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When Bruce Wayne hired Anthony Starks, he thought he had hit a homerun by getting the most brilliant and passionate scientist-leader in the field to be his CSO. But a few months in, Wayne and Starks begin to clash over crucial forward-looking decisions about the direction of the company. As CEO, Wayne needs to make tough decisions about how to manage his passionate but increasingly unpredictable CSO.

This case accompanies the (A) case from Anthony Starks's perspective.

This case describes Hewlett Packard Enteprise's "Dandelion Program," which has developed a new service offering for the company's clients by drawing on the special talents of people with autism. The company has deployed "pods" organized around 8 or 9 employees with autism, to function as high performance mini-ecosystems, which have turned out to be 30% more effective than average service teams (in some areas). The case centers around questions of how to adapt this successful model to new demands in a different service domain, specifically, cybersecurity and defense related areas. The case also explores how the company is innovating and refining its assessment and training processes in support of the program.

Pal's Sudden Service has developed a unique operating model and organizational culture in the quick service restaurant business. With a deep emphasis on process control and improvement, zero defects, extensive training, and a high level of employee engagement, Pal's has been able to achieve excellent operating and financial performance. The case examines the challenges it potentially faces as it contemplates growing the chain significantly from the 28 units it currently operates.

This case describes SAP's "Autism at Work" program, which integrates people with autism into the company's workforce. The company has a stated objective of making 1% of its workforce people with autism by 2020. SAP's rationale for the program is based on the belief that "neurodiversity" contributes to the company's overall innovative capabilities ("We believe that innovation comes from the edges.") Thus, the program is not viewed as a subsidized Corporate Social Responsibility activity but as a positive net benefit activity, as well as a way of addressing skills shortages by tapping into non-traditional pools of (considerable) talent. The case explores how SAP is also using the program to rethink and reengineer its Human Resource Management policies and processes to make them more inclusive and effective.

Science-based industries such as biotechnology offer the potential of high growth, but they are fraught with risk. The payoffs can take many years to materialize or may never come. Even though the traditional venture capital/entrepreneurial model has been shown to stimulate innovation in a wide range of technology settings (software, computers, Internet, electronics, etc.), it wasn't designed to deal with the costs, risks, and slow payout of science-based industries. Although venture capital continues to flow into industries like biotechnology, there has been a significant shift away from funding ventures at the earliest stages. A key concern is that lack of availability of future rounds of financing can shut off the flow of venture capital funding abruptly. In this article, authors Andrew W. Lo and Gary P. Pisano draw on comparisons to projects in the moviemaking industry and propose the project-focused organization (PFO) as an alternative structure for undertaking long-term, high-risk, highly capital-intensive R&D programs in science-based industries such as biotech. PFOs are entities created to conduct a specific R&D project. The authors discuss how they could work in practice, using the example of biopharmaceutical R&D. Researchers innovating in a science-based context must overcome two specific challenges. First, they need to raise sufficient capital to fund a long-term, highly risky, and very expensive project. Second, they must have a governance mechanism for allocating capital (human and financial) and conducting projects. The authors propose that governance centered on the project rather than the company may be a more efficient way to organize innovation in science-based industries. To reduce overhead, they propose contracting out for resources as necessary. As with movie projects, investors could choose projects they want to invest in, with the understanding that they will receive returns only if those projects succeed.

Why is it so hard to build and maintain the capacity to innovate? The reason is not simply a failure to execute but a failure to articulate an innovation strategy that aligns innovation efforts with the overall business strategy. Without such a strategy, companies will have a hard time weighing the trade-offs of various practices-such as crowdsourcing and customer co-creation-and so may end up with a grab bag of approaches. They will have trouble designing a coherent innovation system that fits their competitive needs over time and may be tempted to ape someone else's system. And they will find it difficult to align different parts of the organization with shared priorities. As Corning, a leader in glass and materials science, has found, an innovation strategy must address how innovation will create value for potential customers, how the company will capture a share of that value, and what types of innovation to pursue. Critics tend to discount "routine" innovation that leverages a company's existing technical capabilities and business model and extol "disruptive" innovation, but that is a simplistic view. A company's unique competitive circumstances should dictate the innovation portfolio it pursues. Because innovation cuts across functions, only senior leaders can set an innovation strategy. In doing so, they must recognize that the strategy, like the process of innovation itself, requires continual experimentation and adaptation. HBR Reprint R1506B

In 2010, Pfizer established four small research units in New York, Boston, San Francisco, and San Diego located close to several premier Academic Medical Centers (AMCs), or hospitals with adjoining medical schools. The goal of these units was to redesign collaboration with Pfizer and academic medical researchers with the purpose of developing new, innovative drugs candidates for testing in patients. Project teams consisted of Pfizer scientists and academics working side-by-side to reduce the time needed to bring a therapeutic drug from the lab to a patient's bedside. This case explores the academic collaboration model developed by Pfizer. What were the strengths of and challenges facing this model? How would the model evolve in the future? And how would new, similar collaboration models surfacing at other major pharmaceutical companies pose a threat to the Pfizer model?

This case examines the unique business model of Ristorante D'O, a high end gourmet restaurant located near Milan, Italy. Founded by Chef Davide Oldani, D'O offers meals at approximately one-third the price of other Michelin starred restaurants. Oldani has made this business model profitable by making a conscious set of operating strategy choices (menu, meal design, service process, lay-out, reservation process) that reduce waste and inefficiency, while preserving quality. The case enables students to understand how cost-quality trade-offs can be altered through creative operating strategies, and sufficient data are available to analyze the operating model in depth. A second focal point of the case concerns Oldani's choices for growth. The wait list for D'O is currently 18 months. He can presumably open another D'O at a different location. At the time of the case, however, is considering opening a new restaurant in the same vicinity as D'O that would operate at an even lower price point. Case debate can center around whether this new restaurant format makes sense from a strategic point of view, and, in particular, whether the capabilities and know-how acquired in operating D'O are applicable to the new restaurant. The deeper issue in the case concerns how businesses based on the creative talent of an individual (like Chef Oldani) can grow, without losing what makes them special.

The head of the branded private investment company owner of the Virgin brand reflected on the group's new pillars of growth. Since the 1970s when Richard Branson created the Virgin record retailing company, Virgin had developed from scratch six companies worth more than $1 billion each and changed their focus from record retailing and music production to a broader one based on airlines, health, financial services, mobile and media businesses. In addition, Virgin had been able to apply the Virgin brand to several different products without harming the brand. Their challenge had been finding the capital to finance the new ventures rather than the brand. Since 2005, Branson was dedicating more and more time to a charitable organization, Virgin Unite, and had appointed Stephen Murphy the new CEO of the Group. As Murphy contemplated their growth strategy for the next decade he faced a number of difficult decisions. First, how should he fund new ventures? While growing, the Group had sold stakes in its companies and had signed with them licensing agreements for the use of the Virgin brand name. The Virgin Group was today a loose group of companies some linked to Virgin only by brand licensing agreements. Should they expand by signing new licensing agreements? Second, what kind of opportunities should he seek? Should they keep acting as a venture capital firm, nurturing new ventures as in the past or should they invest in larger and more established companies? What would be the consequences of their choices on the brand and on the Group? Would they always be able to inject the Virgin culture and turn around companies?

Too many U.S. companies base decisions about where to locate production largely on narrow financial criteria. They don't consider whether keeping manufacturing at home makes more sense strategically or take into account the impact it might have on their ability to innovate. The result has been an exodus of manufacturing from America, which has weakened the capabilities that domestic firms need to keep inventing high-quality, cost-competitive products. One problem is that it's hard to tell when moving production far from R&D will do damage. To make that determination, say Harvard Business School's Pisano and Shih, executives need to examine two things. The first is modularity, or the degree to which product design can be separated from manufacturing. When modularity is low, product designs can't be clearly specified and design choices affect manufacturing processes in subtle, difficult-to-predict ways (and vice versa). The second is the maturity of the manufacturing process. Immature processes are ripe for innovation, but over time opportunities for improvement become incremental. Viewed through the modularity-maturity lens, relationships between manufacturing and innovation fall into four quadrants: pure product innovation, pure process innovation, process-embedded innovation, and process-driven innovation. In the first two quadrants, locating design near production isn't critical, but separating the two functions is risky in the third and fourth quadrants. This framework will help business leaders make better sourcing decisions and reinvigorate America's innovation-driven economy.

Fiat ended its 27-year absence in the North American automobile market when the first Cinquecento (500)-a very small, iconic Italian car that had strong sales in Europe-was delivered on March 10, 2011. The Italian automaker re-entered the market through an alliance with Chrysler, the American automaker Fiat acquired in April 2009. For Laura Soave, Chrysler Group's head of Fiat Brand North America, the first delivery marked a watershed in a journey that began 12 months before when she first took responsibility for re-launching the Fiat brand in North America. As the first product of the Fiat-Chrysler alliance, the outcome of the Cinquecento launch would indicate how the integration of operations, and in particular the sharing of technology, platforms, components, manufacturing plants, and distribution networks would drive the long-term health of both Fiat and Chrysler. This case looks at the various strategic and operational challenges Soave faced throughout the process.

What causes so many companies that once dominated their industries to slide into decline? In this article, two Harvard Business School professors argue that such firms lose their touch because success breeds failure by impeding learning at both the individual and organizational levels. When we succeed, we assume that we know what we are doing, but it could be that we just got lucky. We make what psychologists call fundamental attribution errors, giving too much credit to our talents and strategy and too little to environmental factors and random events. We develop an overconfidence bias, becoming so self-assured that we think we don't need to change anything. We also experience the failure-to-ask-why syndrome and neglect to investigate the causes of good performance. To overcome these three learning impediments, executives should examine successes with the same scrutiny they apply to failures. Companies should implement systematic after-action reviews to understand all the factors that led to a win, and test their theories by conducting experiments even if "it ain't broke."

In late 2010, Jean-Paul Clozel, CEO of the Swiss biotech pharmaceuticals firm Actelion, looks back on a successful decade. The small venture that he had started with a few of his scientist colleagues in the late 1990s to discover novel medicine in a research-driven organisation had grown into one of Europe's largest biotech firms by revenues. Their success was mainly founded on their orphan indication drug Tracleer, which Actelion sold and marketed worldwide. However, Tracleer's looming patent expiry in a few years and recent late-stage pipeline setbacks had put the company under pressure from investors. While Clozel was confident in their ability to deliver future drugs that could secure further growing revenue streams, he wondered how to maintain their entrepreneurial culture that he saw as a prerequisite for this--particularly their lean hierarchy and researchers' freedom to follow innovation where it led them--in a company of more than 2,400 people which continued to grow.

In the biotech world, the 18-year-old Munich-based company MorphoSys was a rarity: it was profitable. The company achieved this profitability not by developing and selling its own drugs, but by licensing access to its proprietary library of human antibodies. Recently, the company decided to deviate from this model, and attempt to develop its own proprietary products. The case allows analysis of "license vs. vertically integrate" business model decisions, and can be used to teach principles of business model design and the functioning of markets for know-how.

In 2009, Amyris Biotechnologies was building a plant in Brazil that used synthetic biology to convert sugarcane into both renewable fuels and renewable chemicals. The Amyris' marketing team was investigating the commercial interest for both types of products, while the research and development team and the operations group were building processes that could accommodate both as well. CEO John Melo hoped to have commercial product available in 2011; however, he realized that pursuing both chemicals and fuels added even more complexity to a business that was already executing multiple development steps in parallel. The case looks at the various strategic and operational decisions facing Melo as he planned the company's optimal commercialization strategy.

This case explores project management in a large organization through the eyes of a young project manager, Mike Morris. Morris is tasked with leading a project within the overall merger integration effort at Bank of America. Morris encounters difficulties with managing stakeholders, setting requirements, and reporting progress.

This case examines VF Brands global supply chain strategy. Historically, VF has used a combination of in-house manufacturing and traditional arms-length sourcing arrangements. At the time of the case, the company is considering a third approach to supplier relations that involves much closer cooperation and partnerships. The goal of this "third way" approach is to create a sourcing relationship that combines some of the virtues of vertical integration with the flexibility of sourcing. Such arrangements are increasingly discussed in the operations literature and in practice. This case provides students an opportunity to do an in-depth analysis of such an arrangement, and develop an understanding of the trade-offs involved.

Examines the process used by a major motion picture studio to develop and select movie projects. Warner Bros.' strategy is to focus its efforts on a small number of major "event" films (i.e., films with the potential to generate gross box-office receipts of $300 million or more). This strategy--which has worked for the past two years--entails risks. The studio is now asking how it can better manage these risks and, specifically, how it can improve its odds of success.

In December 2008, Gianluigi Nova, CEO of Tenova SpA, a technology and equipment supplier to the metals and mining industry, had to choose between two options. The first was to continue growing in the company's core business: equipment for the steel production. The second option offered growth in a related, but nearly new business for Tenova: the equipment for mining, mineral processing and extractive metallurgy. They only had a small presence in this market. Yet, Nova had to cope with the worldwide economic crisis whose destructive power hit every area of the metals and mining industry. Nova had to decide which option offered the best opportunity to grow in the worst economic crisis since 1929.