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[Continuation of "A" case.] Less than a month after the close of the merger between The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial, managers at the two firms realized that plans for combining their asset servicing businesses - and realizing the $180 million of annual cost savings that they had promised Wall Street - were fraught with risk. Senior executives must evaluate the seriousness of the risks and identify alternative ways of integrating the two firms, while safeguarding the technologies that process and clear a substantial fraction of the world's financial transactions. [Continues with "C" case.]

[Continuation of "A" and "B" cases.] Less than a month after the close of the merger between The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial, managers at the two firms realized that plans for combining their asset servicing businesses - and realizing the $180 million of annual cost savings that they had promised Wall Street - were fraught with risk. Senior executives must evaluate the seriousness of the risks and identify alternative ways of integrating the two firms, while safeguarding the technologies that process and clear a substantial fraction of the world's financial transactions.

This case highlights the issues around money market mutual funds in the financial crisis of 2008.

This case highlights the issues surrounding money market mutual funds in the financial crisis of 2008.

On September 23, 2008, in the midst of an historic crisis in the U.S. financial markets, Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway invested $5 billion in Goldman Sachs. Goldman CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, said: "We are pleased that given our longstanding relationship, Warren Buffett, arguably the world's most admired and successful investor, has decided to make such a significant investment in Goldman Sachs." He added that the deal "will further bolster our strong capitalization and liquidity position," calling Buffett's decision "a strong validation of our client franchise and future prospects." For his part, Buffett called Goldman "an exceptional institution" with "...an unrivaled global franchise, a proven and deep management team, and the intellectual and financial capital to continue its track record of outperformance." This case provides an opportunity to evaluate Goldman's decision to raise capital, the cost of the firm of Buffett's investment, and the decision by Warren Buffett to make the investment, all in the context of a profound market crisis that may have altered the usual metrics for such decisions.

Bear Stearns & Co burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves during the week of March 10, 2008, and an unprecedented provision of liquidity support from the Federal Reserve on Friday March 13 was insufficient to reverse the decline in Bear's condition. Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner were intent on limiting the impact of Bear's problems on the wider financial system. James "Jamie" Dimon, Morgan's Chairman and CEO, was in frequent contact with these regulators over the weekend of March 14-16, negotiating possible scenarios for the rescue of Bear, without which would force it to seek bankruptcy protection when markets opened on Monday. Late on Sunday afternoon, March 16, Bear's board accepted Morgan's offer to purchase Bear for $2 per share, an offer that would not have been made without significant government assistance. There was hope that the Bear rescue would help avert the far-reaching spread of damage into the larger financial world that many policymakers viewed as likely to follow the failure of a major investment bank. This case examines a seminal event in the financial and economic crisis that began in the summer of 2007, and provides background for better understanding the full scope of the crisis as it was revealed during the summer and fall of 2008. It was written to address two sets of issues. First, it provides the opportunity to understand the corporate finance issues of capital and liquidity, and of firm valuation. Second, the case allows for the exploration of aspects of a firm's internal and external governance, as well as the challenges of navigating through a crisis when faced with compelling pressures from competing stakeholders.

Bear Stearns & Co. burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves during the week of March 10, 2008, and an unprecedented provision of liquidity support from the Federal Reserve on Friday March 13 was insufficient to reverse the decline in Bear's condition. Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner were intent on limiting the impact of Bear's problems on the wider financial system. James "Jamie" Dimon, Morgan's Chairman and CEO, was in frequent contact with these regulators over the weekend of March 14-16, negotiating possible scenarios for the rescue of Bear, without which Bear would be forced it to seek bankruptcy protection when markets opened on Monday. Late on Sunday afternoon, March 16, Bear's board accepted Morgan's offer to purchase Bear for $2 per share, an offer that would not have been made without significant government assistance. There was hope that the Bear rescue would help avert the far-reaching spread of damage into the larger financial world that many policymakers viewed as likely to follow the failure of a major investment bank. This case examines a seminal event in the financial and economic crisis that began in the summer of 2007, and provides background for better understanding the full scope of the crisis as it was revealed during the summer and fall of 2008. It was written to address two sets of issues. First, it provides the opportunity to understand the corporate finance issues of capital and liquidity, and of firm valuation. Second, the case allows for the exploration of aspects of a firm's internal and external governance, as well as the challenges of navigating through a crisis when faced with compelling pressures from competing stakeholders.

Bear Stearns & Co burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves during the week of March 10, 2008, and an unprecedented provision of liquidity support from the Federal Reserve on Friday March 13 was insufficient to reverse the decline in Bear's condition. Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner were intent on limiting the impact of Bear's problems on the wider financial system. James "Jamie" Dimon, Morgan's Chairman and CEO, was in frequent contact with these regulators over the weekend of March 14-16, negotiating possible scenarios for the rescue of Bear, without which would force it to seek bankruptcy protection when markets opened on Monday. Late on Sunday afternoon, March 16, Bear's board accepted Morgan's offer to purchase Bear for $2 per share, an offer that would not have been made without significant government assistance. There was hope that the Bear rescue would help avert the far-reaching spread of damage into the larger financial world that many policymakers viewed as likely to follow the failure of a major investment bank. This case examines a seminal event in the financial and economic crisis that began in the summer of 2007, and provides background for better understanding the full scope of the crisis as it was revealed during the summer and fall of 2008. It was written to address two sets of issues. First, it provides the opportunity to understand the corporate finance issues of capital and liquidity, and of firm valuation. Second, the case allows for the exploration of aspects of a firm's internal and external governance, as well as the challenges of navigating through a crisis when faced with compelling pressures from competing stakeholders.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 309001

As CEO of leading executive search firm Heidrick & Struggles for the past 18 months, Kevin Kelly was pleased with his accomplishments so far but concerned about threats he perceived to Heidrick's position at the highest levels of the executive search business. In response, Kelly had begun making strategic investments in firms offering technology-based solutions, but had not yet made significant progress convincing Heidrick's search consultants about the significance of the threats, or the risks and opportunities being created by information technology and the Internet. The increased emphasis Kelly placed on building leadership consulting services was itself a big change. The case asks what levers Kelly can use, from culture to compensation, to make the challenges to Heidrick's traditional business model understood, and how to implement the strategic initiatives he has launched.

LFG reorganizes its business in order to improve customer intimacy. However, to implement the strategy, they need to effect significant changes in the skills of their salespeople. This case series straddles human resource management, corporate strategy, and sales management by exploring the link between a shift in the firm's overall strategy (customer intimacy), the structural implementation of this strategy in the form of the creation of a new distribution company and, finally, the transformation of the selling approach through skills assessment and development. The (A) case describes the firm's strategic position as the "manufacturer" of three primary product lines--annulities, insurance, and mutual funds--which they sell to banks, broker/dealers, and independent planners. Most of their customers have just one of these products 'on the shelf.' In 2000, they create Lincoln Financial Distributors (LFD) which will be responsible for the wholesaling of all of these products. The case ends by asking the students to (a) react to this idea and (b) formulate a plan for its implementation. Simply taking salespeople away from their product group and housing them side-by-side with other salespeople selling other products is unlikely to create true customer intimacy. Wes Thompson, LFD's President and Kim Miner, the Human Resources VP, undertake a sweeping effort in which they create a "competency model," denoting precisely what they want their salespeople to be good at, assessing the sales force on these dimensions, and then hiring or training in order to get where they want to be. The (B) case provides rich detail of the model, the assessment approach and the results of the assessments. As the (C) case lays out, the results are stunning in terms of their relationships as well as from a financial perspective. The (C) then ends by offering a strategy for "Act II'" significantly expanding the number of salespeople at LFD.

LFG reorganizes its business in order to improve customer intimacy. However, to implement the strategy, they need to effect significant changes in the skills of their salespeople. This case series straddles human resource management, corporate strategy, and sales management by exploring the link between a shift in the firm's overall strategy (customer intimacy), the structural implementation of this strategy in the form of the creation of a new distribution company and, finally, the transformation of the selling approach through skills assessment and development. The (A) case describes the firm's strategic position as the "manufacturer" of three primary product lines--annuities, insurance, and mutual funds--which they sell to banks, broker/dealers, and independent planners. Most of their customers have just one of these products 'on the shelf.' In 2000, they create Lincoln Financial Distributors (LFD) which will be responsible for the wholesaling of all of these products. The case ends by asking the students to (a) react to this idea and (b) formulate a plan for its implementation. Simply taking salespeople away from their product group and housing them side-by-side with other salespeople selling other products is unlikely to create true customer intimacy. Wes Thompson, LFD's President and Kim Miner, the Human Resources VP, undertake a sweeping effort in which they create a "competency model," denoting precisely what they want their salespeople to be good at, assessing the sales force on these dimensions, and then hiring or training in order to get where they want to be. The (B) case provides rich detail of the model, the assessment approach and the results of the assessments. As the (C) case lays out, the results are stunning in terms of their relationships as well as from a financial perspective. The (C) then ends by offering a strategy for "Act II'" significantly expanding the number of salespeople at LFD.

LFG reorganizes its business in order to improve customer intimacy. However, to implement the strategy, they need to effect significant changes in the skills of their salespeople. This case series straddles human resource management, corporate strategy, and sales management by exploring the link between a shift in the firm's overall strategy (customer intimacy), the structural implementation of this strategy in the form of the creation of a new distribution company and, finally, the transformation of the selling approach through skills assessment and development. The (A) case describes the firm's strategic position as the "manufacturer" of three primary product lines--annuities, insurance, and mutual funds--which they sell to banks, broker/dealers, and independent planners. Most of their customers have just one of these products 'on the shelf.' In 2000, they create Lincoln Financial Distributors (LFD) which will be responsible for the wholesaling of all of these products. The case ends by asking the students to (a) react to this idea and (b) formulate a plan for its implementation. Simply taking salespeople away from their product group and housing them side-by-side with other salespeople selling other products is unlikely to create true customer intimacy. Wes Thompson, LFD's President and Kim Miner, the Human Resources VP, undertake a sweeping effort in which they create a "competency model," denoting precisely what they want their salespeople to be good at, assessing the sales force on these dimensions, and then hiring or training in order to get where they want to be. The (B) case provides rich detail of the model, the assessment approach and the results of the assessments. As the (C) case lays out, the results are stunning in terms of their relationships as well as from a financial perspective. The (C) then ends by offering a strategy for "Act II'" significantly expanding the number of salespeople at LFD.

Despite the failure of other attempts to bring mixed use development in New York City, Related Companies in 2004 opened Time Warner Center, a huge complex incorporating offices, shops, restaurants, music auditoriums, a hotel, and luxury apartments on Columbus Circle in Manhattan. Tracing the process by which Related became the site developer, the case examines the risks and rewards of building and marketing the various components of the megastructure.

In the highly competitive information technology outsourcing industry, Cognizant Technology Solutions has developed a strategy to differentiate itself by emphasizing building very close client relationships through its "Two-in-a-box" (TIB) model. This model is based on having two people share complete responsibility for the client. In the U.S. or Europe, the "on-site" person, along with his or her relationship management team, is responsible for understanding the client's needs, obtaining projects and properly scoping out the work. The "offshore" person in India or elsewhere, along with his or her delivery team, is responsible for completing the project in a high quality and timely way. The same top- and bottom-line metrics are used to evaluate the performance of both the on-site and offshore managers. This strategy (as opposed to ones based on things like low cost and innovation used by Cognizant's competitors) is intended to build deep and strong client relationships that will maximize Cognizant's "share of wallet." One interesting aspect of TIB is Cognizant Business Consulting, a 1,700-person group which advises clients in the context of helping them develop IT solutions for their business challenges. More recently, and as the next evolution of the TIB model, Cognizant is developing what it calls "Cognizant 2.0" or C2. C2 is a delivery platform based on Web 2.0 technology that enables Cognizant to subdivide work into tasks that can be allocated wherever in the world the best resources within Cognizant exist based on cost, expertise and availability while at the same time maintaining collaboration and integration to ensure timely and high quality delivery.

Explains the approvals and construction process for a building to be constructed against neighborhood opposition above an operating bank branch in New York City.

Late in September 2001, Hans van Tartwijk, president of Trimp & van Tartwijk Property Development (TvT) of Amsterdam, Holland, was deeply worried about the status of his largest ongoing project; the Amsterdam World Trade Center (WTC). As the discretionary developer, van Tartwijk needed to present his firm's recommendations to WTC owners and municipal stakeholders on how best to manage problems in the renovation of the 27-floor, 60,000 square meter complex. The WTC owners, two Dutch financial institutions, had hired TvT in 1995 to advise out how to best handle their property's under performance, which stood 20% empty and had prematurely aged. 1. Should the Owners sell, perform minimum upgrade or a major upgrade with construction, expansion? 2. What emphasis - commitment made to Green Technologies?

"On February 1, 2007, Wal-Mart Mexico (Walmex) CEO Eduardo Solorzano was preparing for a well deserved, two-week vacation on Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. Things were going well. Wal-Mart Mexico, which consisted principally of six different retail formats, had been growing at a dizzying pace ..."

As the smallest of 4 partners in a unique wireless telephony venture in Bangladesh that he initiated and helped grow, Iqbal Quadir is trying to acquire a larger stake in the venture when one of the partners wants to sell his shares. However, Quadir faces stiff resistance from the other two partners, who also want to acquire the shares.