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By 2018 it was the largest insurance company in China. The case charts the development of the company and how it diversified across financial services. In particular, it talks about its strategic transformation, which included attracting foreign employees and encouraging diversity. A key pillar in the strategic transformation was Ping An Technology, a division of the Group created in 2008 that would develop its technology capabilities. This division was critical to later enabling Ping An to develop into an ecosystem player across five segments. Ping An Technology had three core functions - including data, incubating new businesses and new products. Its immediate goal was to align the Group's different IT systems, reduce bureaucracy and increase efficiency. Harnessing the latest technologies, Ping An would operate as a 'human being' with a brain formed of AI, its body of cloud computing, and a nerve, arterial and vein network of blockchain. The case then charts the rise of the Technology division and its ambition to become a global technology ecosystem player. It looks at the core technologies that the division developed including facial and voiceprint recognition and medical imaging and their applications to different parts of the ecosystem. The final part of the case looks at the five ecosytems - finance, healthcare, automobile, real estate, and smart city and Ping An's collaborations and offerings. The case closes with Ma reflecting on the 15 years of the transformation but questioning whether Ping An's technology leadership can continue given the challenges of competitors Alibaba and Tencent in financial services and Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent in smart city solutions. Ping An was also mainly a domestic player but served other parts of Asia, Ma questions what it will take for the Gorup to become a global player.

This case puts participants in the shoes of the directors of Barry Callebaut (BC), a cocoa-sourcing and chocolate manufacturing company. Chairman Andreas Jacobs is passionate about cocoa sustainability in West Africa - ensuring the cocoa crop (endangered by poor farming and climate change) and the farmers who grow it will survive and thrive. However, in response to a falling share price, the BC board has shifted strategy to achieve cost leadership. Moreover, customers have been unwilling to pay a premium for sustainable cocoa beans. Given the scale of the problem, the company cannot 'go it alone'. Nonetheless, when the CEO steps down in 2008, Jacobs sees an opportunity for BC to embrace sustainability and urges the board to go beyond goodwill gestures - like its earlier building of schools in Ivory Coast - and take "real action". Should the board follow his lead? What would "real action" mean?

Supplement to case IN1598 This case puts participants in the shoes of the directors of Barry Callebaut (BC), a cocoa-sourcing and chocolate manufacturing company. Chairman Andreas Jacobs is passionate about cocoa sustainability in West Africa - ensuring the cocoa crop (endangered by poor farming and climate change) and the farmers who grow it will survive and thrive. However, in response to a falling share price, the BC board has shifted strategy to achieve cost leadership. Moreover, customers have been unwilling to pay a premium for sustainable cocoa beans. Given the scale of the problem, the company cannot 'go it alone'. Nonetheless, when the CEO steps down in 2008, Jacobs sees an opportunity for BC to embrace sustainability and urges the board to go beyond goodwill gestures - like its earlier building of schools in Ivory Coast - and take "real action". Should the board follow his lead? What would "real action" mean?

The case follows Mina Radharkrishnan's career as a product manager and product executive in various digital environments. She launches her own start-up in 2016 and reflects on the lessons she has primarily learned at Uber, and earlier on at Google, Goldman Sachs, and ModCloth. Beyond leveraging technology to the benefit of potential customers, Mina would like to use her experience to build a team of product managers, facilitate collaboration between different stakeholders, and set priorities accordingly. The discussion explores the challenges that product managers and executives typically face and possible solutions.

The case explores the journey taken by GE, at the instigation of Jeff Immelt in 2008, towards transforming itself from a global industrial giant to becoming an Industry 4.0 leader, by harnessing the nascent promise of the Industrial Internet of Things. The case illustrates the different initiatives launched including: 1. Fastworks - lean methodology including design thinking and agile-lite approach to creating new products. 2. Business analytics and sensors for products. 3. Creation of GE Digital in San Ramon, combining analytics with a platform - Predix - and working under full agile methodology. 4. 2015 - introduction of Chief Digital Officers in each industrial vertical reporting to Bill Ruh at GE Digital. 5. Digital Foundries - to help GE customers with their digital transformations. Immelt had invested more than $4 billion into GE's digital transformation. The case uses examples to illustrate the transformation and the challenges GE faced. Challenges included: the initial decision to create a separate division rather than embedding digital into the verticals upfront, culture change, different skill sets and time horizons, different recruitment and remuneration practices, and communication strategies. During the transformation, Immelt retired early due to falling stock value and what the market judged as previous bad decisions. He was replaced by John Flannery, a GE veteran, charged with overhauling GE by focusing on financials and spinning off parts of GE. Flannery announced he was supportive of GE Digital and the changes, but it was clear that the focus was on the industrial verticals. The markets were unhappy with the speed of progress under Flannery and a year later, he was also replaced. This time by Larry Culp, a GE-outsider. The case ends in 2019 with Culp's announcement that GE Digital, the digital 'home' of GE was to become a separate enterprise, although wholly-owned by GE.

The case charts the evolution of NVIDIA, the market leading producer of graphics processing units (GPU), from its beginnings to becoming a leader at the forefront of artificial intelligence (AI) development. Founded in 1993, the company designed processors for gaming, professional visualization, data centers and automotive markets. In 2019, NVIDIA's vision was to be at the forefront of the virtual reality (VR), artificial intelligence and deep learning arenas. Though the company had an impressive growth rate, there were increasing competitive threats against NVIDIA's dominance in deep learning. The case ends by asking whether NVIDIA can retain its leading position and what it has to do to sustain it.

This case illustrates the challenges for a non-digital player adjusting to digital disruption in the travel and tourism industry. The rise and fall of Kuoni illustrates the 'boiling frog' syndrome - i.e., while threats to its business multiplied, there was no 'wake up' moment where managers made decisive changes before it was too late. More generally, the case considers the challenges of digital disruption: leading transformation and change-management skillsets, and the mindset/culture required to embrace new technology. By identifying what Kuoni did and did not do, students understand what it takes to transform into an agile organisation by leveraging digital trends and technologies.

This case series charts the evolution of the hostile battle for Allergan and its ultimate sale to a white knight, Actavis. David Pyott had been the CEO of Allergan since January 1998; only the third CEO in the company's 60-year-plus history. Allergan was primarily known for Botox, the aesthetic anti-wrinkle product, but the company, which had started out in eye care, had developed Botox into a US$2 billion multipurpose drug. By 2014 the company, which enjoyed double-digit growth, had over 11,000 employees, sold its products in 100 countries and had 40 direct-selling subsidiaries. The business mix included eye care, neurosciences, medical aesthetics, medical dermatology, breast aesthetics and urologics. R&D was the backbone of the company and it had strong cash reserves. In April 2014 it came as a shock to Pyott and the Allergan board to learn that that pharma company Valeant, in partnership with Pershing Square Capital Management, had announced its intention to make a hostile takeover of Allergan. The ensuing battle was hostile, attracting media interest, hostile and supportive stories in the papers, and 'games' to force Allergan into negotiating a sale. Tricks included hacking emails in an attempt to find out information on the fight team's strategy and moves. Pyott and the board had managed to drive up the share price over several months in their attempt to keep Allergan independent. In November 2014, a Californian judge accepted Valeant/Pershing Square's demand that shareholders should be allowed to vote on its bid. Case A follows the battle from the initial announcement to the court judgement. Case B then illustrates what happened next. Pyott and the 'fight' team realised that they were not able to keep Allergan independent and looked for a white knight to make a higher bid for the company. They successfully identified and negotiated with Actavis, a fellow pharma company. The sale was announced later in November. While Allergan no longer remained an independent

This case series charts the evolution of the hostile battle for Allergan and its ultimate sale to a white knight, Actavis. David Pyott had been the CEO of Allergan since January 1998; only the third CEO in the company's 60-year-plus history. Allergan was primarily known for Botox, the aesthetic anti-wrinkle product, but the company, which had started out in eye care, had developed Botox into a US$2 billion multipurpose drug. By 2014 the company, which enjoyed double-digit growth, had over 11,000 employees, sold its products in 100 countries and had 40 direct-selling subsidiaries. The business mix included eye care, neurosciences, medical aesthetics, medical dermatology, breast aesthetics and urologics. R&D was the backbone of the company and it had strong cash reserves. In April 2014 it came as a shock to Pyott and the Allergan board to learn that that pharma company Valeant, in partnership with Pershing Square Capital Management, had announced its intention to make a hostile takeover of Allergan. The ensuing battle was hostile, attracting media interest, hostile and supportive stories in the papers, and 'games' to force Allergan into negotiating a sale. Tricks included hacking emails in an attempt to find out information on the fight team's strategy and moves. Pyott and the board had managed to drive up the share price over several months in their attempt to keep Allergan independent. In November 2014, a Californian judge accepted Valeant/Pershing Square's demand that shareholders should be allowed to vote on its bid. Case A follows the battle from the initial announcement to the court judgement. Case B then illustrates what happened next. Pyott and the 'fight' team realised that they were not able to keep Allergan independent and looked for a white knight to make a higher bid for the company. They successfully identified and negotiated with Actavis, a fellow pharma company. The sale was announced later in November. While Allergan no longer remained an independent

Supplement to case LBS109. This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'

Supplement to case LBS109. This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'

This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'

Longfor, a real estate company in China, treats every customer as an individual with distinctive tastes, preferences and needs; the homes it designs emphasize aesthetics, comfort, landscaping and lifestyle in a holistic way. Likewise, its organizational culture emphasizes equality and professionalism in a country where hierarchy and deference to authority are the norm. Its approach to HR (recruitment, training, evaluation, compensation, role-modeling) is completely at odds with common practice in China. The case asks: Is it possible to succeed in business with an organizational culture that is alien to the society in which the company operates? How can emotional capital be generated and embedded in a company to facilitate strategic innovation?

UEFA is considering how best to use the new technologies of the social era to improve fans' experience with football in Europe. The case describes the key challenges facing UEFA and raises the issue of how to introduce change in a successful organisation.

This case describes how IKEA's distinctive strategy was formed over a period of about 30 years (late 1940s to late 1970s). It describes how the various elements of its strategy were created gradually, with the help of many people other than the founder Kamprad, and how these elements were ultimately integrated with each other thanks to the creation of IKEA's organizational culture that came much later.

The case examines the downward spiral of Nokia, the mobile technology giant that once conquered the world, seen from the perspective of 'insiders' - based on interviews with Nokia executives at top and middle management level. They describe the emotional undercurrents of the innovation process that caused temporal myopia - an excessive focus on short-term innovation at the expense of longer-term more beneficial activities. Nokia's once-stellar performance was undermined by misaligned collective fear: top managers were afraid of competition from rival products, while middle managers were afraid of their bosses and even their peers. It was their reluctance to share negative information with top managers - who thus remained overly optimistic about the organisation's capabilities - that generated inaccurate feedback and poorly adapted organizational responses that led to the company's downfall. The case covers the period from the early 2000s to 2010, with a focus on 2007 (the introduction of the iPhone) to 2010, when the CEO left.

In January 2013, Irish Tour Professional Golfer, Paul McGinley was named as Captain of Team Europe for the 2014 Ryder Cup in Gleneagles, Scotland. Across his career, McGinley had both played himself in the Ryder Cup as well as acted as Vice Captain in two successful tournaments for the Team Europe. Being the Captain, however, was a different game. This case traces McGinley's team strategy and demonstrates his leadership as he moulded 12 players from different European countries together into an effective team, in only a few days. He faced numerous challenges including diverse European nationalities, golf being an individual rather than a team sport, that he would only know who was on his team a few weeks before the Ryder Cup, and then that the players would only be 'together' to train four days before the actual tournament began. As well as these, Team Europe were the favourites and would be playing in Europe. McGinley knew that wasn't an easy position to play from, particularly when the US were fielding a very strong team that year. Expectations were running high. Even during the competition, there were upheavals that McGinley had to deal with.

This case traces the rise and rise of Amazon.com, the second company after Apple to hit a trillion dollar market cap. The growth of Amazon is described, from its origins back in 1995 through to 2016. The case intentionally provides a lot of detail on specific new products and services created over this twenty year period, and how many of these were highly risky bets, and some were failures. For example: there is a discussion of how Amazon survived the original dotcom bubble bursting by deliberately reducing investment and showing a profit for the first time; the origins of Amazon Prime, Amazon marketplace, the Kindle, Amazon Web Services, and Amazon video are all described with enough detail for students to ask, why did they do this? What was the bigger purpose behind these moves? The case also talks about Amazon's management principles and organization culture. For example, one of Bezos's guiding principles was to "obsess over customers" - meaning always seeking out ways to improve the quality of their buying experience and offering additional services and products to meet their evolving needs. There is also a discussion of the "always day one" culture, the "willingness to be misunderstood" and the style of leadership Bezos exhibits.

This is part of a case series. As the Alps disappeared into the darkness through NayaMed's window, the General Manager Aarnav Sendutta considered how to grow his fledgling unit. It was February 2014, and NayaMed, a unit of medical device giant, Medtronic, was just over two years old. It was formed to distribute Medtronic's economy range of heart pacemakers and defibrillators, with regional sales and online technical support. Aarnav was facing two key issues. The first was the perception from Medtronic sales reps that NayaMed would cannibalise their offering. The second issue was how to grow the unit, which currently operated from its Lausanne base in Switzerland, targeting only Italy, Germany and Sweden. The business had grown but was still very small, generating US $4 million in its second year of existence. Aarnav's passion for the NayaMed business was clear, the justification for NayaMed made good business sense, but attempts to grow it were being constrained by organisational issues within the parent company, Medtronic. What could they do?

Supplement to case LBS168