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This case describes the strategic and organizational challenges that Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) faced between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, in order to strengthen the firm's brokerage team, JLL merged with The Staubach Company, a real estate services provider with a first-rate brokerage team and great cultural fit with JLL. Staubach paid its brokers with a commission model, which accelerated JLL's decision to let go of its long-standing salary and bonus approach. The merger also surfaced two interesting business opportunities. First, local brokers were now empowered and motivated to open up their client relationships to the rest of the company, growing their business from just local transactions to the full array of services JLL provided. Second, local brokers became aware of a great number of mid-sized clients whose real estate needs were not as sophisticated as those of large corporate accounts but who required multi-service solutions in selected geographies. JLL thus created a group called Markets Corporate Solutions, which specifically targeted mid-sized clients. Toward 2012, with its organizational structure expanding to tackle opportunities for multiple types of clients in a myriad of geographies, JLL was facing challenges associated with managing internal and external complexity. America's CEO Peter Roberts outlines the opportunities and challenges that lied ahead for JLL. This is the final case in a series that also comprises cases A, B, and C, and collectively covers JLL's evolution between the years 1999 and 2012.

This case describes the strategic and organizational challenges that Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) faced between 2005 and 2008. Having dismantled its long-standing service-line-oriented structure, JLL created two interdependent groups: Accounts and Markets. Accounts housed account managers who served JLL's corporate clients. Markets housed brokers specialized in a certain geography. JLL helped drive integration between Accounts and Markets by emphasizing work at the "intersections" between both groups, i.e., instances that required combining both groups' resources. By 2008, however, JLL was facing challenges associated with harnessing the potential of this new structure. There was more growth that could be obtained from penetrating local markets, and top management wondered how to best strengthen their brokerage team. The acquisition of Spaulding and Slye, a renowned Boston-based firm, provided instant growth in some key markets, but organic growth was harder to achieve. While the industry paid brokers with a commission model, JLL did so with a salary and bonus model that aligned well with JLL's culture but proved unattractive to new recruits. America's CEO Peter Roberts outlines the alternatives JLL analyzed as they considered how to strengthen the organization while maintaining its values and integrity. This case is the third in a case series that also comprises cases A, B, and D, and collectively covers JLL's evolution between the years 1999 and 2012.

This case describes the strategic and organizational challenges that Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) faced between 2001 and 2005. Faced with the need to deliver integrated services to corporate clients in 2001, JLL created Corporate Solutions, a group that aimed to draw connections between JLL's semi-autonomous service lines. Despite initial success, by 2005 the group was finding it challenging to foster integration. Account managers and service line leaders clashed as decision-making power, pay and incentives, and clout were altered and redistributed. JLL realized that its organizational structure was hindering the firm in achieving key strategic goals, such as rapid scalability of corporate accounts and effective local market penetration. America's CEO Peter Roberts outlines the alternatives JLL's top management analyzed as they considered how to move the organization forward. This case is the second in a case series that also comprises cases A, C, and D, and collectively covers JLL's evolution between the years 1999 and 2012.

This case describes the strategic and organizational challenges that Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) faced at the turn of the millennium. Until then, JLL sold piecemeal commercial real estate services to its corporate clients, who maintained relationships with a variety of vendors. In 2000, JLL's large corporate clients started globalizing their activities and seeking to outsource their real estate needs. They were looking for integrated solutions delivered through a single point of contact, and they cut their providers to a few strategic vendors. JLL's organizational structure, configured around largely autonomous service lines, was not well suited to supporting the development of integrated services. Executive Peter Barge was put in charge of a new team, called Corporate Solutions, whose mission was to draw connections between the service lines in order to foster integration. How should Barge structure Corporate Solutions to make sure it succeeds in its mission? And how should he configure the group's ties to the service lines to ensure their collaboration? The retention of JLL's most profitable clients was at stake. This case is the first in a series that also comprises cases B, C, and D and collectively covers JLL's evolution between the years 1999 and 2012.

In 2012, Cisco was under intense pressure to show results: growth in its core business was decelerating and a number of exploratory ventures and acquisitions had not proven as profitable as expected. CEO John Chambers vowed to restore the company's health in a way that would support the agility and entrepreneurial mindset required to be successful in emerging sectors while continuing to achieve efficiency and profitability in Cisco's core business. In a world where technologies and customer segments were rapidly evolving, Cisco executives realized that their emphasis on working collaboratively through councils and boards (the company's staple organizational structure in the 2000s) might be impacting the Cisco's ability to be nimble and responsive. This case explores these challenges and Cisco's strategic and organizational response, with a particular focus on Cisco's comprehensive restructuring.

Until a few years ago, General Electric believed that its products could virtually market themselves. Marketers had been limited to passively pushing information to those centrally responsible for innovation-typically in R&D or engineering-with the result that brilliant minds were languishing in dead-end jobs. When it came to discussions about corporate strategy, marketing wasn't at the table. But as GE's businesses matured, the company realized that it could no longer win simply by launching increasingly sophisticated technologies or taking existing technologies to new markets. To succeed, GE would need a marketing engine that could collaborate directly with customers and lead to new markets-one rooted in standards as rigorous as those for functions such as finance and human resources. CEO Jeff Immelt issued a mandate that marketing should be a vital operating function across GE and an engine for organic growth. The marketing team took on the challenge of identifying and codifying from scratch the skills it would need. The result was a marketing framework for the entire company along three dimensions: principles (creating a common language and standards), people (getting the right leaders in place), and process (including very specific measures for grading performance). Marketers took their place alongside technologists and had a voice earlier in the process, as GE's innovation expanded to include ideas grounded in customer needs and market trends.

No one disputes that firms have to make organizational changes when the business environment demands them. But the idea that a firm might want change for its own sake often provokes skepticism. Why inflict all that pain if you don't have to? That is a dangerous attitude. A company periodically needs to shake itself up, regardless of the competitive landscape. Even if the external environment is not changing in ways that demand a response, the internal environment probably is. The human dynamics within an organization are constantly shifting--and require the organization to change along with them. Over time, informal networks mirror the formal structure, which is how silos develop; restructuring gets people to start forming new networks, making the organization as a whole more creative. It also disrupts all the routines in an organization that collectively stifle innovation and adaptability. Finally, restructuring breaks up the outdated power structures that may be quietly misdirecting a company's resource allocation. All these processes--silo formation, the accretion of deadening routines, and the emergence of corporate baronies--take place all the time. But when everything is going well, you tend not to notice them, just as many seemingly fit people don't realize that their arteries may be dangerously clogged. A simple questionnaire can serve as a kind of cholesterol test for your company, enabling you to see if your regimen needs minor or major adjustments.

This case, a supplement to the "Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001 (Abridged)" case (710-450) and the "Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007" case (710-451), reviews the FBI's progress in its transformation effort from 2007 to 2009.

Within 10 months of Gregg Steinhafel's taking over as CEO at Target, the U.S. was mired in the most significant economic downturn in 50 years. Top competitor Wal-Mart had positioned itself well for the crisis, while Target's same store sales began to slide. While Steinhafel believed that Target's long-term strategy and positioning were right, he pondered a set of strategic and operational challenges. Did Target have the right mix of offensive and defensive tactics to weather the downturn and position itself for the economy's eventual recovery? How far could Target go in emphasizing low price-the "pay less" side of its slogan-without eroding the company's core promise of offering unique and upscale products that customers would not see at other low-priced retailers? Would the benefits of adding fresh food to Target's general merchandise stores outweigh the associated challenges?

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), sought to transform the storied Bureau. The FBI had long served as both the chief law enforcement agency and the main domestic intelligence wing of the U.S. government. In practice, though, law enforcement had overshadowed intelligence at the FBI. The terrorist attacks made it tragically clear that the United States required a much stronger domestic intelligence service, and Mueller believed that that service should reside within the FBI. Critics, however, called for the Bureau to narrow its scope, focus on law enforcement, and cede domestic intelligence to a new, specialized agency. Should the FBI retain both the law enforcement mission and the domestic intelligence mission? If so, how should it change itself to succeed in both missions? This case, a supplement to the "Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001 (Abridged)" case (710-450), reviews the FBI's progress from 2001 to 2007.

What strategies can companies use to both survive a recession and thrive when it ends? The authors studied the strategy selection and corporate performance of 4,700 public companies during the past three global recessions: 1980 to 1982, 1990 to 1991, and 2000 to 2002. They found that of companies that survive a recession, about 80% take more than three years to regain their prerecession growth rates for sales and profits. Just 9% of them flourish after a slowdown, doing better on key financial parameters than they had done before it and outperforming rivals in their industry by at least 10% in terms of sales and profits growth. One strategy has the greatest likelihood of producing postrecession winners: a combination of cutting costs, mainly by improving operational efficiency (rather than by slashing the number of employees relative to peers), and developing new business opportunities by making significantly greater investments than rivals do in R&D and marketing while also investing in plants and machinery.

The case describes the formation of Indus Towers, the largest telecom tower company in the world which has a joint venture created to build and manage the passive infrastructure of wireless telecom operators by bringing together three competitors in India's tough telecom market-Bharti AirteI, Vodafone Essar, and Idea Cellular-and merging their tower holdings. It focuses on the issue as to how do you collaborate with your competitors in setting up towers but engage in a brutal competition with them in the market place?

Peter Roberts, CEO of Jones, Lang, LaSalle (JLL) Americas division, has been charged with expanding the company's presence in its core geographic markets while simultaneously growing its corporate account business. Roberts and his task force have narrowed their options to two proposals. The first is an enhancement of the account management model put in place in 2001 where independent service units co-existed with an account management group. The second is a realignment of the firm's operations around geography and key accounts. By examining the tradeoffs required by each option, the case illustrates the tensions involved in structuring an organization around product, geography, and key customers. It also explores the importance of aligning strategic choices with organizational architecture.    

Peter Barge, CEO of the newly created Corporate Solutions Group of Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL), is executing a restructuring of the U.S. corporate real estate services division that will enable the company to offer its clients integrated solutions. Barge has created an account management function to coordinate the activities of the three, product-based business units which, until now, have operated autonomously. As he is executing the restructuring, Bank of America, an important account of the firm, announces its intention to reduce its providers to the two or three who can offer forward-looking, integrated services. While Barge's new organization is not yet fully in place, he is determined to win the Bank of America business, and moves quickly to hire a senior account manager and establish an organizational architecture that will encourage collaboration within his group. The case examines the many tradeoffs Barge must make in balancing the benefits of the former organization with those of the new structure to achieve the firm's strategic goal of becoming more customer solutions oriented.

Customer centricity has been an important part of the culture at Cisco Systems since its inception. While part of this is attributable to values put in place by the founders and retained by subsequent management, it is also closely interwoven with its organizational architecture that reaffirmed those values. Until 2001, Cisco had a decentralized organizational structure with three business units organized around each of its three main customer types: Service Provider, Enterprise, and Commercial. Each unit developed and marketed a complete product line for its specific customer group further reaffirming its belief in the centrality of distinct customers. A number of other systems, structures, and behavioral mechanisms reaffirmed the importance of customer centricity. The 2001 market downturn, however, brought new challenges as Cisco was forced to lay off 18% of its workforce and reexamine its organizational structure that was costly due to duplication of activities across each of the three customer-facing business units. Ultimately, Cisco Systems decided to transform the company from a decentralized to centralized organization. While recognizing that a centralized, functional structure was necessary to avoid product and resource redundancies, it also threatened Cisco's customer-centricity in that the centralization of R & D and marketing made them more distant from Cisco's customers. To overcome the perceived misalignment between its structure and culture, Cisco introduced a number of initiatives like the Customer Focus Initiative (CFI) to ensure that while the structure was turning away from customer centricity, the beliefs and actions of its employees maintained that focus. In doing so, management accepted the likely misalignment between its structure and culture and sought ways to compensate for this perceived gap.

In response to the 2001 market downturn, Cisco Systems implemented a major restructuring that transformed the company from a decentralized to centralized organization. While recognizing that a centralized, functional structure was necessary to avoid product and resource redundancies, it also risked making the company less customer-centric. To mitigate this risk, Cisco implemented a cross-functional system of executive-level councils that would bring leaders of different functions together to collaborate and focus on the needs and issues of specific customer groups. Each council employs a "Three-in-a-Box" leadership model consisting of an executive leader from the engineering or technology business unit, a member of the go-to-market team, and an operations resource director. Each council is also accountable to the Operating Committee, which is chaired by CEO John Chambers and determines the long-term corporate strategy and allocation of corporate resources. Many other companies have failed at facilitating collaboration across functions-particularly large organizations-but Cisco's system has been successful because the company remained committed to the system, required a consistent infrastructure while also allowing for flexibility, gave members decision making authority, and used council leaders who thrive in collaborative environments. The success of the council system led to the creation of 20 boards of "sub-councils" in 2007. The boards are charged with driving development efforts and customer reach further into the organization by addressing specific issues too narrow for the councils to address.

This article highlights several important dimensions of planning for exit from strategic alliances and also offers several examples of the disastrous consequences of inadequate exit-planning. While many companies fall into the trap of having no exit plan, other companies take too simple a planning approach, wondering if the exit will be unconditionally easy or hard. A more effective approach involves questions such as "When should the exit be easy and when should it be hard? And for which partner?" The article develops a framework that stipulates contingency-specific exit provisions for each partner in the alliance-specifically, situations in which exit should be symmetric and easy for both partners, symmetric and hard for both partners, or asymmetric, hard for one partner and easy for the other. Furthermore, many alliances today reflect complex deals that cover several distinct developmental stages, each of which contains a distinct set of contingencies. Such alliances require a dynamic application of the exit framework, wherein each stage of the alliance development entails a different set of exit provisions, and exit from one stage would signify the beginning of the next.

For many senior executives, shifting from selling products to selling solutions--packages of products and services--is a priority in today's increasingly commoditized markets. Companies, however, aren't always structured to make that shift. Knowledge and expertise often reside in silos, and many companies have trouble harnessing their resources across those boundaries in a way that customers value and are willing to pay for. Some companies--like GE Healthcare, Best Buy, and commercial real estate provider Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL)--have restructured themselves around customer needs to deliver true solutions. They did so by engaging in four sets of activities: Coordination. To deliver customer-focused solutions, three things must occur easily across boundaries: information sharing, division of labor, and decision making. Sometimes this involves replacing traditional silos with customer-focused ones, but more often it entails transcending existing boundaries. JLL has experimented with both approaches. Cooperation. Customer-centric companies, such as Cisco Systems, develop metrics for customer satisfaction and incentives that reward customer-focused cooperation. Most also shake up the power structure so that people who are closest to customers have the authority to act on their behalf. Capability. Delivering customer-focused solutions requires some employees to be generalists instead of specialists. They need experience with more than one product or service, a deep knowledge of customer needs, and the ability to traverse internal boundaries. Connection. By combining their offerings with those of a partner, companies can cut costs even as they create higher-value solutions, as Starbucks has found through its diverse partnerships. To stand out in a commoditized market, companies must understand what customers value. Ultimately, some customers may be better off purchasing products and services piecemeal.

Examines how firms find pathways to high performance while simultaneously focusing on their top and bottom lines by aggressively developing and managing their relationships with key stakeholders. Top-performing firms are shrinking their core while expanding their periphery. At the same time that they are contracting their organizational centers and outsourcing increasing portions of their activities, these firms are extending their organizational borders by trying to provide customers with greater sets of products and services. As companies refocus, they have become increasingly dependent on reinforcing mutually beneficial ties to four sets of critical stakeholders: customers, suppliers, alliance partners, and intraorganizational business units. In each of these relationships, successful firms work their way up a ladder in which they intensify their collaborative efforts with that particular constituent. This phenomenon, which is evident across an array of industries, is one of the hallmarks of a new operating model: the relationship-centered organization.

Companies have poured enormous amounts of money into customer relationship management, but in many cases the investment hasn't really paid off. That's because getting closer to customers isn't about building an information technology system. It's a learning journey that begins with the creation of a companywide repository containing every customer interaction with the company, organized by customer. Communal coordination is what's called for at this stage, as each group contributes its information to the data pool separately from the others and then taps into it as needed. In the second stage, one-way serial coordination from centralized IT through analytical units and out to the operating units allows companies to go beyond just assembling data to drawing inferences. In stage three, companies shift their focus from past relationships to future behavior. Through symbiotic coordination, information flows back and forth between central analytic units and various organizational units like marketing, sales, and operations, as together they seek answers to questions like "How can we prevent customers from switching to a competitor?" and "Who would be most likely to buy a new product in the future?" In stage four, firms begin to move past discrete, formal initiatives and, through integral coordination, bring an increasingly sophisticated understanding of their customers to bear in all day-to-day operations.