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In 2017, executives at OpenNotes, a national movement to improve the relationship between doctors and patients by sharing doctors' visit notes about patients with patients, were considering options in efforts to achieve scale. The movement hoped to reach 50 million patients by 2020. One opportunity was building an OpenNotes app for smartphones, in which patients could access their visit notes on their phones through an app compatible with Apple CareKit. But OpenNotes had other options, including partnerships with consumer groups and insurers. In addition, they would always have a role in encouraging doctors and institutions to share notes more readily. What was the best way to scale OpenNotes? Was it the app route, or some other way to pursue the group's ambitions?

Laura Behrens Wu, CEO of software start-up Shippo, prepares her pitch for a Series A funding round following a successful seed round. Customer adoption of Shippo's e-commerce dashboard application, which allows small and medium retailers to compare delivery rates between shipping providers and print package labels, has been steady in the nine months since it went live. But traction with the firm's developer friendly product, an API that allows large enterprise customers to automate their shipping needs, had initially been slow until one customer single handedly tripled the API label volume in late August. Now in November 2014, with nine months of runway remaining, Behrens Wu must decide where to direct the company's limited resources. Should Shippo stay focused on the app while raising the next round of funding, pivot to an API-focused strategy, or pursue both products?

We live in a media-saturated world, where consumers are drowning in irrelevant messages delivered from the web, TV, radio, print, outdoor displays, and a proliferating array of mobile devices. Advertising strategies built on persuading through interruption, repetition, and brute ubiquity are increasingly ineffective. To win consumers' attention and trust, marketers must think less about what advertising says to its targets and more about what it does for them. Rayport outlines four domains of human experience: In the "public sphere" people move from one place or activity to another, both online and off. In the "social sphere" they interact with and relate to one another. In the "tribal sphere" they affiliate with groups to define or express their identity. In the "psychological sphere" they connect language with specific thoughts and feelings. Savvy marketers think about crafting messages that consumers will welcome in these domains. Zappos did that when it placed ads in airport security bins (the public sphere)--reaching people whose minds may be on their shoes. Nintendo identified young mothers who were willing to host Wii parties and provided them with everything they needed for these social-sphere events. Yelp's Elite Squad of reviewers have a heightened sense of tribal affiliation that makes them powerful brand ambassadors. Life is good Inc. is rooted in the psychological sphere: It advertises only through the optimism-promoting logo and slogan on its products.

It's high time to shift our focus from the "avails" in media content to those in consumers' lives - that is, where, when, and how people might be receptive to relevant commercial messages.

As president of Scotch whisky maker Glenmeadie, Bob Littlefield is pleased to see the results of his CMO's recent marketing initiatives. There are new interactive capabilities on the company's Web site, a product information call center, and numerous other customer interfaces designed to deepen consumers' connection to the brand. Thanks to these front-end innovations, sales are up--and largely because of more loyal purchasing behavior, research shows. But not all the news is good. Glenmeadie's CFO says the marketing programs account for half the company's costs. Meanwhile, Glenmeadie's master distiller, Ellis Cameron, resents the fact that, with so much money going toward enhancing customer relations, there isn't enough left for his R&D efforts. In a meeting with Bob, he launches into a tirade about priorities. "There's an old expression," Ellis says, "Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door." Glenmeadie, he says, is neglecting the customer's basic need, "We've given up on redesigning his mousetrap and are trying to trap him instead!" Commenting on this fictional case study in R0610A and R0610Z are David Herman, president of luggage maker Hartmann; Marketspace's president, Jeffrey Rayport; Stephen Dull, vice president of strategy at VF; and Joe Scafido, who leads innovation at Dunkin' Brands.

As president of Scotch whisky maker Glenmeadie, Bob Littlefield is pleased to see the results of his CMO's recent marketing initiatives. There are new interactive capabilities on the company's Web site, a product information call center, and numerous other customer interfaces designed to deepen consumers' connection to the brand. Thanks to these front-end innovations, sales are up--and largely because of more loyal purchasing behavior, research shows. But not all the news is good. Glenmeadie's CFO says the marketing programs account for half the company's costs. Meanwhile, Glenmeadie's master distiller, Ellis Cameron, resents the fact that, with so much money going toward enhancing customer relations, there isn't enough left for his R&D efforts. In a meeting with Bob, he launches into a tirade about priorities. "There's an old expression," Ellis says, "Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door." Glenmeadie, he says, is neglecting the customer's basic need, "We've given up on redesigning his mousetrap and are trying to trap him instead!" Commenting on this fictional case study in R0610A and R0610Z are David Herman, president of luggage maker Hartmann; Marketspace's president, Jeffrey Rayport; Stephen Dull, vice president of strategy at VF; and Joe Scafido, who leads innovation at Dunkin' Brands.

The List is HBR's annual attempt to capture ideas in the state of becoming--when they're teetering between what one person suspects and what everyone accepts. Roderick M. Kramer says it isn't bad when leaders flip-flop. Julia Kirby describes new efforts to redefine the problem of organizational performance. Joseph L. Bower praises the "Velcro organization," where managerial responsibilities can be rearranged. Jeffrey F. Rayport argues that companies must refocus innovation on the "demand side." Eric Bonabeau describes a future in which computer-generated sound can be used to transmit vast amounts of data. Roger L. Martin says highly reliable corporate systems such as CRM tend to have little validity. Kirthi Kalyanam and Monte Zweben report that marketers are learning to contact customers at just the right moment. Robert C. Merton explains how equity swaps could help developing countries avoid some of the risk of boom and bust. Thomas A. Stewart says companies need champions of the status quo. Mohanbir Sawhney suggests marketing strategies for the blogosphere. Denise Caruso shows how to deal with risks that lack owners. Thomas H. Davenport says personal information management--how well we use our PDAs and PCs--is the next productivity frontier. Leigh Buchanan explores workplace taboos. Henry W. Chesbrough argues that the time is ripe for services science to become an academic field. Kenneth Lieberthal says China may change everyone's approach to intellectual property. Jochen Wirtz and Loizos Heracleous describe customer service apps for biometrics. Mary Catherine Bateson envisions a midlife sabbatical for workers. Jeffrey Rosen explains why one privacy policy won't fit everyone. Tihamer von Ghyczy and Janis Antonovics say firms should embrace parasites. And Jeffrey Pfeffer warns business-book buyers to beware. Additionally, HBR offers a list of intriguing business titles due out in 2005.

Most companies serve customers through a broad array of interfaces, from retail sales clerks to Web sites to voice-response telephone systems. But although the typical company has an impressive interface collection, it doesn't have an interface system. That is, the whole set does not add up to the sum of its parts in its ability to provide service and build customer relationships. Too many people and too many machines operating with insufficient coordination (and often at cross-purposes) mean rising complexity, costs, and customer dissatisfaction. In a world where companies compete not on what they sell but on how they sell it, turning that liability into an asset is what separates winners from losers. In this adaptation of their forthcoming book by the same title, Jeffrey Rayport and Bernard Jaworski explain how companies must reengineer their customer interface systems for optimal efficiency and effectiveness. Part of that transformation, they observe, will involve a steady encroachment by machine interfaces into areas that have long been the sacred province of humans. Managers now have opportunities unprecedented in the history of business to use machines, not just people, to manage their interactions with customers credibly. Because people and machines each have their strengths and weaknesses, company executives must identify what people do best, what machines do best, and how to deploy them separately and together. Front-office reengineering subjects every current and potential service interface to an analysis of opportunities for substitution (using machines instead of people), complementarity (using a mix of machines and people), and displacement (using networks to shift physical locations of people and machines), with the twin objectives of compressing costs and driving top-line growth through increased customer value.

The company's management is considering the possibility of launching a rebranding campaign around the promises "What you need. What you need to know." The questions are whether and when to launch the campaign in view of the large number of training efforts and supporting technologies needed to deliver on the promises.

Supplements the (A) case.

At the end of 1999, Steve Riggio, the vice chairman and acting CEO of barnesandnoble.com, wonders what his company should do next against Amazon.com, the online retailer who is the leading online book seller in the United States. While barnesandnoble.com has been careful to expand into new categories related to media--such as magazines, CDs, and posters--Amazon.com has expanded into a variety of seemingly unrelated categories--such as Z-shops, auctions, and power tools. While some see this expansion as a weakness in Amazon.com's branding strategy, how could Riggio and barnesandnoble.com best exploit this so that they become the leading online bookseller over the long run in terms of market share and mind share?

At the end of 1998, Jonathan Bulkeley, the newly-named CEO of barnesandnoble.com, is faced with a challenge. As the second leading online bookseller behind Amazon.com, barnesandnoble.com must build its market share. With Forrester Research predicting that the online bookselling market would grow to $3 billion in 2003, how could barnesandnoble.com attract more of the "newbies" coming onto the web to its site and become the leading online bookseller--as it was in the bricks-and-mortar world--over the long run?

At the end of 1999, Amazon.com founder and CEO Jeff Bezos--just named Time Magazine's Man of the Year--ponders the next moves for his company. Having expanded into numerous categories in 1999, ranging from Z-shops to Auctions to E-cards as well as increasing the number of distribution sites to seven, Amazon.com is quickly transforming itself as an electronic retailer. But does Amazon.com's strategy make sense? Critics worry that Bezos may be stretching the Amazon.com brand too far instead of focusing on a few retail categories. Bezos sees the opportunity to dominate various retail categories online--leveraging off its base of 16.9 million customers--before the brick-and-mortar retailers do.

At the end of 1998, Amazon.com founder and CEO Jeff Bezos ponders the next moves for his company. Having secured the leadership position as the leading online book seller in the United States, Amazon.com has now moved into the product categories of CDs and videos by year's end. Having expanded into the United Kingdom and Germany and having 6.2 million members, what new product categories should Amazon.com expand into during 1999? Consumer electronics? Travel? Toys? Software? The possibilities are endless, but Bezos knows the company needs to focus on choosing a few categories and performing well in those picked.

Jeff Taylor, founder and CEO of Monster.com, ponders how his online site, the leading career site on the web, can continue its dominance (60% share in 1999) and growth on the Internet. Monster.com had just launched a nationwide branding campaign on television and entered a four-year deal with AOL. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Updates the (A) case. Describes competitive developments and the evolution of Streamline's strategy through 1999. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Confounding predictions that the Internet would "disintermediate" commerce, making "middle man" companies all but obsolete, Marshall Industries, a leading electronics distributor, used the Internet and digital technologies to reinvent itself. Marshall continued to sell electronics components, but the company abandoned the traditional sales-driven strategy for a more customer-focused, service-driven strategy. At the heart of its transformation was a complete restructuring of the compensation and incentive system and heavy investments in information technologies. Several years into its first foray into the digital realm, Marshall faced growing pressures: shrinking margins, increasingly demanding customers, restrictive supplier practices, and competitors rapidly introducing me-too Internet and virtual services. Marshall continued to look for ways to use its innovative spirit and digital expertise to differentiate itself and to create and deliver a whole new set of virtual supply chain services.

The founders of Motive Communications, Inc., a recent start-up dedicated to reinventing the support chain involved in the delivery of information technology support services, put in place a development process hinged on extensive customer feedback. As part of this, a select group of "lighthouse customers" agreed to pay $50,000 to participate in beta testing--but as a deadline approached, none had sent in their checks. The founders therefore reevaluate the lighthouse policy and its rationale.

So far, Rachel Soltanoff's instincts had been right. As CEO in this fictional case study, she had successfully navigated TradeRite Software's transition from a news service for stockbrokers to a $70 million provider of shrink-wrapped software geared toward both brokers and the growing day-trader market. Now a well-financed start-up, Stocknet.com, was testing a very competitive product that traders could download directly over the Web. And TradeRite's Web site was nothing more than a collection of elaborate marketing brochures. Rachel knew she needed to start selling over the Web. But the e-commerce consultants she had hired to set up her Web store were behind schedule, and their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned. Her product manager, Lisa Bandini, was working overtime to transform TradeRite's entire product line into Web-aware applications to match Stocknet's, and Rachel had $2.5 million to launch them. But the consultants said it would take $5 million just to rent e-commerce capabilities. Ace sales VP Brian Rockart thought the company had already wasted too much time and money--money from his budget--on its Web site. Marketing VP Rob Collins thought TradeRite should focus on its core stockbroker customers. Chief Technical Officer Joe Martinez doesn't want to go ahead without a pilot project. Should Rachel try to convince Brian, Rob, and the rest of the senior management team that e-commerce is the way to go? In 99209 and 99209Z, commentators David Siegel, Candice Carpenter, David Ticoll, and Jeffrey F. Rayport offer advice on this fictional case.

So far, Rachel Soltanoff's instincts had been right. As CEO in this fictional case study, she had successfully navigated TradeRite Software's transition from a news service for stockbrokers to a $70 million provider of shrink-wrapped software geared toward both brokers and the growing day-trader market. Now a well-financed start-up, Stocknet.com, was testing a very competitive product that traders could download directly over the Web. And TradeRite's Web site was nothing more than a collection of elaborate marketing brochures. Rachel knew she needed to start selling over the Web. But the e-commerce consultants she had hired to set up her Web store were behind schedule, and their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned. Her product manager, Lisa Bandini, was working overtime to transform TradeRite's entire product line into Web-aware applications to match Stocknet's, and Rachel had $2.5 million to launch them. But the consultants said it would take $5 million just to rent e-commerce capabilities. Ace sales VP Brian Rockart thought the company had already wasted too much time and money--money from his budget--on its Web site. Marketing VP Rob Collins thought TradeRite should focus on its core stockbroker customers. Chief Technical Officer Joe Martinez doesn't want to go ahead without a pilot project. Should Rachel try to convince Brian, Rob, and the rest of the senior management team that e-commerce is the way to go? Four commentators offer advice. In 99209 and 99209Z, commentators David Siegel, Candice Carpenter, David Ticoll, and Jeffrey F. Rayport offer advice on this fictional case.