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In July 1997, Thailand became the first Asian "tiger" economy to abandon its fixed exchange rate system in response to speculative attacks on its currency. Investors started to flee Asia, and the crisis rapidly spread to other countries. Central banks spent billions of dollars to try and defend their currencies, only to seek emergency bailouts from the International Monetary Fund. This case presents a chronology of events that unraveled during the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to the end of 1998.

Toshihiko Fukui, Governor of the Bank of Japan, faced a complex situation in the fall of 2007. An economic recovery had allowed the central bank to abandon its zero interest rate policy, which had been in place for years, and raise rates to 0.5%. The Bank of Japan was eager to increase them to more 'normal' levels to exert effective monetary policy. Yet the appropriate timing and approach was a controversial issue, especially as the government did not want a rate hike that could potentially hinder economic growth and increase its already large fiscal debt burden.

South Korea, as one of the Asian "tiger" economies, transformed itself into the world's 11th largest economy and major exporter by 1996, emerging from being one of the lowest income countries in the region back in the 1960s. Yet one year later in 1997, Korea was swept up in the Asian financial crisis and sought a record $58 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund. The crisis exposed fundamental weaknesses in the Korean economy, from bad loans to reckless growth policies pursued by large conglomerates. Sweeping reforms took place and the Korean economy rebounded quickly. Yet as Korea approached the 10-year anniversary of the crisis, the nation found itself pondering whether it had implemented enough institutional and structural reforms, or whether more had to be done, such as searching for a new economic development model to ensure its future.

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At the 2005 Group of Eight summit, world leaders agreed to relieve the world's poorest countries' debt burden and double aid to Africa by 2010. The announcement raised questions whether debt relief would really help the poor. By examining past aid trends and policies of multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, this case also questions whether aid can allow poor countries to break their vicious cycle of poverty, and/or how aid can be used effectively.

Examines what happened to Korea after the 1997 financial crisis and the implementation of the IMF-mandated reforms imposed on Korea as conditionalities to the country's emergency loan package.

Explores the tax policy choices made by Slovakia and the impact of reforms. Set in 2006, looks at the decision facing new Prime Minister Robert Fico as he faces the public's "reform fatigue." Traces the development of tax and fiscal policies since Slovakia's independence in 1993, focusing on the 2004 implementation of the rovna dan, or "equal tax," a drastic simplification of the tax system. A major theme is the impact of labor market and welfare reform, as well as the effective tax rates of both investors and workers. Another important theme relates to Slovakia's desire to join the EU and adopt the Euro.

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Successive economic crises of the 1990s and early 2000s intensified focus on reform of the "international financial architecture." Because many of these crises involved defaults on sovereign bonds, an important component of the discussion revolved around the composition of international capital flows and sovereign debt restructuring. With the official sector, private creditors, and sovereign debtors focused on different issues, proposals surrounding the topic varied widely. Describes some of the proposals and summarizes scholarship on their advantages and disadvantages.

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The role of distressed debt funds, also known as "vulture funds," in sovereign debt restructuring was a hotly debated topic, especially after the success of Elliot Associates in converting an $11 million investment in Peruvian bonds worth $21 million into a $58 million cash payout from the country, representing the full face value of the bonds plus past-due interest. Highlights the problems associated with debt restructuring coordination. On the one hand, many observers derided firms such as Elliot and Dart as "vultures" or "rouge creditors" who sought to profit on sovereign debt restructurings at the expense of countries suffering economic hardship and of the majority of bondholders whose cooperation allowed the restructurings to take place. Critics believed that these holdout creditors created "collective action problems" and presented a major obstacle to successful sovereign debt restructurings. On the other hand, other observers argued that activist investors actually improved the market overall by demonstrating the enforceability of contracts. In fact, they argued that creditors faced too many hurdles in collecting against countries after receiving favorable judgments in support of claims.

The Chinese operations of Alcatel, a global communications solution provider based in France, were faced with strong local competition and a difficult market. It remained unclear how Alcatel would be able to recover growth in the Chinese market. Initiatives were underway to increase focus on services over equipment, to increase Chinese research and development presence, and to merge with U.S. competitor Lucent.

In July 2005, China revalued its currency by 2.1% and adjusted its exchange rate regime toward a more market-based system. Esquel Group, a family-run, privately held textiles firm specializing in high-quality cotton shirts with its most significant manufacturing base located in China, was among those companies confronted with the challenge of addressing the revaluation of the yuan and the possibility of future appreciation. Provides a brief overview of China's textile industry and background on Esquel Group.

With its $3 billion investment in Chinese state bank China Construction Bank, Bank of America--the second U.S. bank behind Citigroup in terms of assets and market capitalization--was one of several foreign banks directly participating in China's banking sector reform. Banking sector reform was considered by some analysts to be an important complement to capital account liberalization and further changes to China's exchange rate regime.

In July 2005, China revalued its currency by 2.1% and adjusted its exchange rate regime toward a more market-based system. ABB, a global power and automation technologies company based out of Switzerland with operations in China, was among those companies confronted with the challenge of addressing the revaluation of the yuan and the possibility of future appreciation. Provides background on ABB's activities in China as well as incentives provided by Chinese officials for multinational corporations to move inland.

On July 21, 2005 China revalued its decade-long quasi-fixed exchange rate of approximately 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar by 2.1% to 8.11% and, at the same time, introduced a more market-based exchange rate system. Many analysts and economists were disappointed with what they considered too small a change and called for more flexibility in the U.S. dollar-yuan exchange rate. Provides a timeline of further changes relevant to the Chinese renminbi.

On July 21, 2005 China revalued its decade-long quasi-fixed exchange rate of approximately 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar by 2.1% to 8.11% and, at the same time, introduced a more market-based exchange rate system. Many analysts and economists were disappointed with what they considered too small a change and called for more flexibility in the U.S. dollar/yuan exchange rate. Modification to China's exchange rate regime had been eagerly anticipated and much debated in the preceding months as China's trade surplus against the United States reached record highs and as friction intensified with Europe and Japan. Also, analysts argued that the tightly managed exchange rate put a strain on China's own economy. Not only was the exchange rate expensive to sustain, but it contributed to--as well as limited China's flexibility in responding to--a potentially overheating economy. Although China's extensive controls on the movement of capital into the country helped to counteract some inflationary pressure, controls were becoming more porous as China increasingly integrated with the world economy. It remained to be seen what China would ultimately choose to do with its exchange rate regime.

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Describes Ireland's transformation from one of Europe's poorest countries to one of its richest in just 10 years, earning it the title Celtic Tiger. The spectacular story of growth and recovery is attributed, in large part, to foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from the United Sates. The government of Ireland has continually nurtured the climate for investment and through its investment promotion arm, Ireland Development Authority (IDA), has aggressively sought investment projects. Despite the apparent miracle, some question the FDI-focused policy and special incentives given. Their skepticism stems largely from the fact that Ireland's indigenous industry has remained on the periphery of this transformation, with limited linkages to the foreign sector. Offers an opportunity to examine the debate surrounding FDI. Was FDI the key ingredient in Ireland's success? What does it take for a country to attract FDI? Did government agencies, specifically IDA, play a role in the Irish success story? Also, analyzes other causes of growth--namely, Ireland's entry into the European Union and subsequent larger market access, as well as a sound macroeconomic policy.

Investors and policymakers throughout the world were confronted with the risk of painful economic consequences arising from the large U.S. current account deficit. In 2007, the U.S. current account deficit was $731 billion, equivalent to 5.3% of GDP. The implications of the deficit were debated with intensity. At one extreme, it was argued that large deficits would eventually resolve themselves smoothly, even if they persisted for many more years. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was among those expecting a "benign resolution to the U.S. current account imbalance." Other analysts, such as economists at the World Bank, believed the large deficits raised the risk of a sharp and disorderly fall of the dollar and that necessary macroeconomic adjustment could be painful, for the United States as well as for the rest of the world. The Financial Times asked: "How long will foreigners be prepared to make such generous 'gifts' to the US?" In this environment, Berkshire Hathaway, run by legendary investor Warren Buffett, postulated that current account imbalances would lead to "some chaotic markets in which currency adjustments play a part" and announced to shareholders a plan to increase investment in overseas companies to protect against this risk. It remained to be seen what the short- and long-term implications of the current account deficit would ultimately yield.