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Interline Brands, a leading distributor of residential housing maintenance and repair parts and equipment in the U.S., had just held its November 2014 board meeting. The meeting had been productive, but not without some soul searching for both the company's management team and financial sponsors. Was now the right time to start a sale process? In particular, the team wondered whether the capital markets would cooperate and how effectively the management and sponsor teams would execute. Moreover, the company had only been private for two years, and the value creation plan was only halfway through completion. While there was much to be done at Interline, the company had performed well and was gaining momentum. Interline was a rare asset in terms of the scale it had reached. However, there were still unknowns. Would buyers reward Interline with a high valuation multiple that reflected its acceleration in organic growth? Would financing markets remain healthy? Would such a process disrupt Interline's customers and employees?

Partners Group ("PG"), a Swiss based PE manager, initiated a series of strategic shifts and evolved from a predominately fund-of-funds manager into a large, multi-asset class PE firm focused on direct investments. PG was the first PE firm to go public in 2006. A number of large US based private equity firms followed to create a new category of firms; public private equity firms (PPEs). PG's results were superlative (565% since inception total return and 22% annual compounded growth) versus the US based PPEs performance over the same time of (76%) to 18%. PG's multiple was 22x versus their PPE peer group of 8x. PG had the lowest value of AUM yet had the second largest market capitalization behind Blackstone. Why? PG had differing management practices: (i) compensation practices; (ii) corporate governance structure; (iii) accounting policies; and (iv) source of revenues. PG historically had a low percentage of its revenues derived from carried interest payments (less than 10%) while the US PPEs had a significantly higher percentage (on average 50%). Should PG do more direct investments and have more of its revenues come from carried interests? This could conceivably jeopardize their trading multiple and their stock price. Should PG risk changing their business model or proceed with confidence?

Jamestown is contemplating how to best lease a portion of their new development along the Brooklyn waterfront, Industry City. The 6 million square foot, mixed-use development is meant to accommodate Brooklyn's growing innovation, creative, and "maker" communities. Jamestown is intrigued by the recently revived trend of "shared office space," championed by WeWork and originated by well-known players like Regus. The case is intended to introduce the reader to the shared office market, including the similarities and differences from traditional office space, and explore the underlying trends driving this change, as well as the risks to the business model. Jamestown must weigh the pros and cons of their different leasing strategies, including economic, operational, and reputational, and must decide whether or not to lease the space to a traditional tenant, lease the space to a third-party shared office operator (e.g., WeWork or Regus), or develop their own shared office offering.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 216055.

In early 2010, senior partners at Warburg Pincus met to review a report on Bausch & Lomb Incorporated, the firm's largest investment at the time. Warburg Pincus had led a group of investors in acquiring Bauch & Lomb on October 26, 2007, taking the company private and becoming its largest and controlling shareholder. Since the acquisition, there had been significant progress at Bausch & Lomb through changes in senior leadership and in its business model. But, shortly after the second anniversary of the investment, the senior partners were beginning to question whether the depth and pace of change was enough. They had some tough decisions to make.

James Tallest analyzed the opportunity to invest in a distressed portfolio of high quality properties in Germany by acquiring one or more non-performing loans from Deutschland Bank. While he considers the many aspects of the deal that is about to unfold, he must decide which securities to acquire, the price he should offer to each of them, and whether to retain the former owner of the portfolio as property manager.

Tony Lee is preparing to present a project to the invesment committee of Howard Street Capital. He will be recommending an investment in Project Sun Devil, a high-quality 225-unit student housing rental property near Tempe, Arizona. Tony Lee will compete for capital against the other project on the investment committee's agenda, Project Paris. Project Paris, a very different type of real estate transaction, is a hybrid mezzanine investment in the acquisition of a residential real estate services firm headquartered in France. The case provides overview of the two projects.

Adam Carter was the portfolio manager for Tate Modern Finance III, L.P. ("Tate" or the "Fund"), the third in a series of U.S. commercial real estate debt funds sponsored by the London-based Tate Partners. The Fund was capitalized with $700 million of equity commitments, including a $50 million Sponsor commitment. The Fund's objective was to acquire income-producing commercial real estate mortgages at conservative attachment points in the capital structure, leverage these investments modestly, and generate mid-teen, net returns. The return objectives were consistent with prior funds and represented an alternative means of investing in commercial U.S. real estate equity that was felt to be overvalued at the time (2006). In theory, a debt strategy would provide more protection, and be more conservative, than an equity-oriented strategy due to the multiple layers of debt and equity subordination that insulated the Fund's investments.

Detailed, hard-to-compile data on private equity, venture capital, and real estate firms shows that the number of women in senior finance positions is stuck in the single digits--and 60% of the firms studied had no female senior investment professionals at all.

In January 2007, Hazem Ben-Gacem, managing director and co-head of Investcorp Technology Partners (ITP), needs to decide what to bid at an auction for Moneybookers Limited, one of the top three e-payment solution providers in Europe. However, approximately 70% of Moneybookers revenues were related to transactions from online gaming sites (down from 100% in 2002). Although the thesis was that e-commerce transactions would soon make up a much larger chunk of the company's revenues, high gaming revenue still raised some questions. Between now and when Ben-Gacem had first submitted a bid of €60 million for Moneybookers back in November 2006, the U.S. Congress had enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act putting pressure on e-payment firms with gambling exposure. How would investors in ITP view this transaction? Ben-Gacem also worried about whether Moneybookers could manage the growth of its business and the evolution of regulation around monetary transactions. Moneybookers had effectively become a type of bank with deposit accounts and capital adequacy requirements and all the reporting that went along with it. But could an internet startup maintain the compliance and accounting standards necessary to handle such scrutiny? Could it succeed-and if it did, what would it be worth?