個案總覽

This case has been set in June 2015, ten months after Unilever had re-launched Lifebuoy soap in Myanmar. The brand had performed exceedingly well, particularly in the metro and urban areas of Myanmar, and Unilever was on-target to achieve its goal of changing the handwashing behaviour of 20 million people in Myanmar by 2020. Despite the challenges of operating in a country where little or no data was available, the Unilever Myanmar team had put together a number of initiatives to make Lifebuoy the number one brand in its category in Myanmar for the future. But was it enough? Did the Lifebuoy proposition resonate with the population? And were Unilever's Sustainable Living Plan initiatives the right activation strategy?

The BreadTalk Group was a leading Singapore-based bakery and restaurant chain, consisting of eight different brands that were sold across 15 countries in Asia. In a span of 12 years, it had become a premier lifestyle bakery brand in Southeast Asia, China and the Middle East, as well as a cherished household name in its native Singapore. BreadTalk prided itself on having a culture of "creative differentiation". The company strived to stay "fresh" by continuously changing and adapting to consumer demand; and "relevant" by offering localised and customised products to its customers. Although the company could boast of many past successes, there were new challenges ahead. With the number of new players growing rapidly, the marketplace was becoming increasingly competitive. New markets offered both opportunities and challenges. And customers had come to expect a constant stream of innovative products from the bakery chain. As BreadTalk enters its mature stage of growth and comes head on with the challenges of international expansion, is its business model equipped to identify and address the risks associated with global brand management? Is the brand positioned well to seize future opportunity? Should it focus on its core competency and brand, or should it be looking to develop and aggressively promote other brands?

The case is set in November 2013, when Siam Park City - one of Thailand's biggest Amusement Park and Water Park - was celebrating its 33rd anniversary. Siam Park City was born out of the vision of Chaiwat Luangamornlert, a successful businessman who wanted to build an amusement park and water park for the people of Thailand that was of international standard, but yet available to the average Thai at an affordable price. With affordability as the cornerstone of the business philosophy, the park's entry fee was pegged at 'a reasonable price', with heavy discounts offered to Thai residents. Visitors also spent very little inside the park. This pricing strategy proved unsustainable for a business that had high set-up and operating costs, and the park suffered financial losses for more than two decades, ultimately leading to its bankruptcy. The financial loss was further aggravated by reputation loss, following two accidents in the park. Understanding that the park required a leadership change, Chaiwat stepped down from the helm in 2008 and handed over the reins of the business to his children. The new management team revamped internal operations and worked to diversify the park's customer base. The changes ushered in a new era for the amusement park - business improved and the company even earned a modest profit in 2012. Looking ahead, the new management faces the challenge of making the business financially viable over the long term, keeping in mind his founder's principles to keep the park affordable and accessible to locals.

Ratchtar Karasuddhi, the head of business development for general trade at Unilever, has an idea to assist a flood stricken owner of a local neighbourhood convenience store. He believed that with some upgrading and better visibility, the shop could be revived and become an alternative to the nearby modern trade convenience store. What started out as a simple wish to help a single distressed shop owner soon spawned into a viable business idea that would benefit the local community and the company. The number of Star Stores, or Platinum Stores as they were called within Unilever, expanded rapidly - the first outlet was inaugurated in March 2012 and there were 7,800 Platinum Stores by July 2014. The frenetic growth in the number of stores eventually affected business execution, as the operations side struggled to cope with the openings of four to five new outlets daily. Each store required the full engagement and cooperation of the shop owner, a customised planogram, and training and capability building of the shop owner. What is necessary for the sustained success of Platinum Stores in Thailand?

After studying medicine and specialising in paediatrics in India, Dr Vibha Krishnamurthy, the founder and Medical Director of Ummeed, underwent further training in children's developmental disabilities in the US. The resources available at the centres there highlighted the lack of similar facilities in India. After relocating to India in 1998, she decided to set out on her own. In November 2001, supported by her husband, Vibha founded Ummeed - a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that provides an integrated medical and therapeutic support system for children with developmental disabilities. Founded with an initial staff of only three, Ummeed has grown to include about 50 professionals, ranging from paediatricians to therapists and social workers. It has also moved into areas of training, research and advocacy, and is increasingly well regarded as one of India's leading NGOs, respected for its work with children with disabilities. But with this growth, the constant challenge to procure adequate funding has been exacerbated. Ummeed's strategic plan and business model is built around the theory that if it were able to access children with disabilities early through their families, it could maximise their outcomes for educational, financial and social achievement. Hence, its business model involves creating ways to access families by building awareness and demand in communities, with subsequent capacity building and training. But is this the most effective way to create a change for children with disabilities? Vibha also recognises that Ummeed's evolution has brought her to a crossroads where a decision will soon have to be made: while on the one hand, she would like to keep Ummeed 'small', retaining the personalised organisation culture that she has embedded at all levels - on the other hand, she would like to scale-up Ummeed, so that it could extend its reach. How should Ummeed position itself? What would be the best way to create an impact in this field?

The case follows the foundation and growth of Social Capital Ventures Development (SCVD), a social enterprise based in Cambodia launched by Christopher Wilson and Khov Boun Chhay in 2008. The venture aims to improve the lives and conditions of disadvantaged people in developing countries, through impact investment and dedication to sustainable and scalable projects, in the field of health, education, and farming. SCVD's first project was to provide rural areas with clean water, the absence of which resulted in high child mortality rate and overall ill health. The case follows SCVD during its first five years of its operations.

In January 2012, Starbucks enters into a 50:50 joint venture with Tata Global Beverages Limited (TGBL), under which Starbucks will own and operate outlet stores in Mumbai. TGBL has a strong reputation and presence throughout the entire coffee production chain - growing, roasting and trading - that has helped Starbucks navigate its entry into the Indian market. But will this alliance be enough for Starbucks to overcome the political, economic, social and cultural challenges unique to the Indian market and establish its stamp? Would it even be possible to do so without a local partner?

This case study discusses the initiatives taken by Unilever, one of the world's leading fast moving consumer goods companies, to promote sustainability, by using the example of Lipton Tea in Turkey. In November 2010, Unilever launches the ambitious "Unilever Sustainable Living Plan", committing to a ten-year sustainable growth plan. Lipton defies the traditional approach of introducing sustainable products as a niche brand in the market. Instead the company adopts a large-scale mainstream approach, planning that by 2015, all the tea in Lipton teabags will be sourced from Rainforest AllianceTM Certified farms, and by 2020, every kilogram of tea will be sourced sustainably.

The case is set in early 2009, at a time when Vietnam is rocked by the global recession. It opens with the discovery by Ly Ngoc Minh, CEO of the porcelain manufacturing company, Minh Long I, that Metro, a chain of seven department stores across Vietnam, has discounted the selling price of its products and has no intention of bringing the price of its porcelain pieces back to the level that was agreed on in their sales and distribution agreement. The backdrop for this decision comes in the midst of a turbulent economy characterised by high inflation and 20%-plus interest rates. Minh Long I management, seeks to preserve their position as a premium brand in the market and must decide whether to terminate the agreement with Metro, and potentially other distributors, or allow distributors to set their own prices. Should Minh decide to change the company's distribution strategy in light of this new economic reality or continue with a high-price high-touch emphasis?

This case is a two-part case series. Part A of the case study is set in early 2011, and begins with Parag Gadre, the assistant vice president of marketing and strategy at Tata Chemical Limited (TCL), contemplating what to do with Tata Salt's flanker brand. It has been five years since I-Shakti was launched in 2006, and has since become the second biggest salt brand in India. I-Shakti was originally conceived as a flanker brand to satisfy demand that TCL's original flagship product, Tata Salt, could not satisfy. The target markets, pricing and other attributes of the two brands were originally envisaged to be very distinct. However, I-Shakti has far outperformed expectations, and is now at a stage where it could potentially cannibalise Tata Salt's market share. This case will stimulate a discussion on the concepts and rationale of a flanker brand. In addition to the overarching question of whether it is a good idea to introduce a flanker brand, it will also create a forum for discussing strategies that are available to a company when the flanker outperforms expectations and becomes a potential threat to the original premium brand that it was set up to protect. Finally, it also enables students to discuss whether market share is an appropriate concern for an organisation. Part B of the case is set at the start of 2012, about one year after the conclusion of Part A. Readers are given an update of the strategy that TCL adopted - a strategy that not only continues with I-Shakti Salt, but also ventures into the production and distribution of an I-Shakti brand of pulses. The reason for doing so is given in the case, and students are left to analyse whether they agree with the company's decision. This section also links back to the earlier Part A of the case study, as it gives the readers an example of a viable alternative that is available to the company in the event that it decides to play down or altogether phase out the flanker brand.

This case is a two-part case series. Part A of the case study is set in early 2011, and begins with Parag Gadre, the assistant vice president of marketing and strategy at Tata Chemical Limited (TCL), contemplating what to do with Tata Salt's flanker brand. It has been five years since I-Shakti was launched in 2006, and has since become the second biggest salt brand in India. I-Shakti was originally conceived as a flanker brand to satisfy demand that TCL's original flagship product, Tata Salt, could not satisfy. The target markets, pricing and other attributes of the two brands were originally envisaged to be very distinct. However, I-Shakti has far outperformed expectations, and is now at a stage where it could potentially cannibalise Tata Salt's market share. This case will stimulate a discussion on the concepts and rationale of a flanker brand. In addition to the overarching question of whether it is a good idea to introduce a flanker brand, it will also create a forum for discussing strategies that are available to a company when the flanker outperforms expectations and becomes a potential threat to the original premium brand that it was set up to protect. Finally, it also enables students to discuss whether market share is an appropriate concern for an organisation. Part B of the case is set at the start of 2012, about one year after the conclusion of Part A. Readers are given an update of the strategy that TCL adopted - a strategy that not only continues with I-Shakti Salt, but also ventures into the production and distribution of an I-Shakti brand of pulses. The reason for doing so is given in the case, and students are left to analyse whether they agree with the company's decision. This section also links back to the earlier Part A of the case study, as it gives the readers an example of a viable alternative that is available to the company in the event that it decides to play down or altogether phase out the flanker brand.