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Digital media--legitimate and otherwise--were one of the few bright spots for high-technology companies in the middle of a deep and protracted recession. These demands left computer makers, builders of components such as microprocessors, software developers, and others between a rock and a hard place. Consumers disliked many of the anti-piracy technologies promoted by media companies because they often restricted legal (as well as illegal) uses of the technologies. High-technology companies feared government intrusion, legislating which technologies they could market. Many thought that digital media could provide compelling services (the "killer app") that would drive device sales and promote broadband uptake. The issues surrounding intellectual property protection could either promote or inhibit digital media. As these complementors squared off, countless billions of dollars and much of the future of media and technology were at stake.

Much of the landscape in which today's media companies find themselves as they contend with the impact of digitization of content and the convergence of means of distribution was shaped by regulatory forces. Three government rulings in particular were influential: the Consent Decree of 1948 (often referred to as the "Paramount Case"), the Financial Interest and Syndication ruling (also called the "FinSyn" ruling of 1970 of the United States Federal Communications Commission), and the United States Supreme Court ruling in Universal City Studios et al. (including Disney) vs. Sony Corp. (also known as the Betamax case of 1984). These regulatory forces broke up tight vertical integration between content production and distribution (Paramount case and FinSyn ruling) or helped to pave the road for the introduction of new technologies for distribution (Betamax case).

Amalgamates several cases concerning strategic decision making at Intel Corp. Discusses the company's decisions surrounding its entry and exit from several lines of businesses, most involving varieties of semiconductors that cost billions of dollars to develop and produce and profoundly influence the company and the marketplace.

Examines the proposed merger between HP and Compaq and the impact of this merger upon the companies and the industry as a whole. Explores the challenges that a combined HP and Compaq will face in various industry segments.

French utility, Vivendi, purchased the United States-based entertainment giant Universal in late 2000. In so doing, the rechristened Vivendi Universal became a major force in music, films, and television production, adding to its European-based cable television and telecommunications assets. By the end of 2001, Vivendi Universal was betting on continued convergence of distribution channels to knit together an international entertainment conglomerate. Its plans would put Vivendi Universal in direct competition with established entertainment giants such as Disney, Viacom, and the merged AOL Time Warner.

Describes USA Networks following its failed bid to buy the Internet portal Lycos in 1999. By 2001, USA Networks was an agglomeration of assets in two distinct areas: electronic commerce (something USA Networks refers to as "interactivity") and entertainment. In each of these two areas, USA Networks faced much larger competitors operating discretely. Explores USA Networks' attempts to compete simultaneously in the spheres of online retailing and television and filmed entertainment.

The venerable British retailer Marks & Spencer suffered a series of setbacks in the late 1990s. The company's performance, which had been solid for decades, quickly deteriorated, forcing the rapid turnover of chief executives and many restructurings. Perhaps the largest change the retailer made was the abandonment of its global expansion plans, withdrawing from continental Europe and trying to sell off assets in the United States, including the well-known clothiers Brooks Brothers. This case examines the changes Marks & Spencer made between 1998 and 2001, as the company tries to shore up its ailing core business, U.K. retail, while deciding on an appropriate global strategy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. How can company leaders identify and exploit the opportunities that take the fullest advantage of their companies' capabilities and potential to pursue new strategies? In their attempts to meet the stock market's imperative, multibusiness companies in the past have pursued operational efficiencies by integrating business activities and have extended their existing strategies by combining resources from various business units. But that is not enough, say Robert A. Burgelman, professor of management at Stanford University, and Yves L. Doz, professor of global technology and innovation at INSEAD. Multibusiness corporations need to develop a capability for what the authors call complex strategic integration (CSI), which involves the discovery and creation of new business opportunities by combining resources from multiple units within the firm--each with its own perspective and vested interests--to extend the corporate strategy in new directions. Only a few multibusiness companies are currently trying to develop a CSI capability. But the challenges and imperatives for all companies are the same. Company leaders need to manage the evolving tension between reinforcing the company's core business and redirecting strategy in new directions, as well as the sharing and transferring of resources. They also must ensure that senior executives develop the political and entrepreneurial skills necessary to pursue CSI initiatives effectively, along with the ability to conceive of these new strategies. Above all, company leaders have to create a corporate context that facilitates CSI as an ongoing institutionalized process rather than as an infrequent occurrence that depends on the ad hoc championing efforts of some highly dedicated senior managers. That includes developing the appropriate organizational structures, control systems, and incentives.

Describes the evolution of Amazon.com from its inception in 1996 as an online bookseller to its position in 2001 as a globally recognized e-commerce brand. Reviews the evolution of the company's business model through an interview with the founder and CEO, Jeff Bezos. At its founding, Amazon.com mostly brokered book purchases through its Web site. After five years of phenomenal growth, the company expanded into international markets and added many categories, partners, and physical infrastructure. Examines Amazon's growth, fueled by the Internet bubble, and looks at how the company coped with increased scrutiny on profitability.

Examines the strategic position of Rambus, Inc. The company designs, develops, and licenses high-speed chip connection technology to enhance the performance and cost-effectiveness of computers, consumer electronics, and communication systems. The company's technology is integrated into dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips and the logic devices that control them. Because Rambus did not manufacture chips, it was directly influenced by chip suppliers (such as Intel), who controlled the price and supply of DRAM chips and stood between Rambus and the OEMs that used these chips. A further complication for Rambus stemmed from the company's involvement in several costly legal battles with much larger competitors over the ownership of prevailing DRAM standards. Looks at the challenges facing Rambus in 2001 as it seeks to balance its interests with those of its business partners (including an increasingly strained relationship with its major partner, Intel) while maintaining a technological lead over its competitors and defending its intellectual property from legal attacks.

Dave Pottruck, president and co-CEO of Charles Schwab Corp. (CSC), is contemplating a piece of news in the June 1, 1999 edition of the Wall Street Journal that was about to send shock waves through the brokerage community: Merrill Lynch's decision to launch online trading on December 1, 1999. Customers at Merrill Lynch would be able to trade online for $29.95/trade or, for a minimum annual fee of $1,500, make as many trades as they wanted. Now that Merrill Lynch had joined the online trading revolution, Pottruck wondered, how would this affect Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (Schwab), and what should the company do in response? Pottruck observes that Merrill Lynch, E*Trade, WingspanBank, and Schwab, although competing for similar customers, appeared to be doing so from very different starting points. Pottruck considers the competitive dynamics of the brokerage industry and wonders: How can Schwab maintain its growth trajectory in the face of so many, varied competitors? What other firms might enter the space? How could Schwab protect and grow its existing customer base? Was Schwab getting "squeezed in the middle" or could it create a "category of one"?

Supplements the (A) case.

Discusses the strategic challenges facing Electronic Arts in 1995 as they try to maintain their leading position in the video game industry. Addresses the evolution, competitive environment, and key trends in the industry, as well as the position and strategy of Electronic Arts.

Dave Pottruck, president and co-CEO of Charles Schwab Corp. (CSC), is contemplating a piece of news in the June 1, 1999 edition of the Wall Street Journal that was about to send shock waves through the brokerage community. The newspaper had just announced Merrill Lynch's decision to launch online trading on December 1, 1999. Customers at Merrill Lynch would be able to trade online for $29.95/trade or, for a minimum annual fee of $1,500, make as many trades as they wanted. Now that Merrill Lynch had joined the online trading revolution, Pottruck wondered, how would this affect Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (Schwab), and what should the company do in response? Pottruck observes that Merrill Lynch, ETrade, WingspanBank, and Schwab, although competing for similar customers, appeared to be doing so from very different starting points. Pottruck considers the competitive dynamics of the brokerage industry and wonders: How can Schwab maintain its growth trajectory in the face of so many, varied competitors? What other firms might enter the space? How could Schwab protect and grow its existing customer base? Was Schwab getting "squeezed in the middle" or could it create a "category of one?"

Discusses the strategic challenges facing Disney in 1996, especially those relating to the proliferation of digital content and the influence of information technologies. Provides the opportunity to discuss the importance of distribution channels in a digital age, along with the strategic reasoning behind Disney's acquisition of ABC in 1995.

For R.R. Donnelley & Sons, the period between 1995 and 1997 was marked by corporate restructuring, executive turnover, and an increasingly competitive environment. The emergence of the Internet and other digital technologies created threats, challenges, and possible opportunities for Donnelley's printing businesses. During 1995, Donnelley moved to improve its position by making technology-related acquisitions and forming the Digital Division. By early 1997, these acquired companies had been or were in the process of being spun-off or resold and the Digital Division had been shut down.

Describes Intel's Hood River project, a new business venture within Intel which sought to establish a market presence for the PC in the living room. Describes the actions of people at different levels in the organization, including the project leader, his direct managers, and Intel's senior management. It describes how the venture was initiated, how funding was won, and how the organization was structured to pursue the opportunity. Also describes the many challenges faced by the Hood River team, which included: defining a new market, establishing and cultivating partners, competing for limited funding resources, competing for limited organization (people) resources, and aligning the objectives of the project with the strategy of the corporation.

Firms in high-technology industries frequently face the dangers and opportunities associated with strategic inflection points in their development trajectory. Strategic inflection points (SIPs) are caused by changes in fundamental industry dynamics, winning strategies, and dominant technologies. SIPs generate strategic dissonance in the organization because they are associated with divergences between the basis of competition and the firm's distinctive competence, and between top management's strategic intent and strategic action. Top management can take advantage of the information generated by strategic dissonance to develop new strategic intent and lead the organization through the turbulence and uncertainty associated with SIPs. This requires a capacity for strategic recognition on the part of top and senior management. Strategic recognition in turn is facilitated by an internal selection environment that allocates resources based on competitive reality and values dissent and debate. Strategic recognition is the foundation for exerting strategic leadership: encouraging debate and bringing debate to a conclusion that realigns the basis of competition and distinctive competence.

Focuses on the decision Intel's top management faces at the end of 1984 of whether to exit the DRAM (dynamic random access memory) business. Discusses the evolution of Intel's distinctive technological competencies and of the critical linkages between its corporate, technology, marketing, and manufacturing strategies. Examines the effect of apparent industry structural changes on the relative importance of different technological competencies and the linkages between corporate, technology, marketing, and manufacturing strategies. Intel was the first successful mover with DRAM products, yet it finds itself with an inconsequential market share at the end of 1984. While the organization still believes that DRAMs are critical both from market and technology viewpoints, DRAMs have actually played a minor role in Intel's product mix in the past five years. Logic products based on microprocessor technology have replaced memory products as Intel's core business. Leads to discussions about the implications of organizational beliefs on technology and manufacturing strategy and top management's role in evaluating those beliefs during changing times.