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The case opens in 2020 as Michael Lahyani, founder and CEO of Property Finder, Dubai's leading online real estate classifieds portal, contemplates the company's five-year growth strategy. Since its founding in 2005 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Property Finder had secured multiple rounds of investments and expanded into countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The business grew following a proven business model revolving around monthly flat subscription fees paid by real estate brokers for packages of listings, while remaining free for end-customers to browse. By 2020, Property Finder had reached profitability in the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, which it considered its core markets, and had done significant brand building in newer markets of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and Turkey. In 2020, Lahyani needed to decide on the company's growth strategy to increase profitability. Property Finder could focus on its core markets and switch to segmented pricing, lure in more developers to post first hand property directly, and create new revenue channels. Alternatively or in parallel, the company could tailor its business model to suit the dynamics of each of its newer markets. All the while, Lahyani had just onboarded a new executive team that was busy adjusting the organizational structure and institutionalizing procedures and processes. As a result, company resources were spread thin and Lahyani found himself at a crossroads; should the company focus its efforts on bolstering its position in incumbent markets and thus forego growth abroad, or should it pursue new markets and risk tarnishing its reputation in its core markets in case of a failure?

The case opens in 2019 as Raja Al Mazrouei, executive vice president of FinTech Hive (the Hive) at the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), the first and largest financial technology accelerator in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia region, contemplates her and the Hive's option to support the fintech ecosystem in Dubai as the accelerated startups face funding challenges in the market. The case chronicles Al Mazrouei's efforts to set up the Hive in 2016 to create a fintech ecosystem in the region in line with the Kingdom's National Agenda to help financial institutions engage with technology to remain relevant to the region's evolving customer and market needs. The case provides a detailed overview of the model the Hive was based on and its growth story that led the Hive to rank as the 10th largest Global Fintech Hub and the 3rd biggest Global Islamic Fintech Hub in 2019. Having successfully "graduated" two classes of startups, in 2019 the Hive had signed partnerships with accelerators and incubators around the world and had announced a $100 million dedicated fund to support fintech companies globally. Yet, Al Mazrouei knew that she had just scratched the surface and there was a lot to be done. The investment mentality in the region was still quite conservative, and there were only a few venture capital funds and angel investors were virtually non-existent. The continued success of the startups depended on their access to funding and Al Mazrouei was concerned about the Hive's ability to support the increasing number of fintech startups the Hive had lured to Dubai. One such startup that had successfully graduated from the Hive's 2018 accelerator program was in the market raising funds. Would they succeed? Would the Hive's funds be enough to encourage VCs, financial institutions, and angel investors to join in and invest in early-stage fintech startups to keep them going?

The case opens in 2017 as Tim Murray, CEO of Aluminum Bahrain (Alba), the largest single-site aluminum smelter in the world outside China and a major contributor to the Bahraini economy, was contemplating the recovery options as the company was facing the most severe crisis in its history. The case provides background on Alba and chronicles a transformation process implemented by Murray. The company had historically underperformed expectations. It developed a hierarchical, engineering oriented culture. The large workforce, made up of multiple nationalities, exhibited uneven levels of process compliance and personal accountability. Those deficiencies manifested themselves in many ways. Most damaging was a consistently poor record of workplace safety. Alba suffered from a high rate of on-the-job injuries and fatalities. Murray undertook to change the company culture, using safety as the linchpin of a campaign to instill a greater sense of discipline and personal responsibility across all levels of the organization. The case occurs against the backdrop of Alba's largest expansion project to date, which was planned to increase its production capacity by 50%. Just as Alba was reaping the benefits of Murray's campaign, a total blackout at Alba's facilities leads to an explosion that severely damaged its largest production line while Murray is on home leave. As the extent of the damage becomes apparent, the management team begins reverting to old behaviors. The case follows the subsequent series of events as Murray seeks to get control of the situation. Murray has to choose between two options for restoring production: outsourcing the recovery efforts to a credible third party at a very high cost or letting his team take on the task. As he contemplated his options, he dwelled on an overarching question-what was the best mechanism for restoring the damaged production line without undermining the culture he had invested so much in trying to create at Alba?

The case opens in 2017 as Tim Murray, CEO of Aluminum Bahrain (Alba), the largest single-site aluminum smelter in the world outside China and a major contributor to the Bahraini economy, was contemplating the recovery options as the company was facing the most severe crisis in its history. The case provides background on Alba and chronicles a transformation process implemented by Murray. The company had historically underperformed expectations. It developed a hierarchical, engineering oriented culture. The large workforce, made up of multiple nationalities, exhibited uneven levels of process compliance and personal accountability. Those deficiencies manifested themselves in many ways. Most damaging was a consistently poor record of workplace safety. Alba suffered from a high rate of on-the-job injuries and fatalities. Murray undertook to change the company culture, using safety as the linchpin of a campaign to instill a greater sense of discipline and personal responsibility across all levels of the organization. The case occurs against the backdrop of Alba's largest expansion project to date, which was planned to increase its production capacity by 50%. Just as Alba was reaping the benefits of Murray's campaign, a total blackout at Alba's facilities leads to an explosion that severely damaged its largest production line while Murray is on home leave. As the extent of the damage becomes apparent, the management team begins reverting to old behaviors. The case follows the subsequent series of events as Murray seeks to get control of the situation. Murray has to choose between two options for restoring production: outsourcing the recovery efforts to a credible third party at a very high cost or letting his team take on the task. As he contemplated his options, he dwelled on an overarching question-what was the best mechanism for restoring the damaged production line without undermining the culture he had invested so much in trying to create at Alba?

The case opens in 2019 as Aytul Ercil, co-founder and CEO of Vispera, computer vision technology provider for retail, is contemplating the company's agenda trying to decide how to prioritize the impeding options. The case chronicles the founding of Vispera, the iterations of its technology and its business model, and lays the ground for the competitive outlook. The case provides a detailed overview of how Vispera's technology and its automated visual analysis help retail and fast-moving consumer goods companies around the world to minimize stock-outs, increase sales, reduce personnel costs, and improve operational efficiency. In 2016, the debut of Amazon Go urges the retail players to up their game vis-à-vis technology. Demand for automation and computer vision in the retail surges. In a land-grab market, Vispera strives to grow globally, differentiate itself, keep its technology cutting edge, and raise capital. In 2019, taking a step back from all of the daily to-dos, Ercil needs to consider the big picture for making Vispera a leading global player. She needs to consider the following: Should the team focus on developing shelf availability and out-of-stock prediction capabilities or focus on dynamic pricing, customization, and real-time campaign management? Should Vispera pivot to provide insights beyond the shelf as was already being done by players entering the space? How should the team think about data ownership: Could Vispera leverage the data to drive cross industry insights or market level perspective?

The case opens in 2017 as Onur Erbay, CEO of HOPI, a multi-vendor loyalty platform, is contemplating a critical decision. The case chronicles the origins of Boyner Group, the parent company of HOPI and a major retailer in Turkey, and development of retail and customer relationship management (CRM) in Turkey over the years. Before HOPI, Boyner Group retailers were unable to trace customers across the Group's brands form insights about customers' preferences and habits beyond what brand-specific CRM and loyalty programs provided data for. HOPI was born as the management team at Boyner Group realized the need to serve the customer holistically; the program was designed as a coalition loyalty program including non-Boyner retailer partners. The case provides a detailed overview of the design choices for HOPI-a mobile only app with its own currency, paracik, its revenue model, user experience, and how the company planned to leverage big data to segment the customers for retailers and increase purchasing power for customers. Since its launch in 2015, HOPI had 5.5 million downloads and 300 thousand daily active users browsing campaigns offered by over 116 coalition retailers that ranged from gas stations and cinemas to supermarkets and department stores. In 2017, Erbay, who had ambitions to grow HOPI beyond a loyalty program, was faced with harsh realities: the Turkish market was very price sensitive, several competitors had emerged since HOPI's launch, and several retailers and consumers preferred discounts at the time of purchase instead of earning loyalty points for future purchases. Erbay was also facing pressure from the parent company to make HOPI profitable. Was it time for HOPI to pivot to the discount model and abandon its original concept?

The case opens in 2016 as Amine Benkirane, CEO of the furniture retailer KITEA, observes KITEA's dormant sales on the day IKEA opens its first store in Morocco. It then provides information on IKEA's Morocco store, as well as a detailed pricing comparison between IKEA products in Morocco and elsewhere and similar products sold by KITEA. The case then asks whether KITEA had any chance to compete with IKEA under the current circumstances, taking into account its extensive preparation for the competition.

The case opens in February 2016, when the official date of IKEA's store opening (March 16, 2016) is announced after a five month delay. It reviews the changes that Amine and Othman Benkirane had made to KITEA's workforce in the extra five months afforded by the delay, and asks if KITEA is now ready to compete successfully against IKEA.

This case describes the delay of IKEA's store opening in Morocco in 2015. After Sweden ordered an internal review of its position on the independence of Western Sahara, a territory Morocco regarded as part of its own, the Moroccan government declared that IKEA did not have proper licensing to open its store in Morocco. The opening of its Zenata store was delayed by at least several months. What additional changes should Amine and Othman Benkirane implement at KITEA in the extra time?

The case opens in 2018 after KITEA has recorded two years of double-digit sales growth following IKEA's entry into the Moroccan market. It then traces the factors that contributed to KITEA' success and that led Tana Africa Capital Limited to acquire a minority stake in the company. In February 2018, following the acquisition, the partners announced plans to create a presence in North and West African countries through KITEA's stores. The case asks whether, after a number of frightening years, KITEA was ready to expand internationally to Sub-Saharan Africa, and if so, what the optimal structure and pace for this expansion should be.

The case opens in September 2015, when IKEA is about to open its first store in Morocco. It then chronicles the efforts of KITEA CEO Amine Benkirane and his son Othman between 2013 and 2015 to prepare KITEA for IKEA's entry. After incurring losses for the first time in 2013, KITEA had bounced back and recorded profits and growth in 2014 and 2015. The improvements in supply chain management, product range, and relationships with stakeholders that the duo had been working on tirelessly seemed to be paying off. After an intense preparation period, was KITEA ready to face off against IKEA in Morocco?

Nobel Ilac was a Turkish generic pharmaceutical company marketing more than 100 drugs in 20 countries and, as of 2017, had over 2,500 employees worldwide. Nobel had implemented a transformation strategy-more specifically, a customer segmentation plan-whereby the sales force had begun to use data to determine their call plans. As a result, it had improved sales performance, and its previously negative EBITDA had reached double-digit positive figures. Two key issues remained: 1) growth was not as high as desired; and 2) the sales force's voluntary turnover was very high. Given that the sales force was the only go-to-market channel, Nobel needed to do something to reduce employee turnover without affecting the positive trend in sales and profits. For many industries, personal selling is the primary and sometimes the only way that a firm can go to market. Hence, properly managing the sales force is a key to a firm's success. The case outlines the challenges of managing a sales force-in particular, how to decrease salespeople's attrition while also increasing growth.

The case opens in 2013 as Amine Benkirane, founder and CEO of the leading Moroccan furniture company KITEA, contemplates the loss his company has incurred for the first time in its 20-year history. The case then describes KITEA's origins and provides a detailed overview of the business plan that enabled Benkirane to bring affordable modern furniture in flatpacks to the Moroccan market, which had previously been dominated by unorganized artisans. At the beginning of 2010, KITEA was a market leader with a robust market share of 24%. However, Benkirane read about rumors that IKEA was planning to enter the Moroccan market. The case explores in detail KITEA's efforts to prepare for the increased competition. In 2013, KITEA found itself in a difficult situation, facing a downturn in the economy, a slowdown in sales, a delayed store opening, and souring creditor sentiment following the news about IKEA's entry. Would KITEA be able to bounce back and remain competitive when IKEA entered the market?

The case opens in July 2016 as Barbaros Ozbugutu, co-founder and CEO of the Istanbul-based payment technology start-up iyzico, contemplates the pros and cons of the different term sheets the company has received for its Series C round. The case then informs the reader about some changes in circumstances that affected the terms of the shortlisted offers. At the end, the case poses this question: Being faced with worsening terms in a volatile environment, should Ozbugutu go ahead with the round, or should he wait and try again at a later point in time?

The case opens in 2016 as Barbaros Ozbugutu, co-founder and CEO of the Istanbul-based payment technology start-up iyzico, contemplates the offers the company received for its Series C round. The case then describes iyzico's origins and provides a detailed overview of the business model and growth story that led iyzico to dominate the industry in Turkey within three years of its founding. Having raised A and B rounds from local and institutional investors in 2014 and 2015 respectively, in 2016 Ozbugutu believes that iyzico could benefit from another round, this time from international venture capital, to reach its aggressive growth targets. In the summer of 2016, after an intense few months of talks with potential investors, Ozbugutu was looking at five competitive term sheets from funds with great fintech know-how and emerging markets experience. From the previous rounds, he knew that if he chose the right investors-ones who could also act as advisors-surprises would be rare. He now needed to weigh the pros and cons of the different term sheets and VCs and decide which offers to ultimately accept.

As one of the few female entrepreneurs in Saudi Arabia, Lateefa Alwaalan had been trying to produce the perfect cup of Arabic coffee for over a decade. In 2007, she began testing various coffee blends, which she later branded Yatooq, the Arabic word for "craving" or "longing". She soon realized that the brewing process was just as important as the blend in consistently producing a great cup of Arabic coffee. Therefore, she developed the world's first Arabic coffee machine in 2013 to complement her blend. Sales of the Yatooq coffee machines grew rapidly in Saudi Arabia, exceeding $2 million in sales in 2014. However, an increase in competition combined with an economic slowdown in the country led to declining sales and increasing costs for Yatooq. Alwaalan reflected on the decisions she made to date, wondering if the revenue decline could have been avoided. She also contemplated on the path forward, specifically whether she should iterate on her go-to-market strategy with her existing product or pivot to an entirely different product.

The case opens in 2017 with two of the five co-founders of MISHA telling the company's CEO Michal Portz that they believe it is time for the global venture to shut down its operations and cease investments. Portz and another co-founder believe MISHA can still work. The case describes the origins of the ready-to-use capsule solution for shisha smokers and the evolution of MISHA from idea to product design, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. Consequent mishaps slow down the performance of MISHA, and after five years of the product being in the market and four financing rounds, numbers are far behind what they were in the business plan. The case explores the pivots the company goes through. The central dilemma is this: should the cofounders pull the plug on the company or invest more time and money to try to turn it around? When and according to which criteria should Portz make such a decision?

EmQuest, Emirates Group's travel distribution company, must decide what to do with its contract with the global distribution system it uses, Sabre. Since its founding in 1988, EmQuest was servicing travel agents in the MENA region by providing a connection to over 400 airlines as well as numerous other travel suppliers. EmQuest mainly relied on Sabre to provide this service to the agents, and its contract was coming to an end. In the last ten years, since the beginning of EmQuest's Sabre contract, while EmQuest grew, a lot happened in the travel industry: the Internet transformed customer habits, low-cost carriers emerged, and the Middle East experienced a boom in tourism. The conditions under which EmQuest had first signed its contract with Sabre a decade before were much different in 2017. With change happening so rapidly and impacting the fundamentals of the travel business model so dramatically, it was a real challenge to predict where the industry would be in the next decade. Yet the management needed to make a decision regarding the Sabre contract in 2017, amidst such a whirlwind in the market.

The case opens with Said Darwazah, chairman and CEO of Hikma Pharmaceuticals, the multinational generics company, anticipating the company's 2017 AGM and reflecting on changes made over the previous year to address concerns expressed by proxy advisors and some shareholders about Hikma's reliance on a combined chairman/CEO position, the long tenure of some directors, and the company's approach to executive pay. The case describes Hikma's origins as Jordanian pharma company founded by Darwazah's father in 1978, and traces the evolution of its governance as a private family company, then as publicly-traded company listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2005, and finally as a member of the FTSE 100, beginning in March 2015. Ahead of the 2017 AGM, Darwazah is confident that shareholders will approve changes made to the company's executive incentive plan (EIP) and steps taken to accelerate the turnover of long-serving directors, but he wonders how much longer the company will be able to continue with a combined Chairman/CEO and, more generally, how to marry the high level of governance expected by shareholders with the entrepreneurial spirit that had driven Hikma's growth and development.