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In the summer of 2006, Nike announced a major corporate reorganization that would shift the company's focus to a category-driven approach. The six major business categories were running, men's training, basketball, soccer, women's fitness, and sportswear. For years, Nike had organized its business around footwear, apparel, and equipment. Integration between these three business units was inconsistent at best. The goal of the reorganization was to take a more consumer-oriented approach to the market to give customers holistic collections of everything they want and need in a particular sports category. This would require the organization to break down its product-oriented silos and collaborate on a more formal, ongoing basis. The reorganization also reflected a change in Nike's corporate strategy. The elevation of women's fitness to a major focus for the company was a substantial victory for the team that had been fighting for the increased prominence of this market segment for years. Darcy Winslow, general manager of Nike's global women's fitness business, and a team of individuals across the company working across traditional boundaries within Nike's complex, matrixed organization to achieve the required level of cross-business integration to deliver cohesive collections of footwear, apparel, and equipment to the women's market. Focuses on Winslow and her team as they tackled challenges related to product development, operations management, organization structure, reporting relationships, change management, and stakeholder buy-in.

In October 2005, in an auditorium filled to capacity in Bentonville, Arkansas, Lee Scott, Wal-Mart's president and CEO, made the first speech in the history of Wal-Mart to be broadcast to the company's 1.6 million associates (employees) in all of its 6,000+ stores worldwide and shared with its 60,000+ suppliers. Scott announced that Wal-Mart was launching a sweeping business sustainability strategy to dramatically reduce the company's impact on the global environment and thus become "the most competitive and innovative company in the world." He argued that, "Being a good steward of the environment and being profitable are not mutually exclusive. They are one and the same." He also committed Wal-Mart to three aspirational goals: "To be supplied 100 percent by renewable energy; to create zero waste; and to sell products that sustain our resources and the environment." Against this backdrop, the case introduces Andrew Ruben, vice president of corporate strategy and business sustainability, and Tyler Elm, senior director of the same group. Ruben and Elm, who were chosen by Scott to lead the sustainability strategy, recognized that they needed to keep environmental improvement tightly coupled with business value and profitability for the strategy to succeed. The case describes Wal-Mart's efforts to accomplish this, focusing on three of the company's primary focus areas (seafood, electronics, and textiles) and their effect on the company's operations, supplier relationships, and results. It also explores how Wal-Mart is measuring and communicating its ideas about sustainability to its suppliers, associates, customers, and the public.

PacifiCare's African American Health Solutions (AAHS) focused on improving the health outcomes of African Americans by providing culturally sensitive health education, health improvement opportunities, and access to high-quality health care services. By early 2006, approximately two years after the program's inception, the initiative had made significant headway in its two primary markets of Dallas and Los Angeles. In the new year, however, AAHS would face new challenges. Limited information was captured and tracked regarding the program's potential effect on the level of risk in the company's portfolio, and little was known about the profitability of the target community. Also, was AAHS making a positive contribution to the company? Finally, competition for African Americans' business was intensifying among health insurance providers. In 2006, AAHS had to define its purpose more clearly in the face of growing competition. The initiative also needed to decide on a customer acquisition approach. Was it really a goodwill program designed primarily to educate and inform African Americans? Or, was AAHS a powerful acquisition tool that should be integrated more directly into PacifiCare's mainstream customer acquisition strategy?

In late October 2003, Randy Scott and the Genomic Health team had just received the results of Genomic Health's first pivotal trial. The company's product, Oncotype DX, a first-of-its-kind genomic assay that quantified the likelihood of breast cancer recurrence, had exceeded the standard measures of patient age, tumor size, and tumor grade in predicting recurrence outcomes. The study results would be presented at the 2003 San Antonio Breast Cancer Symposium in December and published in the New England Journal of Medicine in December 2004. Scott and his team now faced the challenge of determining how and when to launch this groundbreaking product. The team was eager to get the product to market as quickly as possible. However, extensive market research performed earlier in the year reveals that it had less than 10% awareness in the physician community and even less among consumers. When asked about what factors would influence their adoption, physicians overwhelmingly cited clinical validation studies--and lots of them. Many skeptics within the oncology field felt that the legitimate use of genomics in making treatment decisions was still 10 to 20 years in the future.

By the mid-2000s, no segment of the $180 billion global medical device industry was as dynamic as the market for drug eluting stents (DESs). In the United States, which accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total DES market, only two companies had regulatory approval to sell the small devices: Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific. In combination, these two organizations expected 2005 DES sales of approximately $5.5 billion--an increase of 36% from 2004. Forecasts called for the segment to exceed $7 billion by 2008. Driven in part by its size, the DES market was among the most competitive and challenging sectors in the medical device industry. The competitive landscape was marked by intense rivalries and plagued by fierce litigation over intellectual property. Yet, it was also characterized by complex intercompany partnerships, collaboration, and licensing deals. Although DESs had been shown to significantly reduce restenosis rates, new safety concerns were emerging related to the development of life threatening blood clots linked to DESs.

An abstract is not available for this product.

When India regained its independence in 1947, the country's political, social, and economic fate was in its own hands for the first time in almost 90 years. The country embarked on a journey to establish a democracy and representative government, define a plan for economic development, and build a society within which its large, diverse, and fragmented population could prosper. More than five decades later, however, opinions differed as to whether or not India had realized the greater triumphs and achievements which Nehru anticipated. With 17% of the world's population, India generated only 2% of global GDP. Per capita income was less than $3,000 per year, with 25% of the country's one billion people living below the poverty line. India needed to sustain double-digit annual GDP growth, but realized only 6.9% growth for fiscal 2004/2005. Yet, the country had become the world's 12th largest economy (and the 3rd largest in Asia behind Japan and China). India had made significant progress toward establishing a competitive position in the global economy. Its services sector had demonstrated the country's capacity to be a pioneer. Would India capitalize on this success by addressing obstacles to growth?

In the most basic sense, a market failure occurs whenever the production or allocation of goods or services by a market is suboptimal. On one hand, this can mean that the output, price, or distribution of products is either inefficient in the sense that the overall level of economic value or social welfare could be increased. On the other hand, it can mean that the resulting allocation is inequitable or inconsistent with values of justice or fairness. From a public policy perspective, such failures are of concern because the public interest or overall social welfare is lower than it could be if the market were functioning more efficiently. Traditionally, societies have looked to government intervention to correct these market failures. Sometimes, charitable organizations got involved. However, private businesses were rarely called upon (or expected) to respond to breakdowns in efficient market operations by modifying their behaviors in a free-market system. However, a new class of actors has recently gained recognition. These individuals often found and manage organizations drawing on innovative ideas, using entrepreneurial skills, and leveraging market principles, but with one important difference from traditional entrepreneurs: they prioritize social impact over the creation of wealth. These "social entrepreneurs" have discovered and implemented new ways of creating social and environmental value by serving the needs of poor, disadvantaged, and neglected communities. Examines the insights, aspirations, and impact of three leading social entrepreneurs, their organizations, and their efforts to correct a diverse array of classical market failures.

In August 2002, the FDA had notified the executive steering committee for Abbott Laboratories' new rheumatoid arthritis drug to expect approval significantly ahead of schedule. If everything went smoothly, the compound D2E7 (brand name HUMIRA) would be approved for sale in the United States before the end of the year. This gave Abbott and its HUMIRA brand team no more than four months to complete preparations for the product's launch. Abbott acquired D2E7, a biologic disease-modifying antirheumatic drug, when the company purchased Knoll Pharmaceuticals in March 2001. With a significant head start and combined 2002 sales anticipated to exceed $2 billion, Enbrel (from Immunex, later acquired by Amgen) and Remicade (from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Centocor) would provide HUMIRA with tough competition. Yet, with the rheumatoid arthritis market expected to grow to over $7.5 billion by 2008, there was still a significant opportunity for Abbott. The executive steering committee knew that the HUMIRA team would have to orchestrate every aspect of the product's global launch carefully to quickly and effectively establish HUMIRA in this challenging market.

An abstract is not available for this product.

Barbara Ladao was the chief executive officer of the Neighborhood Health Clinic (NHC), a nonprofit health center located in an ethnically diverse, underserved, and complicated community. At the time, the interpersonal dynamics within the clinic had started to interfere with the ability of Ladao's staff to work effectively and efficiently together. Worse yet, she was concerned that the dysfunctional behavior (which had created a racial divide among employees) was starting to affect the clinic's patients, and ultimately could impact NHC's ability to continue expanding, raising funds, and meeting the needs of the community on a long-term basis. The "A" case explores the history, demographics, and tensions in the external environment and the impact they have on clinic operations (e.g., hiring, staff management, interpersonal relations). The "B" case evaluates specific challenges within the clinic related to language, work ethic, and discipline. The "C" case describes what course of action Ladao and her team took, the strengths of their approach, and the challenges/opportunities that still required attention at NHC.

In August 2002, the FDA had notified the executive steering committee for Abbott Laboratories' new rheumatoid arthritis drug to expect approval significantly ahead of schedule. If everything went smoothly, the compound D2E7 (brand name HUMIRA) would be approved for sale in the United States before the end of the year. This gave Abbott and its HUMIRA brand team no more than four months to complete preparations for the product's launch. Abbott acquired D2E7, a biologic disease-modifying antirheumatic drug, when the company purchased Knoll Pharmaceuticals in March 2001. With a significant head start and combined 2002 sales anticipated to exceed $2 billion, Enbrel (from Immunex, later acquired by Amgen) and Remicade (from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Centocor) would provide HUMIRA with tough competition. Yet, with the rheumatoid arthritis market expected to grow to over $7.5 billion by 2008, there was still a significant opportunity for Abbott. The executive steering committee knew that the HUMIRA team would have to orchestrate every aspect of the product's global launch carefully to quickly and effectively establish HUMIRA in this challenging market.

By the mid-1980s, it was clear that not all transplant centers in the growing organ transplantation market were able to achieve and sustain the same levels of quality and high rates of transplant procedure success. Similarly, significant variation had emerged in the cost of these complex and expensive procedures. Within this dynamic environment, United Resource Networks (URN) was founded in 1989. The express purpose of this new organization was to manage variation in the transplantation process to enable the delivery of higher quality, lower cost, more predictable results to patients, employers, and health insurers. The company would accomplish this by establishing a virtual network of transplant centers that were made available to its customers through preferred contracting arrangements. By 2004, URN had built the largest transplantation network in the United States, growing at an average annual rate of 40% over the last 10 years. With 4,000 customers and 44,000,000 covered lives, the network managed approximately 10% of the nation's organ transplants each year. Explores the URN business model as an example of the innovative strategies being used by health plans to carefully manage complex medical conditions and control the risks associated with expensive procedures, such as organ transplants.

China is one of the oldest continuous civilizations in the world, with organized society existing for more than 10,000 years. Although the country has a complex and dynamic past, the scope and pace of change in China within the past 25 years have been unprecedented in the nation's long history. Since 1979, when China's reform era began, the country reduced the number of its citizens living in poverty by 200 million and achieved a sixfold increase in per capita income. China accounted for nearly 4% of the worldwide gross domestic product in 2004 and had become the sixth-largest economy and the leading recipient of foreign direct investment. While these results are impressive, this is only the beginning for China. As the most populous nation in the world, China needs to create 100 million new jobs by 2013 and quadruple its GDP by 2020 to achieve and sustain a reasonable standard of living for its people. To do so, the country must further open itself to foreign investment, trade, and the market-oriented ideas that will stimulate domestic productivity and build its competitiveness as a nation. As Michael Porter asserts, "National prosperity is created, not inherited. It does not grow out of a country's natural endowments, its labor pool, its interest rates, or its currency value. A nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade." Over the last two and a half decades, China has proven its ability to capitalize on its innate advantages and make meaningful reforms. Whether the country can build on these successes to create a lasting competitive advantage under competition remains to be seen.

This note provides an overview of China's IT industry, using Michael's Porter's "Diamond of National Advantage" framework. Specifically, it assesses how China uses its factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and the context for firm strategy, structure, and rivalry to achieve a competitive position in IT. The note was developed as a companion to "The Competitive Advantage of China" (GSB No. IB-57), which provides a more detailed analysis of China's political, economic, and social history, as well as an evaluation of the country's national competitiveness using the Porter framework.

In January 2003, West Marine (the nation's largest boating supply retailer) was on the verge of acquiring its biggest competitor, BoatU.S. Several years earlier, the company had acquired E&B Marine, another boating supply company of a similar size. However, that transaction proved to be too much for the organization to bear. Having nearly doubled its number of stores overnight, West Marine's systems and processes, as well as the experience level of its management team, could not withstand the rapid growth. West Marine's supply chain was especially hard-hit: The company was unable to keep all 72 West Marine and 63 E&B Marine stores amply stocked during the critical peak season. Following the E&B Marine transaction, the company charted a new course, bringing in a deeply experienced management team, initiating a significant cultural change, and repairing systems and processes across the company. On the eve of another major acquisition, West Marine was proud of all that the company had accomplished through its collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment program, particularly in the supply chain arena. As the company prepared to ramp up its growth engine again on its way to becoming a $1 billion business, West Marine's executive team wondered what "soft spots" might be discovered within its new and improved infrastructure.

In the spring of 1999, Matrix Semiconductor was a young start-up on the verge of what the founders considered to be a major technological breakthrough. For more than a year, the company had focused almost exclusively on the invention of its technology 3-D semiconductor memory chips that would offer acceptable performance at selling prices significantly lower than competitive and substitute products available on the market. As the company neared the completion of its first prototype, the founders recognized the need to create a more holistic business strategy for the organization. Director of Marketing Dan Steere had recently joined the Matrix team. In his new role, he was asked to help define the practical parameters of a 3-D product, choose which markets to pursue, and decide on an appropriate business model for the company. Through an evaluation of the alternatives available to the company, the case explores the importance of strategy and strategic decision making, even in the early phases of a company. Also highlights some of the success factors and pitfalls young companies must address as they prepare to begin focusing on the development of a legitimate new business.

In the spring of 1999, Matrix Semiconductor was a young start-up on the verge of what the founders considered to be a major technological breakthrough. For more than a year, the company had focused almost exclusively on the invention of its technology: 3/4 3-D semiconductor memory chips that would offer acceptable performance at lower prices. As the company neared the completion of its first prototype, the founders needed to create a more holistic business strategy for the organization. Dan Steere recently joined the Matrix team, and in his new role as director of marketing, was asked to help define the practical parameters of a 3-D product, choose what markets to pursue, and decide on an appropriate business model for the company (drawing on input from the rest of the Matrix team). Evaluates the alternatives available to the company, exploring the importance of strategy and strategic decision making. Also highlights some of the success factors and pitfalls young companies must address as they prepare to stop focusing solely on the definition of a business opportunity and begin focusing on the development of a legitimate new business.

The advances of the Internet has enabled some companies to dematerialize their products so that digital versions can be personalized and shipped to customers without the usual logistics costs and delays. Once this is achieved, then the opportunities to provide customers with additional services, or to transform from a product-based to a service-based company, could be tremendous. Traces the experience of Intuit in pursuing its digital channel to sell and distribute its products, the challenges faced in making this migration while managing the physical channel, and the new service opportunities that the company created once the digital channel was in place.