個案總覽

Riku Nakamura relocated six years ago with his family from Tokyo to San Mateo, California, to spearhead the launch of Kenko USA, the first foreign subsidiary of a Japanese cracker company. However, Kenko USA hasn't taken off as hoped, and his family is ready to return home. Riku now ponders which course to recommend to Kenko's executive team: a lucrative private-label deal that would quickly drive revenue growth or a new branded marketing push that would better position the division for the long term. This fictional case study by Elie Ofek feature expert commentary by Tetsuya Fujisaki and Carlos Canals.

On September 12, 2017, just as Apple's Tim Cook was unveiling the iPhone X, Richard Yu, CEO of Huawei's Consumer Business Group (CBG), and Glory Cheung, his Chief Marketing Officer, were discussing some key strategic issues regarding Huawei's smartphone business. Established in 1987, Huawei was the largest telecom equipment company in the world. Huawei established the CBG in 2012 to focus on Huawei-branded smartphone models, and within five years had risen to be the No. 3 player in the market in terms of shipments; next only to Apple and Samsung. As they finished watching Cook's presentation, Yu and Cheung thought about the Mate 10 series, Huawei's most advanced smartphone that would be launched on October 16, 2017 in Germany. The new models would include Huawei's proprietary Kirin 970 chipset, which boasted having the world's first artificial intelligence (AI) mobile processor. They had to decide how to position, communicate and price the new phones. Yet beyond these near term decisions, a major challenge facing Huawei was how to make good on Yu's bold vision to overtake Apple and Samsung in market share within three to five years, while maintaining healthy profits. This task seemed particularly daunting given the difficulties the company had encountered in penetrating the lucrative US market. What would it take for Huawei to be the number 1 smartphone brand globally?

One of the hallmarks of the digital revolution is the rise of the socially-connected consumer. Concomitantly, the ability of companies to affect and measure the social interactions among customers has grown tremendously. Consequently, in assessing the full value of each customer to the firm it is no longer sufficient to only consider a customer's worth in terms of the discounted cash flows he or she provides through direct payments, it is also critical to incorporate the indirect value generated through the customer's social influence. In this note we develop a framework for measuring and quantifying the social value that a customer generates. We derive a simple expression for Customer Social Value (CSV) and show how to combine it with the commonly used expression for Customer Lifetime Value (CLV). The combined entity is termed Customer Lifetime Social Value (CLSV). The note uses concrete examples to illustrate the main ideas and explores a host of issues related to how customers create value for the firm through their social interactions, such as the duration of social influence, reduction in acquisition costs, segmentation implications, relevance for influencer marketing programs, and connection to firm-level valuation.

Château Margaux, one of only five prestigious estates in the Bordeaux Medoc wine region to have been classified as a "first-growth", is facing a host of strategic decisions in early 2013. Up until this point the estate had been selling two red wines, a first wine whose retail price often exceeded $1000 a bottle, and a second wine whose retail price often exceeded $200 a bottle. Owner Corinne Mentzelopoulos and her management team were now preparing to launch a new third wine made from the estate's production not used to make the first two. They have to decide whether the best go-to-market strategy is to sell the third wine to the local Bordeaux merchants and relinquish commercialization to them or to devise a complete marketing plan for the new wine that includes: target market selection, positioning, quantity to release, pricing, channel structure and brand name. Mentzelopoulos was considering the optimal marketing for the third wine in light of moves by other first-growths, such as purchase of vineyards in the Bordeaux region, selling mass-market wines, and global expansion.

In June 2014, MannKind Corporation announced that after years of development and billions of dollars in expenses, the FDA had finally approved its drug, Afrezza. MannKind would thus be the only company with an inhalable insulin on the market. As an alternative to injectable rapid-acting (or mealtime) insulin, Afrezza boasted a potential market of at least 4 million diabetic patients. Shortly thereafter, Sanofi, a company with vast experience in the diabetic space, became MannKind's marketing partner and helped launch Afrezza in February, 2015. Although the drug had a black box warning and required doctors to perform a lung test on patients, expectations were high, with some analysts predicting peak sales of up to $4 billion a year. However, those lofty hopes were quickly dashed when Afrezza generated lackluster first-year sales, driving Sanofi to terminate its short-lived contract with MannKind in January, 2016. MannKind's management attributed the launch's failure to a poor marketing approach, convinced that Sanofi, despite its strong global presence and experience, did not effectively address critical barriers to adoption. The company now planned to overhaul Afrezza's entire marketing strategy. This included rethinking: which patients and physicians to target, how to position the drug to engender interest and adoption, how to lower end consumer price, through which media to convey Afrezza's benefits, and how to streamline the process of performing the lung-test and getting the drug into the hands of patients. But would all these changes and initiatives, no matter how well executed, be enough to turn sales around? Would Afrezza ever realize the potential that Alfred Mann, the late founder and former CEO, saw in the novel treatment?

In January of 2017, CJ Entertainment & Media (E&M) proudly announced that it will be holding its first ever KCON in Mexico City just two months later. CJ Group Chairman Jay Lee and Vice Chairwoman Miky Lee are pleased at the progress that KCON, a Korean-oriented music and cultural convention, has made since its debut in LA in 2012. In the years since 2012, the event has been held every year in LA, and has recently also taken place in New York, Tokyo, Paris, and Abu Dhabi, with varying levels of financial success. In addition to growing in number, KCON has grown in size. By 2016, KCON LA had become a three-day, two-concert affair, that attracted 70,000 attendees with a wide range of experiences for fans to enjoy, including Korean foods, dance classes, beauty products, and eSports offerings. Chairman Lee and VC Lee believe that KCON is a good vehicle for accelerating the Hallyu wave of Korean culture that was still sweeping the globe, and riding this wave in promoting CJ Group offerings. Indeed, the Group's food brand Bibigo, which ran nine restaurants in the LA area and sold frozen dumplings and other Korean foods in Costco across the U.S., and KCON.tv, a digital media channel, were experiencing commercial success in the U.S. market. But at the same time, there was some uncertainty about the best way to ensure continued growth of the KCON concept. Should they expand the current KCONs to include more days, shows, and events; launch KCONs in new geographies such as Southeast Asia or Australia; or some combination of these growth strategies? How concerned should they be with KCON's uneven financial performance and difficulty in generating sponsorship revenue? KCON LA and KCON Tokyo have made a profit for multiple years in a row, and KCON NY was in the black for the first time in 2016, but other KCONs lost money. What can they do to further grow the Bibigo brand in the US?

In June 2016, Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, wrestled with how to sustain Israel's strong innovation track record and the country's reputation as the "start-up nation." Despite the economic miracle the country had wrought since its founding, he knew he could not be complacent. On the one hand, in 2015 Israeli start-ups raised record-breaking amounts of venture capital, and exits for the year totaled over $8 billion. On the other hand, government expenditure on R&D had decreased and Israel's position in the Global Innovation Index had fallen. Several other indicators, such as achievement tests among elementary school students in math and science, painted a grim picture. Furthermore, in spite of the wealth created by many high-tech Israeli firms, socioeconomic gaps in the country had widened. A two-tier economy had formed. The long-term sustainability of the "innovation economy" was in doubt, as the sector faced increased competition from foreign innovation hubs, was being reshaped by the growth of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) locating R&D centers in Israel, and had to contend with a vexing shortage of human capital and low labor force participation among some groups. Netanyahu had to assess whether it was time to sound the alarm, and whether drastic and immediate measures were needed to right the innovation economy ship. Bibi mulled over which policies or interventions would best curb the erosion of Israel's competitive position as an innovation powerhouse and how best to promote social equality. He pondered whether public policy could make a difference or whether the market and societal currents, responsible for these trends, were too strong for him and his government to try to contend with.

In spring 2016, Kameda's CEO, Michiyasu Tanaka, is facing difficult questions from board members over the lackluster performance of the company's US subsidiary. Kameda was the leading player in the Japanese rice cracker market and was looking to expand overseas to achieve growth, with the vision of becoming a global food company. Starting in 2008, it had tried to market its best-selling product in Japan, Kakinotane, as well as other types of rice-based snacks to US consumers. Despite years of offering samples to consumers, modifications to the naming and packaging design, the addition of new flavors, changes in the supermarkets it placed its product, and offering retailers slotting fees - sales were well below expectations and losses were mounting. The situation was especially baffling as the company believed that the gluten-free trend as well as a growing desire for healthier food should have bode well for its rice-based snacks; moreover several Japanese food makers had recently achieved success in the US (such as Calbee with snapeas and Ito En with teas). On the bright side, Kameda's recent acquisition of a US company, Mary's Gone Crackers, was showing steady sales growth; though profits were very low due to high manufacturing and raw ingredient costs, and distribution coverage was limited. Tanaka and his management team had only a few years to turn things around or consider closing the Kameda USA subsidiary. Every marketing element was on the table: from changing the packaging to rethinking the retail approach to accepting private label deals to investing in more efficient plants to partnering with a well-known US brand in the snack food space. Could Tanaka save Kameda USA and dramatically improve the profits of Mary's Gone Crackers?

In June 2016, Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, wrestled with how to sustain Israel's strong innovation track record and the country's reputation as the 'startup nation.' Despite the economic miracle the country had wrought since its founding, he knew he could not be complacent. On the one hand, in 2015 Israeli start-ups raised record-breaking amounts of venture capital, and exits for the year totaled over $8 Billion. On the other hand, government expenditure on R&D had decreased and Israel's position in the Global Innovation Index had fallen. Several other indicators, such as achievement tests among elementary school students in math and science, painted a grim picture. Furthermore, in spite of the wealth created by many high-tech Israeli firms, socioeconomic gaps in the country had widened. A two-tier economy had formed. The long-term sustainability of the "innovation economy" was in doubt, as the sector faced increased competition from foreign innovation hubs, was being reshaped by the growth of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) locating R&D centers in Israel, and had to contend with a vexing shortage of human capital and low labor force participation among some groups. Netanyahu had to assess whether it was time to sound the alarm, and whether drastic and immediate measures were needed to right the innovation economy ship. Bibi mulled over which policies or interventions would best curb the erosion of Israel's competitive position as an innovation powerhouse and how best to promote social equality. He pondered whether public policy could make a difference or whether the market and societal currents, responsible for these trends, were too strong for him and his government to try to contend with.

Magnus Wanberg is the creator of reMarkable, a breakthrough e-writer device set apart from similar products on the market by having solved the frustrating "slow ink" problem typically experienced on pen-based electronic devices, thus providing a "pen and paper" like experience. Moreover, the device allowed for the convenient and non-eye-straining reading of typical documents. Though enthusiastically received by several investors, there was still a long way to go before the prototype could reach a final commercial product. Wanberg and his team narrowed down the relevant market to three main segments: creative professionals, working professionals and students. However, these segments were seemingly at odds with each other in terms of which product attributes would most appeal to each. The young company therefore had to choose which group to target as this would dictate future product development efforts. With the planned launch date quickly approaching, the target market selected also impacted communication, channels, and pricing decisions. reMarkable had to resolve these matters while juggling limited time, effort and funds.

In early 2016, Motoi Oyama, president and CEO of ASICS, a major sports apparel and footwear manufacturer based in Japan, lays out his company's growth plan for the upcoming 5 years. The new plan set ambitious goals in terms of revenue and profit increases. At the heart of the strategy to achieve these goals are a desire to embrace a more direct to consumer mindset, expand into new customer segments, and communicate a more consistent and emotional brand worldwide. With its primary core customer currently the "serious" runner and its innovation strategy geared towards high-end performance, pursuing these objectives in light of the fierce competitive landscape posed a multitude of challenges. Moreover, the company had recently launched several lifestyle brands (using brand names it had revived), which posed brand architecture issues. Lastly, the company had just acquired a digital fitness app, RunKeeper, and was wondering how best to leverage this asset and how it fit with the main pillars of the growth plan strategy. The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games would coincide with the conclusion of the 5 year plan, and ASICS had paid over $100 million to be a Gold Sponsor of the games- Oyama wondered whether his company was on the right track to achieving the goals he intimated to shareholders.

In 2016, JCPenney was in the midst of a multi-year turnaround after coming dangerously close to bankruptcy. Under CEO Marvin Ellison, the company had identified three strategic objectives-a focus on omnichannel, private label goods, and increasing revenue per customer-to guide all company initiatives. The company was running pilot tests on a new line of appliances, rebranded hair salons, and new private label merchandise, and management now needed to decide how best to roll out and market these initiatives across the chain. Ellison also considered how to build upon the company's new ad campaign, Get Your Penney's Worth, and how to strike the right balance between serving its "core" and "emerging" customer segments. He wondered if these objectives and initiatives were enough to restore JCPenney's position in the evolving retail landscape.

It is 2014 and AnswerDash, a startup backed by venture capital, has not seen the widespread adoption of their online self-service customer support solution that they were expecting based on early success in helping clients save and generate substantial amounts of money. Dr. Jacob O. Wobbrock and Dr. Andrew J. Ko are revisiting their go to market strategy to determine how to build a viable business out of their groundbreaking technology. The case raises issues in entrepreneurship and B2B marketing such as analyzing economic value to the customer, designing optimal price metrics, aligning pricing with marketing strategy, customer life-time value, organizational selling, and influencing innovation adoption.

It is 2014 and AnswerDash, a startup backed by venture capital, has not seen the widespread adoption of their online self-service customer support solution that they were expecting based on early success in helping clients save and generate substantial amounts of money. Dr. Jacob O. Wobbrock and Dr. Andrew J. Ko are revisiting their go to market strategy to determine how to build a viable business out of their groundbreaking technology. The case raises issues in entrepreneurship and B2B marketing such as analyzing economic value to the customer, designing optimal price metrics, aligning pricing with marketing strategy, customer life-time value, organizational selling, and influencing innovation adoption.

In late 2013, telehealth company American Well, which developed a digital platform that allowed patients to conduct online medical consultations with physicians, is considering pursuing a direct-to-consumer (DTC) strategy. Founded in 2006, American Well had, to date, primarily sold its solution to health plans, which then provided online care services to their members using their own brand name. But while American Well attracted some of the largest U.S. health insurers as clients, a surprisingly small number of individual members had actually used the online care service. American Well management believed low consumer awareness-the result of insufficient marketing by health plans, among other factors-was hampering uptake of what should be a highly valuable offering for all stakeholders involved. They wondered if a DTC approach, in which American Well would become a consumer brand and market a telehealth service directly to the public, for example through a mobile app, could drive utilization and catapult the business to the next level. If a DTC offering were given the green light, the company had to come up with a coherent marketing plan to launch it and figure out how to manage potential conflicts with existing clients, who might view the move as competing with their own telehealth efforts. Moreover, the move had to be considered in light of other initiatives the company had recently embarked on, such as marketing its platform to pharmacy chains, targeting large employers, and selling kiosks that provided a physical space to conduct online consultations. The case forces students to grapple with the challenges and barriers involved in disrupting an established industry, examine alternative go-to-market strategies and the timing of implementing them, and consider different business models to manage supply and generate revenues. The case also offers a rich analysis of digital marketing issues.

Buoyed by the success of K-pop music and K-drama television shows in Asian countries, Jay Lee, Chairman of the South Korean conglomerate CJ Group, believed that the time was ripe for taking Korean cultural content to the West. One initiative, carried out by the Group's Entertainment & Media (E&M) division, was a daylong fan convention, called 'KCON' , that was held in Irvine CA in October 2012 and which featured various Korean cultural elements, such as music, dance, film, and food. In the spring of 2013, Miky Lee, the Group's Vice Chairman, called a meeting with key executives to review the results of KCON 2012's and make a recommendation to the Chairman on whether to hold a similar event in 2013. As part of their deliberations, the executives were expected to consider where a potential 2013 convention should be held, which artists to invite, which target consumers to focus on, how to price tickets and how to attract more sponsors. With KCON 2012 having lost money, despite a robust turnout, it was far from clear whether to repeat the event and, if so, whether its scale should be expanded beyond 2012's $1.1 million budget. With CJ recently opening a chain of mid-market Korean food restaurants in the Los Angeles area called Bibigo, the meeting would also touch on the restaurant's U.S. growth plans and how they might be connected to KCON. More broadly, the executives had to wrestle with the question of whether Americans would ever really embrace Hallyu, the Korean Wave, beyond one-off success stories like PSY's "Gangnam Style". And even if they believed so, was KCON the right vehicle to make it happen, or was the event just a waste of the company's time and money?

Augustin Rey, the president of Emilia, a century-old clothing retailer in Spain, is determined to revamp the company's merchandising strategy and redesign some of its dowdiest stores. He also wants to do away with discounts, circulars, and special sales, and win customers over with a strategy he calls hablar claro--"straight talk." That means the same low prices every day. At first, Emilia's financial results were outstanding. But they've since started to slip: Customer traffic is down significantly, and same-store revenue has dropped. Rey's board of directors is pressuring him to go back to the old ways. This case is based on real events at J.C. Penney and includes commentaries from Shari Rudolph, of Gabriel Brothers, and Yashodhara Shroff, of the Indian retail chain ffolio.

Augustin Rey, the president of Emilia, a century-old clothing retailer in Spain, is determined to revamp the company's merchandising strategy and redesign some of its dowdiest stores. He also wants to do away with discounts, circulars, and special sales, and win customers over with a strategy he calls hablar claro--"straight talk." That means the same low prices every day. At first, Emilia's financial results were outstanding. But they've since started to slip: Customer traffic is down significantly, and same-store revenue has dropped. Rey's board of directors is pressuring him to go back to the old ways. This case is based on real events at J.C. Penney and includes commentaries from Shari Rudolph, of Gabriel Brothers, and Yashodhara Shroff, of the Indian retail chain ffolio.

This note presents two related measures for assessing the financial value of a customer to the firm. The first is the well-known measure of Customer Lifetime Value, or CLV for short. The second, which has received much less attention, treats the acquisition of a customer as a financial investment that has a quantifiable return based on future profit streams. Accordingly, we term this latter measure Customer Lifetime Return on Investment, or CLROI for short, and explain how it is calculated. We further show how employing CLROI can yield wildly different marketing implications relative to CLV (despite the strong link between them), particularly for targeting decisions. The note provides multiple examples to illustrate the concepts and also introduces formal characterizations of the two measures. The relevance of segment sizes, customer dynamics, social network influences, and strategic considerations are discussed.