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After struggling through the country's longest recession since 2008, the U.K. was expected to grow faster than any other G7 nation in 2014. Analysts wondered whether the return to growth was because, or in spite of, Prime Minister David Cameron's controversial £113 billion austerity plan introduced in 2010. Despite the positive upturn in the economy, U.K. policymakers still faced challenges with rapidly rising income inequality, an economy dominated by the financial sector, a possible housing bubble, and an approaching referendum on Scotland's independence. Moreover, many claimed the U.K. was at risk of secular stagnation, a slowdown in economic growth caused by a structural deficiency in demand. What could the government do to put the country on a sustained and balanced growth trajectory?

Assuming office in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was determined to revive Japan's stagnating economy through an ambitious plan known as 'Abenomics.' Under the guidance of the newly appointed governor of the central bank, Haruhiko Kuroda, the Bank of Japan adopted quantitative easing as its new monetary policy, pledging to double the nation's monetary base in two years through the purchase of long-term government bonds. While Kuroda insisted that Japan needed to "use every means available" to combat deflation, critics wondered whether inflation would increase the nation's public-sector debt to unsustainable levels or outpace growth in wages. Furthermore, skeptics debated whether Prime Minister Abe was wise to make the Bank of Japan the key player in moving the nation toward economic growth. Others questioned whether, unlike in the past, the Bank of Japan would take the necessary steps to carry through with the policy.

In February 2013, the G-20 finance ministers met in Moscow, Russia to discuss the rising anxieties over a potential international currency war. It was speculated that certain countries were purposely devaluing their currencies in order to improve their competitiveness in global markets. Emerging markets contended that the expansionary monetary policies of the major central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, and the Bank of England, were causing significant and detrimental spillover effects, such as currency appreciation, declining exports, and rising inflation, in less developed economies. Conversely, the major central banks insisted that such policies were necessary for reviving economic growth both domestically and internationally. Would these policies successfully create a resurgence of growth? Can expansionary monetary policies be considered "beggar-thy-neighbor" actions by emerging markets? How should developing nations respond?

Over the past decade, Brazil's future as a leading world economic power appeared certain. An expanding middle class and commodity boom had fueled economic growth, with GDP growth hitting a peak of 7.5% in 2010. However, the high cost of conducting business in Brazil, known as "Custo Brasil," was hurting domestic manufacturing, while incoming foreign investments threatened to overwhelm Brazilian markets. Under President Dilma Rousseff, economic growth stagnated, and the Rousseff administration struggled to find the best balance between reducing inflation, maintaining a flexible exchange rate, and improving the competitiveness of Brazilian exports.

In 2009, Chile's Finance Minister Andres Velasco's fortunes had been reversed. His fiscal policy that had come under attack just a year ago had been used to finance a $4 billion fiscal stimulus package amid the global economic downturn. Velasco was now Chile's most popular minister. However, the future of Chile's fiscal policy was questionable with the election of a new president, Sebastian Pinera, the first conservative leader to lead Chile in two decades.

In 2008, Andres Velasco, Chile's Finance Minister, was under mounting criticisms over his fiscal policy. As the world's largest copper producer, Chile was benefiting from the rise in copper prices, which had more than tripled since 2003. Copper revenues translated into greater income for the government as Chile's biggest copper producer, Codelco, was a state-owned enterprise. Velasco had chosen to save the bulk of the copper revenues into two stabilization funds; by the end of August 2008, the collective amount represented more than 20% of Chile's GDP. Several critics wanted the funds to be used to improve the poor public education system, income gap, and other impending social issues. After all, Chile had one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. Productivity was stagnant and economic growth had slowed down significantly since the 1990's. What should Velasco do amid growing public discontent? Was it really in Chile's best interest to keep saving the copper wealth?

In 1997, amidst Japan's ongoing financial problems, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sought to restructure the financial sector to make it more transparent and globally competitive. He hoped that this effort, dubbed the "Big Bang" after the British financial restructuring of a decade earlier, would prove as successful. But the financial problems, which seemed to have abated, looked as if they might be worsening. Thus, Hashimoto had to weigh priorities. Should he focus on long-term restructuring, immediate financial rescue, or both? Might an over-emphasis on long-term restructuring increase the chances that major banks could collapse? And what were the best economic and political strategies in these arenas? As a major developed economy, Japan offers an analog to the problems that faced the United States in its 2008-09 financial crisis.

In 1997, amidst Japan's ongoing financial problems, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sought to restructure the financial sector to make it more transparent and globally competitive. He hoped that this effort, dubbed the "Big Bang" after the British financial restructuring a decade earlier, would prove as successful. But the financial problems, which seemed to have abated, looked as if they might be worsening. Thus, Hashimoto had to weigh priorities. Should he focus on long-term restructuring, immediate financial rescue, or both? Might an over-emphasis on long-term restructuring increase the chances that major banks could collapse? And what were the best economic and political strategies in these arenas? As a major developed economy, Japan offers an analog to the problems that faced the United States in its 2008-2009 financial crisis.

Australia's Prime Minister Kevin Rudd faced a daunting task that he never imagined he would have to face when he was elected two years ago. Australia at that time was poised to enter its 17th year of uninterrupted growth. Commodity exports were booming, largely driven by China's insatiable appetite for raw materials. Then the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, brewing challenges for the world's biggest exporter of coal and iron ore. Prime Minister Rudd pushed for massive stimulus packages to revive domestic consumption and demand. Yet as an economy heavily dependent on trade, tumbling commodity prices brewed difficult times for Australia's trade deficit and its persistent large current account deficit. What was in hold for Australia's deficit, which had been in the red all but four years since 1950? In addition, how should policymakers address the intense concerns regarding China's growing interest in Australia's prized natural resources sector?

The global economy was expected to suffer from negative growth for the full year in 2009, a phenomenon not seen since World War II. While the U.S. subprime mortgage disaster was blamed as the original instigator, it was noted that the "global imbalances" of the U.S. current account deficit funded for many years by other nations such as China was also a chief culprit of the crisis as well. Policymakers around the world recognized that the scope and scale of the financial crisis required a coordinated global response. Yet there were conflicting views on what kind of action was needed to address the first global financial crisis of the 21st century.

In March 2009, the U.S. economy was in a severe recession not seen since the Great Depression after the subprime mortgage crisis had spiraled out of control. The situation had dramatically changed in one year since the Federal Reserve Board had helped to bailout investment bank Bear Stearns. Deflation, not inflation, had become a top concern. Interest rates were near zero percent. Five million jobs had been lost. The new Barack Obama administration had pushed forward with a $787 billion stimulus package, coupled with various programs to address the frozen credit markets and depressed investors' confidence. Yet the burning question in every policymakers' mind was--how effective would the various plans work to revive the U.S. economy?

Toshihiko Fukui, Government of the Bank of Japan, faced a complex situation in the fall of 2007. An economic recovery had allowed the central bank to abandon its zero interest rate policy, which had been in place for years, and raise rates to 0.5%. The Bank of Japan was eager to increase them to more 'normal' levels to exert effective monetary policy. Yet the appropriate timing and approach was a controversial issue, especially as the government did not want a rate hike that could potentially hinder economic growth and increase its already large fiscal debt burden.

In October 2008, Tata Motors canceled their car manufacturing plant in West Bengal state, in the face of widespread farmer protests over land acquisition issues. This meant abandoning a project in which the company had invested $300 million and delaying the launch of the Nano, the world's cheapest car. What strategy could Tata have pursued to avoid this outcome? Would similar problems arise in Gujarat state, where the project had been relocated?

In 2005, the government of India enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in order to attract investment, generate export revenues, and create manufacturing jobs. However, several planned projects faced difficulties in acquiring land for setting up the SEZ. In December 2007, the government introduced a new piece of legislation, which proposed to extend the power of eminent domain to allow the government to acquire land for SEZs. Was this the right response to the land acquisition problems of private firms? Was the SEZ strategy the right one for India's economic growth?

On March 21, 2008, the U.S. government secured an agreement from two leading sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to adopt a new set of investment principles to govern the Funds' activities. SWFs, broadly defined as an investment fund owned by a national or a government, were gaining prominence across the globe, especially with their recent investments in troubled U.S. financial firms that had suffered significant losses from the subprime mortgage crisis. Yet SWFs were viewed with suspicions amid concerns that they could have potential political interests behind their investments. Many SWFs also lacked disclosure or transparency regarding their activities or investment goals. Countries such as the United States felt that some kind of international regulation had to be imposed, but would it be possible?

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 708036

By March 2008, the U.S. Government and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board had taken various policy measures over the last few months to tackle the subprime mortgage crisis that threatened to drag the economy into a recession. The Bush administration approved a fiscal stimulus package exceeding $150 billion. Interest rates had been repeatedly cut at the fastest pace in decades, to 2.25% as of March 2008. The Fed, in an unprecedented move, helped JPMorgan Chase to take over Bear Stearns, which was on the brink of collapse. Yet as the global economy faced slower growth stemming from the U.S. mortgage crisis, policy makers were caught in an intense debate over what the 'right' solution would be, and the implication of these policies on global imbalances.