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Well before the fateful morning of September 11, 2001, the threat posed to Americans and the United States by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda ("The Base") network of terrorists was well documented and closely monitored. Two US agencies-the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-each maintained units devoted to bin Laden. In 1998 and 2000, al Qaeda attacks on US targets had precipitated intensive investigations which yielded a wealth of knowledge about the terrorist operation. Those attacks also promoted increased cooperation between the FBI and CIA, which regularly exchanged personnel and information. Moreover, throughout the summer of 2001, there had been a steady drumbeat of warnings about terrorist attacks, which the US government treated with utmost seriousness. American travelers abroad, US embassies, businesses and military installations were all in a heightened state of alert. The Federal Aviation Authority issued general warnings to airlines. An FBI office reported on suspicious Middle Eastern men taking flying lessons in Phoenix; an aviation student in Minnesota was arrested. The CIA notified the FBI that two suspected al Qaeda members were in the US. This case brings together accounts of what U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies knew about al Qaeda before September 11, 2001 and raises the question of why that knowledge-tips, satellite pictures, intercepted communications, defector reports, courtroom testimony-did not thwart the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. It frames, in particular, the challenges of synthesizing intelligence-the difficulties involved in assembling seemingly random incidents into a coherent picture and distinguishing between credible warnings and probable false alarms. It can be used as a vehicle for discussion about intelligence-gathering per se, as well as government inter-agency and inter-departmental coordination.

This case tells the inside story of one of the most controversial episodes in the history of the US intelligence services. Its focus: whether to break the time-honored rules of CIA covert actions in order to supply Afghan rebels (fighting in the 1980s to oust invading Soviet forces) with US-made, state-of-the-art Stinger missiles. The case offers an unusual glimpse into the policymaking process for intelligence decisions, especially covert actions--secret activities meant to advance US foreign policy objectives without revealing the hand of the US government. It describes a pitched internal debate among the Defense Department, CIA's Operations Directorate, CIA leadership, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the advisability of providing the Stinger anti-aircraft weapon to Afghan mujahideen. Advocates said the Stinger could help win the war. Opponents argued it made the US role transparent, which could escalate the conflict to superpower level; might increase the risk of retaliation against staging-area Pakistan; and created a threat that terrorists would get possession of the weapon. HKS Case Number 1546.0

This case presents a view of the renowned army general, World War II chief of staff, secretary of state and secretary of defense, as seen through the eyes of his contemporaries. It may be read singly or in conjunction with George Washington (C14-82-479.0). (See the abstract of that case for teaching objectives.) HKS Case Number 480.0

In April 1961, President Kennedy denied US military assistance to a force of CIA-trained Cuban exiles attacking Cuba, thus sealing the fate of the Bay of Pigs invasion. When the losses had been tallied, 114 exiles were dead, Castro was left with 1,200 prisoners, and the Kennedy administration was publicly embarrassed. The case recounts the formulation and failed execution of this CIA plan to invade Cuba. The authors trace the origins of the plan under the Eisenhower administration and follow Kennedy through his first three months in office, during which time he first heard of, then revised, and ultimately approved a trimmed-down version of the plan. This case was initially designed to illustrate the importance of decision-makers' identifying and testing their own and their advisers' presumptions. Extending this theme, the case may be used in conjunction with The CIA to 1961 (C14-80-280.0) as an exercise in "organizational placement." Had Kennedy used this method to better understand the institution of the CIA, he might have questioned them more closely and avoided some of the tragedy of the Bay of Pigs. For further discussion of the placement method, see The CIA to 1961 abstract. This case may also be used to demonstrate the hazards of transition in the American presidency. HKS Case Number 279.0.