個案總覽

In 1730, Japanese merchants petitioned shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune to officially authorize trade in rice futures at the Dojima Exchange, the world's first organized (but unsanctioned) futures market. For many years, the Japanese government had prohibited the trade of futures bills because it was widely regarded as a form of gambling that caused rice prices to rise. However, when the price of rice fell to record lows in the late 1720s, the samurai (whose income was tied to the value of rice) saw their economic position fall relative to the merchant class, whose growing economic power worried the nation's elites. The shogun responded by easing restrictions on futures trading, but without officially sanctioning a futures market at Dojima. The question now was whether he should heed the merchants' petition and take the next step.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 709040

In early October 1931, in the midst of a global economic depression, the U.S. banking system was in crisis - - with bank suspensions running at near record levels. At the same time, the broader economy was sputtering, and U.S. gold reserves had come under severe pressure after Britain abandoned its gold standard in mid-September. As pressure continued to mount, the leaders of the Federal Reserve faced several critical decisions. Should they adjust interest rates? Was abandoning the gold standard an acceptable option? Should they lend more freely to the nation's commercial banks? Or would this only ensure the sorts of financial excess that had gotten the country into trouble in the first place? Was it time to give in to the mounting pressure, or to hold firm?

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 708035

When Dominique Strauss-Kahn became the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund in late 2007, he faced a number of significant changes. The organization had lost much of its legitimacy over the previous decade, and countries seemed increasingly reluctant to borrow from the Fund. Developing countries had increased their foreign exchange reserves, which reduced their reliance on potential IMF support packages. Furthermore, the IMF found itself unable to influence the macroeconomic policies of the United States and China in order to reduce global current account imbalances, and developing world countries complained that they were underrepresented at the Fund. As the IMF's new Managing Director, Strauss-Kahn had to decide how best to address these challenges and in what direction to steer the Fund.

Founded in 1870 to help finance surging German exports and imports, the Deutsche Bank soon moved into domestic banking. In fact, its founders aimed to create both a commercial bank and an investment bank under one roof--that is, a "universal bank." By the end of the nineteenth century, the Deutsche Bank was not only the largest bank in Germany, but also a strategic actor in the broader European market and, indeed, in the world economy. Over the first half of the twentieth century, however, the bank faced a series of national crises: defeat in WWI (1914-1918), revolution in 1919, hyperinflation in 1923, economic depression in the early 1930s, the rise of Hitler in 1933, another world war in 1939, and then total defeat in 1945. At the end of WWII, the Soviets closed the Berlin headquarters of the Deutsche Bank as part of their denazification effort. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France, occupying the western portion of Germany, attempted to implement a policy of economic decentralization, and broke what remained of the bank into small pieces. By 1950, facing a proposal from leading German bankers to allow the big banks to begin reconstituting themselves, the Allied powers and the new German legislature had to decide whether to accept this proposal or reject it.

At the start of WWI, the United States faced a significant housing shortage. Public officials feared the spread of disease--and even communism-- in the nation's cramped urban centers where vacancy rates held near zero and families often "doubled up" in single housing units. Hoping to spark a burst of new construction, New York Senator William Calder called for the creation of eleven regional Federal Building Loan Banks that would serve as a new source of funds for mortgage lenders. The proposal was controversial, however. Opponents disliked the fact that the Federal Building Loan Banks would have the authority to issue tax-free, mortgage backed bonds, and many claimed that the private market would solve the housing shortage on its own. Proponents of the bill, meanwhile, believed that it was necessary to stave off a potentially disastrous and protracted housing shortage, and they cited the long-successful mortgage bond markets in France and Germany as evidence that their plan could succeed. Federal lawmakers had to assess the arguments on both sides and render a decision.

In the early 20th century, public outrage at certain life insurance practices led to an investigation in New York State that threatened to curtail growth in the industry. Charles Evans Hughes guided the four-month-long Armstrong Investigation, which made startling revelations, and offered a number of controversial recommendations, several of which would forbid the most popular form of life insurance (tontine insurance), limit the growth of life insurers (which included several of the nation's largest financial institutions at the time), and prevent insurance firms from owning the stock of other companies. The New York State legislature approved all of the recommended measures, and sent the bill to the Governor for his signature. The life insurance industry objected, however, claiming that some of the new rules would reduce consumer choice and unnecessarily lower returns on company investments.

Banks throughout New York State suspended specie payments (i.e., payments in gold and silver) in May 1837 following the collapse of several state banks, and the onset of a nationwide financial panic. Amid the chaos, the upstart Whigs were able to depose the longstanding Republican majority in the state legislature. Responding to citizen anger, as well as perennial calls for more banking capital, the Whigs drafted a novel "free banking" bill, which would override the established bank chartering mechanism and allow any association with sufficient capital the opportunity to open a bank and issue bank notes (a widely accepted form of paper money at the time). The bill also required that every note issued by a New York bank be fully backed by bonds or mortgages. if enacted, the bill seemed likely to encourage the establishment of many new banks. There was no telling what the economic impact of the bill's special bank note provisions would be. Once the bill passed the legislature, Governor Marcy had to decide whether to sign this radical proposal into law.

In the early 1790's, a flood of newly issued public and private securities sparked an investment boom in the nascent United States. In New York, the bustling commercial district along Wall Street emerged as the center of the city's securities trade. One of the many Americans drawn into the frenetic and largely unregulated securities market was William Duer, who ultimately became a major player on the Street. As it turned out, however, Duer's financial dealings proved unsustainable, and his financial collapse helped to bring the securities boom to a halt. Shocked by the widespread devastation wrought by Wall Street's first panic, the New York legislature acted quickly to ban outdoor securities auctions and a popular class of financial instruments known as "time bargains," both of which were thought to have contributed to the boom and bust on Wall Street. Facing public outrage along with the new legal restrictions, New York's top brokers had to decide whether a new system for securities trading was needed and, if so, what it should look like.

In early 1720, the South Sea Company and the Bank of England were competing for the right to issue new shares and to exchange those shares for government bonds that were then in the hands of the public. The British government had already executed two such debt conversion with the South Sea Company. Most individuals who had converted bonds for shares in 1711 and 1719 had seen their South Sea shares appreciate in the meantime, and the government had lowered its debt servicing costs as a result of these two conversions. The conversion under consideration in 1720, however, would be on a much larger scale. In time, the South Sea Company won the bidding war, and the House of Commons approved its debt conversion plan. Now it was up to the House of Lords to approve or reject the deal.

In 1830, Governor Levi Lincoln, Jr. urged the Massachusetts state legislature to introduce a limited liability regime for manufacturing corporations similar to that adopted in neighboring states. At least since 1809, shareholders in the state's manufacturing corporations had faced unlimited liability, which held shareholders personally liable for corporate debts. While unlimited liability was meant to ensure financial prudence, Lincoln and others worried that this policy was doing more harm than good and driving capital from the state. With the governor pushing for action, it was up to the state legislature to decide how to proceed.

The New York State Legislature had come to a standstill in 1829 as lawmakers refused to charter any new banks or recharter any existing banks. Four of New York's forty banks had failed since 1825, and many legislatures believed that a significant change in the banking regime was needed to shore up the state's financial systems. Others, however, feared that a major change in the law was too risky, especially since over three-quarters of the state's banks held charters that were slated to expire over the next four years. On the table was a completely untested proposal to create a mandatory public insurance fund that would back the banknotes and deposits of every state bank. As bank charters throughout New York State rapidly approached expiration, lawmakers faced a tough decision: should they pass the bill and gamble with the untried insurance fund, or should they go seek a more traditional solution to the state's banking woes?

Inequality represented a major issue at the dawn of the 21st century. By many measures, inequality had increased over the previous several decades, within both developed and developing countries. Whether global inequality (measured across countries or among the people of the world) increased remained controversial. Even in those cases where experts agreed that inequality had risen, there was little consensus about the causes. Some blamed globalization for the growing gulf between rich and poor, whereas others pointed to technology, government policies, and even social norms. Experts also disagreed over whether rising inequality was even a problem, particularly in those places where the poverty rate was low or falling.

Introduces the core principles and challenges of bankruptcy law (both individual and corporate) against the backdrop of the early 1970s, when the U.S. bankruptcy system appeared to be failing. With personal bankruptcy filings at record levels and successful corporate reorganizations relatively rare, policymakers had to decide whether the time had come to overhaul the nation's bankruptcy law and, if so, how to structure the new system.

Provides basic economic and social indicators for 145 countries, drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2004). The data include: population, land area, GNP per capita, real GDP growth, life expectancy, adult illiteracy, fertility rate, access to sanitation, and income inequality. Reports data from 2000 whenever possible and is largely based on Basic Statistics from World Bank's World Development Report 2002 (9-703-030).

Traces the economic development of the United States from 1790 to 1857, focusing especially on the struggle between free traders and protectionists over federal tariff policy. Devotes considerable attention to the nation's political system, its evolving common law, basic factors of production (land, labor, and capital), and key sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, etc.).

Examines the federal financial response to September 11, 2001: the airline bailout, the victim compensation fund, emergency aid to New York and Washington, and terrorism reinsurance. Less than two weeks after the attacks, the government had committed almost $40 billion to relieving the victims and safeguarding the economy. A little over a year later, these measures were joined by the creation of a federal terrorism reinsurance program, originally proposed by the White House in October 2001. On the surface, the federal financial response to September 11 was puzzling. Did the enormity of the attacks weaken the country's commitment to laissez-faire principles? Or is the traditional attitude toward government economic intervention in the United States more complicated than the phrase "laissez-faire" (or "free market") implies? Explores the appropriate role of government in managing risk and responding to disasters and then asks students to consider whether each of the various initiatives--and indeed the program as a whole--was a success or a failure.

Presents the fundamentals of GDP accounting (including definitions, etc.), examines the history of national accounting, and surveys the international debate over "Green GDP." The first section explains the basic rules and definitions of national economic accounting and the meaning of GDP versus NDP. The second section provides historical context for the development of national income estimates, 1886 to 1940, culminating in the creation of GNP by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1940s. The third and final section discusses the standard imputations currently made to reflect nonprice economic activity (e.g., for owner-occupied housing and government services) and explores the debate over imputations for natural resources and environmental quality.

Explores the origins and workings of the World Trade Organization (WTO), focusing particular attention on the special challenges of trade liberalization at the dawn of the 21st century.