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Two years after the death of Sony's visionary founder, Akio Morita, chief executive officer Noboyuki Idei faced a major crisis. Sony had just posted its worst performance in years and had to figure out if its current strategy needed to change. In pursuit of Morita's vision to bring entertainment to the masses through innovation and applied technology, Sony had grown from a small Japanese company to a US$50-billion-per-year global corporation. As it entered the new millennium without its founder, Idei realized that the success Sony had enjoyed in the 1990s was being challenged in the global marketplace. With increasing global competition and in the midst of a recession, the company's net income was far below expectations. The situation would probably worsen if Sony failed to make immediate strategic changes, including changes to its international strategy. Idei had experienced firsthand the success Sony enjoyed in the 1990s as it expanded its product lines and international presence. By April 2001, after reviewing the previous year's financial performance, Idei knew Sony was fighting an uphill battle. All that Morita had worked towards, particularly in the 1990s, was suddenly being threatened. Idei faced a critical decision going forward. Sony was a company that still strove to embody its founders' vision, but could he dare go against his predecessor's approach and pursue a new international strategy?

Two years after the death of Sony’s visionary founder, Akio Morita, chief executive officer Noboyuki Idei faced a major crisis. Sony had just posted its worst performance in years and had to figure out if its current strategy needed to change. In pursuit of Morita’s vision to bring entertainment to the masses through innovation and applied technology, Sony had grown from a small Japanese company to a US$50-billion-per-year global corporation. As it entered the new millennium without its founder, Idei realized that the success Sony had enjoyed in the 1990s was being challenged in the global marketplace. With increasing global competition and in the midst of a recession, the company’s net income was far below expectations. The situation would probably worsen if Sony failed to make immediate strategic changes, including changes to its international strategy. Idei had experienced firsthand the success Sony enjoyed in the 1990s as it expanded its product lines and international presence. By April 2001, after reviewing the previous year’s financial performance, Idei knew Sony was fighting an uphill battle. All that Morita had worked towards, particularly in the 1990s, was suddenly being threatened. Idei faced a critical decision going forward. Sony was a company that still strove to embody its founders’ vision, but could he dare go against his predecessor’s approach and pursue a new international strategy?

The president of Infusion Development Corporation was reviewing the progress of the new subsidiary the company had set up 15 months earlier in Krakow, Poland. The purpose of the subsidiary was to work with other Infusion offices around the world to provide innovative software development services to global clients. The investment, a big success, had grown in size from eight to forty staff in one year, and there were plans to double that by the end of the following year. The issues facing the president were threefold. Firstly, how could he work with the country manager to continue to grow the subsidiary? Attracting the right talent was vital to Infusion's culture and business model. Initial growth in Poland was based partly on local referrals in the community of .NET professionals in Krakow. It was also based on being a new start-up with an entrepreneurial culture. The president and country manager were concerned that there were limits to these factors. Secondly, what role should Infusion Poland have in the wider company in the future? Should it become a global centre of excellence and a pivotal hub for the company's innovative capability? If so, how? Thirdly, what kind of succession planning should be put in place for the country manager in Poland? If he moved to another post at Infusion, as expected, should the company seek a local country manager instead of transferring one from headquarters?

The president of Infusion Development Corporation was reviewing the progress of the new subsidiary the company had set up 15 months earlier in Krakow, Poland. The purpose of the subsidiary was to work with other Infusion offices around the world to provide innovative software development services to global clients. The investment, a big success, had grown in size from eight to forty staff in one year, and there were plans to double that by the end of the following year. The issues facing the president were threefold. Firstly, how could he work with the country manager to continue to grow the subsidiary? Attracting the right talent was vital to Infusion’s culture and business model. Initial growth in Poland was based partly on local referrals in the community of .NET professionals in Krakow. It was also based on being a new start-up with an entrepreneurial culture. The president and country manager were concerned that there were limits to these factors. Secondly, what role should Infusion Poland have in the wider company in the future? Should it become a global centre of excellence and a pivotal hub for the company’s innovative capability? If so, how? Thirdly, what kind of succession planning should be put in place for the country manager in Poland? If he moved to another post at Infusion, as expected, should the company seek a local country manager instead of transferring one from headquarters?

The newly appointed president and chief operating officer (COO) of Olympus Corporation of Japan was called to an emergency board meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss governance issues regarding corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). However, it would be no ordinary meeting. Since assuming the role of president in April 2011, the president discovered evidence of corporate fraud on a large scale. He had commissioned an external auditor report that showed a significant loss of shareholder value. His call for changes to be made to the Japanese board of directors had been met by resistance. How should he plan for the meeting? What could he expect? What position should he take? How should he influence decisions regarding the company's immediate problems and its longer-term corporate governance?

The newly appointed president and chief operating officer of Olympus Corporation of Japan was called to an emergency board meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss governance issues regarding corporate mergers and acquisitions. However, it would be no ordinary meeting. Since assuming the role of president in April 2011, the president had discovered evidence of corporate fraud on a large scale. He had commissioned an external auditor report that showed a significant loss of shareholder value. His call for changes to be made to the Japanese board of directors had been met by resistance. How should he plan for the meeting? What could he expect? What position should he take? How should he influence decisions regarding the company’s immediate problems and its longer-term corporate governance?

On January 17, 2005, the function head in the Health Care Business in 3M Taiwan, found himself in a meeting with the Acne Dressing project team. In 2004, the function head initiated a project team to exploit local market needs for 3M Hydrocolloid Dressing, a technology that existed in the company for many years without any practical applications. The local project team suggested applying the material for acne treatment. The product would be known as Acne Dressing. There was no standardized solution for acne treatment in Taiwan. If developed, Acne Dressing would be a brand new product in the local market. The biggest challenge would be how to change local consumer behaviors on new acne treatment products. In addition, since there were no similar products in the market, the project team only had limited information. The potential sales and volume estimation were all uncertain. If the local development were to be launched, Acne Dressing would be 3M's first product application from Hydrocolloid Dressing technology. With little previous experience in product development and no similar products existing in the market, the function head had to decide fast whether to proceed with this new product development. Should the team carry on with the project? If so, what options did the local project team have? What kind of resources and support should the local Health Care business segment seek from the headquarters for the product development? Should the local product development collaborate with other subsidiaries?

The managing director of Apollo Health Street (AHS), a health care business process outsourcing (BPO) company headquartered in Pennsylvania, United States, was pondering two dilemmas: achieving short-term growth for his company, and finding new ways to compete in a changing industry. AHS was itself a subsidiary of Apollo Health Enterprises Ltd., an integrated health care company located in Hyderabad, India. AHS had been growing at an 80 per cent compound annual growth rate since 2005 and aimed to reach $100 million in sales by March 2010. Its target was to increase annual sales to $500 million within three years in a highly competitive space, which if successful would move AHS into the top three BPO companies in the health care sector. How should it secure short-term growth? The second dilemma was how to plan for the future. Industry analysts had predicted that over the next five to ten years, health care BPO would become unrecognizable from its current form. The managing director believed that although scaling up would strengthen the company’s position for the short term, the company should also be looking for solutions to stay relevant to the customer. How should AHS influence the shape of health care BPO in the future? What new ways of competing could the company pursue?

In April 2011, the management team at Expatica Communications B.V. was reviewing the progress of the company and the opportunities for future growth. The management team had to take stock: the external environment was rapidly changing, and threats from competitors were on the rise. Expatica was founded 11 years earlier to provide English-language information and news to the expatriate community in Europe, delivering its services primarily over the Internet. One of the central issues Expatica faced was how to make its core business model effective across multiple markets. Recent launches of the online platform in new countries were not as successful as hoped and the performance of traditional 'bricks and mortar' offerings was also mixed. The company made tremendous progress over the years but needed to re-evaluate its position and decide which new opportunities for growth, if any, should be pursued.

In April 2011, the management team at Expatica Communications B.V. was reviewing the progress of the company and the opportunities for future growth. The management team had to take stock: the external environment was rapidly changing, and threats from competitors were on the rise. Expatica had been founded 11 years earlier to provide English-language information and news to the expatriate community in Europe, delivering its services primarily over the Internet. One of the central issues Expatica faced was how to make its core business model effective across multiple markets. Recent launches of the online platform in new countries were not as successful as hoped and the performance of traditional “bricks and mortar” offerings was also mixed. The company had made tremendous progress over the years but needed to re-evaluate its position and decide which new opportunities for growth, if any, should be pursued.

New York Fries' president and executive vice president were preparing for the next biannual meeting of domestic and international franchisees. They planned to provide an update on all aspect of corporate strategy and planning for the year ahead, but they only had a few days to formulate a new international growth strategy. The president and executive vice president were hesitant to expand into new territories partly due to poor experiences in Australia and South Korea, yet international franchisees had encouraged them to investigate promising areas of expansion into China and India. Complicating matters was the future development of the company's chain of premium hamburger restaurants. While New York Fries was a well-received brand in Canada, it had not yet decided if and how to internationalize the brand. How could the president and executive vice president pursue new opportunities while maintaining their premium brands of French fries and hamburgers?

New York Fries’ president and executive vice president were preparing for the next biannual meeting of domestic and international franchisees. They planned to provide an update on all aspect of corporate strategy and planning for the year ahead, but they only had a few days to formulate a new international growth strategy. The president and executive vice president were hesitant to expand into new territories partly due to poor experiences in Australia and South Korea, yet international franchisees had encouraged them to investigate promising areas of expansion into China and India. Complicating matters was the future development of the company’s chain of premium hamburger restaurants. While New York Fries was a well-received brand in Canada, it had not yet decided if and how to internationalize the brand. How could the president and executive vice president pursue new opportunities while maintaining their premium brands of French fries and hamburgers?

The managing director of Apollo Health Street (AHS), a healthcare business process outsourcing (BPO) company headquartered in Pennsylvania, United States, was pondering two dilemmas: securing short term growth for his company, and finding new ways to compete in a changing industry. AHS was itself a subsidiary of Apollo Health Enterprises Ltd. (AHEL), an integrated healthcare company located in Hyderabad in southern India. AHS had been growing at 80 per cent compound annual growth rate (CAGR) since 2005, aiming to reach $100 million in sales by March 2010. Its target was to increase annual sales to $500 million within three years in a highly competitive space, which if successful would move AHS into the top three BPO companies in the healthcare sector. How should it secure short term growth? The second dilemma was how to plan for the future. Industry analysts had predicted that over the next five to 10 years, healthcare BPO would become unrecognizable from its current form. The managing director believed that although scaling up would strengthen the company's position for the short term, the company should also be looking for solutions to stay relevant to the customer. How should AHS influence the shape of healthcare BPO in the future? What new ways of competing could the company pursue?

On January 17, 2005, 3M Taiwan’s function head of its health care business division found himself in a meeting with the Acne Dressing project team. In 2004, the function head had initiated a project team to exploit local market needs for 3M hydrocolloid dressing, a technology that had existed in the company for many years without any practical applications. The local project team suggested applying the material for acne treatment. The product would be known as Acne Dressing. There was no standardized solution for acne treatment in Taiwan. If developed, Acne Dressing would be a brand new product in the local market.<br><br>The biggest challenge would be how to change local consumer behaviours on new acne treatment products. In addition, since there were no similar products in the market, the project team only had limited information and potential sales and volumes were uncertain. If the local development was launched, Acne Dressing would be 3M’s first product application of hydrocolloid dressing technology. With little previous experience in product development and no similar products existing in the market, the function head had to decide fast whether to proceed with this new product development. If so, what options did the local project team have? What kind of resources and support should the local health care business segment seek from headquarters for the product development? Should the local project team collaborate with other subsidiaries?

Infusion had grown over the 10 years between 2000 and 2010 to become a $50 million per year international software services business with 350 employees. The president was wondering how he could move the company towards becoming a $100 million per year international business through a mix of organic growth and initiatives with partners. The entrepreneurial vision of its original founders lived on in many ways, but the company had found it necessary to install an administrative structure with a professional management layer to underpin delivery in both domestic and international markets. It had not been an easy ride. The company had encountered problems in India, and there had been periods of staff attrition and challenging deliveries to clients. Clients were beginning to pull the company in new directions. The pace of technology change appeared to be relentless. While entrepreneurship was still encouraged in the form of an idea incubator called Infusion Angels, the CEO was faced with some critical decisions.

Infusion had grown over the 10 years between 2000 and 2010 to become a $50 million per year international software services business with 350 employees. The president is wondering how he could move the company towards becoming a $100 million per year international business through a mixture of organic growth and initiative with partners. The entrepreneurial vision of its original founders lived on in many ways, but the company had found it necessary to install an administrative structure with a professional management layer to underpin delivery in both domestic and international markets. It had not been an easy ride. The company had encountered problems in India, and there had been periods of staff attrition and challenging deliveries to clients. Clients were beginning to pull the company in new directions. The pace of technology change appeared to be relentless. While entrepreneurship was still encouraged in the form of an incubator called Infusion Angels, the CEO was faced with some critical decisions.

Starbucks enjoyed tremendous growth over the previous two decades. In 2007, it had a global reach of over 17,000 stores in 56 countries. Between 2007 and 2009, however, Starbucks' relentless march was slowed by three forces: increasingly intense competition, rising coffee bean prices and a global economic recession. In order to remain profitable, the company started to scale back its overseas operations. In 2010, Starbucks was faced with a critical strategic decision: Should the company resume its international expansion and once again intensify its commitments in overseas markets? If so, what approach should the company take? Had the pace of Starbucks' internationalization (i.e. the rate of opening new stores abroad), the rhythm of its internationalization (i.e. the regularity by which stores were opened abroad) and geographical scope of its internationalization (i.e. number of new countries entered) had an impact on the company's performance in previous years? Could Starbucks learn from its prior internationalization within the coffee industry in order to guide its future international strategy?

Starbucks enjoyed tremendous growth over the previous two decades. In 2007, it had a global reach of over 17,000 stores in 56 countries. Between 2007 and 2009, however, Starbucks' relentless march was slowed by three forces: increasingly intense competition, rising coffee bean prices and a global economic recession. In order to remain profitable, the company started to scale back its overseas operations. In 2010, Starbucks was faced with a critical strategic decision: Should the company resume its international expansion and once again intensify its commitments in overseas markets? If so, what approach should the company take? Had the pace of Starbucks' internationalization (i.e. the rate of opening new stores abroad), the rhythm of its internationalization (i.e. the regularity by which stores were opened abroad) and geographical scope of its internationalization (i.e. number of new countries entered) had an impact on the company's performance in previous years? Could Starbucks learn from its prior internationalization within the coffee industry in order to guide its future international strategy?