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When a young, former mining executive with no previous elective office experience is elected Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia in 1985, he expects to attack notorious inefficiency and overstaffing aggressively. But, within weeks, Mayor Ronald MacLean finds that, although he faces some predictable antagonists, such as public sector unions resistant to personnel cutbacks, he also faces difficulty in even understanding the workings of the city government. MacLean ultimately realizes that the problems he faces are less those of inefficiency than a more potent antagonist: corruption. This case describes the efforts of Mayor MacLean to understand how and why corruption has taken root in the La Paz government and to devise a strategy to uproot it. The second part of the case specifically spells out approaches which stem from MacLean's belief that corruption is less a reflection of cultural or ethical problems than one of poorly-designed systems which provide the medium for corruption to take hold. MacLean's progress in combating corruption is described, as is its recurrence following MacLean's departure from office. The case is well suited to discussions of organizational change but is best suited to specific discussion of corruption in the developing world and the ways in which progress against it can be institutionalized and sustained. HKS Case Number 1523.1

When a young, former mining executive with no previous elective office experience is elected Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia in 1985, he expects to attack notorious inefficiency and overstaffing aggressively. But, within weeks, Mayor Ronald MacLean finds that, although he faces some predictable antagonists, such as public sector unions resistant to personnel cutbacks, he also faces difficulty in even understanding the workings of the city government. MacLean ultimately realizes that the problems he faces are less those of inefficiency than a more potent antagonist: corruption. This case describes the efforts of Mayor MacLean to understand how and why corruption has taken root in the La Paz government and to devise a strategy to uproot it. The second part of the case specifically spells out approaches which stem from MacLean's belief that corruption is less a reflection of cultural or ethical problems than one of poorly-designed systems which provide the medium for corruption to take hold. MacLean's progress in combating corruption is described, as is its recurrence following MacLean's departure from office. The case is well suited to discussions of organizational change but is best suited to specific discussion of corruption in the developing world and the ways in which progress against it can be institutionalized and sustained. HKS Case Number 1523.0

When the administration of Peru president Alberto Fujimori embarks on an ambitious privatization program, it turns inevitably to the nation's creaking telephone system. With but 2.5 phone lines per 100 persons, Peru, in the mid-1990s, had the lowest phone "density" in Latin America; installation of a new line took years, except via a thriving black market in existing lines. But the privatization committee which begins to plot the role of both the existing local and long distance phone monopolies, knows that it faces formidable obstacles to change: a suspicious and powerful military which nationalized the phone system in the 1970s; an influential cellular phone operator with his own agenda; existing unions, doubtful legislators who must approve a constitutional amendment to allow privatization to go forward. This case is about the political management of privatization. It describes the "interest group map" developed by the privatization committee and poses the question of what tactical approach should be taken with each. Case users must envision the potential conflicts, the objective desired, and the most useful tactics. The sequel describes the early success of the privatization process, after the phone system's sale to the Spanish phone giant, Telefonica. HKS Case Number 1404.1

When the administration of Peru president Alberto Fujimori embarks on an ambitious privatization program, it turns inevitably to the nation's creaking telephone system. With but 2.5 phone lines per 100 persons, Peru, in the mid-1990s, had the lowest phone "density" in Latin America; installation of a new line took years, except via a thriving black market in existing lines. But the privatization committee which begins to plot the role of both the existing local and long distance phone monopolies, knows that it faces formidable obstacles to change: a suspicious and powerful military which nationalized the phone system in the 1970s; an influential cellular phone operator with his own agenda; existing unions, doubtful legislators who must approve a constitutional amendment to allow privatization to go forward. This case is about the political management of privatization. It describes the "interest group map" developed by the privatization committee and poses the question of what tactical approach should be taken with each. Case users must envision the potential conflicts, the objective desired, and the most useful tactics. The sequel describes the early success of the privatization process, after the phone system's sale to the Spanish phone giant, Telefonica. HKS Case Number 1404.0

When Washington attorney and longtime Capital Hill staff member James Woolsey became director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1993, he inherited a bombshell that would soon become public. A joint CIA-FBI investigation had found that Aldrich Ames, a longtime Agency employee, had sold intelligence secrets to the Soviet Union. Ames had compromised the safety of Soviets, who had sought to help the US, in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars, with which he bought a large home and fancy cars. The public announcement of the Ames scandal in February 1994 would pose a dilemma for Woolsey. Public and Congressional reaction -- focused on the failure of the CIA itself to detect Ames' duplicity for almost a decade -- was harshly critical of the Agency. There was a widespread expectation that Woolsey would mete out harsh punishment for those who had failed to detect Ames' activity. For his part, however, Woolsey was unsure as to what sort of punishment, if any, was appropriate. As a public clamor grew for "heads to roll," Woolsey would have to consider what was fair to long-time CIA officials, what was best for the morale of a beleaguered agency, and what was expected by the public. HKS Case Number 1339.1.

Public sector unions are the fastest-growing sector of organized labor in the US, and are key players to be considered by a wide variety of elected and appointed public officials. This case, in contrast to most in both public management and business school collections, is told through the eyes of a labor leader, the executive director of the Ohio state government branch of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. It traces the evolution of an emerging union philosophy aimed at improving the long-term lot of members through increased productivity and efficiency, goals articulated in Ohio State government through a variation of total quality management techniques. The sense of steady, incremental progress and labor-management cooperation is disrupted, however, when a legislative demand for cost savings turns the state's Department of Administrative Services into a budget battleground. AFSCME executive director Paul Goldberg must decide how to respond to the immediate crisis in a way that preserves the "quality management" approach in which he believes but also convinces members that the union will continue to stand up for them.

This case focuses on the contractual relationship between a state's office charged with forestalling child abuse and neglect and one non-profit provider of social services for those purposes. The case points out the reasons the state of Massachusetts decided to contract for services and how it chose to define that contractual relationship. At the same time, the case also allows for discussion of whether the non-profit provider La Alianza Hispana would be well-advised to take on the work proffered by the state, given its organizational mission and capacity. Ultimately, the final part of the case reveals the disastrous end to which the Massachusetts-Alianza contract led. [See also High Stakes and Frightening Lapses: DSS, La Alianza Hispana and the Public-Private Question in Child Protection Work (C16-94-1265.0).]

When Washington attorney and longtime Capital Hill staff member James Woolsey became director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1993, he inherited a bombshell that would soon become public. A joint CIA-FBI investigation had found that Aldrich Ames, a longtime Agency employee, had sold intelligence secrets to the Soviet Union. Ames had compromised the safety of Soviets, who had sought to help the US, in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars, with which he bought a large home and fancy cars. The public announcement of the Ames scandal in February 1994 would pose a dilemma for Woolsey. Public and Congressional reaction -- focused on the failure of the CIA itself to detect Ames' duplicity for almost a decade -- was harshly critical of the Agency. There was a widespread expectation that Woolsey would mete out harsh punishment for those who had failed to detect Ames' activity. For his part, however, Woolsey was unsure as to what sort of punishment, if any, was appropriate. As a public clamor grew for "heads to roll," Woolsey would have to consider what was fair to long-time CIA officials, what was best for the morale of a beleaguered agency, and what was expected by the public. HKS Case Number 1339.0.

Faced with the need for draconian budget cuts, Robert Little was determined to do all that he could to save his agency's struggling Kinship Foster Care Program. Preserving the core of the program would demand two major steps: reducing and restructuring other areas of his agency and shaving the reimbursement rate the city paid to the voluntary foster care agencies. Under his own roof, Little slashed his administrative budget by 20 percent, stripped away all programs not legally mandated, and pared his agency's mandated programs in protective and preventive services to the bone. The mayor's budget office still insisted on cuts within the kinship program, imposing reductions on the program's periphery by stripping down the level of supervisory staff and staff in the unit charged with approving relatives' homes. But Little was able to maintain the core of the program-its caseworkers-almost as he had hoped; although he did have to sacrifice 200 of the most recently hired workers, he did receive a commitment from OMB to rehire that number and more once the current crisis passed. HKS Case Number 1203.1

In the late 1980s, the way New York City cared for thousands of its abused and neglected children underwent an unplanned shift. The impetus for the change came from a crisis: an explosive growth in the number of children in need of foster care. Between 1986 and 1990, the number of children in the city's foster care system nearly tripled, a tragic consequence of the crack epidemic plaguing the city. The sudden increase in demand for foster care overwhelmed the city's traditional source of foster care placements. Under pressure to find homes quickly, officials turned to a recently launched, city-run program--known as kinship foster care--to help meet the need. Kinship foster care was originally intended to be a relatively modest program. But in the wake of the crisis, the program rapidly ballooned, transforming the city agency responsible for foster care from a purchased and overseer of services into the nation's largest direct provider of foster care. This case chronicles this period of change and expansion for Kinship Foster Care and focuses on the leadership of then commissioner of the Child Welfare Administration Robert Little. It should be paired with HKS82 (Epilogue). HKS Case Number 1203.0.

A major teaching hospital in inner-city Richmond seeks to retain its tradition as a public research hospital serving all in need, at the same time it attracts new, fully-insured patients. As a first step, a new top administrator decides to institute a "guest relations" program designed to augment the hospital's culture with aspects of hotel methods. The relatively simple idea proves less than simple to implement, however. Staff members with a commitment to the existing hospital culture are skittish; some even fear that the new policy implies better-insured patients are to receive a better level of care. A complex administrative structure exempts doctors, who report to academic, not administrative overseers, from training programs. Nurses are wary. HKS Case Number 1017.0

In July 1991, South African president F.W. de Klerk announced the appointment of Hermanus Kriel to the cabinet post of minister of law and order. As the official responsible for oversight of the controversial national police force, the South African Police (SAP), Kriel would perhaps have the hardest job in a rapidly changing South Africa: a job made all the more daunting by recent revelations of a police role in fanning the flames of factional strife among blacks. The growing scandal had reinforced the SAP's reputation among black South Africans as one of the most hated symbols of white rule. For over four decades, the South African Police had been entrusted with enforcing the country's notorious and iniquitous system of apartheid--a task it had performed with what many regarded as excessive zeal and brutality. All this had been done by the SAP in the name of the apartheid system, which it was sworn to uphold. Yet as the 1980s drew to a close, the underpinnings of that system began to change dramatically and SAP's mission was no longer in force. This case details the changes that took place within SAP during the post-apartheid period. It should be paired with HKS830 (Part B). HKS Case Number 1095.0.

An antiquated airport jeopardizes a region's economic health but the county of Albany, New York, operator of the airport, lacks funds to undertake much-needed capital improvements. In this context, the county executive seriously examines privatization-selling the airport off to a private developer with a background in airport management. This case is designed to permit a full discussion of the potential merits and drawbacks of privatization of such a large public facility. It raises such issues as monopoly power and ease of access to capital. The decision to permit the Albany privatization is ultimately made by the Federal Aviation Administration, thus allowing the case to raise national as well as local issues. HKS Case Number 1024.0

An antiquated airport jeopardizes a region's economic health but the county of Albany, New York, operator of the airport, lacks funds to undertake much-needed capital improvements. In this context, the county executive seriously examines privatization-selling the airport off to a private developer with a background in airport management. This case is designed to permit a full discussion of the potential merits and drawbacks of privatization of such a large public facility. It raises such issues as monopoly power and ease of access to capital. The decision to permit the Albany privatization is ultimately made by the Federal Aviation Administration, thus allowing the case to raise national as well as local issues. HKS Case Number 1024.1

The dramatic story of how the Japanese American community successfully lobbied Congress and the White House for legislation mandating financial compensation for those of their number sent to detention camps in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The case not only tells the inside story of a decade-long lobbying campaign-including a carefully-researched personal approach which changed Ronald Reagan's mind on the subject-but serves as a model of how bills really become laws. Aspects of this process explored in the narrative include internal legislative strategy, the role of the press, the role of grassroots organization, and the structure and nature of coalitions. HKS Case Number 1006.0