個案總覽

Examines what happened to Korea after the 1997 financial crisis and the implementation of the IMF-mandated reforms imposed on Korea as conditionalities to the country's emergency loan package.

On July 21, 2005 China revalued its decade-long quasi-fixed exchange rate of approximately 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar by 2.1% to 8.11% and, at the same time, introduced a more market-based exchange rate system. Many analysts and economists were disappointed with what they considered too small a change and called for more flexibility in the U.S. dollar-yuan exchange rate. Provides a timeline of further changes relevant to the Chinese renminbi.

Investors and policymakers throughout the world were confronted with the risk of painful economic consequences arising from the large U.S. current account deficit. In 2007, the U.S. current account deficit was $731 billion, equivalent to 5.3% of GDP. The implications of the deficit were debated with intensity. At one extreme, it was argued that large deficits would eventually resolve themselves smoothly, even if they persisted for many more years. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was among those expecting a "benign resolution to the U.S. current account imbalance." Other analysts, such as economists at the World Bank, believed the large deficits raised the risk of a sharp and disorderly fall of the dollar and that necessary macroeconomic adjustment could be painful, for the United States as well as for the rest of the world. The Financial Times asked: "How long will foreigners be prepared to make such generous 'gifts' to the US?" In this environment, Berkshire Hathaway, run by legendary investor Warren Buffett, postulated that current account imbalances would lead to "some chaotic markets in which currency adjustments play a part" and announced to shareholders a plan to increase investment in overseas companies to protect against this risk. It remained to be seen what the short- and long-term implications of the current account deficit would ultimately yield.