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In 1997, building on its earlier success with Tokyo Disneyland, Oriental Land Corp. Japan and the Walt Disney Co. discussed the possibility of a new joint project known as the Tokyo DisneySea Park. Different approaches toward capital budgeting and distinct corporate governance regimes led the two firms to evaluate the project in different ways. Although globalization of the Japanese economy has advanced with astounding speed, management philosophy and capital budgeting techniques still differ significantly among Japanese and American firms. In a joint venture, such differences have a momentous impact on decision-making processes. Illustrates key divergent practices between Japanese and American firms in the realm of corporate governance and finance.

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In 1995, Sumio Abekawa, Daiwa Bank's president, received a letter on July 18 from Toshihide Iguchi, vice-president of the bank's New York branch. In that letter, Iguchi confessed that over the course of 11 years, he lost nearly $1.1 billion (approximately 123 billion yen) through the unauthorized trading of United States Treasury Bonds and had sold securities the bank had in custody to cover losses. Two months later, Daiwa's senior management reported the loss to the Federal Reserve Board of New York (FRB) and the New York State Banking Department. The bank directors faced several questions: Had the bank taken the appropriate steps to comply with U.S. reporting requirements? What was the potential liability of the directors? Would the Japanese bank directors be held liable for violating the law of a foreign country? How could the Japanese Ministry of Finance help?

Tokyo Disneyland was started as a result of a licensing agreement between Walt Disney (WD) of the United States and Oriental Land Corp. (OL) of Japan. The agreement states that WD will receive a license fee of 7% of sales in exchange for providing OL with managerial and technological know-how and assuming small risks in the venture. When WD proposed a second project with OL, OL's senior executives wanted to find a way to make WD a risk-taking partner through investment in the business as a precondition to venturing into the new project. To prepare for the negotiations, OL's executives needed calculations of the project's net present value as seen from WD's standpoint--both in terms of the existing licensing method and one in which WD would share appropriate risks.