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Alan Kendricks struggles to address many challenges facing him as a recently promoted medical director for Cardiology Associates at Southeastern Pennsylvania University Hospital. He must balance his time taking care of patients, running a practice, managing up, down, and laterally, managing stars with little formal authority, allocating resources fairly, developing his people, providing strategy and direction, building an organization, and spending time with his family. Offers insights into the dilemmas of a "producing manager," a person who is simultaneously responsible for producing and managing.

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More and more, expanding companies are hiring high-functioning groups of people who have been working together effectively within one company and can rapidly come up to speed in a new environment. These lifted-out teams don't need to get acquainted with one another or to establish shared values, mutual accountability, or group norms; their long-standing relationships and trust help them make an impact very quickly. Of course, the process is not without risks: A failed lift out can lead to loss of money, opportunity, credibility, and even native talent. Boris Groysberg and Robin Abrahams studied more than 40 high-profile moves and interviewed team leaders in multiple industries and countries to examine the risks and opportunities that lift outs present. They concluded that, regardless of industry, nationality, or size of the team, a successful lift out unfolds over four consecutive, interdependent stages that must be meticulously managed. In the courtship stage, the hiring company and the leader of the targeted team determine whether the proposed move is, in fact, a good idea, and then define their business goals and discuss strategies. At the same time, the team leader discusses the potential move with the other members of his or her group to assess their level of interest and prepare them for the change. The second stage involves the integration of the team leader with the new company's top leadership. This part of the process ensures the team's access to senior executives--the most important factor in a lift out's success. Operational integration is the focus of the third stage. Ideally, teams will start out working with the same or similar clients, vendors, and industry standards. The fourth stage entails full cultural integration. To succeed, the lifted-out team members must be willing to re-earn credibility by proving their value and winning their new colleagues' trust.

Provides an overview of leadership development for the manager charged with developing a single individual or corporate leadership program. Introduces a framework for understanding the components of developmental experiences and then applies it to a range of experiences, including: formal and informal feedback, training, job assignments, and mentoring. Concludes with a discussion of the leadership development process--in particular, the need to factor in organizational context and individual differences when selecting and sequencing developmental experiences.

Almost five years had passed since Goldman Sachs launched its innovative leadership development initiative called Pine Street. Focused primarily on developing Goldman's most senior managers, Pine Street had evolved significantly since its inception in November of 1999. Looking forward, there were a number of challenges. How would Pine Street remain valued in a culture where what you did yesterday doesn't matter much? The question every day is "What will you do for me today?" Early in May 2005, members of the Pine Street Board of Directors gathered for their quarterly meeting to address the dimensions of this challenge: First, its curriculum had to maintain the interest of an increasingly demanding internal clientele. Second, program content had to keep pace with the constantly changing requirements of a rapidly shifting competitive and regulator landscape. Third, Pine Street itself had to pursue creative ways of renewing its structure and people without compromising either its mission or its unique culture. Fourth, Pine Street had to retain the continued support of Goldman Sachs' senior leadership. Finally, as program offerings grew, so did fundamental questions of identity: After five years of evolutionary growth, what did the Pine Street brand mean to Goldman Sachs?

Details power dynamics that unfold in the firm when one of its best and brightest threatens to leave. It focuses on the dynamics of attracting, hiring, compensating, negotiating, and leveraging a star performer in a professional service firm. In particular, traces the detailed events from the resignation of a star to the manager's struggle to decide which of the eligible candidates should be hired. Four candidates and their firms are discussed in great detail. The case allows students to consider both individual (e.g., background, aspirations, attitudes, past short-term and long-term performance) and organizational (e.g., cultures, strategies, structures, performance management systems) factors in choosing a candidate to maximize individual-organization fit.

Tracks of the first 6 months of a recent MBA grad, Tim Keller, at Katzenbach Partners, a boutique consulting firm focused on organizational change and strategy. Covers how Keller initially struggles with his assignment and ends with a question of whether or not he should attend a meeting that he was not invited to, where more senior consultants plan to implement the system dynamics tool that he was responsible for creating--on a Sunday when he had a major personal engagement.

Supplements the (A) case. The (B) case presents the final outcome of the events. Reveals how Keller is able to turn around perceptions about him and forge relationships with key decision makers. Includes reflections and lessons learned from all parties and Keller's actual 2005 year-end and self evaluations on the project.

Supplements the (A) case. The (C) case includes Keller's actual 2006 mid-year and self evaluations.

What does it take to build a successful career over time? Describes Amy Schulman's career progression and role as a star senior litigator and top executive at one of the world's largest law firms. It focuses on different stages in her career and what she did to be successful at each stage. The demands on her time--client development, casework, firm leadership responsibilities, mentoring her people, managing her team, spending time with her family--were changing over time. After being chosen to sit on the firm's Global Board as well as its Executive and Policy Committees, Amy Schulman feels that there are things that are being left undone. She must decide how to allocate her time.

After nearly 100 years as a mid-size regional law firm, Duane Morris entered a period of spectacular growth led by CEO Sheldon Bonovitz. Originally founded by Quakers, the firm had a distinct organizational culture featuring a number of unique or unusual business practices: a transparent and flexible compensation system, practice-group integration across multiple offices, ancillary businesses, early adoption of financial reporting software, and consensus-based decision making. The firm was proud of its corporate culture and sought to maintain it as it grew, bringing in only people who would fit the culture, in small groups. In 2005, the firm completed its first merger, taking over a 64-person San Francisco firm. Growth was necessary to remain competitive, but could Duane Morris maintain its unique culture while bringing on large numbers of new attorneys?

Teena Lerner started her own hedge fund firm in 2001 after nearly 20 years as a star biotechnology analyst and hedge fund manager. After the start-up phase, her firm became highly profitable. In 2004, however, one of her four analysts lost a lot of money for the firm. If Lerner followed the existing compensation system, she would wind up significantly underpaying her other analysts, all of whom had performed well. Should she follow the compensation system or not? And what should be done about the underperforming analyst?

Supplements the (A) case.

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors' findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can contribute significantly to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.

Describes and contrasts the roles and challenges of three high-performing finance heads at Novartis Consumer Health businesses in Australia, Japan, and Venezuela. All three faced tremendous pressures in terms of managing time and limited resources, but the particular circumstances of each business made for some specific challenges. Remi Escurel, CFO for Animal Health in Australia and New Zealand and regional CFO for Asia Pacific, juggled a demanding dual role. In Australia, Animal Health was a market leader, but dependence on climate-sensitive products made for uneven performance. Tanya Ferretto served as both finance head and general manager for Animal Health in Japan, where the business was a niche player struggling for survival. Jaime Maturana filled the business, planning, and analysis role for Over-the-Counter in Venezuela, a fast-growing business in a volatile political and economic environment. Describes and contracts the roles and challenges of three high-performing finance heads at Novartis Consumer Heath businesses in Australia, Japan, and Venezuela. Examines whether the skills that made these executives successful are portable from one country or region to another. Focuses on how an administrative function such as finance can play a strategic role.

Supplements the (A) case, 906034.

Under Jack Rivkin's leadership, Shearson Lehman's research department rose from relative obscurity to the highest ranking research department on Wall Street within three years. When Rivkin is promoted to head of equity, he wonders how to succeed in his new position.

Supplements the (A) case, 906034.

In the spring of 2005, Candace Browning, head of Global Securities Research and Economics at Merrill Lynch, led about 500 Merrill Lynch analysts worldwide in a collaborative effort to produce innovative research, most of them accustomed to working independently in their own regions and areas of expertise. Less than five years earlier, research analysts had expressed little or no interest in group efforts. By 2005, many analysts who had been assigned to work on collaborative projects indicated increased learning and a willingness to work in teams again. Some analysts themselves chose to work together. Whereas Merrill had come a long way, some analysts remained skeptical. Managers also questioned whether all types of collaboration were worth the significant efforts required. Browning had to consider the issues involved, the feedback received, and the industry itself and devise a strategy moving forward.