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This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Past research is clear on the benefits of high-performing, or "star," workers. Star computer programmers, for example, are more productive than average ones by a ratio of eight to one. But reaping the benefits of such talent is not so simple. Say you hire a number of stars. How can you guarantee that they will be able to replicate their success in a new environment -- in short, how portable are they? In the past, portability has been viewed as an attribute of a person, team or organization, but it can also be looked at as an attribute of a position. Specifically, certain jobs do require different levels of company-specific human capital, thus making some workers less portable than others. Consequently, organizations should not think of talent management as a simple "build versus buy" dichotomy. Rather, there are some positions for which they can buy, and others for which they must build. Within investment banks, for example, the retail brokers (who handle individual clients) work primarily on their own. In contrast, institutional salespeople (who sell to major institutional investors such as Putnam, Vanguard and Fidelity) are more likely to perform their jobs in teams. Thus, retail brokers are more portable and can easily be hired from the outside. Institutional salespeople, however, should be developed from within, and efforts should be made to retain them. Understanding such differences is crucial for companies attempting to attain sustainable competitive advantages that derive from human capital. The authors' research, which has probed the application of human capital theory to talent portability, should help companies recognize that an entire class of factors -- specific roles within an organization -- greatly determines the portability of performance. With that knowledge, executives can gain a deeper understanding of the pros and cons of hiring certain star employees.

More and more, expanding companies are hiring high-functioning groups of people who have been working together effectively within one company and can rapidly come up to speed in a new environment. These lifted-out teams don't need to get acquainted with one another or to establish shared values, mutual accountability, or group norms; their long-standing relationships and trust help them make an impact very quickly. Of course, the process is not without risks: A failed lift out can lead to loss of money, opportunity, credibility, and even native talent. Boris Groysberg and Robin Abrahams studied more than 40 high-profile moves and interviewed team leaders in multiple industries and countries to examine the risks and opportunities that lift outs present. They concluded that, regardless of industry, nationality, or size of the team, a successful lift out unfolds over four consecutive, interdependent stages that must be meticulously managed. In the courtship stage, the hiring company and the leader of the targeted team determine whether the proposed move is, in fact, a good idea, and then define their business goals and discuss strategies. At the same time, the team leader discusses the potential move with the other members of his or her group to assess their level of interest and prepare them for the change. The second stage involves the integration of the team leader with the new company's top leadership. This part of the process ensures the team's access to senior executives--the most important factor in a lift out's success. Operational integration is the focus of the third stage. Ideally, teams will start out working with the same or similar clients, vendors, and industry standards. The fourth stage entails full cultural integration. To succeed, the lifted-out team members must be willing to re-earn credibility by proving their value and winning their new colleagues' trust.

After nearly 100 years as a mid-size regional law firm, Duane Morris entered a period of spectacular growth led by CEO Sheldon Bonovitz. Originally founded by Quakers, the firm had a distinct organizational culture featuring a number of unique or unusual business practices: a transparent and flexible compensation system, practice-group integration across multiple offices, ancillary businesses, early adoption of financial reporting software, and consensus-based decision making. The firm was proud of its corporate culture and sought to maintain it as it grew, bringing in only people who would fit the culture, in small groups. In 2005, the firm completed its first merger, taking over a 64-person San Francisco firm. Growth was necessary to remain competitive, but could Duane Morris maintain its unique culture while bringing on large numbers of new attorneys?

Supplements the (A) case.

Teena Lerner started her own hedge fund firm in 2001 after nearly 20 years as a star biotechnology analyst and hedge fund manager. After the start-up phase, her firm became highly profitable. In 2004, however, one of her four analysts lost a lot of money for the firm. If Lerner followed the existing compensation system, she would wind up significantly underpaying her other analysts, all of whom had performed well. Should she follow the compensation system or not? And what should be done about the underperforming analyst?