles, family governance, family council, inclusiveness, succession process.

For Feike Sijbesma, CEO of Royal DSM since 2007, rapid changes were normal as major trends were playing out. Global population swelled, the balance of wealth shifted, often increasing disparities and inequalities, while human beings remained hooked on using more resources than the planet could handle or replace. As early as 2010, DSM formulated a strategy to build on its strength in Life and Materials Sciences, capitalizing on what it saw as the most promising global megatrends, notably health & wellness, global shifts and energy & climate change. At DSM, sustainability went way beyond complying with laws and regulations: It was a key driver for innovation and a core value for the firm. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 and the ensuing recession, cost concerns came back to the forefront, pushing the sustainability agenda to the back. The sense of urgency on environmental and social issues was gone, so how could you convince people a totally different approach to doing business was needed? Could sustainability really be turned into an effective driver for innovation and ultimately improve a company's profitability? Were the three bottom lines - financial, social and environmental - really mutually self-reinforcing, instead of mutually exclusive? Proving the case to some still-reluctant financial investors could prove difficult. For DSM, the ultimate challenge to its broad-based sustainability agenda was quite clear: Could a case be made for sustainability as a key driver of value creation over the long term? Learning objectives: Sustainability as driver of innovation and growth, CSR in action, corporate venturing, sustainability strategies, growth management, portfolio management.

December 2011, Varese, Italy. MV Agusta, the legendary Italian racing motorcycle brand, had just launched its latest attempt to regain the fame it had enjoyed in the 1970s. In August 2010 Claudio Castiglioni, the famous motorcycle aficionado and serial entrepreneur, had acquired MV Agusta for the third time in 20 years. Claudio was an icon in the motorcycle world, having revived illustrious brands such as Ducati, Cagiva, Husqvarna and Moto Morini. Together with his son Giovanni and Massimo Bordi, the famous engineer behind the Ducati success stories of the 1990s, Claudio hoped that third time would be a charm. Unfortunately, Claudio did not get to see the fruits of MV Agusta's revival: He passed away on 17 August 2011 at the age of 64, leaving some big shoes for his son Giovanni to fill. Giovanni had been working in the company since 2002, as head of marketing and sales first then stepping in as CEO in 2010. He shared his father's vision and now it was up to him to turn it into reality. The first results after the re-acquisition looked promising but the motorcycle market had been shrinking dramatically over the past 10 years. The economic and financial crisis had hit Italy particularly hard during the last three years. What would it take to complete the turnaround successfully and rapidly gain momentum in this competitive market? How could he reignite the flame under this beacon of motorcycle racing prowess? How should the MV Agusta brand be positioned now? Should it put more emphasis on the brand's lifestyle elements, extending its offering of accessories for both bikes and riders? How large could the company become without compromising the brand's elements of exclusivity? Learning objectives: Rebuilding an iconic brand, positioning a luxury product, technology innovation and development, financing growth, entrepreneurship, corporate venturing, succession management, family business governance.

Peer Swinkels (36) took a moment in 2011 to reflect on the achievements and the challenges that lay ahead for the 330-year-old family brewery. Peer was responsible for the commercial activities of the company. Together with his fellow board members, he was quite aware that his predecessors had left behind a beer company that excelled in manufacturing but lacked the brand traction to really hit the big league. The challenge for the seventh generation was clearly to leverage its exceptional brewing skills to create an equally strong brand using the unique family values and culture nurtured since the company was created back in 1680. Bavaria stood for fierce independence and a high degree of entrepreneurship, mixing legacy with innovation. Despite its long history, Bavaria regarded itself as a fresh young company, as epitomized by its internal motto ("Let's try") and the branding pay-off of the Bavaria brand ("Done!"). In the last few years, Bavaria had made significant progress in (re-)positioning the brand. It had successfully revitalized it in its Dutch home market with a new brand design, and was now rolling it out on a global scale. It launched award-winning innovations such as alcohol-free white beers. Its innovative guerilla marketing activities at the World Soccer Championships in South Africa won applauses and recognition all over the world. Should the company roll out the same aggressive product and marketing tactics in its 120 markets? Would it be possible to pull off a new guerilla marketing campaign around the 2012 European Soccer Championships in Poland and Ukraine? What other channels should it consider to reinforce the brand and match its product innovation prowess? Learning objectives: Guerilla marketing, growth management, family business.

Vision 2020 aimed to achieve annual revenues in excess of $200 billion by offering innovative integrated solutions to major global challenges such as the availability of water, energy and infrastructure. To "dream the client's dreams," the plan required over 200,000 new employees worldwide, united by a common entrepreneurial bond. Such projections would have sounded extravagant for any other firm; for Odebrecht, these were simple linear extrapolations of the company's performance over the last 10 years, during which the firm grew its revenues at an annualized rate of over 21%... Odebrecht also aspired to become a model of sustainable development and socio-environmental responsibility. For this, it could already rely on its massive investments in "green" plastics and ethanol production facilities. It also rallied behind a colossal hydroelectric project, pioneering CSR practices and novel turbine and dam technology to reduce the impact of such facilities on sensitive Amazon ecosystems. These investments set the tune for the firm in the second decade of the century. For Marcelo, the issue was how to translate the vision into "a dream with a deadline." Could he depend on the old recipes for growth? Were historical clients the right ones going forward? Would the forces and culture that had created the opportunities in the past support the future? Was Odebrecht ready to handle another massive bout of growth? As Marcelo assumed sole executive leadership for the $23 billion family business at the age of 42, he was aware of his responsibility and challenges. He knew he was expected to build on his forefathers' successes, and they had set a very high bar for him, but he also knew he could rely on the entrepreneur-partners he inherited. Learning objectives: Managing growth, family business governance, succession, CSR, sustainable development, renewable energy, managing the value chain.

The man was on a mission. With just two years to go before stepping down from the direction of the enterprise, he had his hands full. Not only did he want to ensure that he would leave his ancestors' distinguished house in capable hands but also that the values the firm espoused would flourish. The legacies had to go beyond family and values though: Miguel Torres wanted to convince his family, employees and the rest of the wine industry that climate change was already impacting the business. Environmental responsibility had to become part of the Torres family legacies. And that was still not obvious to most. When he chose global warming as the topic of his keynote address to Rioja wine producers in 2009, the reception was lukewarm. Winemaking peers questioned his priorities. After all, there was a global crisis going on and wine sales were down more than 10%. Why worry about long-term climate issues when there were more urgent short-term challenges to tackle? Was climate change even real? But Miguel Torres had a long-term perspective: "In the wine business one needs to think 15 years ahead. Forget weather statistics: facts are telling. In less than four decades, harvesting of the grapes in the Penedès region had to be brought forward more than 10 days on average." To preserve quality, Torres had already adjusted its viticulture practices, planting vines at a higher density per hectare and on higher ground to reduce the impact of increasing temperatures. Climate change was happening and it was impacting the business today. Something had to be done. Another concern for Miguel Torres was how to successfully transition the business to the fifth generation. How could he ensure the preservation of the family values? How could he make the firm attractive for the best non-family managers? How could he nurture the "youngsters" after his retirement?

The chain would be the latest addition to Grenadier's portfolio. Rohan hoped it would not be plagued by the occupancy problems that Larsens Camp was experiencing - one of the three properties that made up Wilderness Lodges, the company's other luxury hospitality business. The tourist trade in Kenya had been hit by the double whammy of political violence followed by the credit crunch and global recession, both of which had been nothing short of disastrous for the hospitality business. The tourism crisis, in turn, led to a renewal of public debate around the sustainable management of Kenya's natural resources. Some operators saw an opportunity to push for a relaxation of existing rules for establishing hotels and resorts in and around nature reserves, which would create new jobs and increase tax revenues for the state and local councils. However, nature preservationists and environmental NGOs wanted to protect the animal sanctuaries and the local communities that often lost their ancestors' lands to the nature reserves without getting much in return. In addition to getting the new venture off the ground and taking the risk of stepping on the toes of established players, Rohan needed to tackle these other challenges: How could the group rebuild a value proposition for tourists and restore occupancy rates at Larsens Camp? What was the best way to restructure the company to ensure financial stability? How could it find the proper balance between its business and the environment, thus ensuring the future of its resorts?

For months, Jon Baumhauer, the Chairman of the Family Board and influential member of the Executive Board of E. Merck OHG, had sustained the commitment of the family owners to a transformational merger that would define the future of Merck. Maintaining such secrecy among the 120-plus family partners representing the 10th to the 12th generations of Merck family owners was no small feat, but the absence of a deal was starting to create tensions on all levels. The offer from Ernesto Bertarelli, the largest shareholder of Serono, a Swiss-listed, family-controlled biotechnology firm, was hardly a surprise. Ernesto, through the company's investment bankers, had peddled the firm for months to all major pharma companies in the world, but had found few takers. The surprise was the newfound willingness of Serono to consider a negotiated deal. Merck's Executive Board, the family and Merck's advisers had kept an eye on Serono throughout the year. The company was attractive for its family culture, strong R&D capabilities, significant US presence, a rich product pipeline and of course world-class biotechnology manufac-turing competencies. Its size would give Merck much needed critical mass, but the deal was not cheap. It required extensive leverage and new equity injections from the family, its risk profile was higher than Merck's and cultural differences ran deep. Now the deal was within reach. Was this the transformational opportunity the Merck family sought? It was time to put the "courage and pioneering spirit" of the family firm to the ultimate test. Learning objectives: Managing a family business for sustainability; sophisticated family and business governance structures; managing growth; technology innovation; maintaining the entrepreneurial spirit; multi-generation family business; critical size and growth issues in the pharma business; managing incentive systems for executives.

Supplement for IMD506

Supplement for IMD484

"It was late morning on January 21, 2004 and Dr Robert Easton was enjoying the beautiful sunshine and crisp mountain air on the ski slopes of Davos, Switzerland when his mobile phone rang. It was a call from Ken Greatbatch, the former CFO of Vantico, with very interesting news: Clariant's attempt to auction off its operating division, AZ Electronic Materials (AZ-EM), had failed. There was now a great chance of an exclusive deal for Carlyle to acquire the company. Clariant needed to make the deal happen, and fast; it had promised shareholders and analysts during the summer of 2003 that it would reduce its debt level by almost €800 million. Six months had passed and the company had very little to show for its efforts. To dispose of its division, Clariant had initially engineered an auction among AZ-EM's closest competitors, but had not succeeded in finding a suitable buyer. Faced with the failed auction, increased pressure from shareholders and a clear need to raise cash rapidly, Clariant resorted to its second-best option - a negotiated sale with a qualified private equity buyer. The Carlyle Group immediately voiced an interest and offered to expedite due diligence if a deal could be negotiated rapidly. Speed was now of the essence for Clariant's top management team, who were very keen to figure out how quickly Easton and his team could move. Learning objectives: Buyout, due diligence, managing transition, turnaround management, leverage, incentives, restructuring."

Supplement for IMD484

Venture Valuation conducts an independent valuation of Genedata, a Swiss start-up company in order to help Novartis Venture Fund analyze and structure the next financing round. Venture Valuation has to, given a very tight deadline, customize the evaluation process to using quantitative and qualitative data to best meet its customers needs. The case outlines the task ahead of Venture Valuation and requires students to make assessments and calculations and finally come up with a valuation for the startup, Genedata.

March 2008. Lando Simonetti, founder and CEO of La Martina was pacing around his office in the Buenos Aires suburbs. Not so long ago, the offer that had just landed in his in-box would have been relegated to the trash bin within seconds. He had always been fervently committed to the independence of his firm - independence from investors, boards of directors, banks and politicians. From a local polo equipment producer, La Martina had become one of the most recognized global brand names in polo and fashion alike. He would have preferred to stay true to the brand's DNA, rooted in the estancia lifestyle and the polo game, delivering functional polo equipment. But that no longer seemed possible since the fashion industry had discovered the brand and transformed it into a fashion icon. This time the offer was different. It came from Tribeca Partners, a reputed South American private equity firm in Bogotá that had developed a serious fashion specialty. It had recently concluded its first deal in Argentina, acquiring one of La Martina's local competitors, Etiqueta Negra, with a view to taking it global. The company clearly knew about fashion and Argentina was on its radar screen. The offer was rock solid, valuing the company at close to three times sales and ten times EBIT. Was it time to let go? Learning objectives: Discuss exit planning, harvesting, private equity, growth management, and the fashion industry.

February 2008. Lando Simonetti was enjoying the relative cool of his Cucha Cucha office in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, Argentina. It may have been cool, but definitely not quiet. His desire to always be in the middle of the action at the company also meant he had to live through the noise of the factory. This ability to stay in close contact with people and realities on the ground had been instrumental in building La Martina from a modest polo equipment provider to the premier polo brand in the world, with global sales in excess of US$200 million. La Martina was not about polo: it was polo. As an Argentinean of Italian origin, Lando could not have felt prouder to have conquered Europe. At 65, he had reached the pinnacle of the sport he loved so much. A few nagging questions lingered. The brand was being pushed more and more into fashion, a move he had strongly resisted so far. How would this affect its sustainability? La Martina had never been about fashion; it produced and sold functional polo equipment. Polo had become fashionable, and so had its products. Should he fight the trend or capitalize on it? What would that mean for the company? Fashion also meant growth. So far, he had stubbornly pursued only self-financed growth. Perhaps it was time to consider raising more capital. Learning objectives: Building a brand, managing growth, globalizing.

September 2007. For both founding fathers of the Happy Shrimp Farm, it had been a hectic three years. What started as a simple market research on co-siting for the Rotterdam Port Authority (RPA) in April 2004 had rapidly developed into an international multi-million euro business proposition that literally took over their lives. Their research had identified interesting business opportunities. RPA agreed to support them on a case-by-case basis, starting with the Happy Shrimp Farm. Initial challenges included getting a residual energy contract to heat the shrimp production ponds and external funding for the venture. Construction started in September 2006. With its energy recycling and urban revival themes, Happy Shrimp generated extensive press coverage. Greiner and Curtessi were already looking ahead: Could the concept be replicated in Germany and Canada? Could it be applied to seaweed production as well? How sustainable was sustainability as a business concept? Happy Shrimp International needed to take shape fast. Could they manage all this growth? And handling the multiple stakeholders was still a headache... Learning objectives: Managing multiple stakeholders in a sustainable project development. Understanding the economic drivers of cradle-to-cradle, recycling projects. Discuss sustainability as a business model.