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Since emerging from decades of conflict in 2002, Angola has been growing at a scorching double-digit rate, led by its oil industry. But the nation remains beset with seemingly intractable problems: immense inequality, low life expectancy, a non-diversified economy, and constant grumblings of corruption. The global financial crisis and subsequent fall in state oil revenue drives a loan-seeking Angola towards either the IMF, who demand extensive reforms, or the Chinese, who seek to take a direct stake in the nation's recovery. The case explores the dynamics of post-conflict recovery as well as the challenges associated with a reliance on oil wealth, including the resource curse and Dutch disease.

By mid-2009 Colombian President Alvaro Uribe had ended decades of virtual civil war and strengthened the business climate, but he faced tough economic challenges. Though he had instituted prominent market reforms and brought inflation down sharply, Colombia seemed stuck in a middle ground, industrially behind Brazil or Chile but ahead of poorer Latin American countries. Traditional exports--coal, coffee, oil--still comprised more than half the total, while manufactured exports comprised only a fifth. Public investment in transport and other infrastructure--a perpetual obstacle to growth in mountainous Colombia--remained too low. A major ambition of Uribe or his possible like-minded successor was to secure U.S. Congressional approval of a free trade agreement signed in 2006. But would it really help Colombia diversify its economy? Colombia already had access to the U.S. market but still had a relatively closed economy compared with neighbors such as Mexico or Chile.

GUIDES is an easily remembered framework that can help the business leader and student to confidently and quickly identify, organize, and interpret a country's key economic indicators. Alternatively, it can help them to evaluate third-party analyses and to compare such analyses across countries. In either case, this framework provides a structured way to complete and communicate analysis of a country's economic data.

In 1997, amidst Japan's ongoing financial problems, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sought to restructure the financial sector to make it more transparent and globally competitive. He hoped that this effort, dubbed the "Big Bang" after the British financial restructuring of a decade earlier, would prove as successful. But the financial problems, which seemed to have abated, looked as if they might be worsening. Thus, Hashimoto had to weigh priorities. Should he focus on long-term restructuring, immediate financial rescue, or both? Might an over-emphasis on long-term restructuring increase the chances that major banks could collapse? And what were the best economic and political strategies in these arenas? As a major developed economy, Japan offers an analog to the problems that faced the United States in its 2008-09 financial crisis.

In 1997, amidst Japan's ongoing financial problems, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sought to restructure the financial sector to make it more transparent and globally competitive. He hoped that this effort, dubbed the "Big Bang" after the British financial restructuring a decade earlier, would prove as successful. But the financial problems, which seemed to have abated, looked as if they might be worsening. Thus, Hashimoto had to weigh priorities. Should he focus on long-term restructuring, immediate financial rescue, or both? Might an over-emphasis on long-term restructuring increase the chances that major banks could collapse? And what were the best economic and political strategies in these arenas? As a major developed economy, Japan offers an analog to the problems that faced the United States in its 2008-2009 financial crisis.

The International Monetary Fund was dismissed as almost irrelevant to the global economy, but during the 2008 financial crisis, it returned to center stage, providing financial rescues for developing countries.

In the summer of 1992, hedge fund manager George Soros was contemplating the possibility that the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) would break down. Designed to pave the way for a full-scale European Monetary Union, the ERM was a system of fixed exchange rates linking together twelve members of the European Union, including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. However, the impact of German reunification after 1989 had created significant strains within the system. Moreover, financial deregulation and the growth of cross-border flows of "hot" money increased the likelihood that a speculative attack on one or more ERM currencies might succeed. Soros had to decide which currencies to bet against. The Italian lira? The British pound? The French franc? Or all three? The result could determine the success or failure of the project for a single European currency.

What caused the 1997-98 Asia Crisis: Asian nations' poor economic management, international financial contagion, close "crony" relations between local politicians and capitalists? This case examines how the crisis erupted in Thailand and spread in a chain of events that no one-neither Asian financial authorities nor Western economists-had foreseen. The crisis raises questions about how competently financial institutions such as mutual funds managed their global capital investments. It raises questions about how effective the International Monetary Fund's package of reforms was-and to what extent the IMF acted in the interest of Wall Street rather than developing nations. And the crisis raises questions about the development policies of Asian nations: Did too-close "crony" relations between politicians and owners of major banks or firms pave the way for crisis?

Why do managers become corrupt? Does corruption ever pay? When do friendly relations cross into bribery? How can CEOs manage and prevent outbreaks of corruption? These and other questions are raised by three short case studies of corruption in Germany: at the global engineering firm Siemens, the automaker VW, and the chemical giant BASF. While German law not only permitted overseas bribery but even made it tax deductible until 1999, it was not welcomed in some nations where Siemens did business such as the United States-or in Germany after 2000-but old practices continued. Cooperative management-labor relations, often seen as key to the post-World War II German industrial powerhouse, went sour at VW, as a top manager secured key concessions by paying for union leaders' lavish foreign travel and visits to prostitutes. After vitamin prices sagged in the late 1980s, BASF and the Swiss chemical firm Hoffmann-La Roche plotted a global cartel that lasted a decade and raised the prices of many vitamins 50 percent or more. In the end, even after record criminal fines and jail time for some executives, some observers argued, such practices were likely to recur.

New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer faced a decision about how to stop wrongdoing committed by major Wall Street firms during the Internet boom. The equities analysts of Merrill Lynch and other Wall Street firms were charged with objectively advising retail investors whether to buy or sell publicly traded stock. The analysts had rated some stock a strong buy, while at the same time disparaging it in Internet emails as "a piece of junk" or a "powder keg." Spitzer concluded that the analysts sometimes issued such buy ratings on stock of companies because of a conflict of interest: the Wall Street firms the analysts worked for were making handsome fees for underwriting the companies' stock offerings and providing other services. The usual procedure when an enforcement agency such as the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered such a situation would be to complete its investigation and negotiate a resolution privately with the financial firm. If it could not resolve the matter, the agency would formally file suit against the firm in court. This option was open to Spitzer, but the 1921 New York statue gave him an alternative. Even before filing suit in court--and while continuing to investigate the firm further--he could broadcast his findings to warn the public and brand the firm with wrongdoing. This case investigates the decision Spitzer made, and its long-term implications for U.S. financial regulation and financial industries.

On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. ULI's panel of experts urged what it saw as a pragmatic approach. The city lacked the resources to restore services quickly to all of New Orleans. It would have to pick and choose the most promising areas to rebuild first. The hope was that vibrant rebirth in the center would catalyze growth elsewhere. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the lower-lying, poorer sections of town hardest hit by Katrina would have to wait. In fact, it might not make sense to rebuild neighborhoods likely to experience serious flooding in a future hurricane. Two-thirds of the city's pre-Katrina residents were African Americans, disproportionately residents of the poorer, lower-lying, worst damaged areas. Some saw the ULI plan as a conspiracy to get rid of them and make New Orleans whiter. Even many middle-class whites and blacks who did not share the conspiracy theory vehemently opposed the ULI proposal because it seemed to relegate their homes and neighborhoods to oblivion. Meanwhile, city councilors representing lower-lying districts feared that ULI would plan their political base out of existence. HKS Case Number 1862.0

This sequel accompanies the main case (1862.0). On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. HKS Case Number 1862.1

For more than 70 years, beginning in 1929, one party-the Party of Institutional Revolution, known by its Spanish initials PRI-dominated political life in Mexico, at all levels of government. But when Vicente Fox, a candidate of the rival National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency in 2000, change rippled through the country's overall political structure. This case tells the story of the emergence of competitive elections at the municipal level-in particular, one municipality emblematic of larger change. In describing the change in political life in Chignahuapan, a jurisdiction of some 50,000 in the Sierra Norte mountains northeast of Mexico City, the case frames the question of whether electoral change can lead to sustainable reform of local government. It is a question which arises when, surprisingly, a reform-minded PAN administration gains power in the locality in February 2002-and proceeds to change both administrative processes (opening meetings of the local Council for the first time) and moving generally toward transparency and improved local services. The reform administration, was, however, limited by law to just one term-thus, posing the central question of the case: in what ways can a reform administration seek to ensure that the changes it initiates will not be transitory? HKS Case Number 1841.0

For more than 70 years, beginning in 1929, one party-the Party of Institutional Revolution, known by its Spanish initials PRI-dominated political life in Mexico, at all levels of government. But when Vicente Fox, a candidate of the rival National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency in 2000, change rippled through the country's overall political structure. This case tells the story of the emergence of competitive elections at the municipal level-in particular, one municipality emblematic of larger change. In describing the change in political life in Chignahuapan, a jurisdiction of some 50,000 in the Sierra Norte mountains northeast of Mexico City, the case frames the question of whether electoral change can lead to sustainable reform of local government. It is a question which arises when, surprisingly, a reform-minded PAN administration gains power in the locality in February 2002-and proceeds to change both administrative processes (opening meetings of the local Council for the first time) and moving generally toward transparency and improved local services. The reform administration, was, however, limited by law to just one term-thus, posing the central question of the case: in what ways can a reform administration seek to ensure that the changes it initiates will not be transitory? HKS Case Number 1841.1

In January, 1997, the Rhode Island Department of Public Health inaugurated KIDSNET, an effort to harness the power of information technology to ensure that all children in the state received proper preventive care. The medical "informatics" system was designed to track essential public-health data-such as immunizations-and make it accessible to the health care providers and public health programs across the state. "Informatics," in other words, was to improve child health by making sure that any doctor or emergency room in the state could quickly and conveniently become aware of key aspects of any child's medical history. The system was to be fully operational by the year 2000. The marriage of computer records and public health did not go smoothly, however, and, in late 1999, a consultant found that the system was "grossly underutilized." KIDSNET was tracking immunizations for but 43 percent of infants and only 31 percent of the clinics and doctors' offices in Rhode Island were submitting immunization data. HKS Case Number 1800.0

This sequel accompanies the case 1800.0. In January, 1997, the Rhode Island Department of Public Health inaugurated KIDSNET, an effort to harness the power of information technology to ensure that all children in the state received proper preventive care. The medical "informatics" system was designed to track essential public-health data-such as immunizations-and make it accessible to the health care providers and public health programs across the state. "Informatics," in other words, was to improve child health by making sure that any doctor or emergency room in the state could quickly and conveniently become aware of key aspects of any child's medical history. The system was to be fully operational by the year 2000. The marriage of computer records and public health did not go smoothly, however, and, in late 1999, a consultant found that the system was "grossly underutilized." KIDSNET was tracking immunizations for but 43 percent of infants and only 31 percent of the clinics and doctors' offices in Rhode Island were submitting immunization data. HKS Case Number 1800.1

Inequality represented a major issue at the dawn of the 21st century. By many measures, inequality had increased over the previous several decades, within both developed and developing countries. Whether global inequality (measured across countries or among the people of the world) increased remained controversial. Even in those cases where experts agreed that inequality had risen, there was little consensus about the causes. Some blamed globalization for the growing gulf between rich and poor, whereas others pointed to technology, government policies, and even social norms. Experts also disagreed over whether rising inequality was even a problem, particularly in those places where the poverty rate was low or falling.

This case focuses on one of the largest and most successful of such microlenders, Mexico's Compartamos ("we share") organization, and raises questions about the most effective business model and scale of microlenders. Specifically, the case tells the story of how Compartamos, which had found great success making small loans in villages and rural areas, fared when it sought to expand into Mexico City. A series of reverses--higher default rates, personnel problems, and unexpected competition and regulatory issues--implicitly pose the question of whether Compartamos and microlenders of its type, which historically have relied on peer group pressure to ensure repayment of otherwise unsecured loans to small start-up businesses, can expand and adapt to an urban setting. HKS Case Number 1761.1

Microlending, defined as very small loans advanced to very low-income entrepreneurs, has attracted wide attention as a potentially effective means to aid the economic development of impoverished nations. This case focuses on one of the largest and most successful of such microlenders, Mexico's Compartamos ("we share") organization, and raises questions about the most effective business model and scale of microlenders. Specifically, the case tells the story of how Compartamos, which had found great success making small loans in villages and rural areas, fared when it sought to expand into Mexico City. A series of reverses--higher default rates, personnel problems, and unexpected competition and regulatory issues--implicitly pose the question of whether Compartamos and microlenders of its type, which historically have relied on peer group pressure to ensure repayment of otherwise unsecured loans to small start-up businesses, can expand and adapt to an urban setting. HKS Case Number 1761.0