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ICICI was the first Indian company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This case is set in 1998, when the company had to decide whether to enter the retail credit segment of the Indian financial market. Although the retail credit sector presents attractive growth opportunities, ICICI lacked many of the capabilities needed to succeed in this space and would have to compete against a host of established domestic and foreign banks. Describes how ICICI, under the visionary leadership of K.V. Kamath, has transformed itself, against all odds, from a development financial institution into a commercially competitive organization.

With help from a team of ethnographers and senior organization specialists, authors Mark Maletz and Nitin Nohria recently conducted a unique research project that focused on "whitespace": the large but mostly unoccupied territory in every company where rules are vague, authority is fuzzy, budgets are nonexistent, and strategy is unclear--and where entrepreneurial activity that helps reinvent and renew an organization most often takes place. The researchers shadowed entrepreneurial managers operating in the whitespace and met with top managers about their efforts to oversee whitespace activities. Using examples from the financial services, computer, and e-commerce industries, the authors explain when it's imperative to operate in the whitespace--and when it's wiser to stay in the traditional blackspace. They describe how effective whitespace managers subtly and resourcefully lead successful efforts, and how senior executives nurture whitespace projects by putting aside their traditional planning, organizing, and controlling techniques. Finally, they examine the ultimate issue for any successful whitespace project: should it be moved into the blackspace, kept in the whitespace indefinitely--or, despite its apparent success, killed off? If companies leave this valuable territory to the scattershot whims and talents of individual managers, the authors say, they are likely to miss out on many of the opportunities that come from exploring the next frontier.

Business incubators such as Hotbank, CMGI, and Idealab! are a booming industry. Offering office space, funding, and basic services to start-ups, these organizations have become the hottest way to nurture and grow fledgling businesses. But are incubators a fleeting phenomenon born of an overheated stock market, or are they an important and lasting way of creating value and wealth in the new economy? The authors argue that one type of incubator, called a networked incubator, represents a fundamentally new and enduring organizational model uniquely suited to growing businesses in the Internet economy. Its key distinguishing feature is its ability to give start-ups preferential access to a network of potential partners. Such incubators institutionalize their networking. That doesn't mean incubatees get preferential treatment; it means only that they have built-in access to partnerships that might not have existed without the incubator. Even with this advantage, however, networked incubators can easily follow the road to ruin. To avoid failure, they must create a portfolio of companies and advisers that their incubatees can leverage.

Today's fast-paced economy demands that businesses change or die. But few companies manage corporate transformations as well as they would like. The brutal fact is that about 70% of all change initiatives fail. In this article, authors Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria describe two archetypes--or theories--of corporate transformation that may help executives crack the code of change. Theory E is change based on economic value: shareholder value is the only legitimate measure of success, and change often involves heavy use of economic incentives, layoffs, downsizing, and restructuring. Theory O is change based on organizational capability: the goal is to build and strengthen corporate culture. Most companies focus purely on one theory or the other, or haphazardly use a mix of both, the authors say. Combining E and O is directionally correct, they contend, but it requires a careful, conscious integration plan. Beer and Nohria present the examples of two companies, Scott Paper and Champion International, that used a purely E or purely O strategy to create change--and met with limited levels of success. They contrast those corporate transformations with that of UK-based retailer ASDA, which has successfully embraced the paradox between the opposing theories of change and integrated E and O. The lesson from ASDA? To thrive and adapt in the new economy, companies must make sure the E and O theories of business change are in sync at their own organizations.

The rise of the computer and the increasing importance of intellectual assets have compelled executives to examine the knowledge underlying their businesses and how it is used. Because knowledge management as a conscious practice is so young, however, executives have lacked models to use as guides. To help fill that gap, the authors recently studied knowledge management practices at management consulting firms, health care providers, and computer manufacturers. They found two very different knowledge management strategies in place. In companies that sell relatively standardized products that fill common needs, knowledge is carefully codified and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and used--over and over again--by anyone in the organization. The authors call this the codification strategy. In companies that provide highly customized solutions to unique problems, knowledge is shared mainly through person-to-person contacts; the chief purpose of computers is to help people communicate. They call this the personalization strategy. A company's choice of knowledge management strategy is not arbitrary--it must be driven by the company's competitive strategy. Emphasizing the wrong approach or trying to pursue both can quickly undermine a business. The authors warn that knowledge management should not be isolated in a functional department like HR or IT. They emphasize that the benefits are greatest--to both the company and its customers--when a CEO and other general managers actively choose one of the approaches as a primary strategy.

Describes the conditions leading to the acquisition of Cross and Trecker by Gidding & Lewis.

Supplements the (A) case.

In the 1980s, U.S. business experienced an explosion of new managerial concepts unparalleled in previous decades. Many American managers felt that the emergence of new managerial ideas signaled a rejuvenation of U.S. business. But their thinking doesn't jibe with the facts. American managers did not take charge in the 1980s. Instead, they abdicated their responsibility to a burgeoning industry of management professionals. If business leaders want to reverse this trend, they must reclaim management responsibility--and pragmatism is the place to start. Pragmatic managers are sensitive to their company's context and open to uncertainty. They focus on outcomes and are willing to make do. Pragmatic managers also avoid three common pitfalls, the "let's do it better this time" syndrome and the "flavor of the month" and "let's go for it all" approaches.

Describes the ways in which managers communicate the need to change, specifically the way in which they use vision, crisis, and transition as rhetorical strategies to mobilize change. Also discusses strategies used by those trying to resist change, setting up what may be considered a rhetorical contest that determines whether change is embraced or not.

Describes some of the key principles that managers must follow in order to successfully persuade their organization of their vision for change.

Provides a 7S framework to complement the McKinsey 7S framework. Focuses on some of the critical choices that must be made in implementing change--Strategic Intent, Substance, Scale, Scope, Speed, Sequence, and Style. Overall, the note argues that these choices must be made so that they are coherent and robust.

Describes the strengths and weaknesses of three generic strategies for implementing change--programmatic change, discontinuous change, and emergent change.

Discusses Roger Smith's tenure as CEO of General Motors. Describes his vision for changing General Motors, and how he went about implementing that vision.

Supplements the (A) case. Intended as an in-class handout.

Supplements the (A) case. Intended as an in-class handout.

Supplements the (A) case, emphasizing issues of implementation.

Describes the changes fashioned by Iacocca during his tenure as CEO of the Chrysler Corp. Pays particular attention to the rhetoric he employed in mobilizing change and the actions he took to implement change.

By the early 1990s, Amgen--a pharmaceutical company started little over a decade ago as Applied Molecular Genetics--was within range of becoming a billion-dollar company. With two extremely successful biotechnology drugs on the market, Amgen stood as the largest and most powerful independent company of its type in the world. Top executives in the company viewed long-range planning as an important ingredient in the firm's success; many others--including some of the firm's scientists--were less sure. With Amgen's sales expected to continue to grow rapidly, the firm's long-range planning process would be put to the test. Shows the different, sometimes paradoxical perspectives held within a single, dynamically changing company toward the issue of long-range planning. Students are challenged to synthesize these views into a coherent picture of a firm's growth amid great uncertainty.

Provides the reader with a basic understanding of organizational structure. The first section outlines some of the key tools and criteria that must be taken into account in designing organizational structures. In the second section, some archetypal forms of organizational structure and their strengths and weaknesses are described. Finally, some emerging trends in how organizations are structured are discussed in the last section of this note, supplemented by a brief summary, in timeline format, of the evolution of organizational structure in theory and practice.

1990 Business Week named Appex Corp. the fastest growing high-technology company in the United States. Appex provided management information systems and intercarrier network services to cellular telephone companies. During its rapid growth, the company went through several structural changes. At first, there was essentially no structure and no control systems. The atmosphere at Appex eventually became chaotic. As the new CEO, Shikhar Ghosh realized that Appex needed some structure and bureaucracy. Once control was established, he reasoned, he could begin to break down the structure. Much of the structural change he implemented had advantages and disadvantages in terms of company culture and productivity. In 1991, Appex was acquired by EDS. Appex's challenge now was to work out its own structure in the context of its role as a division of a large, bureaucratic organization.