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In 2015, U.K.-based Ocado was the world's largest pure player in the online home-delivery grocery business and was gaining a growing share of the highly competitive U.K. grocery market. Ocado had made heavy investments in technology, including a highly automated warehouse operation, intelligent software for efficient order delivery, and a customer-friendly online interface. Ocado's customer base had expanded beyond the wealthy to include middle-income consumers; even with a delivery charge, grocery shopping through Ocado was, in many cases, as affordable as shopping in a retail stores. In 2015 the company was developing a strategy for its Smart Platform, a model in which Ocado would lease its software, hardware, and integration services to brick-and-mortar grocery retailers seeking to build online businesses. Ocado's management believed the Smart Platform, which they planned to market internationally, had the potential to disrupt the global grocery retail market.

Deji Akinyanju, founder of Nigerian fast-food chain Chicken Republic, and Ayo Oduntan, founder of an integrated Nigerian poultry operation (Amo Byng Group), are among a growing cadre of skilled food-industry entrepreneurs for whom the opportunities to serve the Nigerian market-a population of over 170 million, including a large and growing middle class-outweigh the challenges of operating there. And indeed, as embodied by Nigeria's status as a net food importer despite having 80 million hectares of arable land, the challenges are considerable. Animal feed is excessively expensive, driving up poultry production costs and limiting production volumes; illegal poultry imports pose food safety threats while undercutting prices of domestic product; corruption is rampant; debt is exorbitantly expensive; commercial real estate is sparse; and electricity is unreliable. Yet, Nigeria has all the natural blessings to be an agricultural powerhouse competitive on an international scale. And it has the large, ambitious population needed to drive its development, both as workers and consumers. Akinyanju and Oduntan believe many of the issues constraining Nigeria's poultry sector can be alleviated with relatively simple solutions-and that doing so can open tremendous growth opportunities for their businesses and the country as a whole. Set in October 2015, this case provides a detailed look at Nigeria's poultry value chain and the complexities of modernizing a traditional and largely informal industry. It also presents an inspiring story of determined entrepreneurs succeeding against tough odds. Finally, for students whose conception of Nigeria is all too often reduced to simplistic headlines, this case offers a more nuanced look into the complexities, potential, and aspirations of what may be one of this century's most dynamic and important economies.

Lipman, the largest open field fresh tomato grower and marketer in the United States, has been successfully pursuing an aggressive strategy of acquisitions over the last several years. End market consolidation in the retail space has driven vertical integration in the extremely competitive fresh tomato business, where farm gate prices have not changed in 30 years. The company is facing pressure from climate change, alternative uses for farm land, and a transition to the next generation of family ownership of the business.

Privately held Simplot has developed a new genetically engineered potato that substantially reduces waste and does not turn brown after cutting. Unlike other GMOs, it does not contain foreign genes. The case describes the company's commercialization plans in light of the complex environment surrounding genetically modified foods.

Muñoz Group, which supplied supermarket chains and food distribution chains around the world with fruit, flowers, juice and ice cream, was at a strategic crossroads in 2014. CEO Alvaro Muñoz had to choose the best way to achieve profit goals and provide his company with a sustainable competitive advantage. The company had already developed innovative citrus, grape and flower breeding units in efforts to keep its product pipeline on the cutting edge. The company also worked to integrate vertically-to own or control every viable piece of the supply chain-in an effort to manage the flower and produce businesses from plant to retailer. The company's stronghold was its UK and European markets, but it had expanded into North America and also eyed new opportunities in Asia. Muñoz had to decide where to focus his efforts against a backdrop of margin squeezes in the food business, competition for product from the developing world, ever more stringent quality, sustainability, and environmental standards from clients, and perennial hiring challenges.

The Dutch company HEINEKEN, one of the leading global brewers known for its brands like Heineken, Amstel, or Desperados and for its award-winning marketing campaigns, seeks to closely integrate its long-term sustainability "Brewing a Better World"-approach into its corporate strategy. HEINEKEN had set itself ambitious 2015 and 2020 sustainability targets in six pillar areas around Energy/CO2, Water, Sustainable Sourcing, Responsible Consumption, Community/Inclusive Growth, and Health & Safety. The case zooms in on HEINEKEN's efforts in the sustainable sourcing pillar, with its work on farming standards and supplier code as well as its support for local sourcing programs in the growing African market. HEINEKEN's management finds that marketing its achievements in these sustainability areas poses new challenges though. For example, its current "mass-balance" sourcing in which sustainable and traditional material got mixed in the supply chain did not allow for effective communication on a given bottle. But was this reason enough to try to move to "segregated" sourcing, if that was even reasonable?

In 2014, Khuram Mir, CEO of HN Agri Serve, an innovative apple orchard company in the Kashmir region of Northern India, wonders about the best growth strategy for his company.

Dr. Mark Post and his team at Maastricht University were perfecting their tissue culture beef product-made entirely from muscle grown in his lab-to give it the same taste, texture and appearance of a traditional beef hamburger. A previous iteration of this product had been taste tested live, with good results, and Sergey Brin, a co-founder of Google, had provided Post with much of the funding to make the burgers. The next step was to form an independent company around this technology and take it to market. This innovative product could both radically disrupt the existing beef production and supply chain, and provide an animal welfare and environmentally-friendly food that had far less of an environmental impact than traditional beef products. Post faced several challenges in making this a commercially viable product though. He had to get price down, as it currently cost roughly $330,000 to make a single burger. He also had to find the right partner(s) to help him bring the product to market, but who should he work with: someone from the established beef production and supply system, a retailer, or someone entirely outside the traditional beef system? How could he expect established companies to react to this disruption of the status quo? Messaging around this product was critical: How should Post communicate with the public to convey that this was a natural product-the way muscle tissue grew in his lab was the same way it developed in cattle-and overcome public skepticism of overt scientific involvement in their food?

Ghurka was a 38-year-old luxury leather goods brand that specialized in leather and twill luggage, handbags, and accessories. Brightwork Brand Holdings Corp. acquired it as an asset purchase in 2011. Ghurka, under CEO John Reuter, worked to re-launch the brand with a ten-year, three-phase growth plan. The company aimed to be profitable by 2016. Management worked to address challenges surrounding the role of wholesaling, Ghurka's advertising strategy, and leather sourcing issues.

As the leading distributor of fresh avocados in the U.S., Mission Produce was at a crossroads in late 2013. Avocado consumption was booming and CEO Steve Barnard wanted to acquire additional land in Peru and develop new avocado farms to help fill a projected supply gap. Mission could also buy avocado farms in other countries, expand its international marketing efforts, invest in brand building in Asia, and/or add processed avocado products. This strategy case describes Mission's growth, entrepreneurial leadership, future opportunities, and financing alternatives.

In 2010, the world's third largest retailer created a new centralized sourcing department for fresh food and store-brand grocery products in response to changes in global supply and to better meet the needs of a new multi-channel retail environment. The case, set in late 2013, covers the development of Tesco Group Food and identifies future opportunities and challenges.

In his August 2012 earnings call, CEO Ron Johnson urged investors to be patient and stay the course with the revised JC Penney marketing strategy despite mounting negative financial indicators. The heart of the strategy was the "Fair and Square" approach to pricing. This was a switch from J.C. Penney's previous high-low pricing program to a new everyday low pricing policy that aimed to fit with a radical repositioning of the JC Penney business model and brand. However, with sales continuing to decline the Board fired Johnson in April 2013 and appointed Johnson's predecessor Myron E. "Mike" Ullman III as his successor. What would Ullman do to stop JC Penney's losses? Would he push forward with Johnson's "Fair and Square" vision; would he return to the former strategy; could he manage a hybrid strategy; or would he define a new path for the retailer to follow?

Rehired in April 2013, Myron E. "Mike" Ullman III was brought back to stabilize the retailer's business. Under Ron Johnson's "Fair and Square" program, sales had declined rapidly and quarterly losses and expensive capital investments had put severe pressure on cash reserves. Ullman decided to combine "Fair and Square" everyday low pricing and high/low pricing to reverse the negative trend. For example, to welcome people back to its stores, J.C. Penney ran deep discount sales for Mother's Day and Veteran's Day. By November 2013 the retail stores posted positive sales comparisons year over year, the first time since December 2011. However, margins remained low and Wall Street was wondering if J.C. Penney was sacrificing margin to drive store traffic. Would 2013 holiday sales be strong enough for J.C. Penney to begin building stronger margins? Would another strategy have been more effective? Did the board dispose of Johnson too quickly? Was it wise to bring back Ullman? Can J.C. Penney get back on its feet?

In 2013, Kenyan horticulture producer and exporter VP Group is weighing potential expansion opportunities against the growing risks in its production and export markets. With $121 million in 2012 revenues, VP Group has grown rapidly in recent years by expanding its vegetable and flower production beyond Kenya into Ethiopia and Ghana; exploring new products such as sugar; and vertically integrating by bringing marketing and logistics operations in-house. The company's leadership is excited about future growth opportunities but also concerned about the impact of VP Group's growth on its entrepreneurial culture. The company also faces increasing cost pressures due to rising costs in Kenya and flat prices in U.K. supermarkets, its main buyers. VP Group's size, vertical integration, and focus on sustainability leave it well positioned as a long-term partner to U.K. supermarkets, but changes to the overall operating environment might require the company to rethink its strategy.

The Barbara Krakow Gallery is a successful contemporary art gallery located in Boston. It utilizes a very rare "no haggle pricing" strategy and extended sales cycle when selling pieces to collectors. Though it remains profitable and very respected, the size and scope of the gallery will be brought into question when Barbara Krakow, its founder, retires and hands it over to her associate, Andrew Witkin.

In 2013, Mohamed Hage, founder of the rooftop farming business called Lufa Farms, thought his company had reached a level of maturity where scaling the business model was the next logical step. With two greenhouses already in Canada, he was looking into other locations in the U.S. Though Lufa Farms' advanced cultivation technologies made the company stand out in its sector, the industry was still young and investors were not fully comfortable putting their resources into rooftop farms. This case explores the intricacies of a rooftop farming business, how it built a successful brand, and presents the challenges that might lie ahead for the company as the founder thinks about expansion.

Value Retail PLC owned and managed a number of premium shopping destinations (Villages) across Europe. Soon the company would be moving into an entirely new market: China. The company's Villages had proven popular with both shoppers (many of whom were international tourists who had come to Europe specifically to visit one of Value Retail's Villages) and brands, a number of which were luxury brands that had historically avoided selling product at outlet locations. The company's Founder and Chairman, Scott Malkin, looked to the future challenges his company might face in China, as well as to the challenges his company faced around human resource management and organizational control as the company grew in size and formalized parts of its processes, and how his company would be impacted by the ongoing changes in the retail industry, including the rise of online shopping.

Francesco Mutti, owner, CEO, and great-grandson of the founder of Mutti S.p.a., ran the 113-year old Parma, Italy-based tomato-processing company. Mutti sales grew from €11 million in 1995 to €185 million in 2011, without producing for store brands in a market in which these offerings were steadily gaining share. The company's leaders wanted to make sure Mutti maintained its position in Italy and further, to move into a leadership position in several countries around the world. What was next for the family firm and brand leader from northern Italy's Emilia-Romagna region? How would the singularly focused, consensus-driven firm fare in an increasingly competitive, globalizing retail landscape?

In late 2012, Kori Tuggle, director of marketing and business development at Ocean Mist Farms, a California produce company, examines her social media-based marketing program and her attempts to create a brand for a bulk commodity.

In January 2012, H-E-B Grocery Co., a private retail chain with stores located in Texas and Mexico, was introducing its Healthy at H-E-B program to its customers. The program, which started with the company's employees a few years earlier, was an effort to educate and inform customers on how to lead a healthier lifestyle. What CEO Craig Boyan had in mind was creating a state-wide healthy living movement in Texas, where obesity was high relative to other states in the U.S. But how far to go with its employees and customers was a question that President and COO Craig Boyan and his team struggled with. On one hand Boyan believed that H-E-B, long recognized for its community involvement, had a role to play in Texans' health and well-being. On the other hand, he recognized that H-E-B was first and foremost a retailer that had to compete against the likes of Walmart. He needed to make sure that H-E-B was serving its customers what they wanted while also trying to influence their buying behavior toward healthier foods. Some would say that H-E-B had no role in changing the lifestyle and food choices of its employees or customers. But Boyan and his team thought differently.