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Growing from a passive investment in a Chicago delicatessen in 1978, into a national foodservice company by 2007, Levy Restaurants (Levy) served approximately 63 million customers a year at more than 85 different restaurants and sporting and entertainment venues. Then Levy expanded its fine-dining restaurant business into sports and entertainment venues and such unexpected places as Disney World. Levy grew at greater than 20% compounded growth rates between 1999 and 2007 because of a plethora of newly constructed baseball, football, basketball, and hockey arenas and stadiums. When construction growth leveled off, Levy responded by expanding into entertainment venues. How could Levy maintain its stellar growth rate? Levy's answer to this question depended, in part, on how it defined its core competencies; it needed to decide whether it was a fine-dining company or a foodservice company and how its customer-value proposition differed from its competitors. Levy had to determine which new customer segments to expand and whether to grow, maintain, or shrink its restaurant business.

Michael Pirron was a health care services consultant who had always dreamed of starting a "Nonprofit Competitive Business" with a social mission. In 2006, he launched Impact Makers, a new hybrid entity that crossed the nonprofit/for-profit lines. Although it was a small business like many others (paying competitive salaries, bidding for work, providing professional services at market prices), Impact Makers had several unique components: It would contribute strategic consulting, and all profits, to charitable community organizations; there was no stock and equity ownership; it had a volunteer board of directors and its financial information was open to the public. The first two years saw some successes and some setbacks. Impact Makers faced the challenges of growth: how to get more customers, more revenue, and a more predictable revenue stream. How would Impact Makers raise investment capital with its unique organizational structure? And how would the company survive?

Coca-Cola was the world's largest manufacturer and distributor of nonalcoholic beverage syrups and concentrates, selling over $24 billion of products in 2006 in more than 200 hundred countries. It became a high-growth company under Roberto Goizueta who was president and then chairman and CEO from 1980 until his death in 1997. Under Goizueta's leadership, Coca-Cola's market cap grew from $4.3 billion to $180 billion, but since his death in 1997, it has declined to under $115 billion, and for the first time in their long competition Pepsi-Cola has a larger market cap. Coca-Cola needs a blockbuster break-out growth idea to transform it and its culture. Coca-Cola needs to show Wall Street that it is not wedded to its legacy model and that it can be a growth company again.

UPS had become a global public company, with a market cap of $74 billion, more than 428,000 employees, $47 billion in revenue, and operations in more than 200 countries. A recognized leader among package-delivery companies, its growth had been above industry averages and had historically been through geographical expansion. In 1998, UPS changed its business model to Synchronized Commerce and adopted a new growth strategy called the Four Quadrant Model, hoping to expand its market space by transforming itself into a logistics-solutions company. But eight years after these changes, UPS was generating only 17% of its revenue from its nonpackage deliveries, with only $2 million of its operating profit coming from the new businesses. In the company's 2006 Annual Report, the UPS chairman and CEO acknowledged the disappointing results and realized that these results required a response to the public market.

Tiffany & Company was the leading U.S. luxury jewelry brand, generating more than $2.6 billion in revenue through 167 retail outlets globally and from catalog and Internet sales. For nearly 170 years, Tiffany had managed its brand. In February 2007, a hedge fund, Trian Fund Management LP, announced that it had bought a 5.5% stake in Tiffany, and become its largest shareholder. Trian believed that Tiffany was undervalued and stated that it wanted to help the company "improve its earnings per share by addressing various operational and strategic issues." In response, Tiffany began to consider different actions to increase shareholder value.

A retail-furniture company that abandoned the standard retail-industry business model, disavowed debt and equity-growth financing, and embraced a unique multiple-stakeholder model that valued quality and relationships ahead of the bottom line while producing stellar financial results achieves contrarian success. Its culture supported an energized, positive growth environment for its employees that fostered high employee engagement and, in turn, high customer engagement. Now the founder was confronting his biggest challenge: how to institutionalize the unusual business model, culture, and employee environment he has built. His primary objective is to preserve and protect his "relationship" business model, which is the heart and soul of his business's success.

The Home Depot case is a great story. It's about entrepreneurship, growth, CEO leadership, and the dramatic impact, good and bad, a CEO can have on a company's growth culture, strategy, and performance. Home Depot had faced market growth challenges for the last seven years as it tried in numerous ways to reignite its growth engine. The case explores the growth strategies of CEOs Bernie Marcus, Arthur Blank, and Blank's successor Bob Nardelli, a former GE executive. After examining Home Depot's growth history, the case challenges students to devise a growth strategy for the company under a new CEO.

In 2007, Best Buy was the leading electronics retailer in the United States with more than 941 stores, revenue totaling $31 billion, and a market cap of $21 billion. In 2005, Best Buy had adopted a new business model, culture, and customer-segmentation template called Customer Centricity. This move created volatility in the price of Best Buy stock because of the higher-than-expected employee costs that went with this new way of doing business and the difficulty of executing the old and the new business models simultaneously while the new model was rolled out. Best Buy responded to Wall Street's short-term focus in a myriad of ways. It first asked for investor patience, and stressed the strong operating results achieved in Best Buy stores operating under the new model. But in June 2007, after the stock dropped again, the CEO knew he had to decide whether to open more Best Buy stores, increase the company's dividend, or increase the stock-repurchase program.

As a major player in a $200-billion market with only a 15% market share, SYSCO outperforms its industry competition. This execution champion and organic growth winner has figured out how to balance and manage tensions between decentralized entrepreneurial autonomy and centralized controls. But what makes SYSCO different is that its leaders have figured out, on a daily basis, how to keep everyone, from the CEO to the truck driver, focused on the details that count to customers. In 2005, however, the growth of its underlying market had leveled forcing the company to face the challenge of continuing to grow and maintain its margins in a plateauing market.