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In 1906, C.W. Post had to move his latest breakfast product--corn flakes--from store shelves into cereal bowls nationwide. Post genuinely believed his corn flakes and other breakfast foods would make people well. Through sampling and other innovative sales and marketing techniques, Post convinced consumers and grocers to buy Postum and Grape-Nuts--which generated millions in profits for the Postum Cereal Co. But not Elijah's Manna--the brand name that Post put on his corn flakes boxes when his company introduced the product in 1904. Two years later, it was clearly not selling. To make matters worse, other cereal companies in the burgeoning Battle Creek area where Post's foods were manufactured were cornering the market, in particular, Kelloggs. How was Post going to convince consumers that his corn flakes were better than the rest?

Companies and leaders don't succeed or fail in a vacuum. When it comes to long-term success, the ability to understand and adapt to changing business conditions is at least as important as any particular personality trait or competency. A clear picture of how powerful the Zeitgeist can be emerges from the authors' comprehensive study of the way the business landscape in the United States evolved, decade by decade, throughout the 20th century. Six contextual factors in particular, they found, most affected the prospects for business: the level of government intervention in business, global events, demographics, shifts in social mores, developments in technology, and the strength or weakness of the labor movement. A lack of contextual sensitivity can trip up even the most brilliant executive. No less a luminary than Alfred P. Sloan was relieved of General Motor's day-to-day management in the 1930s because he was unwilling to meet with the new UAW. Conversely, an understanding of the Zeitgeist can play a crucial but unheralded role in business performance. To understand better this connection between business performance and context, the authors studied 1,000 great U.S. business leaders of the 20th century and identified three distinct archetypes: Entrepreneurs, often ahead of their time, overcame dire challenges to build something new. Managers excelled at reading and exploiting the existing Zeitgeist to grow their businesses. Leaders defied context to identify latent potential in businesses others considered mature, stagnant, or in decline. In every decade, all three archetypes were vital. It is the ongoing regeneration of this pattern in the business life cycle that ultimately sustains development and progress.

Describes the challenges facing Jim Hackett, the newly appointed CEO of Anadarko Petroleum, an independent oil and gas exploration company. In addition to strategic and organizational issues, Hackett must address concerns about proper disclosure of the company's oil and gas reserves.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0507A and R0507Z, are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in reprints R0507A and R0507Z are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

From a converted muffler repair shop, Ray Kelner launched RLK Media in 1985, selling its radical audio speakers to affluent connoisseurs for $20,000 a pop. By the 1990s, RLK had grown into a billion-dollar business. But things are no longer going so well, and chairman Keith Harrington lays it all at the feet of CEO Lars Inman. "Your margins have evaporated," he barks. "You're missing your numbers. People aren't buying the old product, and you don't have anything new." But RLK might just have something new: the iVid headset prototype is light-years ahead of the competition. All Ray needs is another 18 months (or so) and $6 million to hire 10 elite software developers and he could put RLK back on the map. Lars considers outsourcing software development to Inova Laboratories in India, which promises to move RLK from prototype to volume manufacturing in 12 months--at a fifth the cost. But Ray is adamant. His group is just too tightly knit. Should Lars outsource R&D anyway? Commenting on this fictional case study in reprints R0507A and R0507Z are Larry Huston, VP for innovation and knowledge at Procter & Gamble; former Xerox chief scientist John Seely Brown and consultant John Hagel III; Claremont Graduate University professor Jean Lipman-Blumen; and Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, an IT services company based in Bangalore, India.

As a newly minted CEO, you may think you finally have the power to set strategy, the authority to make things happen, and full access to the finer points of your business. But if you expect the job to be as simple as that, you're in for an awakening. Even though you bear full responsibility for your company's well-being, you are a few steps removed from many of the factors that drive results. You have more power than anybody else in the corporation, but you need to use it with extreme caution. In their workshops for new CEOs, held at Harvard Business School in Boston, the authors have discovered that nothing-not even running a large business within the company-fully prepares a person to be the chief executive. The seven most common surprises are: You can't run the company. Giving orders is very costly. It is hard to know what is really going on. You are always sending a message. You are not the boss. Pleasing shareholders is not the goal. You are still only human. These surprises carry some important and subtle lessons. First, you must learn to manage organizational context rather than focus on daily operations. Second, you must recognize that your position does not confer the right to lead, nor does it guarantee the loyalty of the organization. Finally, you must remember that you are subject to a host of limitations, even though others might treat you as omnipotent. How well and how quickly you understand, accept, and confront the seven surprises will have a lot to do with your success or failure as a CEO.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For many years, multinational corporations could compete successfully by exploiting scale and scope economies or by taking advantage of imperfections in the world's goods, labor, and capital markets. But these ways of competing are no longer as profitable as they once were. In most industries, multinationals no longer compete primarily with companies whose boundaries are confined to a single nation. Rather, they go head-to-head with a handful of other giants. Against such global competitors, it is hard to sustain an advantage based on traditional economies of scale and scope. MNCs must seek new sources of competitive advantage. Whereas multinationals in the past realized economies of scope principally by utilizing physical assets and exploiting a companywide brand, the new economies of scope are based on the ability of business units, subsidiaries, and functional departments within the company to collaborate successfully by sharing knowledge and jointly developing new products and services. Collaboration can be an MNC's source of competitive advantage because it does not occur automatically--far from it. Indeed, several barriers impede collaboration within complex multiunit organizations. To overcome those barriers, companies will have to develop distinct organizing capabilities that cannot be easily imitated. The authors develop a framework that links managerial action, barriers to interunit collaboration, and value creation in MNCs to help managers understand how collaborative advantage can work. The framework conceptualizes collaboration as a set of management levers that reduce four specific barriers to collaboration, leading in turn to several types of value creation.

From his humble beginnings in China as a teacher's son, a refugee, and later as a salesman, Li provides a lesson in integrity and adaptability. Through hard work, and a reputation for remaining true to his internal moral compass, he was able to build a business empire that includes: banking, construction, real estate, plastics, cellular phones, satellite television, cement production, retail outlets (pharmacies and supermarkets), hotels, domestic transportation (sky train), airports, electric power, steel production, ports, and shipping. Teaching Purpose: To examine leadership.

With the battle for the best and brightest people heating up again, you're most likely out there looking for first-rate talent in the ranks of your competitors. Chances are, you're sold on the idea of recruiting from outside your organization--developing people within the firm takes time and money. But the authors, who have tracked the careers of high-flying CEOs, researchers, software developers, and leading professionals, argue that top performers quickly fade after leaving one company for another. To study this phenomenon in greater detail, the authors analyzed the ups and downs of more than 1,000 star stock analysts, a well-defined group for which there are abundant data. The results were striking. After a star moves, not only does his performance plunge, but so does the effectiveness of the group he joins--and the market value of his new company. Moreover, transplanted stars don't stay with their new organizations for long, despite the astronomical salaries firms pay to lure them from rivals. Most companies that hire stars overlook the fact that an executive's performance is not entirely transferable because his personal competencies inevitably include company-specific skills. When the star leaves the old company for the new, he also leaves behind many of the resources that contributed to his achievements. As a result, he is unable to repeat his performance in another company--at least not until he learns to work the new system, which could take years. The authors conclude that companies should focus on cultivating talent from within and do everything possible to retain the stars they create.

Human beings are driven by reasons and emotions. On the one hand, as rational choice theorists assert, human beings are resourceful and evaluative as they strive to maximize their own interests. An individual's interests can converge or diverge from the interests of the organization. Thus, to bring the resourcefulness of individuals to benefit the organization, control systems must be designed to align the interests of the organization and the individual. On the other hand, it has long been recognized (and reinforced by contemporary research on the human brain) that human beings are also driven by emotions. Emotions can be in accord with rational behavior (e.g., when fear evokes caution in the face of danger, or pride motivates greater effort). But emotions can also be at odds with rational behavior (e.g., when pain avoidance leads to an unwillingness to confront difficult decisions, or shame leads to cover-ups, or hubris leads to excessive optimism). Understanding the importance of both reason and emotion is, thus, critical to designing organizations, control systems, and governance structures that promote desired behaviors. Teaching Purpose: Some model of human nature, implicitly if not explicitly, guides any manager's actions. It is useful for students to be aware of these underlying assumptions and attentive to ways reason and emotion shape their own behavior and those of others around them.

Supplements the (A) case.

CEO Aaron Feuerstein of Malden Mills decided to pay idled workers after a massive fire at his mill in 1995. Focuses on the decisions made post-fire and the rebuilding process and eventual bankruptcy of the company. Also outlines creditors' struggle to decide whether to lend Feuerstein additional funds to enable him to regain control of the company after emerging from bankruptcy.

Describes the acquisition of Nat West by Royal Bank of Scotland. Describes the strategic rationale for the acquisition and the process by which the integration of the two banks was accomplished. The acquisition is remarkable for how successful it was, given the typical high rate of failure of similar acquisitions. Teaching Purpose: To teach about the general lessons of successfully implementing mergers and acquisitions.

When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques from which to choose. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a groundbreaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques employed by 160 companies over 10 years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.

Three managing directors at Peabody Simpson had just returned from a firm-wide recruiting event at Columbia University, which they had covered together, as all were alumni. They were commiserating about having to submit revised forecasts to their division heads by the end of the week. Alec Hastings, head of Global Institutional Securities, wanted an update on year-to-date expense. They sat at their favorite watering hole and discussed the challenge of cutting $600 million out of the operating budget.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Over the past couple of decades, management innovations have pushed companies toward the ideal of the "boundaryless" organization. As a result of these changes, formal reporting structures and detailed work processes have a much diminished role in the way important work is accomplished. Instead, informal networks of employees are increasingly at the forefront, and the general health and "connectivity" of these groups can have a significant impact on strategy execution and organizational effectiveness. Many corporate leaders intuitively understand this, but few spend any real time assessing or supporting informal networks. And because they do not receive adequate resources or executive attention, these groups are often fragmented, and their efforts are often disrupted by management practices or organizational design principles that are biased in favor of task specialization and individual rather than collaborative endeavors. The authors initiated a research program two years ago to determine how organizations can better support work occurring in and through informal networks of employees; they assessed more than 40 networks in 23 organizations. They discovered in all cases that the networks provided strategic and operational benefits by enabling members to collaborate effectively; they also found that managers truly wanting to assist these groups had to overcome six myths about how networks operate. Explains the six myths and why they are harmful; in place of these assumptions, the authors offer reality checks that can be implemented to help networks become more effective.

Supplements NerveWire, Inc.

Supplements NerveWire, Inc.

NerveWire, a management consulting and systems integration provider based in Newton, MA, was closing in on its second anniversary. In the beginning days of NerveWire, the major challenge was recruiting--finding the right people who embodied its values and business mission. Traditional business enterprises were thirsty for a new type of consulting organization, a partner that would help them utilize the Internet not as a marketing tool, but as a tool to re-design their business models, their internal value chains, and their extended industry value chains to drive significant ROI. NerveWire was created for just that purpose. The year 2001 brought some very new and different challenges. In the fall of 2000, the economy in the United States fell off a cliff, and by the beginning of 2001, NerveWire's Fortune 500 clients, by and large, had frozen all spending in major new technology-centric business initiatives. A Day in the Life of Kirk Arnold, Video and A Day in the Life of Malcolm Frank, Video are required with this case.