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For three years after its spin off from Lucent in late 2000, Avaya struggled with how best to structure its go-to-market organization. Chronicles Avaya's repeated attempts to create an effective go-to-market structure. Ends in late 2003, when Don Peterson, the CEO, must choose between four final options.

Details the challenges facing OuterBay in pursuing an OEM deal with a very large and well-established technology company, EMC. Describes both companies' businesses, the history of their relationship, and the initial discussion surrounding an OEM deal. Looks at the particular issues that surfaced in the ensuing negotiation, including revenue sharing, term limits, exclusivity, and account control. Negotiations dragged on over several months, with the two companies exchanging 14 versions of the letter of intent. OuterBay's CEO, Michael Howard, wonders whether the deal will make or break the company.

Silver Lake Partners led a syndicate that took Seagate private in 2000. Crystal Decisions was an underperforming software subsidiary of Seagate and had been an immaterial part of Seagate. Silver Lake assigned $95 million (of the $1.1 billion in equity paid for Seagate) to Crystal Decisions. Chronicles the turnaround of Crystal Decisions and the eventual harvest of the company in 2003. The Silver Lake syndicate must consider whether to sell the company to Business Objects or pursue an IPO.

The case offers an overview of a startup that has chosen to sell its solutions entirely through indirect channels-currently through value-added resellers (VARs) and, in the future, through both VARs and systems integrators (SIs). In the case, we discuss why the company chose a channel strategy, how management devised its marketing, product development, and pricing scheme for channel selling, the steps the company undertook to build its VAR network, and the costs of building such a channel. We also touch on how the company motivates, supports, and evaluates this network. We discuss issues such as pricing and bundling, dealing with under-performing VARs, and fundraising from a venture community that traditionally shuns companies that sell indirectly.

In October 1998, VERITAS and Seagate's Network Storage and Management Group, which both sold data storage management software, agreed to merge. In terms of employee size and revenues, it was nearly a merger of equals. Until regulatory approval for the merger was granted from the government under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, the two companies could share only public information, initially limiting due diligence. The companies received HSR approval on December 4, 1998. It had been clear from public information that the two companies offered different products, sold through different channels of distribution, and captured two different customer segments of the market. After all, these differences were regarded as complements and the major justification behind the merger. However, what was not so apparent until HSR approval was the clash in sales force cultures. Paul Sallaberry, an executive at pre-merger VERITAS, assumed the role of executive vice-president of worldwide sales and marketing after the merger. Sallaberry needed to design a sales force integration plan that would take the company to billions of dollars in sales within the next few years without sacrificing any short-term sales momentum. To do so, he had to resolve the issues at hand: culture clashes, disparate compensation structures, overlapping territories, and redundant management positions.

Peter Kelly became CEO of Med-Mart, a home health supply company, shortly after his search fund acquired it in 1993. Unfortunately, at the time of purchase, Med-Mart's sales growth, inventories, and receivables had been grossly overstated, leading to a precarious financial situation once these errors were discovered after the acquisition was completed. During the summer of 1995, Kelly hired Tim Martin as Med-Mart's vice-president of sales to boost sales and help rescue Med-Mart from financial peril. However, Martin's proposal to increase sales involved refocusing Med-Mart from thousands of products down to just a few high-margin products, eliminating over 80% of current revenues. Kelly was wary of implementing such a drastic plan and knew that success was wholly dependent on the ability of the sales force to increase sales of the few remaining products dramatically. Kelly thought they could reorient the sales force to implement Med-Mart's proposed change in strategy effectively by changing the commission scheme. Kelly's next step was to design this new commission plan, considering the dollar value and timing of commission payments, as well as any thresholds, caps, or ramping of commissions. He wondered how the sales force would react to a compensation revamp and handle selling only one primary product.

Zaplet faces internal challenges following the dramatic change in the economy and the resulting market demand for its product.

Deals with the logistics and incentives at Tong Yang Cement Corp.