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In September 2011, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) celebrated its 122nd anniversary. Its chairman had just turned 76. Two years earlier, he had travelled to the United States to receive a cardiac ablation to correct an irregular heart rhythm. Succession-related questions were on his mind. SMC needed a clear plan for the leadership transition. The charismatic chairman spent his life successfully exploiting business opportunities, growing SMC from a small brewery company into a giant business group. By 2011, SMC was the largest corporation in the Philippines in terms of revenue-accounting for about 6 per cent of the country's gross domestic product and employing about 17,000 people. The group engaged in a wide range of businesses including mining, oil refining and distribution, power, telecommunications, airlines, airports, and infrastructure. How could the company continue to thrive without its remarkable leader? Finding a path towards a smooth leadership succession would be a difficult task.

Food Empire Holdings Limited (Food Empire) was a food and beverage brand owner and manufacturer of instant beverage products, frozen convenience food, confectionery, and snacks. Its main markets were Russia and Ukraine. When the political tensions between Russia and Ukraine erupted and their currencies depreciated in 2014, Food Empire’s bottom line was badly affected: its share price dropped 71 per cent in 30 months. In light of these developments, investors were not sure if they should sell their investments in Food Empire. Using financial statement analysis and various valuation concepts—including net tangible assets, dividend discount models, and peer multiples—it was hoped that the best course of action could be determined.

Instructor spreadsheet for product 8B17N013.

Mr. and Mrs. Wong and their three children had rented a condominium unit in Singapore for the past six years. During that time, they had been watching the property market with the objective of buying a home of their own. A larger unit in the same building finally became available for sale in June 2016. Coincidentally, their rental lease would expire soon after that date. If they decided to buy the larger unit, they would hold it for the next 10 years. Their net gain or loss of the buy versus rent decision would depend on the selling price of the unit at the end of 10 years and the rental payments.

Mr. and Mrs. Wong and their three children had rented a condominium unit in Singapore for the past six years. During that time, they had been watching the property market with the objective of buying a home of their own. A larger unit in the same building finally became available for sale in June 2016. Coincidentally, their rental lease would expire soon after that date. If they decided to buy the larger unit, they would hold it for the next 10 years. Their net gain or loss of the buy versus rent decision would depend on the selling price of the unit at the end of 10 years and the rental payments.

Instructor spreadsheet for product 8B16N070.

Student spreadsheet for for product 9B16N070.

Student spreadsheet for case W16834.

Neptune Orient Lines Limited (NOL) was started as Singapore’s national shipping line to facilitate industrial development and support the economy. The CMA CGM Group (CMA CGM) had acquired 67 per cent of NOL from Temasek Holdings Private Limited for SG$2.3 billion or $1.30 per share—a 6 per cent premium over the last closing price. In 2016, CMA CGM sought to acquire the remaining shares at the same price so that it could delist NOL and take it private. In order to delist, the company would need to acquire another 23 per cent of shares to hit the acceptance threshold of 90 per cent. Should the remaining shareholders sell their shares at $1.30 per share, or hold out for a better price? Should bondholders of CMA CGA and NOL be concerned about the acquisition?

Neptune Orient Lines Limited (NOL) was started as Singapore's national shipping line to facilitate industrial development and support the economy. The CMA CGM Group (CMA CGM) had acquired 67 per cent of NOL from Temasek Holdings Private Limited for SG$2.3 billion or $1.30 per share-a 6 per cent premium over the last closing price. In 2016, CMA CGM sought to acquire the remaining shares at the same price so that it could delist NOL and take it private. In order to delist, the company would need to acquire another 23 per cent of shares to hit the acceptance threshold of 90 per cent. Should the remaining shareholders sell their shares at $1.30 per share, or hold out for a better price? Should bondholders of CMA CGA and NOL be concerned about the acquisition?

Food Empire Holdings Limited (Food Empire) was a food and beverage brand owner and manufacturer of instant beverage products, frozen convenience food, confectionery, and snacks. Its main markets were Russia and Ukraine. When the political tensions between Russia and Ukraine erupted and their currencies depreciated in 2014, Food Empire's bottom line was badly affected: its share price dropped 71 per cent in 30 months. In light of these developments, investors were not sure if they should sell their investments in Food Empire. Using financial statement analysis and various valuation concepts-including net tangible assets, dividend discount models, and peer multiples-it was hoped that the best course of action could be determined.

In January of 2016, Singapore International Airlines Group (SIA) announced that it had secured more than 90 per cent stake in Tiger Airways Holdings Limited (Tigerair), and would take Tigerair private. Once the buyout offer closed on February 19, trading in Tigerair's shares would be suspended because the free float had fallen below the minimum 10 per cent threshold. Tigerair had been suffering losses amounting to more than SG$600 million from 2012 to 2015. When SIA initiated the buyout offer, Tigerair's shareholders wanted to use the discounted cash flow model, the discounted dividend model, and relative valuation to determine whether the buyout was a fair deal.

In January of 2016, Singapore International Airlines Group (SIA) announced that it had secured more than 90 per cent stake in Tiger Airways Holdings Limited (Tigerair), and would take Tigerair private. Once the buyout offer closed on February 19, trading in Tigerair’s shares would be suspended because the free float had fallen below the minimum 10 per cent threshold. Tigerair had been suffering losses amounting to more than SG$600 million from 2012 to 2015. When SIA initiated the buyout offer, Tigerair’s shareholders wanted to use the discounted cash flow model, the discounted dividend model, and relative valuation to determine whether the buyout was a fair deal.

Jumbo Group Ltd. (Jumbo) was among Singapore’s leading food and beverage establishments. Founded in 1987, the group consisted of eight brands and operated 16 outlets—14 in Singapore and two in China. On October 28, 2015, Jumbo announced its initial public offering (IPO) of SG$22.06 million, consisting of two million retail shares and 86.23 million placement shares at SG$0.25 each. In this highly competitive market, the company’s chief executive officer and chairman was motivated to list Jumbo so it would have a bigger platform and better exposure to grow faster. He hoped a softer IPO market would attract more long-term investors. Jumbo was clearly profitable, but based on its past financial performance, what would be a reasonable valuation for each of its shares? The case covers valuation using the discounted cash flow model, weighted average cost of capital, discounted dividend model, and relative valuation, as well as the computation of underpricing.

Jumbo Group Ltd. (Jumbo) was among Singapore's leading food and beverage establishments. Founded in 1987, the group consisted of eight brands and operated 16 outlets-14 in Singapore and two in China. On October 28, 2015, Jumbo announced its initial public offering (IPO) of SG$22.06 million, consisting of two million retail shares and 86.23 million placement shares at SG$0.25 each. In this highly competitive market, the company's chief executive officer and chairman was motivated to list Jumbo so it would have a bigger platform and better exposure to grow faster. He hoped a softer IPO market would attract more long-term investors. Jumbo was clearly profitable, but based on its past financial performance, what would be a reasonable valuation for each of its shares? The case covers valuation using the discounted cash flow model, weighted average cost of capital, discounted dividend model, and relative valuation, as well as the computation of underpricing.

Student spreadsheet for case W16808.

Student spreadsheet for product 9B16N068.

On January 21, 2015, a trading halt was placed on the shares of Keppel Corporation (Keppel Corp) and Keppel Land Limited (Keppel Land). On January 23, 2015, Keppel Corp announced an offer to take its subsidiary, Keppel Land, private. At the time of the offer, Keppel Corp already owned 54.6 per cent of Keppel Land. The buyout offer used a two-tier pricing approach with a higher price paid if Keppel Corp acquired a threshold number of shares. Keppel Corp would have the right to receive any distribution that might be declared, paid, or made by Keppel Land on or after the purchase date. The offer was scheduled to close on March 12, 2015. On February 2, 2015, Keppel Land appointed KPMG Corporate Finance Pte. Ltd. as the financial adviser to the independent company directors regarding the offer. Minority shareholders of Keppel Land were interested in evaluating Keppel Corp’s offer and examining its motivations. This would require that they compute the premium and net present value of the company, as well as analyze the revenue and cost synergies of the buyout.

When Margaret A. Cargill passed away in 2006, her 17.5 per cent stake in Cargill went to Margaret A. Cargill Philanthropies (MAC). MAC lobbied for her stake to be liquidated. Cargill proceeded to shed its 64 per cent stake in Mosaic, North America’s second-largest fertilizer company, in exchange for Margaret Cargill’s stake in the company, in order to maintain control over the company. Like many second- and third-generation family businesses, Cargill’s current family owners were not actively involved in the day-to-day running of the company. Was spinning off Mosaic in the best long-term interests of Cargill? Were there other feasible ways in which Cargill could have better facilitated the liquidation of Margaret Cargill’s stake?

When Margaret A. Cargill passed away in 2006, her 17.5 per cent stake in Cargill went to Margaret A. Cargill Philanthropies (MAC). MAC lobbied for her stake to be liquidated. Cargill proceeded to shed its 64 per cent stake in Mosaic, North America's second-largest fertilizer company, in exchange for Margaret Cargill's stake in the company, in order to maintain control over the company. Like many second- and third-generation family businesses, Cargill's current family owners were not actively involved in the day-to-day running of the company. Was spinning off Mosaic in the best long-term interests of Cargill? Were there other feasible ways in which Cargill could have better facilitated the liquidation of Margaret Cargill's stake?