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Faced with major losses from operations, Sharp Corporation’s young and unconventional president questioned the company’s long-standing operating model. Sharp was a leader in the area of liquid crystal display (LCD) technology and manufacturing. It also held strong positions in several categories of consumer electronics in the Japanese market. Although Sharp had been increasing its involvement in overseas markets, it had yet to replicate its successes overseas. Sharp’s operating model placed sensitive, high-value-added operations such as research, development, and component manufacturing near its headquarters in Japan. The company jealously guarded its LCD knowhow and had implemented strict security measures at its LCD panel plants. As Sharp’s international sales grew, limitations with its business model became more apparent. Operating primarily in Japan had drawbacks, such as exposure to currency risk, high infrastructure cost, and high taxes. Additionally, the logistics of shipping large items overseas, such as LCDs and solar panels, presented other dilemmas. Sharp needed to reconsider this model and develop an approach that was more suitable to the environment in which it now competed.

Faced with major losses from operations, Sharp Corporation's young and unconventional president questioned the company's long-standing operating model. Sharp was a leader in the area of liquid crystal display (LCD) technology and manufacturing. It also held strong positions in several categories of consumer electronics in the Japanese market. Although Sharp had been increasing its involvement in overseas markets, it had yet to replicate its successes overseas. Sharp's operating model placed sensitive, high-value-added operations, such as research, development and component manufacturing near its headquarters in Japan. The company jealously guarded its LCD knowhow and had implemented strict security measures at its LCD panel plants. As Sharp's international sales grew, limitations with its business model became apparent. Operating primarily in Japan had drawbacks, such as exposure to currency risk, high infrastructure cost and high taxes. Additionally, the logistics of shipping large items, such as LCDs and solar panels, overseas presented other dilemmas. Sharp needed to reconsider this model and develop an approach that was more suitable to the environment it now competed in.

A recent Ivey study confirms the commonly held view that General Electric is an excellent breeding ground for future business leaders. This article summarizes the study and its three conclusions: Firms led by CEOs who were trained at GE will outperform firms led by CEOs who were not; GE's reputation for developing CEO talent is, in fact, well deserved and not mere hype; and GE appears to develop more CEO talent than other noted CEO talent-generating firms.

In this supplement to Lonrho PLC (A): An African Conglomerate, product 9B05M067, Sir John Craven discusses his decision to accept the chairman position. It also looks at the general direction taken by Sir John, and how Lonrho had faired as it took this new direction. Lonrho has decided to focus on mining in Africa and dispose of non-mining related assets.

In January 1997, Sir John Craven, a highly respected investment banker and chairman of the investment bank Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, was offered the chairmanship of Lonrho, a conglomerate with headquarters in London, England, and operations primarily in Africa. Lonrho's more significant interests were in hotels, mining, agribusiness and trading. The company was experiencing financial trouble, and was no longer respected by the financial community in London. Tiny Rowland, the tycoon entrepreneur who built the firm, had recently been fired. The firm lacked the leadership and direction it needed to remove itself from its current financial troubles and prosper in the future. Sir John needed to decide whether he should accept the offer of the chairman position, and if he did, what direction Lonrho should take. Supplements From Lonrho to Lonmin (B): Restructuring a Conglomerate, product 9B05M068 and Lonrho (C): Lonmin, product 9B05M069 look at the Sir John's decision and the company's focus.

A highly respected investment banker was offered the chairmanship of Lonrho, a conglomerate headquartered in London, England with operations primarily in Africa as outlined in Lonrho (A): An African Conglomerate, product 9B05M067. The investment banker's decision is discussed in From Lonrho to Lonmin (B): Restructuring a Conglomerate, product 9B05M068. This supplement looks at the next step in the firm's strategy development, to consider whether the company should focus on a particular type of mineral extraction, and if so, what kind.

In early 2003, WestJet's management was reviewing its plans for growth, specifically considering whether WestJet should move its eastern Canada base of operations from Hamilton's Munro Airport to Toronto Pearson Airport. WestJet had grown rapidly since its launch in 1996 and was now the second largest airline in Canada. WestJet had originally focused on western Canada, but had entered eastern Canada in March 2000, with an eastern base of operations in Hamilton, a secondary airport in the greater Toronto area. Pearson was Canada's largest domestic and international airport, the primary commercial airport for the greater Toronto area and a hub of WestJet's largest competitor, Air Canada. Compared with Pearson, Hamilton was less congested and charged much lower fees. WestJet's operations had been closely modeled on Southwest Airlines'. The use of a secondary airport such as Hamilton as a base of operations was consistent with Southwest's low-cost, high-utilization features. With higher costs and longer turnaround times due to congestion, a base at Pearson was arguably not consistent with the Southwest business model; however, it was hard for WestJet to ignore the growth potential.

In early 2003, WestJet's management was reviewing its plans for growth, and specifically considering whether WestJet should move its eastern Canada base of operations from Hamilton's Munro airport to Toronto Pearson airport. WestJet had grown rapidly since its launch in 1996, and was now the second largest airline in Canada. WestJet had originally focused on Western Canada, but had entered eastern Canada in March of 2000, with an eastern base of operations in Hamilton, a secondary airport in the greater Toronto area. Pearson was Canada's largest domestic and international airport, the primary commercial airport for the greater Toronto area, and a hub of WestJet's largest competitor, Air Canada. Compared with Pearson, Hamilton was less congested and charged much lower fees. WestJet's operations had been closely modeled upon Southwest Airlines. The use of a secondary airport such as Hamilton as a base of operations was consistent with Southwest's low cost, high utilization features. With higher costs and longer turnaround times due to congestion, a base at Pearson was arguably not consistent with the Southwest business model, however, it was hard for WestJet to ignore the growth potential.