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Most big deals--megamergers, major sales, infrastructure projects--are built on a series of smaller ones. Each component deal presents a tactical challenge, but sequencing the parts in a way that achieves the target outcome is a strategic challenge that can unfold over months or years. This process, which the authors call a negotiation campaign, must generally be conducted on several fronts, each involving multiple parties. A multifront campaign can be much more effective than direct negotiation. After failed talks between longshoremen and the Pacific Maritime Association--a group of shippers and port operators--the PMA's president turned away from the bargaining table and embarked on a campaign to align member--firms, the business community, the U.S. government, and the public around his target outcome: the deployment of new information technologies to help unclog busy ports. The result was an agreement that was ultimately mutually beneficial. Designing and executing a negotiation campaign involves identifying the relevant parties, grouping them into fronts according to shared interests, determining whether to combine fronts (if, for instance, doing so would unite your allies), and deciding which fronts to approach early on and which to engage only after you've made progress elsewhere. The deal between the PMA and the longshoremen involved high stakes, but many small-scale deals--such as gaining approval for a new product--also play out on multiple fronts. Going straight to a key decision maker often makes sense, but in many cases a multifront campaign is the only way.

What stands between you and the yes you want? According to negotiation experts David Lax and James Sebenius, executives face obstacles in three common and complementary dimensions: tactics, or interactions at the bargaining table; deal design, or the ability to draw up a deal at the table that creates lasting value; and setup, which includes the structure of the negotiation itself. Each dimension is crucial in the bargaining process, but most executives fixate on only the first two: 1-D negotiators focus on improving their interpersonal skills at the negotiating table, and 2-D negotiators focus on diagnosing underlying sources of value in a deal and then recrafting the terms to satisfy all parties. In this article, the authors explore the often-neglected third dimension. Instead of just playing the game at the bargaining table, 3-D negotiators reshape the scope and sequence of the game itself to achieve the desired outcome. They scan widely to identify elements outside the deal on the table that might create a more favorable structure for it. They map backward from their ideal resolution to the current setup of the deal and carefully choose which players to approach and when. And they manage and frame the flow of information among the parties involved to improve their odds of getting to yes. Lax and Sebenius describe the tactics 3-D negotiators use and cite examples from business and foreign affairs.

Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? The authors also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.

Describes a mine operated by Bougainville Copper Ltd. in Papua New Guinea and the pressures negotiating the mineral contract between PNG and Bougainville Copper. Condensed from Bougainville Copper Ltd. (B), (C), and (D) by J.S. Hammond and G.B. Allan.

A negotiation exercise between Riverside Lumber Co. and the Division of Environmental Conservation about reducing the effects of effluent discharge in a river. Students are assigned to a role and receive confidential information including a scoring system detailing the costs and benefits of various proposals. Though their interests conflict, joint gains beyond simple agreement can be found. Students come to see that joint gains must be created and divided and that the tension between competitive and cooperative urges often lead to inferior agreements. Means for managing this tension can then be discussed. This game can be used as a complex example of bargaining with incomplete information.

Confidential information for students assigned the role of the Division of Environment Conservation. See Riverside and DEC--General Information.

This game is a highly structured exercise in labor-management bargaining. If union and management cannot reach agreement within two days, then the union will strike. The costs of a strike are not the same for the two sides. Similarly, the cost of a settlement to management differs from its benefits to the union. Union and management players frequently feel that they are more powerful, hold out, endure a strike, and do poorly relative to other players.

Two-party, multi-issue, scoreable negotiation between a manufacturer and a state environmental agency to reach a settlement over the manufacturer's pollution of a local river. Riverside Lumber is a pulp manufacturer in a small town in the Pacific Northwest. Riverside regularly dumps effluent into a nearby river. The Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC) claims that the effluent is toxic and jeopardizes the local salmon catch. Relations between the two parties have deteriorated. DEC has filed suit against Riverside in an attempt to close the plant. The trial date is three days away, and the parties are meeting to see if a last minute settlement is possible. Several issues will surface in the negotiation: Should Riverside be forced to purchase a special scrubber to neutralize the toxic effects of its effluent? Should Riverside be forced to close temporarily or permanently? Can DEC provide Riverside financial incentives to encourage cooperation?

Two-party, multi-issue, scoreable negotiation between a manufacturer and a state environmental agency to reach a settlement over the manufacturer's pollution of a local river. Riverside Lumber is a pulp manufacturer in a small town in the Pacific Northwest. Riverside regularly dumps effluent into a nearby river. The Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC) claims that the effluent is toxic and jeopardizes the local salmon catch. Relations between the two parties have deteriorated. DEC has filed suit against Riverside in an attempt to close the plant. The trial date is three days away, and the parties are meeting to see if a last minute settlement is possible. Several issues will surface in the negotiation: Should Riverside be forced to purchase a special scrubber to neutralize the toxic effects of its effluent? Should Riverside be forced to close temporarily or permanently? Can DEC provide Riverside financial incentives to encourage cooperation?

Two-party, multi-issue, scoreable negotiation between a manufacturer and a state environmental agency to reach a settlement over the manufacturer's pollution of a local river. Riverside Lumber is a pulp manufacturer in a small town in the Pacific Northwest. Riverside regularly dumps effluent into a nearby river. The Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC) claims that the effluent is toxic and jeopardizes the local salmon catch. Relations between the two parties have deteriorated. DEC has filed suit against Riverside in an attempt to close the plant. The trial date is three days away, and the parties are meeting to see if a last minute settlement is possible. Several issues will surface in the negotiation: Should Riverside be forced to purchase a special scrubber to neutralize the toxic effects of its effluent? Should Riverside be forced to close temporarily or permanently? Can DEC provide Riverside financial incentives to encourage cooperation?