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Most executives believe that competing through business models is critical for success, but few have come to grips with how best to do so. One common mistake, the authors' studies show, is enterprises' unwavering focus on creating innovative models and evaluating their efficacy in standalone fashion-just as engineers test new technologies or products. However, the success or failure of a company's business model depends largely on how it interacts with those of the other players in the industry. (Almost any business model will perform brilliantly if a company is lucky enough to be the only one in a market.) Because companies build them without thinking about the competition, they routinely deploy doomed business models. Moreover, many companies ignore the dynamic elements of business models and fail to realize that they can design business models to generate winner-take-all effects similar to the network externalities that high-tech companies such as Microsoft, eBay, and Facebook often create. A good business model creates virtuous cycles that, over time, result in competitive advantage. Smart companies know how to strengthen their virtuous cycles, undermine those of rivals, and even use them to turn competitors' strengths into weaknesses.

La Fageda is a manufacturer of high-quality, naturally-made yogurts in northern Catalonia, Spain. La Fageda is substantially different from its main competitors such as multinational Danone in that it is a 270-person workers' cooperative with 60 percent of its membership made up of mentally disabled individuals. Since its establishment in 1982, the organization has aimed to integrate the mentally disabled by providing meaningful jobs and dignified salaries. As of March 2010, La Fageda has opened up a new production facility to make ice cream in an urban area outside of its well-known agricultural farm. Students are faced with understanding La Fageda's business model and how it competes against multinationals.

Patagonia was deeply committed to the environment. This commitment, at times, conflicted with the company's goal to create the most innovative products in its industry. Patagonia's founder and executives welcomed imitation of both its environmental commitment and its culture. The question remained whether Patagonia's model would work well for a wide range of companies. In 2003, Patagonia executives were considering which products and markets would fit best into their portfolio of product lines, which included alpine, skiing, snowboarding, fishing, paddling, rock climbing, surfing, kayaking, and mountain biking. There was a tradeoff between alienating its core customers and achieving growth via entry into new product markets.

This note was prepared to aid students in the EC course "Competing through Business Models."

To aid students in the EC course, "Competing Through Business Models."

The fine art auction business has remained a duopoly over its 250 year history. The industry is dominated by Sotheby's and Christie's Inc. Curiously, neither competitor has been able to overtake the other by a notable margin despite the clear network effects of this platform business. As we enter unprecedented economic times, as technology pushes forward infiltrating almost all areas of business, and as new competitors fight to enter the fine art sales space, these two auction houses explore modifications to their business model. Some efforts by the two organizations have already begun but are in the infantile stage and thus the success of these initiatives is entirely unproven. Sotheby's and Christie's must decide how to respond to this economic and cultural turning point and whether to keep investing in these ancillary aspects of their operations.

The case describes the history and business model of Cirque du Soleil (CdS). The case allows for a rich discussion and analysis of Cirque du Soleil's business model with an emphasis on how it interacts with that of MGM Mirage. Le Cirque and MGM's business models complement one another: MGM makes important capital investments in theaters tailored to CdS's shows that are located in the middle of MGM casinos, CdS acts as a magnet for traffic for an exclusive clientele that spends large amounts of money at the casino. CdS's partnership with MGM has been tremendously profitable. This raises the question of why hold up and opportunism have not destroyed competitive advantage for both entities: What features in CdS and MGM Mirage's business models have resulted in such a successful partnership? The case is set at a juncture where Daniel Lamarre (CdS's CEO) is looking for new opportunities for growth. Lamarre is pondering the likelihood of success of Cirque's first resident show in Asia at Tokyo Disney Resort, its entry in the Macao market, and a new partnership with two subsidiaries of Dubai World, the sovereign wealth fund of the Emirate. The question is: Can Le Cirque find a new model of complementary relationships that will be as profitable as its relationship with MGM Mirage?

Lan Airlines operates three distinct models: low-cost for domestic short-haul flights, full-service for international routes; and an international cargo business, the latter of which makes up 33 percent of Lan's overall revenues (markedly different from many U.S. legacy carriers which derive 3 to 4 percent of revenues from cargo). Since a change of ownership in 1994, Lan has grown steadily and quickly at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19 percent from $318 million in revenues to $3.5 billion at the end of 2007. Lan is at an interesting point in history as the low-cost model was recently implemented. While early results have been strong, observers wonder if the airline can successfully manage three disparate business models.

The case looks at the two dominant Finnish retailers: S Group and Kesko. S Group is a customer-owned cooperative, which has a unique holding structure whereby 1.7 million residents (or 70 percent of Finnish households) own 22 regional cooperatives. In turn, the regional cooperatives own SOK, a centralized company that provides services to the regional cooperatives. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, S Group lagged far behind the market leader, Kesko. However, since 2005, S Group has held the leadership position; in 2007, it had captured 41 percent market while Kesko's was 33.9 percent. Kesko Plc is publicly traded and pursues a model whereby retailer entrepreneurs use their personal funds to invest in stores and operate them completely. The case requires that students consider sources of competitive advantage that arise from the companies' markedly different business models.

Betting exchanges provide an electronic platform that allows ordinary consumers to not only back teams to win, but also to lay odds for other punters to back. This business model allows punters to cut out the middle-man of the bookmaker, and leads to a much more efficient 2-sided market. Betfair.com's domination of the betting exchange has threatened to undermine the core of the traditional bookmakers' business model. The case examines two aspects of the industry: 1. What specific choices did Betfair make to become the dominant betting exchange, winning the competitive battle over Flutter.com? 2. At what stages do Betfair.com's business model and those of the bookmakers interact? Will Betfair.com naturally come to dominate the industry, and if so how should the bookmakers react?

This is Part B to the "Arauco: Forward Integration or Horizontal Expansion?" case. This short case looks at the company in late 2007 after it has decided to invest in a Brazilian joint venture involving forests, saw mills and a paper mill. The case acts as an epilogue and allows students to revisit the concept of forward integration into paper in the Brazilian context.

This case series looks at three important inflection points in Palm's history that relate to decisions about its platform: when the company was debating whether to open its operating system (OS) for licensing to third-party hardware manufacturers; 2001, when the company was deciding whether to split into two separate companies; and, 2005, when the company was migrating from its own OS into Linux. (The last part, set in 2008, is an epilogue). By looking at Palm's decision concerning its platform over time, students are asked to consider how Palm's decisions affect innovation, competitiveness, value creation and value capture.

This case series looks at three important inflection points in Palm's history that relate to decisions about its platform: when the company was debating whether to open its operating system (OS) for licensing to third-party hardware manufacturers; 2001, when the company was deciding whether to split into two separate companies; and, 2005, when the company was migrating from its own OS into Linux. (The last part, set in 2008, is an epilogue). By looking at Palm's decision concerning its platform over time, students are asked to consider how Palm's decisions affect innovation, competitiveness, value creation and value capture.

This case series looks at three important inflection points in Palm's history that relate to decisions about its platform: when the company was debating whether to open its operating system (OS) for licensing to third-party hardware manufacturers; 2001, when the company was deciding whether to split into two separate companies; and, 2005, when the company was migrating from its own OS into Linux. (The last part, set in 2008, is an epilogue). By looking at Palm's decision concerning its platform over time, students are asked to consider how Palm's decisions affect innovation, competitiveness, value creation and value capture.

This case series looks at three important inflection points in Palm's history that relate to decisions about its platform: when the company was debating whether to open its operating system (OS) for licensing to third-party hardware manufacturers; 2001, when the company was deciding whether to split into two separate companies; and, 2005, when the company was migrating from its own OS into Linux. (The last part, set in 2008, is an epilogue). By looking at Palm's decision concerning its platform over time, students are asked to consider how Palm's decisions affect innovation, competitiveness, value creation and value capture.

This note defines the concepts of business model and the value loop. It also introduces business model representations and proposes four tests for evaluating business models in isolation. This is the first note in a series of three written for the HBS elective course "Competing through Business Models."

When the Danish mobile phone service provider Telmore entered the market in October 2000, few people took notice. Its business model was not perceived as particularly aggressive or threatening to the industry. Less than three years later, Telmore's creative adaptation of the well-known, no-frills model of the airline industry had taken the Danish market by storm. With a combination of rock-bottom prices, simplicity, and a focus on customer satisfaction backed by a unique low-cost infrastructure, Telmore's business model, with its powerful virtuous cycles, proved to be the most successful innovation the industry had seen in many years.