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On March 28, 2011, The New York Times website became a restricted site where most of the content was protected behind a "paywall." Users who exceeded the limit of 20 free articles per month were required to pay for either a digital or print subscription. The newspaper industry had been suffering from revenue declines over the past decade, and the transition to digital media was difficult to navigate. Revenues from online advertising were not sufficient to replace the loss of print revenue, and many publishers had explored charging readers for content, with mixed success, where specialized sources like The Wall Street Journal were successfully using the model, but several other general news sites had failed. Newspapers and content creators in general were very interested in understanding whether transitioning to the paywall at the most popular news website would succeed, and whether it could become a blueprint for future success as a sustainable business model. There were several difficult issues to examine in determining the digital strategy for The Times. Would consumers remain as engaged with a site protected by a paywall? Would advertisers react positively to such a move that walled off readers? Would readers value both the print and digital versions of the content, or would it become necessary to create new content? The Times had several choices in designing the paywall, including determining the digital content, pricing, as well as how to interface with readers of secondary news websites like blogs that posted links to news articles. Should they design a "leaky" paywall where determined users could easily slip through, or a "bulletproof" paywall like the Financial Times had done, where users had to pay before they could access any content? What choices would provide the foundation for a successful business model?

In response to growing concern about childhood obesity, in February 2006 the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) announced an initiative to examine its self-regulatory program on children's advertising. The existing program was a voluntary cross-industry program that monitored advertisements directed to children. However, the program did not stipulate which products companies could or could not advertise to children. In response to calls for action on childhood obesity, the CBBB was considering a number of approaches, including revising children's advertising guidelines, but staying within the basic parameters of the current program. Alternatively, the CBBB was considering launching a new self-regulatory program in which participating firms would constrain the amount of their children-targeted advertising of less-nutritious products. It was widely believed that children's food advertising was a major contributor to childhood obesity, and within the food-advertising category, considerable attention was directed to advertisements of children's presweetened cereals. The major ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal manufacturers, such as Kellogg's and General Mills, were supporters of the CBBB self-regulation programs and were invited to participate in the CBBB initiative. Each manufacturer had been taking different individual approaches to address the concerns of childhood obesity. The case discussion focuses on what actions General Mills should take with respect to the CBBB initiative and on its own.

Per the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which President Obama signed in 2010, states would be required to create state-wide health insurance marketplaces - the Health Benefit Exchanges (HBEs) - in which individuals and small employers could choose from a set of easy-to-compare, tightly regulated health plans. This case explores how Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey would have to decide whether and how to compete in New Jersey's HBEs.

In 2009 the Economist continued to experience impressive growth and operating margins while many of its peers reeled from both a cyclical downturn and structural threats to print publishing. The case describes the history, organization, and business model of the Economist, and describes three issues confronting Andrew Rashbass, the group's chief executive: first, reevaluating the magazine's digital strategy; second, preparing for e-readers; and, third, positioning the company to exploit what the Economist described as an era of "Mass Intelligence" where more readers sought out sophisticated and challenging information sources.

This case examines the decision of Alibaba Group to diversify from an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange (Alibaba.com) into a B2C and C2C exchange (Taobao.com) for Chinese retailers and consumers. In China, Taobao had managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world's largest consumer marketplace. However, the company had little revenue because it offered services free of charge. How could Taobao best monetize its services without attracting a new set of competitors?

While wine tourism in the United States was booming, the majority of consumers who tasted a Cabernet Sauvignon in one of Napa Valley's tasting rooms were not permitted to ship the wine directly to their home. In 2002, direct-to-consumer shipping was either banned or overly cumbersome in 37 states. W. Reed Foster, president of the Coalition for Free Trade, was determined to remove these obstacles. Would he be able to free the grapes?

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Marco Suter, Executive Vice-Chairman, UBS Board of Directors, carefully studied the chart on his desk. It showed the public commitment of major financial institutions to help mitigate global warming. Evidently, UBS lagged behind its competitors. The graph was part of a report that environmental specialists and senior executives at UBS had compiled. It suggested the company adopt a more progressive policy on climate change. Suter thought about the options that the working group had generated. These ranged from stabilizing the company's current carbon emissions to complete carbon neutrality. The UBS Corporate Responsibility Committee would meet early next week. Suter wondered which option he should support.

Discusses the rise of Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (CC) as the most important radio broadcasting company in the United States. While CC can look back on a glorious past, it faces a multitude of business issues: radio listenership is in decline, media deregulation has come to a halt, and the company's public image is less than favorable.

The fall of 2004 brought exciting news to Love Field, the Texas headquarters of Southwest Airlines. Delta Airlines, one of Southwest's main competitors, had announced that it would dramatically decrease service from the nearby Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW) airport, cutting the number of daily flights from 250 to a mere 21. Gary Kelly, Southwest's newly minted CEO, thought about what appeared to be a golden opportunity. How could Southwest best capitalize on Delta's withdrawal? As Kelly saw it, Southwest had several options to pursue the new business opportunities. A first was to service the canceled Delta routes from Love Field. A second possibility was to encourage members of Congress to repeal the Wright Amendment, which limited Southwest's flight offerings from Love Field. An alternative to fighting for the repeal of the Wright Amendment was for Southwest to lease the 18 gates that Delta had left at DFW. Kelly carefully considered his options. Was now the time to call his lobbyist?

Describes how companies engage the political and legal system and the rules and ethics associated with doing so. Focuses on the U.S. political and legal system, but also seeks to familiarize readers with lobbying norms and structures in the European Union and Japan.

In the spring of 1977, Goodyear CEO Charles J. Pilliod Jr. was looking at an internal report on government and legal events relevant to the tire industry. Two items caught his attention. First, he noticed that an industry suit to block the government's proposed system to rate tires on tread wear, traction, and temperature resistance had been rebuffed by a U.S. appeals court. Although the court found fault with the government's proposals, the ruling could mean that the tire grading system was close to becoming a reality. Second, Joan Claybrook, a former Nader consumer interest group lobbyist, had just become head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the agency within the government that was in charge of producing the rating system. Pilliod wondered if the regulatory events might affect Goodyear's ability to maintain its world leadership in the tire industry.

Strategists are not alone in finding failing markets irresistible. Governments and social groups ranging from unions to the World Wildlife Fund also respond to market failures. Governments typically seek to fix failing markets, often with prescriptions of what companies can and cannot do. Activist groups are also out to change corporate behavior, but they rely on social pressure to reach their goals. Many companies that compete successfully in the market environment stumble when it comes to dealing with governments and social groups. Microsoft's near breakup by the U.S. Department of Justice and Wal-Mart's less-than-stellar performance against groups who oppose the retailer's stores are just two of many examples. "Strategies Beyond the Market" overviews an additional set of tools that strategists can use to contend with and exploit forces in a company's government, legal, and social environment.

In July 2006, Mitsuhisa Ishikawa wondered how he could further enhance the success and visibility of his animation production company headquartered in Tokyo, Production I.G. For the year ended May 2006, Production I.G. had sales of 5,439 million yen ($47.3 million), operating profit of 404 million yen ($3.5 million), and 184 employees. Its recent film Innocence: Ghost in the Shell 2 competed at Cannes Film Festival in 2004, and the company had gone public in December 2005. These were no small accomplishments for a Japanese animation production company. Indeed, despite the global success of Japanese animation, the industry was fragmented with about 430 animation production companies and dominated by distributors--TV stations, movie distributors, DVD distributors and advertising agencies, which held the lion's share of content copyrights. Distributors controlled the funding and contracted the production out to animation production companies. As a result, most of the latter were small companies laboring in obscurity. As such, no Japanese animation production company came even close to the size of Walt Disney Co.: in 2005 Disney had revenues of $32 billion, whereas Toei Animation, the largest animation production company in Japan, had revenue of only 21 billion yen ($175 million). To Ishikawa's mind, one of the key decisions concerned the mix of the "contents garden" that his company should aspire to. Should he increase the share of animation productions based on manga (comics and print cartoons) relative to original-productions (i.e. animation stories created entirely by Production I.G.)?

In 2004, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. proposed to build a new supercenter in Inglewood, a low-income community near Los Angeles. The proposal was a part of Wal-Mart's strategy to bring its supercenter format to California. Introduced in the late 1980s, supercenters added a full line of groceries and specialty departments to Wal-Mart's traditional assortment of general merchandise. Wal-Mart's planned entry into California caused problems even before the discounter opened a single supercenter. To compete with Wal-Mart, supermarkets in California cut grocery workers' health benefits and wages. The unions ordered a strike against the supermarkets. The labor unrest lasted five months and involved 70,000 workers. In the meantime, Inglewood's city council rejected Wal-Mart's request to build a supercenter. The retailer took its expansion plans directly to the voters of Inglewood. With the help of the California initiative process, Wal-Mart forced a public vote on the proposed 60-acre development. Will Inglewood's voters dampen the shine of "America's most admired company?"

Amgen Inc.'s Epogen was the first biotech blockbuster drug. Epogen helped prevent anemia, a condition that leads to severe fatigue, increased risk of cardiovascular disease, and even death. At the time, the market for Epogen, which included dialysis patients and persons with cancer undergoing chemotherapy, was estimated to be a $1 billion opportunity. After a critical scientific breakthrough, which allowed Amgen to identify the EPO gene, the company applied for a number of patents to protect its achievement. However, much to its surprise, Amgen learned that EPO had already been patented. Genetics Institute, the holder of the patent, demanded a royalty-free cross-license. Amgen's manager needed to decide how best to compete with its rival.

The Dutch "Verenigde Bloemenveiling Aalsmeer Cooperative" (VBA) was on of the world's largest flower exchanges. Around 6,300 flower growers, one half of them located in the Netherlands, used the auction to sell cut flowers and plants to more than 1,000 wholesalers. In 2004, the value of the flowers and plants traded at Aalsmeer exceeded 1.6 billion euros, representing 36% of the world's trade in cut flowers. Every morning, VBA held 55,000 Dutch auctions to match buyers and suppliers. While formidable in size, VBA management worried about the future of the exchange because direct sales between growers and buyers had started to bypass the auction. Kenyan growers, for instance, often shipped roses directly to wholesalers. VBA's management considered a number of strategic initiatives and tactical moves in response to the growth in direct sales. Should the exchange allow non-Dutch growers to become members? Would it make sense to have the wholesalers bear a larger fraction of the trading cost? Philip Smits, CEO of VBA, knew that expanding VBA membership and adjusting trading commissions were guaranteed to be hotly contested topics at the upcoming general meeting.