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In 2013, Babcock International Plc (Babcock) was the largest engineering services provider in the UK with sales of over £3 billion. Under the leadership of CEO Peter Rogers, Babcock had grown revenues and profits nearly tenfold over the previous decade as it benefited from increased public sector outsourcing. In 2012, for the UK's Ministry of Defense (MOD), Babcock trained over 50,000 troops, maintained the nuclear submarine fleet, provided engineering support for military vehicles, and managed numerous facilities at military bases. On the civil side, the company decommissioned aging nuclear plants, maintained the Metropolitan Police auto fleet and other emergency services fleets, and was the UK's leading trainer of engineering apprentices. Babcock's leadership team believed that continued pressure on public spending would provide opportunities for double digit growth in the UK for at least five years. However, this might not come from Babcock's primary customer, the Ministry of Defense. What other national and local government agencies might the firm target? On the civil side, the resurgence of the salience of nuclear power generation in the mid 2000s had appeared to be good news for Babcock with its long-standing nuclear expertise, but the April 2011 Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan had shed doubt on future construction, while the fracking of shale deposits to extract natural gas promised a much lower cost supply of abundant energy. Nevertheless, decommissioning nuclear power stations promised steady and growing work. What other opportunities might Babcock pursue in the UK? Meanwhile, analysts were pushing for more international expansion but efforts at building business in South Africa, Canada, and Australia had been slow, with only 16% of revenues coming from outside the UK in 2013, a figure little changed since 2005. What would drive Babcock's long term future growth?

"In 2012, Hennes & Maurtiz (H&M) was the second-largest specialty apparel retailer in the world. Sales for fiscal 2012 were $18.1 billion and operating profits were $3.3 billion. H&M operated 2,776 stores, 93% of them outside its home base of Sweden. Over the past decade, H&M had passed Gap in sales, but the company had failed to keep up with Inditex's growth and its Spanish rival had larger sales and greater profitability than H&M. H&M had also lagged behind Inditex in supply pipeline speed, brand diversification, online retail presence, and expansion into China. Meanwhile, the world's leading hypermarket chains, including Wal-Mart and Tesco, were making significant headway in apparel and challenge H&M's basic clothing segment.<br> In 2012, CEO Karl-Johan Persson, grandson of the company's founder Erling Persson, promised increased expansion into underdeveloped markets, a stronger push to online retailing, and the launch of a major new retail brand. Whether Persson's plans were enough to catch up with Inditex remained to be seen."

In 2000, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) was the second-largest and most global player in the fashion retail business. It operated 682 stores, 80% of them outside its home country of Sweden, and achieved revenues of $3.0 billion and operating profits of $375 million. In 1999, when H&M announced plans to enter the U.S., sales had grown 20% per year and operating profits, 30%, for a decade. After the August announcement of U.S. expansion plans, its share price hit a record $35 (a P/E of over 90). But the new millennium brought challenges and uncertainty. In March 2000, the first nonfamily CEO, Fabian Mansson, resigned after only two years at the helm and the company issued a profits warning. In September 2000, H&M's share price closed at $18.68, a fall of nearly 50% from the prior year. Meanwhile Gap, the world's leading fashion retailer with revenues of $13.7 billion, was adding 600 stores a year and expanding into Europe from its U.S. base. Rolf Erikson, Masson's replacement, impressed few analysts and questions lingered about H&M's ability to maintain its rate of expansion. What did new CEO Rolf Erikson need to do to avert the threat from Gap and restore the company's fortunes?

In the 11 years since its public offering, Inditex and its flagship brand, Zara, had expanded into 86 countries, achieved $21.6 billion in revenue, and become the largest specialty apparel retailer in the world. In marked contrast to the general malaise of the Bolsa de Madrid, Inditex's share price tripled from 2008 to 2012 and traded at 25 times expected 2013 earnings, a 15% premium over Swedish rival, H&M. From 1,080 stores in 2000, it had expanded to 6,009 locations while sales and operating profits grew 25% p.a over this period. It had also established online stores across 23 different markets, with plans for launches in Russia and Canada during 2013, and it managed eight different brands. CEO Pablo Isla remained confident of future success and anticipated store expansion would continue growing at 8%-10% per year for the next three to five years. How could Inditex best maintain its strong growth and fend off competition?

In 2000, Inditex was one of the largest specialty apparel retailers in the world, with $2.4 billion in sales from 1,080 stores across 33 countries. Zara, Inditex's main brand, produced popular designer items at a fraction of design-house prices and could push an item from design to display in less than two weeks. This left most other fashion retailers, who took between 9-12 months for this process, far behind. However, Inditex was still only one-sixth the size of the world's largest specialty retailer, US-based Gap, and two-thirds the size of its Swedish rival, H&M. Amancio Ortega, Inditex's notoriously private Chairman and founder, was committed to challenging these industry leaders. This expansion required more capital and, in July 2000, the company announced it would IPO in 2001. There was also the question of a new management team to take the company forward. Ortega was approaching retirement as was the CEO, José Maria Castellano. The first attempt to find a younger CEO had failed. Hopefully, an IPO would attract a new management team that could maintain Inditex's rapid expansion.

From humble beginnings as a Levi jeans store, by 2000 Gap, Inc. had grown to become the world's leading specialist clothing retailer. Its CEO, Millard S. Drexler, the "merchant prince," was credited with transforming Gap into a global empire, leading the company through eighteen years of 21% p.a. growth to reach sales of $13.6 billion in 2000. Gap had expanded to 2,848 stores under its three brands: Gap, Banana Republic, and Old Navy, and controlled 6% of U.S. apparel sales. Drexel had also pushed Gap through a global expansion program, and international accounted for 12.5% of total sales in 2000. But as Gap entered the new millennium, dark clouds were building on the horizon. While sales in 2000 were up nearly 18% over the previous year, operating profits fell by 20%, only the second profit fall since 1984. Gap found itself plagued with concerns about fashion misses, logistics failures, the departure of senior managers, and increased foreign competition. New fast-fashion competition in the form of Inditex, H&M, and Club Monaco threatened Gap's market share both domestically and abroad. Drexler remained confident of recovery and promised to fix infrastructure problems and recent fashion misses while expanding the high-growth GapBody and BabyGap concepts. Would these changes be enough to keep Gap competitive in a new retail era?

"On May 31, 2012, after 36 years on the Milan Stock Exchange, Benetton was officially delisted and taken private by Edizione, the Benetton family's holding company. Since 2000, Benetton shareholders had seen its market value fall from $4.3 billion to $720 million at the end of 2011. At $2.6 billion, Benetton's sales in 2011 were virtually the same as they were in 2000, but Inditex from Spain, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) from Sweden and Fast Retailing from Japan had all grown several times larger over the same period. What happened to this global retail giant?<br> Under the direction of four different CEOs since 2000, Benetton had attempted to move from being an Italian supplier of knitwear with licensed small retailers throughout the world to a vertically integrated global player by tightening management over its supply chain and rolling out directly operated superstores. These moves helped Benetton gain more control over its operations, but they also ate into its profitability. In 2012, Benetton found itself competing with fashion giants who could respond faster to market trends and deliver comparable clothes at half the cost. With Benetton under private ownership, would Harvard Business School graduate Alessandro Benetton be able to make the changes required to return the company to its former strength?"

"Between 2000 and 2012, Gap, Inc. (Gap) ceded its world leadership position in specialty fashion retailing to Inditex of Spain and H&M of Sweden. These two companies, each less than a quarter of Gap's size in 2000, were now setting the pace in the global mass fashion market, and Gap appeared to be falling ever further behind. In the intervening twelve years, three CEOs had struggled to turn around the fading brand. While several temporary profit boosts appeared to herald a recovery, a sustained rally remained elusive.<br> Mickey Drexler, Gap's CEO since 1983, who had been responsible for Gap's rise to global prominence, was fired in 2002 after two years of double digit, same-store sales declines and a 75% drop in the stock price. His successor, Paul Pressler, appeared to have engineered a remarkable recovery, but was fired in 2007 after disappointing sales and another slump in profits. His replacement, Glenn Murphy, fresh from a successful turnaround at a Canadian drug-store chain, promised tighter price controls, lower administrative costs, and a leaner, more aggressive Gap, but sales continued to decline over his tenure. After four years of troubles, Murphy brought in former J. Crew President, Tracy Gardner, to consult with the Gap brand and Murphy began a bold program to close one fifth of Gap's North American store base. In 2012, sales had lifted 8%, same-store sales were strongly positive for all of Gap's domestic sub-brands, and the company's share price had lifted nearly 50% from the prior year. After 12 years of poor performance, had Glenn Murphy finally discovered the answers to Gap's problems?"

"In 2000, Benetton was one of the leading mass fashion competitors in the world with approximately $1.9 billion in sales across 5,500 stores in 120 countries. But the company's fortunes seemed to be on the wane. Operating profits had fallen 9% from the prior year to $299 million. Having almost matched global leader, Gap Inc.'s revenues in 1985, Benetton was now only one seventh of Gap's size. Moreover, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) of Sweden had passed Benetton in 1996 and now claimed more than double the sales of Benetton. Inditex of Spain and Fast Retailing of Japan had also passed Benetton in revenues by 2000. To make things worse, Inditex and H&M had announced in 2000 that they intended to enter Italy, Benetton's heartland.<br> Chairman and co-founder Luciano Benetton was determined to fight back and toward this end had just launched a major new retail strategy to expand the size of Benetton's current stores, invest in large superstores and build greater control of the supply chain. The company also had high hopes for its new drive into sports equipment and apparel. Would this be enough to halt the rise of its mass fashion competitors?"

In 2012, J Sainsbury Plc (Sainsbury's), the number three supermarket chain in the UK with £22.3 billion in sales, appeared to have put the troubles of the past behind it. For over 70 years, Sainsbury's had been the UK's largest grocer, but Tesco had overtaken it in 1995 and then Asda knocked it into third position in 2003. When Justin King took over as CEO in 2004, UK sales were flat and UK profits languished at 40% below their 1999 levels. He cut prices and restored sales growth, and from 2007 onwards, Sainsbury's had outperformed Tesco on same-store sales growth. What did King need to do to sustain Sainsbury's revival?

It was October 3rd, 2012, and all was not well at Tesco, the UK's largest supermarket chain with revenues of £64.5 billion ($104 billion). CEO Philip Clarke unveiled the first half-year profit drop in almost 20 years and, in the UK, the majors Asda and Sainsbury were closing the market-share gap, while niche players like hard discounter Aldi, with prices as much as 20% below Tesco's, and premium-grocer Waitrose were both growing fast. What did Clarke need to do to restore confidence and get Tesco back on track?

On January 16, 2009, after a dismal holiday season, Circuit City was forced into liquidation. Unable to meet creditors' demands, and with no acquirer in sight, Circuit City began the process of liquidating its remaining 567 U.S. stores. Circuit City had been the leader in consumer electronics retailing for nearly twenty years when its profits peaked in 2000. What led to its dramatic decline? Why did three CEOs fail to turn it around? Were these problems present before the 2000 peak?

In June 2012, Best Buy was in crisis. In 1996, Best Buy overtook Circuit City as the world's leader in consumer electronics retailing; however, 18 years later, Best Buy now found this position threatened. With $51 billion in revenues, it was still the biggest CE retailer, but sales were flat and profits had collapsed. Meanwhile, Amazon's sales in Best Buy's categories were growing at more than 50% p.a. and its total sales, at $48 billion, were approaching those of Best Buy. As Wal-Mart cherry-picked popular items for steep discounts and Amazon encouraged consumers to compare prices using smart phones, Best Buy was becoming a showroom for lower cost retail models. International expansion was struggling and domestic sales of digital televisions were cooling. Although the popularity of mobile devices suggested easy growth, many devices were sold by telephone service providers, creating increased retail competition. To add to Best Buy's problems, on April 10, 2012, CEO Brian Dunn resigned after an investigation into his personal conduct. On June 7, 2012, Dick Schulze, the firm's founder, who had navigated the company through many strategic changes since 1966, also decided to leave and "explore all available options" for his 20.1% stake in the company. Best Buy had seen off many competitive challenges in the past. Would it be able to fend off these challengers and maintain its position?

In fiscal 2000, Circuit City was at the top of its game. The world's leading consumer electronics retailer had delivered record sales and profits for the first year of the new millennium. It was a fitting moment for Richard Sharpe, the CEO of the last 14 years, to step down. Over his tenure, revenues had increased 18 times and operating profits 13 times. In June 2000, Alan McCollough succeeded him as CEO. A 12 year veteran of Circuit City, McCollough expressed confidence in the future, citing trends such as the digitization of televisions, music players, and cameras. But challenges loomed from the increasingly aggressive discount sector. Was Circuit City as strategically strong as its financial results suggested? Would it be able to maintain momentum and retain its leadership?

In 2007, Allstate was the number two property and casualty insurer in the USA, and had enjoyed five years of rapid profit improvement. The question facing CEO Thomas J. Wilson was how to maintain the momentum. This case tracks the evolution of Allstate's strategy over 20 years, examining the logic behind the strategic changes, and the challenges of implementing them. It identifies sources of inertia from within the organization and from without, and summarizes the strategic issues facing Allstate in early 2007.

The global recorded music industry was undergoing a major transition in 2006. Sales had been declining for a decade, and consumers were buying music in new formats and through different distribution channels. CD sales still accounted for the majority of revenues, but sales of music in digital formats (downloads, videos, ringtones) were growing significantly and accounting for approximately 10% of the industry's revenues in 2006. Many considered digital the future of the music business but the format posed both opportunities and challenges. While it had revitalized the singles market, for instance, digital had also facilitated rampant piracy. The music industry was retaliating, launching lawsuits against illegitimate peer-to-peer operators such as groups caught downloading illegally. Whether this would be enough to stop the trend was a matter of much debate. Meanwhile, the industry continued to consolidate. In 2004, Sony Music and BMG, the third- and fifth-largest record firms at the time, merged to form Sony BMG. Surprisingly, in 2006 the European Union's Court of First Instance annulled the merger--which the European Commission had approved two years earlier--after a group of independent music labels complained about the merger's effect on competition. While Sony and BMG were defending the merger in court, EMI Group plc wondered if its desired takeover of Warner Music Group--which it had been pursuing since 2000--would ever happen. If it did, how much business would the new entity have in the rapidly changing environment? All wondered how the industry would evolve.

On October 3, 2005, Washington Mutual acquired Providian Financial Corporation, the ninth-largest credit card issuer in the U.S., for $6.5 billion. At the time, Providian had approximately 10 million customer relationships and a balance of $18.6 billion. For some observers, the transaction was merely the end of another chapter in the history of the fast consolidating credit card market. For Providian CEO Joseph Saunders, it was vindication of four years' hard work in turning around a company that many thought was close to bankruptcy.

It is 1988 and David Glass has just taken over as CEO from the legendary Sam Walton at Wal-Mart. Meanwhile, Joe Antonini has just taken the CEO position at Wal-Mart's arch rival, Kmart. Although Wal-Mart is still well behind Kmart, it appears to be in great shape and is catching up fast. Glass seems committed to continuing with "business as usual." Is this enough? What might Kmart do to stop him?

Ever since ex-Ben and Jerry's CEO Perry Odak took over as CEO of Wild Oats in 2001, he has been trying to turn the company around. After some apparent false starts, profits now seem to be on the rise in 2005 and 2006. Has he finally done it?

For decades, Progressive has proven to be one of the most innovative players in the US auto insurance industry, but can it maintain its lead? Progressive has moved up to the number three position in the industry in 2006, but competitors are finally waking up to the threat the company poses. Can they make it to the number one slot? If so, how? What advice would you give CEO Glenn Renwick?