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This case describes a compensation negotiation between a global HR director and a candidate for a high-level executive position. The situation becomes awkward when the candidate feels insulted because he is given a monetary incentive to join the company more quickly than originally planned. The case provides an opportunity to analyze negotiation strategy and the importance of emotional intelligence and effective interpersonal communication during a negotiation.

This note briefly describes compensation and incentive issues in one of the major US professional sports leagues, the National Football League (NFL). It first provides some background information on the labor market for players and the salary cap, and then describes incentive issues facing players and their agents.

Supplements the (A) and (B) cases.

MBA student Monroe Davies is asked by a potential employer to determine his own compensation package. This case follows Jim Hummer, President and CEO of Whole Health Management and Davies through a unique recruitment process that raises questions of compensation and employee incentives, negotiation strategy, and human resources management.

Supplements the (A) case.

Despite strong appeal among job seekers and outside recruiters, TheLadders' corporate job listings seem to lag. Could raising prices help solve the problem? TheLadders considers this strategic paradox.

In September 2003, Jeff Immelt challenged the business leaders at GE to come up with "Imagination Breakthroughs," innovative new projects that would serve as the centerpiece of GE's organic growth initiative. Follows the company as these changes are driven through the business units, focusing on GE Transportation as it launches a series of groundbreaking, green products--from the Evolution Locomotive to the Hybrid Locomotive. The growth process transforms the culture within GE Transportation, leading to a redefinition of the marketing role, the implementation of a "growth leader" profile and new decision-making processes to encourage innovation and risk. Finally, presents a critical decision point, as Transportation executives must decide whether or not to support the high-risk Hybrid Locomotive project.

Supplements the (A) case. A rewritten version of an earlier supplement.

In the mid-1980s, Arrow, the world's largest electronics distributor, implemented a college recruiting program to hire salespeople. The program was part of an effort to increase the professionalism and skill set of the sales force in an industry where few salespeople had college degrees. After an expensive and thorough training program, many of the new college grads hired were poached by Arrow's competitors for higher salaries. Arrow was ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the college grads to stay, and the recruiting program ended after five years. In 1997, CEO Steve Kaufman decided to start a new college recruiting program, determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Serves as a brief introduction to incentive design and implementation. The analysis first locates incentive strategy within the larger structure of organizations and markets and then helps to define the central components and difficulties of incentive design. Focuses on the principal difficulties in implementing incentive systems, including the tradeoff between objective and subjective performance metrics, how to design incentive systems in team environments, and the inherent problems with designing incentive systems in environments where workers are involved in multiple activities. A rewritten version of an earlier note.

In 1996, U.S. Surgical launched a hostile takeover bid against Circon Corp. CEO Richard Auhll recruited an old HBS friend, George Cloutier, to the Circon board to help him defend the company. Circon's primary defenses include a "poison pill" and a staggered board and lead to the longest-running takeover battle in U.S. corporate history. This is an abridged version of an earlier case.

This case analyzes incentive strategy from the perspective of a company's board of directors and owners. The focus is the role that executive compensation and ownership structure (the composition of, and financial structure between, a company's owners) play in motivating value-creating behavior.

Supplements the (A) case.

Akamai's stock price declines dramatically with the NASDAQ in 2000, causing virtually all employee options to go underwater. Ownership and retention incentives are largely destroyed, and employee morale falls sharply. Management weighs the pros and cons of various alternative "solutions" to this problem (including repricing, issuing a new supplemental grant, canceling the underwater options and issuing a delayed regrant, and making a tender offer to exchange underwater options for fewer shares of restricted stock).

This case serves as a supplement to any course on incentive design and implementation. The analysis first locates incentive strategy within the larger structure of organizations and markets and then helps to define the central components and difficulties of incentive design. The case focuses on the principal difficulties in implementing incentive systems, including the trade off between objective and subjective performance metrics, how to design incentive systems in team environments, and the inherent problems with designing incentive systems in environments where workers are involved in multiple activities.

This exercise provides an opportunity to gain insight about designing, negotiating, and responding to incentives. The setting is investment management. A class is divided into a certain number of investment firms. Each company has one CEO and begins with four portfolio managers (PMs), who manage their portfolios by choosing from a restricted set of assets. The game takes place over approximately two weeks and is divided into three periods. Each period will last from two to four days. At the end of each period, new funds flow to high-performing portfolios, wheras funds flow out of poorly performing portfolios, simulating contributions from investors. CEOs and PMs negotiate compensation arrangements and PMs may move from one company to another, subject to some costs and rules regarding how much of their portfolio they take with them to their new companies. CEOs try to maximize the value of their companies at the end of the game, whereas PMs attempt to maximize their total compensation during the game.

This case describes compensation and incentive issues in one of the major U.S. professional sports leagues, the National Football League (NFL). It first provides some background information on the labor market for players and the salary cap and then describes incentive issues facing players and their agents.

This case describes the compensation and performance evaluations at an investment management company. The senior management team of Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) Investment Management was contemplating an introduction of hedge funds at the firm, but many believed that typical hedge fund manager pay (20% of the upside) would harm the MFS culture, which glorified "star performance but not star egos." The case presents the MFS compensation philosophy and plan (including the plan's emphasis on subjective compensation), the types of people it attracted, the resulting culture, and how the senior management team approached the hedge funds question. It includes side discussion on firm-specific human capital.

This case describes the compensation system for portfolio managers at Harvard's portfolio management company, including its formulaic and bonus bank features. Harvard Management Co. President Jack Meyer explains the philosophy behind the incentive pay at his company.

Supplements the (A) case.