個案總覽

Today, the most urgent challenge for most companies is to develop the managers who must operate in the new delayered, horizontal, networked organizations to deliver on their complex, multidimensional strategic priorities. It is here that most companies are facing the greatest difficulties. The reason lies in the historic "Russian-doll model of management," in which managers at each level are expected to play similar roles and have similar responsibilities, only for a different size and scope of activities. The underlying premise that there is a generic management role is being further reinforced by many companies currently engaged in the new fad of identifying a set of desired personal competencies as the anchor for their management development initiatives. This article challenges this Russian-doll model of management to argue that managers at different levels of the organization play distinctly different roles and add value in fundamentally different ways. Based on field research in twenty major corporations, the authors identify the roles of front-line, senior, and top-level managers in the new organizational form, and how companies can develop these new managerial competencies.

Highlights the general manager's role in building a self-renewing organization.

Describes how general managers can build organizational capability in their firms.

Describes the development of McKinsey & Co. as a worldwide management consulting firm from 1926 to 1996. In particular, it focuses on the way in which McKinsey has developed structures, systems, processes, and practices to help it develop, transfer, and disseminate knowledge among its 3,800 consultants in 69 offices worldwide. Concludes by focusing on three young consultants operating in each dimension of the firm's organization--the local office, the industry practice, and the firm's competence center. Managing director, Rajat Gupta, wonders if the changes he has made are sufficient to maintain the firm's vital knowledge development process.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 396-357.

Highlights and explores how a general manager adds value to the firm at the operational level by managing through people. Discusses how assumptions about human motivation influence the employment contract that the general manager implicitly enters into with the workers and ends with speculation on how the employment contract is fundamentally changing.

Addresses the following issues at a conceptual level: 1) Who is a general manager? 2) To whom is the general manager responsible? and 3) How do general managers add value?

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Why are some companies able to remain vital, even after extensive reengineering, while others flounder and fail? The answer, according to these authors, lies in a company's ability to rejuvenate its employees by establishing a behavioral context with four characteristics: discipline, support, trust, and stretch. The authors trace postwar corporate history to identify the pernicious qualities that have ossified many companies, using Westinghouse as an example of an oppressive context based on the elements of compliance, control, constraint, and contract. They also show how companies like Intel and 3M have renewed themselves by creating an environment in which people are the most important resource.

In the postwar years, planning and control systems were the tools that enabled companies to grow and helped managers deal with sprawling enterprises. Yet many of the problems companies experience today are inherent in the strategy-structure-systems doctrine that produced those tools. The systems that allowed managers to control employees also inhibited creativity and initiative. Today the challenge for top-level managers is to engage the knowledge and skills of each person in the organization in order to create what the authors call an individualized corporation. In the individualized corporation, top-level managers don't direct and correct middle and frontline managers; they create an environment in which individuals monitor themselves. The authors have conducted research on 20 high-performing corporations. They have concluded that systems, no matter how sophisticated, can never replace the richness of close personal communication and contact between top-level and frontline managers.

Traces the birth and development of 3M Corp., focusing in particular on the origins of its entrepreneurially-based ability to innovate. In particular, it highlights the role of CEO William L. McKnight in creating a unique set of values, policies, and structures to nurture and develop continuous renewal. With the changing environment of the 1980s, however, a new generation of CEOs begin to adopt new policies and change the cultural norms that helped 3M grow. The trigger issue focuses on what other changes are required.

The hierarchical organization based on the strategy-structure-systems doctrine of management no longer delivers competitive results. While a top-down structure of corporate divisions gives managers tight control and allows companies to grow, it also fragments resources and creates a vertical organization that prevents small units from sharing their strengths with one another. Structural fixes, such as skunk works, alliances, and acquisitions, have not solved the problem. Based on a study of 20 companies with vanguard management styles, the authors predict a managerial revolution that will focus on horizontal processes rather than vertical structures. The job of management will be to promote three core organizational processes: frontline entrepreneurship, competence building, and renewal.

A middle-level division manager must decide whether he should support an investment request for a third attempt at launching a new product developed by a struggling business unit. Describes the long, difficult process by which the unit has developed the product--a computer privacy screen--after years of problems and continuing losses, and its absolute faith in the project. Also presents the division manager's concerns about the need for discipline and control, setting up a tension that is focused on the launch decision.

Structure follows strategy; and systems support structure. In the high-growth environment of post-World War II, a management doctrine rose up around these two aphorisms. But today the business environment has changed. A change in management doctrine is needed to match this new landscape. After 5 years researching 20 leading European, U.S., and Japanese companies, the authors concluded that senior managers must change their own priorities and way of thinking. Beyond designing corporate strategy, they must shape a shared institutional purpose. They must expand their focus from devising formal structures to developing organizational processes. And more than just managing systems, they must develop people. Top management's role in the companies researched already reflects the changes the authors prescribe. Consequently, 3M has managed to retain an entrepreneurial spirit despite its $14 billion bulk. ABB transformed two "also-ran" companies into the leading competitors in the global power-equipment industry. And companies like AT&T, Royal Dutch/Shell, Intel, Andersen Consulting, Kao, and Corning are doing well despite what some predicted as the inevitable decline of large corporations.

Traces the history of Intel from its earliest days as a technology-driven memory company to its emergence as an increasingly market-focused microprocessor company with emerging systems capabilities. The focus is on the strategic, organizational, and management adaptation that was required to ensure the company's survival in a highly volatile industry. Under the leadership of Andy Grove and Gordon Moore, Intel is able to overlay its R&D base with manufacturing and marketing capabilities that allow it to continually adapt to changes and renew itself.

Describes Becton Dickinson's evolving attempt to develop products and strategies to meet worldwide competitive and market needs. Traces the evolution of a classic parent company-led product-market strategy to truly transnational product and strategy development. Explores the use of an integrative team as the organizational means of achieving global integration while preserving local flexibility.

Describes the development and management of the relays business area (BA) in ABB's global matrix organization. Focuses on three levels of management--corporate, BA, and operating company. Highlights the roles and responsibilities of individuals at each level as ABB creates a unique, highly successful organization structure and management process that enables it to integrate its disparate worldwide operations while maintaining a highly entrepreneurial front-line environment.

Focuses in detail on implementing a corporate restructuring program in ABB's German subsidiary. Special attention is given to Germany's unique form of industrial governance. Two major problem areas--power plants and power transformers--are described in detail. ABB's new policies, in terms of strategy, organization, behavior, and financial targets, are portrayed. How should the head of ABB Germany proceed? Will the new ABB policies clash with Germany's national and BBC's corporate culture? Why are power plants and power transformers in deep trouble and what action can be taken? Does decentralization of the salesforce make sense? What are the challenges, opportunities, and risks facing ABB's Germany country head? Will the new international matrix be a help or a hindrance?

In the annual report, Welch indicates a new priority for the company--developing a cadre of managers who can lead GE in implementing its strategy in a new organizational context. The question facing Welch is whether his bold new human resource vision is realistic and achievable.

In 1987, two European rivals--Asea AB of Sweden and BBC Brown Boveri Ltd. of Switzerland--merged to form Asea Brown Boveri. The new company employed 150,000 employees in 850 legal entities operating in 140 countries. The case describes the challenges facing Percy Barnevik--the organization's leader--and how he resolved those challenges through staffing, communicating priorities, new structural alignments, and information and reporting systems.

Describes Jan Carlzon's actions on assuming the CEO's responsibility at SAS in a time of financial and organizational difficulty. After tracing Carlzon's development as a manager, it focuses on the way in which he developed, then communicated a clear and motivating strategic mission to become "the world's best businessman's airline." After a spectacular turnaround, organizational problems re-emerge, and the case concludes with Carlzon wondering if his "second wave" can provide the same impetus that he gained on his first wave. Highlights the power of a clear and well-communicated strategic mission (strategic intent), but also explores problems and limits that can arise. Specifically, focuses on the common problem of motivating middle managers who often feel disenfranchised by front line empowerment.