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In 2012, Anna Haupt and Terese Alstin, cofounders of the Hövding company, reflect on the evolution of their venture and the way forward. Since 2005, Haupt and Alstin had been working on a new type of bicycle helmet-an "airbag for cyclists". What had begun as a thesis had grown into a seven-year journey of research and development, including raising over $5 million of venture capital. The product had been granted Europe's CE certification in 2011 and had been launched simultaneously in Sweden and Norway. Yet, a year later, the company had still not reached the breakeven point. To help them establish a commercialization strategy, the Hövding board had prevailed upon the founders to hire a professional CEO. But surrendering management control was an emotional process for Haupt and Alstin, while the CEO struggled to assert his leadership and build the company's commercial capabilities. Should Haupt and Alstin collaborate with their CEO despite their misgivings or should they step away from the company they had dedicated seven years to building?

"MuMaté Tool: Evaluating Financing Alternatives" walks students through the considerations in allocating equity amongst the members of a startup's founding team. This exercise is designed to be used in conjunction with Shikhar Ghosh, Joseph B. Fuller, Thomas E. Eisenmann, Alex Godden, and Adrew Sandoe "MuMaté: Funding Growth," HBS No. 814-063

The founders of Maricopa, Inc., a startup that sold proprietery hair-care products directly to salons, were preparing a board presentation to address the young company's inability to meet financial projections. While the products had caught on with customers, the financial shortcomings raised some questions about the company's business plan. The company had gone through much of its cash and needed additional funding to continue operating. At the same time, two VC investors were deciding how to proceed with their investments in Maricopa. The larger VC firm questioned Maricopa's management's decisions and was hesitant to further fund the company. However the Maricopa investment was much more important to the smaller VC firm, and it's representative on Maricopa's board worked hard to convinve her counterpart from the larger firm that while the firm had struggled, it was a young startup with strong potential. Without the larger firm investing again in Maricopa, the business was at risk of going under.

GenapSys, a California-based startup, was soon to release a new DNA sequencer that the company's founder, Hesaam Esfandyarpour, believed was truly revolutionary. The sequencer would be substantially less expensive-potentially costing just a few thousand dollars-and smaller than other sequencers, many of which were large devices costing tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars. GenapSys' device, named GENIUS, could also quickly generate large amounts of data, as it was capable of sequencing an entire human genome in less than eight hours. At this price, GenapSys' device would be attractive to customers that had been unable to afford sequencers, such as smaller laboratories or hospitals, and even expand the market to include industries such as agriculture and biofuels. As GenapSys came closer to releasing its product, Esfandyarpour and his Senior Director of Operations and Strategy, Leila Rastegar (HBS '11), sat down to decide which of three business models they would choose to bring this device to market. In the first model, the company would sell sequencers at a higher price to those entities which already purchased sequencers, primarily major research labs and pharmaceutical firms, but position its machine as a faster alternative to existing technologies. In the second model, GenapSys would sell its sequencer at a lower price but charge more for the cartridges necessary to run a sample, and earn its primary revenue from these cartridges. The third model would see GenapSys sell its device at or around cost, but use the data customers generated to create a proprietary database of genetic information. Customers could pay to access the database for research, to create genetic tests, or for many other purposes. GenapSys would also build an online store with the genetic tests customers created. Esfandyarpour's and Rastegar's decision would determine GenapSys' customer base and financial position for the coming years, and also impact develop

Course overview of The Entrepreneurial Manager.

HBR's editors searched for the best new ideas related to the practice of management and came up with a collection that is as diverse as it is provocative. The 2004 HBR List includes emergent concepts from biology, network science, management theory, and more. A few highlights: Richard Florida wonders why U.S. society doesn't seem to be thinking about the flow of people as the key to America's advantage in the "creative age." Diane L. Coutu describes how the revolution in neurosciences will have a major impact on business. Clayton M. Christensen explains the law of conservation of attractive profits: When attractive profits disappear at one stage in the value chain because a product becomes commoditized, the opportunity to earn attractive profits with proprietary products usually emerges at an adjacent stage. Daniel H. Pink explains why the master of fine arts is the new MBA. Herminia Ibarra describes how companies can get the most out of managers returning from leadership-development programs. Iqbal Quadir suggests a radical fix for the third world's trade problems: Get the World Bank to lend to rich countries so that there are resources for retraining workers in dying industries.

Beyond the recent accounting scandals, something is wrong with the way most companies are managed today. That's the message of this fictional letter from a board member to a CEO, written by Joseph Fuller, CEO of the strategy consulting firm Monitor Group. The letter highlights the challenges and complexities of running a business in today's uncertain environment. The letter addresses a single CEO and company, yet it is intended to speak to executives and boards everywhere: "It wasn't the recession that caused us to make 3 acquisitions in 2 years at very, very high prices; the need to fuel [unreasonable] growth did. Nor was it the recession that caused us to expand our capacity in anticipation of gaining market share; rather, it was our own overly optimistic sales forecasts that led us to that decision. Where did those forecasts originate? From line managers trying to fulfill profit goals that we created after meeting with the analysts. The root cause of many of the problems that became apparent in the last 24 months lies not with the economy, not with September 11, and not with the dot-com bubble. Rather, it lies with that willingness to be led by outside forces--indeed, our own lack of conviction about setting a course." Restoring sound, strategic decision making--thinking that looks beyond tomorrow's analyst reports--will go a long way toward keeping those outside forces at bay, according to Fuller.

Logistics have the potential to become the next governing element of strategy. Customer needs vary, and companies can tailor their logistics systems to serve them better and more profitably. The goal of logistics strategy is building distinct approaches to distinct groups of customers. The first step is organizing a cross-functional team to proceed through the following steps: segmenting customers according to purchase criteria, establishing different standards of service for different customer segments, tailoring logistics pipelines to support each segment, and creating economies of scale to determine which assets can be shared among various pipelines.