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Muhtar Kent, CEO of the Coca-Cola Company, faced a critical decision in 2011 after closing a $12 billion deal to buy its troubled North America bottling operations from its biggest bottler, Coca-Cola Enterprises. The decision was prompted by several changes in the U.S. market, including the bottler's inability to make crucial investments, the growth of alternative, non-sparkling drinks, and the growing power of national accounts, such as Wal-Mart. Now that Coke owned most of its North American bottling network, Kent had to decide whether keeping the labor and capital-intensive side of the bottling business was in Coke's long-term strategic interest. If not, should he re-franchise the bottling business, again, as Coke had done in the past? Or was there a third path? For one of the most successful companies in the world over the last 100 years, Kent's answers to these questions had the potential to redefine Coke's business model for the next century.

The 'Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in 2010' case examines the industry structure and competitive strategy of Coca-Cola and Pepsi over 100 years of rivalry. The most intense battles of the cola wars were fought over the $74 billion CSD industry in the United States, where the average American consumes 46 gallons of CSD per year. In a "carefully waged competitive struggle," from 1975 to the mid-1990s, both Coke and Pepsi had achieved average annual growth of around 10%, as both U.S. and worldwide CSD consumption consistently rose. However, starting in the late 1990s, U.S. CSD consumption started to decline and new non-sparkling beverages become popular, threatening to alter the companies' brand, bottling, and pricing strategies. The case considers what has to be done for Coke and Pepsi to ensure sustainable growth and profitability. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Qualcomm in 2009 and 2010 experienced both the worst of times and the best of times. During the "great recession" of 2009, smartphones growth stalled, stalling Qualcomm's revenue, but in 2010 growth surged again, and was predicted to continue its upward trajectory in 2011. This brief case updates Qualcomm's struggles with FLO TV and BREW, while outlining the new opportunities for Qualcomm in emerging categories such as tablet computers, displays, and new operating systems for smartphones.

On April 4, 2010, Apple Inc. launched the iPad, the company's third major innovation released over the last decade under its iconic CEO Steve Jobs. Apple's strategy of shifting its business into non-PC products had thrived so far, driven by the smashing success of the iPod and the iPhone. Yet challenges abounded. Macintosh sales in the worldwide PC market still languished below 5%. Growth in iPod sales was slowing down. iPhone faced increasing competition in the smartphone industry. And would Apple's latest creation, the iPad, take the company to the next level?

Paul Jacobs, chairman and CEO of Qualcomm Incorporated, smiled as he reflected on the success of Qualcomm's code division multiple access (CDMA) technology. By the summer of 2009, CDMA was the basis for all third generation technologies available for cellular transmissions. However, while Qualcomm seemed poised for growth, Jacobs wondered how successful the company's contributions to new generation technologies would be and if they should aggressively develop their new service offerings into profitable business units.

Intellectual Ventures creates and acquires intellectual property, which it then seeks to monetize through non-exclusive licensing. In early 2009, as an increasing number of companies were trying to position themselves as leading intermediaries in the market for intellectual property, IV was looking for the best business model to become such a leading intermediary. Its model was predicated on making it easy for small inventors to monetize their inventions and IP (by selling it to IV) and then using its scale and aggregate IP portfolio to extract revenues from potential licensees (usually technology companies).

Taiwan-based HTC Corp. had emerged as the world's fourth largest smartphone manufacturer by 2009. CEO Peter Chou was extremely proud of the remarkable achievements his company had made over the last 12 years since starting off as an unknown manufacturer of PDAs for other companies. Yet Chou faced several decisions in order to move his company forward. Competition for high-end, sophisticated mobile devices was intensifying as HTC faced big name players such as Nokia, Apple, and Samsung Electronics. Many companies were offering their own application stores. What did HTC have to do to become a more powerful global brand? Where should HTC participate in the value chain in one of the most exciting, innovative product categories in the technology world?

Multisided platforms can lower your transaction costs and increase customer reach. But powerful MSPs like Microsoft, Google, and Apple have also tended to extract most of the value from their platforms, mainly because companies that played with them didn't adequately understand their motives and operating strategies. As a result, firms can easily find themselves ceding control over customers to MSPs or being unwittingly turned into commodities. Hagiu and Yoffie, both professors at Harvard Business School, explore how MSPs can use their power to "hold up" companies that join them. The authors offer guidelines to help managers create an effective strategy for dealing with MSPs, identifying three basic issues that managers must address: (1) Whether to play with existing MSPs, build their own platform, or do both; (2) once they've concluded that at least one third-party MSP can benefit their business, deciding how many to join; and (3) figuring out how to play - that is, which features or services they should adopt and which they should reject in order to maintain their company's competitive advantage. Some companies that lack the power to influence an MSP's actions may have few options. But many firms - either on their own or in alliances - can make choices that will differentiate them from competitors and curb MSPs' power over their businesses.

The Gucci Group had transformed itself into the world's third largest luxury retailer with multiple brands. The company had performed well even after the departure of star designer Tom Ford and former CEO Domenico De Sole. However, the challenging global economic times in 2009 raised the question whether it was time, again, to re-adjust Gucci's portfolio, especially as YSL continued to lose money.

In the fall of 2008, E Ink had positioned itself as a leader in electronic ink technology thanks to the launch of several eBook devices such as Amazon's Kindle. Yet E Ink still faced the question of how to turn its technology into a profitable business amid competing technologies and financial challenges.

Paul Maritz took the helm of VMware in July 2008, just as the company confronted a radically new competitive environment. Since its founding in 1998, VMware had been the leading provider of virtualization software. Now it faced the kind of threat that every software company dreaded most: Microsoft, the world's largest software maker, was taking direct aim at its core market. As of June 2008, buyers of Microsoft's Windows Server 2008 operating system received a free, bundled version of Hyper-V, an advanced virtualization platform product. Looming over the impending competition between these two companies was the story of the "browser wars," in which Microsoft overwhelmed browser maker Netscape Communications by bundling the Internet Explorer browser with the Windows operating system. Did a similar fate await VMware? Maritz moved quickly and boldly to respond to the Microsoft threat--by deciding to offer a version of VMware's own virtualization platform product for free. But he still had to determine whether VMware's overall strategy was the right one. The case offers an overview of virtualization technology, a brief history of VMware, including descriptions of its acquisition by computer storage giant EMC, its August 2007 IPO, and Maritz's arrival as CEO; a summary of its product lines; a discussion of the ecosystem in which the company operates; and a survey of key competitors, including not only Microsoft, but also Citrix Systems and other providers that use the Xen virtualization platform. Finally, the case offers a description and analysis of several strategic options available to VMware.

In June 2008, the online professional networking service LinkedIn became a $1 billion company. But CEO Dan Nye understood that LinkedIn faced several strategic dilemmas. Founded in 2002, LinkedIn by 2008 had become the world's leading professional networking service (PNS), with more than 23 million members. Aiming to "dominate the business of business networking," in Nye's words, LinkedIn allowed individual members to post a profile on the LinkedIn site and then to use the site's tools to search for job opportunities; to recruit job candidates; to find suppliers, partners, and customers; and to seek out expert advice. The company was also expanding into corporate services that would enable companies to build and manage their own online networks. With revenue sources that included advertising, premium subscriptions, job posting services, and business solutions, LinkedIn was on track to bring in revenues in 2008 of up to $100 million. A new funding round in mid-2008 yielded a $1 billion valuation for the company. Three key dilemmas confronted LinkedIn, however. First, at a time when the "walled garden" model of online community building was under siege, it had to decide how far it should open its platform to users. Second, in light of competition from highly popular social network services such as Facebook and MySpace, LinkedIn had to decide whether to incorporate social networking into its value proposition. Third, in an increasingly global business environment, it had to weigh the option of merging with its leading international competitor, XING.com.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 708-480.

In January 2007, three decades after its incorporation, Apple Computer shed the second word in its name and became Apple Inc. With that move, the company signaled a fundamental shift away from its historic status as a vendor of the Macintosh personal computer (PC) line. Mac sales remained vital to Apple's future, but they now accounted for less than half of its total revenue. The company's line of iPod media players, its iTunes online content store and its newly launched iPhone mobile handset business made up increasingly large shares of its operations. In early 2008, on the strength of sky-rocketing sales in those areas and by resurgent sales of Macintosh products, Apple's revenues and its stock price reached record levels. The case explores the sustainability of Apple's current business model, one that positioned the company simultaneously in the PC industry and the consumer electronics industry. While Apple enjoyed a high market share in digital media players and in online music sales, it remained a niche player in the worldwide PC industry. The case examines the history of Apple's strategic moves under the leadership of CEOs Jobs, Sculley, Spindler, Amelio, and (again) Jobs; places those moves in the context of structural features of the evolving PC industry; and covers the iPod and iPhone businesses at considerable length.

Tom Rogers, CEO of TiVo, had placed multiple strategic bets on his company. In September 2007, that strategy was due for a major test. TiVo was a maker of digital video recorder (DVR) products and a distributor of DVR technology. Rogers believed that macro-trends in the home entertainment industry--the convergence of standard television with the delivery of video content via broadband Internet, and the related crisis faced by companies whose business models relied on TV advertising--played to TiVo's unique strengths. Leadership in DVR technology and a TV-centric user interface arguably positioned TiVo to become something more than a consumer electronics company. That was Roger's big bet. Implementing it required making six other bets: continuing to sell stand-alone DVRs in the retail market, despite rapidly eroding market share; distributing TiVo service in partnership with cable and satellite TV providers (which also functioned as TiVo's chief competitors in the DVR market); developing a platform for DVR-based advertising; entering the audience research business; leveraging TiVo's intellectual property both through litigation and in the marketplace; and expanding into non-U.S. markets. In late 2007, a pivotal new product, a major distribution deal with cable operator Comcast, and a key intellectual property lawsuit were all reaching points of critical impact.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 708-401.

The launch of Apple's iPhone marked a pivotal new chapter in the story of mobile music (the uniting of digital music players with mobile phones). The iPhone combined an iPod music player, a cell phone, and a mobile Internet device, along with a camera and other features. By September 2007, just 74 days after the June launch of the iPhone, Apple and its mobile carrier partner AT&T Mobility had sold one million units. When Apple CEO Steve Jobs introduced the product in January 2007, he said that the goal behind it was to "reinvent the phone." Yet both the device and the mobile service provided by AT&T involved limitations that could hinder the long-term prospects for the iPhone. At the same time, handset makers and other mobile carriers had brought, or would soon bring, various "iPhone killers" to the market.

In 2007, Wal-Mart faced challenges to its historically high growth rate. Lagging same-store sales and setbacks overseas led the company to consider strategic shifts. Wal-Mart was the world's largest retailer, but competition had become particularly acute as the company expanded from rural markets, which it had long dominated, into urban and suburban areas. Covers developments in Wal-Mart's merchandising strategy and its approach to store formats; its sometimes controversial human resources practices; its efforts to improve its image through a public relations campaign; its aggressive, though occasionally problematic, move into international markets; and its leading competitors, especially Target. Exhibits provide data (current as of February 2007) on Wal-Mart's financial performance, its stock-price performance, its international operations, and its store formats, as well as on Target's financial performance.

Intel and Microsoft neither buy from nor sell to each other directly, but they are undeniably in business together. They are probably the world's most widely known pair of complementors--companies that independently provide complementary products or services to mutual customers. Complementors increase the value of each other's offerings and the size of the total market. So it's not surprising that so many just assume that their interests are aligned. Nothing could be further from the truth. Discord can develop in many areas, such as pricing, technology, standards, and control of the market--both in terms of which company has the most influence over customers and which one gets the biggest slice of the pie. The issue of pricing perfectly captures this tension. Ideally, you'd like to price your goods high while your complementors price theirs low. Airlines, for instance, would be happy to see vacation lodgings go for a song, while destination resorts could raise rates and still fill their rooms if customers could fly there for free. The first step in managing relationships with complementors is to develop a deep understanding of their economics, their strategies and goals, their existing capabilities, their incentives for cooperation, and any potential areas of conflict. Then, to gain the upper hand, companies can use a variety of tools that fall into two main categories: hard power (inducements or coercion to get what you want) and soft power (persuasion through indirect means to get others to want what you want). The authors explain how to build both hard power and soft, illustrate the strengths and limits of each, and offer guidelines for choosing one over the other. Conflict among complementors is inevitable, but together, hard and soft power can help companies manage the dark side of complementor relationships and take full advantage of the opportunities that cooperation should create.

In 2006, a nascent market for music-enabled mobile phones was emerging to challenge Apple Computer's dominant position in the digital music industry. Through its iPod line of portable digital music devices and its iTunes Music Store, Apple controlled more than half of the market for both music player hardware and online music sales. But the evolving ability to merge those devices with mobile phones, and to deliver music to mobile handsets (via streaming, side-loading content from a PC or downloading it wirelessly over the air), created a potentially market-changing opportunity for players in several industries. Examines the key players, including Apple; the major wireless service carriers, such as Cingular, Sprint-Nextel, and Verizon Wireless; technology and service vendors, such as RealNetworks and Microsoft; and mobile virtual network operators, such as Virgin Mobile. Covers the origins of the mobile music business, projections on its potential size, its technological building blocks (such as file formats, digital rights management systems, wireless network infrastructure, and handset capacity), and the key dynamics--music delivery method, pricing, mobile-PC integration--that characterize mobile music business models.