個案總覽

The case describes the journey of Zola, an online wedding registry designed to greatly improve the clunky and impersonal wedding registry process. With innovative features such as group gifting, scheduled delivery, and honeymoon donations, Zola was described as the registry for Millenials. As the company achieved significant traction and looked to scale, it had to choose from three distinct strategic growth paths to pursue: 1) become the go-to registry site for all major life events; 2) become the online home department store for Millenials; 3) become the premier all things wedding website. As well, the CEO and her team needed to decide whether and how to raise capital in the context of this strategic decision.

Near the end of 2014, Derek Belch decided to turn his master's thesis into a virtual reality athletic training company called STRIVR Labs [Sports Training in Virtual Reality]. Born out of Stanford University's famed Virtual Human Interaction Lab, STRIVR garnered immediate interest from a wide array of organizations. Having played and coached football at Stanford University, Belch had connections within several professional and collegiate football programs. Furthermore, he had tested STRIVR's revolutionary product extensively with the Stanford University Football team throughout the 2014 football season. During this testing phase, Belch made drastic improvements to the virtual reality training solution, and several national media outlets began to take notice of the innovative technology. Against this backdrop, Belch was able to secure several meetings in the beginning of 2015 with coaches, scouts, and NFL executives, with the hope of acquiring a few customers. By the end of June, STRIVR had signed contracts with two NFL teams and six colleges. By the end of August, STRIVR had added an additional four NFL teams, three college football teams, the NBA's Washington Wizards, and the NHL's Washington Capitals. As STRIVR grew its customer base, it generated significant press, which led to even more inbound interest in STRIVR's solutions. Much of the interest came from sports teams, eager to utilize STRIVR's sports training solution. However, several companies approached Belch to discuss partnership opportunities outside of sports training-some related to sports entertainment, and others in industries completely unrelated to sports. In less than a year, Belch and the STRIVR team had seemingly endless opportunities for growth. And while Belch was thrilled about the many potential avenues for STRIVR's continued expansion, he knew that the excitement needed to be tempered with caution.

Disappointed by how poorly his two favorite football teams were playing against each other on a Thursday night in November 2009, Warren Packard considered the other games he could watch. It was late fall and there were college basketball, college football, and hockey games being played. With all of those different options, Packard thought, "Wouldn't it be nice if somebody could just tap me on the shoulder and say, 'you should be watching this game.'" That thought is what sparked the creation of Thuuz Sports. This case covers the evolution of Packard's idea from side project to Thuuz Sports, a start up with the mission of providing fans with personalized sports entertainment. Thuuz, which assigned every game an excitement rating and alerted users about games they would not want to miss, began as a B2C app. When Packard and his team realized that the biggest pain point was with the companies that saw sports as a way to drive interest, Thuuz pivoted and began prioritizing a B2B2C approach. The case explores how Thuuz approached a number of challenges, including running low on cash, developing a pricing model, and positioning its Automated Highlight Reels. As the only businessperson at the company, Packard was very resource constrained, making prioritization of issues and initiatives even more imperative. Students are asked to evaluate the B2C and B2B2C approaches, identify growth opportunities, and recommend how to pursue those opportunities.

In 2010, Rob Dyrdek launched a new skateboarding league called Street League Skateboarding (SLS) with the goal of raising the profile of street skateboarding around the world. Dyrdek had excelled within the world of professional skateboarding for more than 20 years, during which time he amassed he amassed a large following of international fans. In 2006, Dyrdek gained further fame through his starring role in the MTV reality series Rob & Big, which reached more than 70 million viewers in its first season. On the show, Dyrdek often discussed his many entrepreneurial pursuits and creative passions. Among these pursuits, Dyrdek imagined recreating the world of professional skateboarding through the creation of a new, innovative skateboarding league.

The (A) case described the early days of Movile, a Brazilian mobile phone company, and debated the decision to open an office in Silicon Valley. The case went into the history of the firm and the mobile phone industry in Brazil. It discussed how the firm grew throughout Latin America through acquisitions and failed in earlier attempts to expand organically. The (A) case also outlined the unique culture of the firm, which blended a highly innovative culture with Movile's focus on achieving targets and results. The question of whether to expand into Silicon Valley raised the issue of the importance of an entrepreneurial ecosystem in the growth trajectory of a firm. This issue was particularly significant at this point in Movile's life cycle when it needed to evolve from being a feature phone business to diversifying to include new smartphone technologies in their product offerings.

The (B) case explained how Movile expanded their business, moving into the smartphone market from their core business of feature phones in Latin America. The case described the two parts of Movile's strategy. The first was Movile's development and launch of a smartphone app, PlayKids, which, as of the end of 2014, was the number-one children's app in the world (by sales in the Apple app store). The second aspect of this strategy involved investing in mobile-enabled offline start-ups in Brazil. The (A) case may be taught as a stand-alone case. The (B) case requires the (A) case to be read beforehand.

Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.

Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.

Through the first part of the twenty-first century, the number of people playing golf in the United States had been in decline. Fewer people played the game, they played less frequently, and more golf courses were closing than opening. Players complained that it took too long to play golf, new courses were too difficult, and the game was expensive and hard to learn. However, the professional game was thriving, with increasing prize money and television viewership. The case looks at the governance of golf, with particular emphasis on the United States Golf Association. It asked students to consider what groups should be responsible for the health of the game, and what might be done to increase participation.

It was June 2011, and Alain Chuard and Victoria Ransom reflected on their history as founders of Wildfire Interactive Inc. (Wildfire). Originally called Promotion Builder, Wildfire had evolved from an in-house marketing solution used by the duo's adventure travel company to a multi-platform software program used by thousands of businesses globally. The Wildfire product enabled these customers to develop customized social-media marketing campaigns composed of video and essay competitions, user-generated contests, quizzes, and coupons. Users could then push these promotions to their websites or social networks, such as Facebook, hi5, and LinkedIn. Through this evolution, the team contended with a myriad of difficulties, including attracting talent, navigating international markets, and building and scaling operations. In particular, obstacles associated with cultural differences and geographical distance made it challenging for the company to maintain effective operations overseas. Moreover, relative to its competitors, Wildfire was substantially under-funded and under-marketed. This made it difficult for the founders to decide when the company should either accept or turn away lucrative-yet demanding-high-profile customers. Chuard and Ransom were now at another critical decision point in the organization's lifecycle. Wildfire had traditionally been a campaign-based product. Under this model, Wildfire was offered to customers for an initial fee plus a per-day charge, the size of which was dependent upon the feature set chosen by the customer. Recent pressures from investors and consumers, however, had pushed the founders to consider a transition to a subscription-based platform that would provide timeline and stream management, analytics, and page-management functionality. Whereas the founders knew that transforming business models could have various positive effects for Wildfire, implementing the change would also inherently alter the company and its product

Alain Chuard and Victoria Ransom reflected on their history as founders of Wildfire Interactive Inc. (Wildfire). Originally called Promotion Builder, Wildfire had evolved from an in-house marketing solution used by the duo's adventure travel company to a multi-platform software program used by thousands of businesses globally. The Wildfire product enabled these customers to develop customized social-media marketing campaigns composed of video and essay competitions, user-generated contests, quizzes, and coupons. Users could then push these promotions to their websites or social networks, such as Facebook, hi5, and LinkedIn. By summer 2011, Wildfire had achieved significant success and the founders believed that the company had reached a turning point. The team had analyzed the histories of similar industries (e.g., e-mail marketing) and determined that Wildfire's space likely would not support several independent companies and would ultimately experience an industry-wide consolidation. This meant that Wildfire would probably not be able to maintain the status quo and that Chuard and Ransom may need to consider the possibility of going public, getting acquired, or raising additional capital to bolster the firm's presence in the market. In May 2012, two large acquisitions occurred in the space and triggered a flurry of M&A activity. Among these events was an offer by Google to purchase Wildfire for $350 million with the contingency that Ransom and Chuard provide Google with a decision within 24 hours. The team set forth evaluating their options.

The case profiles Brad Handler, co-founder of Inspirato, as he contemplates and ultimately founds the luxury and leisure membership-based 'destination club,' shortly after selling and leaving an analogous company that he previously also founded (Exclusive Resorts). The case begins with a biographical overview of Brad Handler and the genesis of and logic for Exclusive Resorts. It provides an overview of the luxury vacation property industry, as well as the timeshare, fractional ownership and destination club industry and then dives into the Exclusive Resorts business model and company growth. After Handler decides to leave Exclusive Resorts, the case delves into his considerations and next steps as he evaluates the opportunity for an improved business model to that of Exclusive Resorts. Given Handler's unique understanding of the industry and a few of its inherent flaws (most notably capital intensity and seasonal demand), he recognizes the unique position he is in to improve upon the Exclusive Resorts model. In particular, the 'destination club' sector had previously been characterized by property acquisition and ownership-with significant capital requirements-as well as demand choppiness and supply constraints during weeks of high vacation interest. Handler considers the implications of entering into long-term leases and rental agreements with individuals and third-party vacation home owners, as well as the use of fluctuating "use rates" for each property in the 'destination club' portfolio in an attempt to both reduce the financial hurdles of entering a 'destination club' and to smooth internal demand. The case brings up a number of important considerations, including new venture formation, how and when an entrepreneur should think about a follow-up to a previous venture-especially one with similarities to a previous business and with customer overlap-business model design, and product launch.

In early 2009, following the collapse of the housing market, Doug Brien and Colin Wiel began buying single family homes (SFH) to renovate and rent. SFH rental had previously been a mom-and-pop business due to scaling difficulties-buying and managing large properties such as apartment complexes was well suited to institutional investors, but no one had solved the problem of buying and managing large numbers of relatively inexpensive SFHs. Brien and Wiel raised a series of funds from high-net-worth individuals, and the success of their company, Waypoint Homes, eventually attracted institutional investors as well as competition from large private equity firms. The case discusses Waypoint's growth to the end of 2012, at which point it owned more than 3,000 homes. The case also describes the changing economic and competitive environment, and asks about how the company can adapt to these changes going forward.

Professional boxing was once a mainstream sport, whose stars were widely known to the general public. Major fights were broadcast on network television. By the 2000s, the landscape had changed dramatically. Boxing had become a niche sport in the United States, few boxers were known beyond the hard-core fan base, top fights were only available on premium cable or pay-per-view (PPV), and other combat sports were on the rise. This case describes the world of professional boxing, including the roles of fighters, managers, promoters, and television. It focuses on a decision facing HBO, one of the important economic drivers of the sport. In September 2012, Julio Cesar Chavez Jr. lost a title fight to Sergio Martinez despite a thrilling final round. The fight was seen on HBO PPV. Most observers thought that a rematch would be held, and that it would attract a substantial PPV audience. However, Martinez planned a fight in his native Argentina prior to a potential rematch. Chavez would likely also have an interim fight. HBO considered the possibility of having the interim Chavez match on their cable channel rather than on PPV. This would make the fight available to more viewers, hopefully increasing the audience for the PPV rematch with Martinez, and would guarantee Chavez a sizable payment from television rights. However, if the fight were on PPV, Chavez would have the opportunity to earn more money based on PPV sales (and also take the risk of a lower payday if PPV sales did not meet expectations). If HBO believes that it is in the long term interest of the sport, the fighters, and HBO to have the fight on cable rather than PPV, how can they convince Chavez's promoter, and how can they help the promoter convince Chavez to accept a lower potential payday in exchange for an increased audience and the opportunity to build PPV sales for the planned rematch with Martinez?

This case profiles the launch and growth of Tough Mudder, a startup founded by Will Dean and Guy Livingstone in the mud run/adventure challenge space. Dean, an avid triathlete and marathoner, found these solitary endurance events boring, and wanted to come up with a new concept that would bond teams of people together to complete an athletic event that would test not only their physical strengths, but their will, determination and mental grit as well. The case chronicles the meteoric rise of Tough Mudder within the rapidly growing adventure race industry. As Tough Mudder looked ahead to 2013, it faced numerous opportunities and challenges, not the least of which was a move to host events internationally. The company also faced fierce competition and was constantly having to innovate in order to stay at the head of the pack. Finally, rapid growth meant scaling challenges within the organization that would need to be addressed if the company was going to maintain the high level of operational excellence that was so critical to the success of its events.

Women's Professional Soccer (WPS), which began play in March 2009, rose from the ashes of the Women's United Soccer Association (WUSA), a league that played its third and final season in 2003. After WUSA failed under the mounting pressure of flagging attendance, failure to attract sponsors, and high operating losses, its dedicated supporters immediately regrouped to learn from their past mistakes and try again. This case chronicles the experience of WPS's founding team.

By the early 21st century, the economics of thoroughbred horse racing in the United States was backwards - owners invested about four times as much money into the sport than the total amount of purse money available. Owners raced their horses as early as possible, and for as short a time as possible to prove that they were valuable for breeding-then sold them to breeding operations. The industry relied heavily on new entrants who had money from outside horse racing to buy and race their foals. Stonestreet Farms was founded by Jess Jackson, a billionaire wine entrepreneur, who invested more than $200 million in the sport. Unlike most in the horse racing business, Stonestreet was involved in both training and racing horses and in breeding. Two of its horses, Curlin and Rachael Alexandra, won the coveted North American Horse of the year for three consecutive years, from 2007-2009. Both later became part of Stonestreet's breeding operation. This case discusses the challenges facing owners and breeders in the North American thoroughbred racing industry. It can be used as a companion case to SPM-49: Del Mar Racetrack: Reinventing the Horse Racing Fan Experience, which focuses on the industry from the perspective of race tracks.

Thoroughbred horse racing was in decline at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century. Nearly all metrics, from number of horses and races, to attendance, and amount wagered, was falling. Studies indicated this was likely to continue. Horse race tracks made their money from wagering-where once racing had a monopoly on gambling in the U.S., now there were a wide range of options for gamblers. Del Mar racetrack in California was suffering the same fate as other tracks. In 2001, it embarked on a radical new marketing strategy, appealing to a young, hip demographic, families, and couples, rather than older, male gamblers. The case describes the situation facing the racing industry and track management, the rebranding strategy, and results. It challenges students to determine whether the strategy used by Del Mar is applicable to other tracks, or if it is limited due to unique circumstances at Del Mar. This case focuses on horse racing from the perspective of tracks. A companion case, SPM-50: Stonestreet Farms: Making a Business in the "Sport of Kings," focuses on the industry from the perspective of race horse owners and breeders.

In 2009, the digital world was in a period of drastic change. The YES Network, the regional sports network linked to the New York Yankees baseball club, was at the forefront of the issue of the day: the management of digital rights. In simpler terms, they were faced with the challenge of merchandising broadband, wireless and interactive TV while not undermining our existing television audiences. Risks were high and the management challenge intense. This issue was facing all regional sport networks (RSNs) as club and league management seek to maintain their fanbases, grow their revenues and expand their footprints. In 2009, the technology for online streaming existed, was in place, and was affordable. However, the quest for a business model between the content owners (television networks and content rights holders such as MLBAM) and the 'TV Everywhere' concept of cable operators such as Time Warner and Comcast was ongoing. This case outlines the challenge of monetizing these new areas while not disrupting core business models and cannibalizing current revenue sources. Notably, the television cable model was superior to the broadcast model in terms of revenue generation with cable networks reporting high profitability in 2009.

Robert Eberhart is an American electronics executive living abroad in Japan as market president. He's ready to move on to something new and discovers that the changing distribution laws in Japan may provide him a chance to upend the supply chain for California wines. Legal, marketing, operational, and executive management challenges ensue.