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The 2015 case "Royal Bank of Canada: Transforming Managers (A)" discusses programs that the bank put in place between 2011 and 2013 to improve managerial effectiveness. The case looks at the traits that make good managers, how to use data to create visibility into managerial effectiveness, the features of a successful intervention action plan, and the challenges with finding ways to reward good managers. Specifically, the case focuses on a pilot intervention program within the Canadian Banking operations division that was designed by Human Resources thought leaders in collaboration with Canadian Banking operations' top leaders. The program had multiple parts: 1) Using an analytics model based on the employee opinion survey to rank all managers in the division based on effectiveness; 2) Dividing all managers into four effectiveness cohorts (roughly in quartiles); 3) Identifying the managers most in need of, and most likely to benefit from, manager effectiveness training; and 4) creating and carrying out action plans. The action plans included formal coaching by each of the targeted managers' managers (the most effective intervention), feedback, and formal training. The case concludes as the bank waits for the results of the next employee opinion survey to gauge how effective its management improvement programs were. The companion case, "Royal Bank of Canada: Transforming Managers (B)," discusses the results of the programs.

The 2015 case "Royal Bank of Canada: Transforming Managers (B)" details the success of the manager improvement pilot intervention program discussed in the companion case, "Royal Bank of Canada: Transforming Managers (A)." Within one year, the division that ran the program, the Canadian Banking operations division, saw marked improvement in nearly all of the managers who participated in the program. Based on these results, the division continued to hone the intervention program details, and RBC expanded the program across the bank.

In 2015, LinkedIn, the world's largest professional network, was experiencing explosive growth, and it needed to hire the very best people quickly to support and fuel that growth. This case discusses LinkedIn's hiring approach and details how the company used its own online recruiting products, such as LinkedIn Talent Solutions, to attract and retain talent. At the same time, the company was creating new recruiting models that put it at the forefront of modern recruiting. LinkedIn had done well so far in bringing in top talent. Nevertheless, as it rapidly scaled, the challenge was making sure the company could compete with other tech firms to attract enough highly skilled engineers. The case explains specific techniques that LinkedIn's recruiting team of over 100 people used to attract talented candidates for positions in engineering, sales, and other departments. Those techniques included: 1) replacing cold calling potential candidates with finding "warm connections" to them through their LinkedIn networks; 2) using a data-driven approach to identify the best candidates to pursue; and 3) developing personalized online relationships with top candidates. LinkedIn made internal hiring a priority. For external hires, the company focused heavily on recruiting passive candidates-people were who already gainfully employed and not necessarily looking for a new job. The case also discusses LinkedIn's employee value proposition, focusing on the extraordinary opportunities employees were given for "transformation" once they joined the LinkedIn team. These opportunities included personal advancement through a smooth path to change jobs within LinkedIn if they wished, as well as formal and informal programs designed for employees to pursue their passions-and share their experiences. "LinkedIn and Modern Recruiting (B)" goes into more detail about LinkedIn's data-driven approach, new recruitment innovations, and diversity scorecard.

This case picks up where "LinkedIn and Modern Recruiting (A)" left off, detailing the company's innovations in hiring practices, which included its highly effective use of LinkedIn profile and resume data. As part of these innovations, LinkedIn's talent acquisition team built a new recruiting model, called the Total Addressable Market (TAM) model. TAM took a page out of sales and marketing models by using data that users provided on LinkedIn, enabling the company to narrow, segment, and prioritize which potential candidates to commit recruiting resources toward. In addition, the case presents LinkedIn's diversity scorecard and efforts to date.

This 2015 case focuses on the evolution of Box's management practices as the company grew from a small start-up to an organization with over 1,000 employees in five major locations. The online file sharing and cloud content collaboration service company was founded in 2005, and a decade later it was valued at $2.4 billion. During that time, Box was evolving its approaches to and processes for hiring, compensation, promotions, and performance evaluations. A driving factor in its management practices was the need to attract and retain top-quality entrepreneurial employees. However, as the company pivoted strategy to focus more on the lucrative enterprise market, its management practices had to evolve to be able to attract and retain more experienced employees with specific expertise in that segment. Box found it need to address tensions that arose as the company grew, including the slower speed of promotions, the changing compensation mix (cash versus equity), and the changing company culture as more seasoned employees joined the Box team.

"Intel's Mobile Strategy in 2015 and Beyond" examines the company's 2014 - 2015 strategy to become a more important mobile player. In early 2015, the semiconductor giant had virtually no presence in the smartphone market, and had only recently gained a real presence in the tablet market. Getting into the mobile market was strategically vital for Intel as the notebook market had been shrinking due to cannibalization from tablets. Flattening demand for notebook processors also meant that production volume in Intel's multi-billion fabrication plants was flattening as well. Intel's mobile efforts had led to losses of $5 billion by the first quarter of 2015. Most phones and tablets ran on a competing architecture designed and licensed by ARM Holdings, and Intel competitors Qualcomm, Apple, Samsung and MediaTek made most of the processors for mobile devices. Intel's efforts to gain market share included compensating its manufacturing customers for the cost of using Intel's more expensive chips. Its goal was to supply chips for 40 million tablets by the end of 2014 (which it exceeded). Intel was also engaging in new partnerships and investment tactics in China to sell Intel-branded chips for the low end of the tablet market. In pursuing the mobile market, Intel had encountered technology challenges and delays, as well as an internal resistance to selling the lower-priced, lower-margin mobile processors, despite having data showing customers' increasing desire for mobile products. Intel had very little time to establish a relevant presence in the mobile market, and the question was whether implementing these new strategies would be enough.

In 2014 The Alta Gracia clothing factory in the Dominican Republic was doing something quite unusual in the industry; it was paying its employees a living wage, which was 350 percent higher than the country's minimum wage. Knights Apparel, which owned the four-year old factory, also provided benefits, health care, and allowed the workers to unionize. Most apparel factories paid employees a minimum wage, which in some places was not enough to pay for workers' basic needs and the needs of their families. Knights Apparel founder and CEO Joe Bozich, the driving force behind Alta Gracia, came to this decision from both business and personal motivations. Knights Apparel was the number one provider of licensed collegiate logo apparel, and Bozich saw the opportunity presented by the growing number of college students unhappy with the working conditions of the people making their schools' branded apparel. Personally, Bozich said he wanted to provide "hope and a pathway out of poverty for generations to come." However, Alta Gracia's production costs were 20-30 percent higher than at Knights' other factories, and Alta Gracia was losing over half a million dollars a year. Knights was able to keep Alta Gracia open only by subsidizing it with funds from its profitable business units. Knights was a private company, but Bozich was still accountable to his board and the company's large multi-billion-dollar institutional investors. Over time, Bozich had convinced many of them to back Alta Gracia, but he needed to pull the factory into profitability soon in order to prove it was a viable business model. If Alta Gracia was successful, Knights would have to decide if it should be expanded. There was also the question of whether Knights would be able to replicate Alta Gracia, and if it could, should it? Other companies had tried and failed to offer a living wage and become profitable. Would Knights be different?

This 2014 case describes how the Los Angeles-based Magnolia Community Initiative (MCI) - a network of 70 government, nonprofit and for-profit organizations from multiple sectors - is trying to create population-level change for 110,000 people in a neighborhood plagued by poverty and low education levels. The case discusses the challenges for such a network and raises questions about 1) how to measure progress and outcomes and 2) what factors contribute to success or failure. The six-year-old initiative had built the large network, linked participating organizations together to better serve clients, and designed a new data-driven system for measuring progress and outcomes. However, MCI had not yet seen any improvements in population-level outcomes or intermediate-level outcomes for the neighborhood. MCI is an example of "Collective Impact," an approach to solving social problems that involves commitment from many groups around a common agenda - with the specific features of a centralized infrastructure, a dedicated staff, a structured process, shared measurements, continuous communication and mutually reinforcing activities among all participants.

(With SaaS, vendors stored a client's data in an external server or in the cloud, and maintained the software and relevant hardware.) Transitioning to SaaS required the €114 million company simultaneously to transform its strategy, business model, technology and culture; and the change process was bumpy. SaaS customers paid as they used services, rather than upfront as they did with the licensed software and installation business; that difference had an immediate negative impact on Basware's revenue stream. The company's new SaaS technology would be best in breed when it was complete, but it was taking longer than expected to be ready. Basware also needed to reorganize as a global organization, its sales people needed to be retrained or transitioned out, and its culture needed to adjust to match these rapid changes. At the same time, Basware's e-invoice operator business was booming. In 2013, there were an estimated 63 million transactions across the Basware Commerce Network, and the company expected to hit 150 million transactions by the end of 2015. Speed was the name of the game for Basware, as each transaction brought in money and because the network's size was Basware's competitive advantage. Although the software and e-invoicing businesses were two separate businesses, they were synergistic. The more customers moved from paper to e-invoicing, the more they would be able to use the full functionality of Basware's automated software solutions.

The case presents the challenges confronting BrightSource, a company building a commercial-scale concentrated solar power plant in California in 2013: 1) environmentalists wanted to protect a threatened species at the site of the new plant, 2) competing solar power technology had become much cheaper in recent years, and 3) the company had been unable to get investors for its new thermal storage technology, which could be a game changer for the industry. When BrightSource was in the planning stages of Ivanpah, a 400-megawatt solar power plant in the Mojave Desert, the company encountered opposition from environmentalists because the federal land specifically set aside for the facility was also the habitat of the desert tortoise, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. While solar energy was a positive step toward increasing renewable energy resources, and Ivanpah would power 140,000 homes during peak hours, local environmentalists were equally concerned about the survival of the desert tortoise. The case describes the steps BrightSource took to respond to the concerns raised by the environmentalists and build the plant, addressing both climate change and protecting local habitats. Company management also faced challenges from the changing economics of generating solar power due to developments in competing systems and technologies. Students are asked to consider whether the technology that BrightSource is using, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), is the right choice for the future of the industry, given that the cost of competitors' technology, Photovoltaics (PV), had dropped dramatically in the previous few years. BrightSource also had a new thermal storage technology that would allow it to provide electricity on cloudy days, thereby significantly increasing output and the profitability of future power plants, but investors so far had not come on board, citing the risk and expense of the building out the technology.

Nike's labor practices were the subject of high profile public protests in the 1990s, and CEO Mark Parker said the company still had a lot of work to do in that area. The case also details how making sustainability a key part of the design process led Nike to develop more innovative and high-performing products, such as a breakthrough running shoe called the Flyknit, which was widely worn at the 2012 Olympics. Following protests in the late 1990s over unsafe working conditions, low wage rates, excessive overtime, restrictions on employee organizing, and negative environmental impacts, Nike began shifting from a reactive to a proactive mode. During the 15 years covered in this case, Nike made significant changes in its sustainability practices, including moving its Corporate Responsibility team much further upstream in the organization, where it could have a greater impact on decisions by providing input early in the process. The company also developed multiple indexes that measured its sustainability practices and those of its independent contract manufacturers. The indexes had metrics for measuring the relevant impacts of product waste, water, chemistry, labor, and energy. Nike's critics said many labor issues had not been resolved, but Nike made progress in that area through collaboration with governments, NGOs and labor unions, and through management compliance trainings. If a contract factory did not score high enough on the company's sustainability and labor ratings scales, Nike would impose sanctions on the factory or even drop it from the supply chain. These actions took Nike off the top of most activists' target lists.

The case discusses LinkedIn's corporate culture in 2012-2103 and the importance the professional networking company put on maintaining that culture as it dramatically expanded in headcount domestically and internationally. LinkedIn's leadership believed its culture was its competitive advantage. The company fostered creativity, innovation, and a collaborative and open working environment, embraced humor, and was results oriented. LinkedIn sought to hire staff who wanted to make a positive lasting impact in the world and who valued integrity. To build and grow the corporate culture, two programs were designed to inspire creativity and collaboration: 1) Hackdays, in which teams of engineers worked to find solutions to problems they found personally engaging; and 2) Incubator, in which a team could pitch a product to the executive staff and potentially get time to turn the idea into a reality. Maintaining the culture also meant that employees were given a day off every month for personal development. LinkedIn Analytics data was used to measure overall strategy and results as well as employee satisfaction; "All Hands Meetings" twice a month included fun activities and some tiebacks to the company's culture along with reviewing the company's operating priorities and progress; and social impact programs were given a high priority. LinkedIn aimed to hire and promote from within, and when hiring externally looked for evidence of collaboration, humor, and passion. New employees were assigned a personal mentor, and all employees were part of initiatives to help colleagues learn new skills. The company's leadership had to figure out how it could maintain or modify these activities as it quickly grew.

"Natural Gas and Its Role in the New Energy Dynamics" presents a comprehensive look at new natural gas extraction technology (hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" and horizontal drilling), as well as the economic and climate effects of the recent dramatic increase in unconventional natural gas production and consumption. It discusses the impact of the low natural gas prices in the U.S., as well as the lucrative arbitrage opportunities in transporting liquified natural gas (LNG) to Europe and Asia, where prices could be as much as five times higher than those in the U.S. The case also explores the new energy dynamics created by the natural gas boom, most notably the significant decrease in U.S. coal production and consumption due to low natural gas prices. It looks at other options for coal companies, such as exporting more coal to China, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The potential for natural gas to replace oil as a transportation fuel is also discussed The question presented to students by the case is whether the executive director of a fictional environmental group should support the use of natural gas, and if so, under what conditions. Reasons for supporting the use of natural gas include reducing the use of coal in the U.S., a key goal of many environmental groups. When burned, natural gas emits only half as much carbon dioxide as coal-so the substitution could positively impact climate change. However, data on the climate effects of LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG) in certain uses-such as in transportation fuel-are still incomplete. In addition, there is evidence that fracking may cause local environmental damage and that methane leakage must also be taken into account.

The case is about the San Francisco-based law firm, Paragon Legal, founded by lawyer and entrepreneur Mae O'Malley. Paragon Legal gave high-level attorneys the opportunity to have a flexible schedule and work 10 to 40 hours a week. This was in the context of an industry that typically required very long hours and had inflexible schedules and serious penalties for stepping out of the field for any length of time. Eighty-five percent of Paragon Legal attorneys were women with children, but the firm also attracted women and men without children who wanted to find a work/life balance. Paragon Legal lawyers were contract workers and received competitive compensation. In addition to discussing Paragon Legal, the case details the landscape of the legal industry, including challenges and pressures on all attorneys and the additional challenges for women. By the summer of 2010, Paragon Legal had become successful in the San Francisco Bay Area, and the question posed in the (A) case is whether the company should scale within the region and/or geographically. And if so, what would that look like? Other topics of discussion in the case include: the nature of contract work, entrepreneurship (and female entrepreneurship), and redesigning work for a better work/life balance.

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The Ameritor family of mutual funds was nicknamed the "Dead Man Funds" because of its terrible performance and the assumption that those who kept their money in the funds had no choice, that is, they were dead. Established in the 1950s, the funds boasted $200 million in assets under management by 1970. But those numbers quickly dropped to practically nothing by the late 1980s. In 1989, Morningstar Inc. told investors, "We urge you to cut your losses and get out." Expense ratios skyrocketed as high 40 percent per annum, numerous lawsuits were filed by the SEC, and turnover rates hit 400 percent in some years. By 2010, the mutual funds had either been liquidated or went out of business. The case examines the demise of the funds, highlighting the initial outflow of funds as well as the investors who chose not to remove their capital.

This case covers the electric vehicle industry, starting with the history of the electric car and then moving on to the forces driving the twenty-first century automotive industry toward electrification. These include: Government incentives for buying electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles, the economic and political problems related to oil dependency, the effect of oil prices on consumers' car buying habits, carbon dioxide emission and pollution awareness, and the effect of current and upcoming worldwide emissions regulations. The case then discusses the challenges to mass electric vehicle adoption including: the relatively higher price of certain electric vehicles; consumers' fear of "range anxiety" - the term for batteries running out of power in the middle of the road; and the narrow demographics of traditional hybrid buyers - which could be mirrored in the demographics of electric car buyers. Other challenges include: competition with internal combustion engines that were becoming more fuel efficient, time limits for government incentive programs, the new competitive market of small, more fuel efficient cars being produced and sold in China and India for less than $3,000, and the question of carbon footprint - the concept that coal is the major source of electricity production in the United States and China, and therefore electric vehicles may simply create a shift in carbon footprint from oil to coal. The case provides specific data about electric car and plug-hybrid brands, price, all-electric driving range and release dates. It also details government programs to promote electric vehicles, as well as current and future mandated miles per gallon for various countries. In addition, it provides data about worldwide and U.S. car sales, how far Americans drive and for what purpose, and psychographics of hybrid vehicle owners.

This case is set five years after the Stanford Graduate School of Business case "Infosys Consulting in 2006: Leading the Next Generation of Business and Information Technology Consulting." Since then Infosys Consulting (IC) had become quite successful in the IT consulting world through its model of offsite technology development and its new Value Realization Method, which had driven IC's profits and reputation while becoming the company's key differentiator. The method involved quantitatively linking IC programs back to the creation of shareholder value on one side and to customer value on the other. While IC brought in zero dollars of revenue in 2004, in fiscal year 2011 direct revenue hit $200 million. In addition, IC drove another $600 million in revenue for its India-based parent company, Infosys Technology Limited (ITL). IC also had an operating margin of 25 percent. The company had grown very rapidly - by 2011 it counted 700 consultants worldwide and 42 partners. This quick growth provided both opportunities and challenges for the new company. IC's parent company ITL was also growing extremely rapidly, and the case discusses IC relationship with its parent company, which was across the world and had a much more formalized method of operation. By contrast, IC described itself as a maverick culture, which it saw as a great asset and helped the company attract and retain top-notch consultants.

The case examines HelloWallet, the online, independent financial guidance service, in the context of behavioral finance concepts. It also looks at the specific challenges faced by online personal financial management (PFM) systems. In addition, the case has a detailed overview of American household finance, including data regarding Americans' ability to save money, readiness for retirement, and level of financial literacy. HelloWallet offers a range of services including PFM, financial planning, a system to aggregate users' financial accounts, and an application to help users find financial products that are better deals than their current ones. While not the first to market with this type of service, HelloWallet differentiated itself in three major ways. First, it was independent, meaning it did not receive monetary incentives from financial institutions to push their products, nor did it receive payments (i.e., commissions) when individuals made buying decisions. Second, it looked at over 130,000 financial products to help users find the best products for them, compared to its competitors, which searched through a much smaller number of products. Third, because it was independent, it used a subscription model in which individuals paid a monthly fee. The case is set in March 2010, just after the beta launch of HelloWallet's web site, and it examines two key issues HelloWallet is grappling with: 1) How to price its product for its two different channels - the direct-to-consumer channel and the enterprise channel - and 2) How to proportionately allocate its resources for the two channels.

In the spring of 2010, Intel was regarded as an important champion for a new broadband technology called WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access). WiMAX transmitted large amounts of data over radio signals, and offered much greater range than Wi-Fi. It also offered much faster connection speeds than 3G networks run by AT&T, Verizon and Sprint. WiMAX was a new space for Intel, and the company hoped it would yield the same type of profitability and success for Intel that Wi-Fi had. Between October 2008 and May 2010, Intel had joined forces with Clearwire, Sprint, Motorola and other partners to launch WiMAX in about 30 U.S. cities. Intel's vision for the deployment of WiMAX evolved from fixed wireless (for broadband connectivity to homes and businesses) to portable wireless (laptops) to mobile wireless (handheld devices and high-end smart phones), as the company spent billions of dollars on acquisitions and investments in the WiMAX arena. But Intel faced many challenges with WiMAX. A large infrastructure would have to be built from the ground up in the U.S. and around the world, and WiMAX needed a least a few major cellular operators to choose it as their next-generation (4G) technology. Intel would have to create a new 4G ecosystem to convince equipment manufactures to embed WiMAX technology in its devices. In addition, WiMAX faced stiff competition from other new wireless technologies, including LTE (Long Term Evolution), which AT&T and Verizon planned to use when they upgraded from 3G to 4G technology. Although WiMAX had a two- to three-year lead over LTE, the size of the mobile operators already committed to LTE threatened to make WiMAX a niche technology.