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Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Nutrorim's products have been gaining national attention. In particular, sales of the company's organic, performance-enhancing sports supplement powder, ChargeUp, have gone through the roof. Now the new and improved version, called ChargeUp with Lipitrene, has recently hit the market, and expectations are high. CEO Don Rifkin has tried hard to build an inclusive, democratic culture at this successful company. But the organization's open decision-making process has proved problematic, especially during times of conflict and crisis--and a crisis there is. Several months after ChargeUp with Lipitrene is initially released, an investigator from the Minnesota state department of health calls Rifkin to report "11 cases of gastrointestinal distress" among those using the supplement. Nutrorim's top executives must now decide whether to recall the product. The head of R&D, Steve Ford, insists there is nothing wrong with the new ChargeUp, citing elaborate toxicity studies in animals and humans. Meanwhile, the heads of PR and legal want to stem any negative publicity by recalling the product and issuing a press release to that effect. The company decides to recall the supplement--but, two weeks later, the health department investigator calls back with good news: The people who had become ill, it turns out, had actually picked up a bug from their gym's smoothie bar. In other words, Nutrorim is exonerated. But the close call prompts Nutrorim to bring in a consultant to review the company's methods for making decisions. Among the many questions he's asking is, What's the right decision-making process for Nutrorim? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0601A and R0601Z are Christopher J. McCormick, the president and CEO of L.L.Bean; Hauke Moje, a partner at Roland Berger Strategy Consultants; Ralph Biggadike, a professor of professional practice at Columbia Business School; and Paul Domorski, the vice-president of service operations at Avaya.

Nutrorim's products have been gaining national attention. In particular, sales of the company's organic, performance-enhancing sports supplement powder, ChargeUp, have gone through the roof. Now the new and improved version, called ChargeUp with Lipitrene, has recently hit the market, and expectations are high. CEO Don Rifkin has tried hard to build an inclusive, democratic culture at this successful company. But the organization's open decision-making process has proved problematic, especially during times of conflict and crisis--and a crisis there is. Several months after ChargeUp with Lipitrene is initially released, an investigator from the Minnesota state department of health calls Rifkin to report "11 cases of gastrointestinal distress" among those using the supplement. Nutrorim's top executives must now decide whether to recall the product. The head of R&D, Steve Ford, insists there is nothing wrong with the new ChargeUp, citing elaborate toxicity studies in animals and humans. Meanwhile, the heads of PR and legal want to stem any negative publicity by recalling the product and issuing a press release to that effect. The company decides to recall the supplement--but, two weeks later, the health department investigator calls back with good news: The people who had become ill, it turns out, had actually picked up a bug from their gym's smoothie bar. In other words, Nutrorim is exonerated. But the close call prompts Nutrorim to bring in a consultant to review the company's methods for making decisions. Among the many questions he's asking is, What's the right decision-making process for Nutrorim? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0601A and R0601Z are Christopher J. McCormick, the president and CEO of L.L. Bean; Hauke Moje, a partner at Roland Berger Strategy Consultants; Ralph Biggadike, a professor of professional practice at Columbia Business School; and Paul Domorski, the vice-president of service operations at Avaya.

Nutrorim's products have been gaining national attention. In particular, sales of the company's organic, performance-enhancing sports supplement powder, ChargeUp, have gone through the roof. Now the new and improved version, called ChargeUp with Lipitrene, has recently hit the market, and expectations are high. CEO Don Rifkin has tried hard to build an inclusive, democratic culture at this successful company. But the organization's open decision-making process has proved problematic, especially during times of conflict and crisis--and a crisis there is. Several months after ChargeUp with Lipitrene is initially released, an investigator from the Minnesota state department of health calls Rifkin to report "11 cases of gastrointestinal distress" among those using the supplement. Nutrorim's top executives must now decide whether to recall the product. The head of R&D, Steve Ford, insists there is nothing wrong with the new ChargeUp, citing elaborate toxicity studies in animals and humans. Meanwhile, the heads of PR and legal want to stem any negative publicity by recalling the product and issuing a press release to that effect. The company decides to recall the supplement--but, two weeks later, the health department investigator calls back with good news: The people who had become ill, it turns out, had actually picked up a bug from their gym's smoothie bar. In other words, Nutrorim is exonerated. But the close call prompts Nutrorim to bring in a consultant to review the company's methods for making decisions. Among the many questions he's asking is, What's the right decision-making process for Nutrorim? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0601A and R0601Z are Christopher J. McCormick, the president and CEO of L.L. Bean; Hauke Moje, a partner at Roland Berger Strategy Consultants; Ralph Biggadike, a professor of professional practice at Columbia Business School; and Paul Domorski, the vice-president of service operations at Avaya.

Describes the process, components, and detailed action steps involved in using scenario planning in any organization. Provides detailed examples that use the process.

In March 2005, CEO Michael Eskew has asked the Corporate Strategy Group to recommend changes to the strategic process to ensure it allows United Parcel Service (UPS) to continue to transform itself over the next several years. Describes the evolution of UPS's strategic process, with special attention on the company's use of scenario planning techniques, as well as other critical elements of the process: the development of the company charter, strategic planning, strategic decision making, and strategy implementation. Also discusses the roles of the various players in the process, focusing especially on the CEO and corporate strategy staff.

Faced with the need for a massive change, most managers respond predictably. They revamp the organization's strategy, shift around staff, and root out inefficiencies. They then wait patiently for performance to improve--only to be bitterly disappointed because they've failed to prepare employees adequately for the change. In this article, the authors contend that to make change stick, leaders must conduct an effective persuasion campaign--one that begins weeks or months before the turnaround plan is set in concrete. Like a political campaign, a persuasion campaign is largely one of differentiation from the past. Turnaround leaders must convince people that the organization is truly on its deathbed--or, at the very least, that radical changes are required if the organization is to survive and thrive. (This is a particularly difficult challenge when years of persistent problems have been accompanied by few changes in the status quo.) And they must demonstrate through word and deed that they are the right leaders with the right plan. Accomplishing all this calls for a four-part communications strategy. Prior to announcing a turnaround plan, leaders need to set the stage for employees' acceptance of it. At the time of delivery, they must present a framework through which employees can interpret information and messages about the plan. As time passes, they must manage the mood so that employees' emotional states support implementation and follow-through. And at critical intervals, they must provide reinforcement to ensure that the desired changes take hold and that there's no backsliding. Using the example of the dramatic turnaround at Boston's Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, the authors elucidate the inner workings of a successful change effort.

Describes the evolution of General Motors' strategy, organizational structure, and management processes from its founding to the present day. Focuses on the role of GM's management committee--the senior-decision-making body at the company, now called the Automotive Strategy Board (ASB)--and how it operates under Rick Wagoner, its current CEO. In October 2004, Wagoner and the ASB are wrestling with recent changes in GM's planning and budgeting processes and how they will affect the balance between global and local needs.

A Harvard Business School professor distills decades of research into the 10 most important insights that should guide every corporate venturer.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 304-075.

By June 2003, IBM had made significant progress in changing the way it managed new, emerging businesses. Describes the development of a separate management program at IBM designed to identify, fund, and shepherd new businesses through growth. Traces the history of the program, its evolution, and the current challenges senior management faces in scaling up the program.

The case method is widely used in professional education. Different professional schools, however, employ very different case methods. This article compares the use of the case method in law, business, and medical schools and also traces the history of its development. Concludes by examining the impact of new technology on cases and case method teaching.

On January 7, 2002, Paul Levy became CEO of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, a troubled organization, in serious financial difficulty. This case describes the situation Levy inherited, his negotiations prior to taking the job, and his first six months as CEO.

Presents an introduction and overview of corporate venturing. Describes the need for companies to create new businesses, the stages in the process, predictable problems and challenges, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches such as internal venture divisions and corporate venture capital funds, and guidelines for successful practice.

Most executives think of decision making as a singular event that occurs at a particular point in time. In reality, though, decision making is a process fraught with power plays, politics, personal nuances, and institutional history. Leaders who recognize this make far better decisions than those who persevere in the fantasy that decisions are events they alone control. That said, some decision-making processes are far more effective than others. Most often, participants use an advocacy process, possibly the least productive way to get things done. They view decision making as a contest, arguing passionately for their preferred solutions, presenting information selectively, withholding relevant conflicting data so they can make a convincing case, and standing firm against opposition. Much more powerful is an inquiry process, in which people consider a variety of options and work together to discover the best solution. Moving from advocacy to inquiry requires careful attention to three critical factors: fostering constructive, rather than personal, conflict; making sure everyone knows that their viewpoints are given serious consideration even if they are not ultimately accepted; and knowing when to bring deliberations to a close. The authors discuss in detail strategies for moving from an advocacy to an inquiry process, as well as for fostering productive conflict, true consideration, and timely closure. And they offer a framework for assessing the effectiveness of your process while you're still in the middle of it. Decision making is a job that lies at the very heart of leadership and one that requires a genius for balance: the ability to embrace the divergence that may characterize early discussions and to forge the unity needed for effective implementation.