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It is a two part case, set in 2018. Case A describes how Amazon and Walmart have been two of the most successful retailers in history and responsible for changing the rules of the game in the retail industry in the US. In their wake, they have driven many retailers out of business while transforming how suppliers manage their relationship with powerful retailers. Case B presents India, one of the most attractive e-commerce market globally, as the next battleground for the two retailers. The unique trajectory of each retailer, Amazon through online and Walmart through offline, has endowed these companies with different and distinctive capabilities. For the most part they have managed to avoid each other in the competitive marketplace by serving different consumer needs. However, as consumers and markets have been increasingly demanding an omni-channel presence, both retailers have been forced to invade the other's turf - with Amazon seeking an offline presence and Walmart seeking a substantial online operation. This leads to several questions that engage students. To grow, how should the two retailers confront each other and build their omni-channel operations? What has been their past success in the playing field of their nemesis (Amazon offline and Walmart online)? How does the marketing strategy of the two retailers differ? What are the distinctive capabilities of each retailer and how do these either help or hinder their ability to evolve for an omni-channel future? What are the financial implications of the omni-channel transformation for each retailer?

The case describes how Amazon and Walmart have been two of the most successful retailers in history and responsible for changing the rules of the game in the retail industry. In their wake, they have driven many retailers out of business while transforming how suppliers manage their relationship with powerful retailers. They have both been widely admired even if the market currently views Amazon as having greater potential. The unique trajectory of each retailer, Amazon through online and Walmart through offline, has endowed these companies with different and distinctive capabilities. For the most part they have managed to avoid each other in the competitive marketplace by serving different consumer needs. However, as consumers and markets have been increasingly demanding an omni-channel presence, both retailers have been forced to invade the other's turf - with Amazon seeking an offline presence and Walmart seeking a substantial online operation. This leads to several questions that engage students. To grow, how should the two retailers confront each other and build their omni-channel operations? What has been their past success in the playing field of their nemesis (Amazon offline and Walmart online)? How does the marketing strategy of the two retailers differ? What are the distinctive capabilities of each retailer and how do these either help or hinder their ability to effectively evolve for an omni-channel future? What are the financial implications of the omni-channel transformation for each retailer?

This case is set in 2018, when Veriown, a pay-as-you-go Internet connected solar service provider, was preparing to launch in its first and potentially the most important market - India. Steve Johanns, the founder CEO of the company had pinned his hopes on the success of this launch to establish the viability of Veriown's business model, its scalability within India, and expansion into sub-Saharan Africa. Established in 2016, Veriown's primary objective was to bridge the infrastructural gap in energy that existed in developing countries by providing a safer and cleaner alternative to kerosene, a non-renewable fossil fuel that was detrimental to health and the environment. Besides energy, Veriown aimed to facilitate digital connectivity and access to financial services to help enable socio-economic development and financial inclusion of the impoverished rural communities. Empowered by a strong team, and supported by global partners, Veriown had developed an advanced solar energy-based solution that brought electricity, the Internet and micro-finance services together on the same platform, and followed the 'pay-to-consume' model of the kerosene transactions that consumers at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) preferred. It had also tied up with local companies with expertise in distribution and installation of solar energy solutions in rural India for on-ground support during the launch. However, despite all the planning, Johanns was concerned about the operational capability of Veriown in meeting the high consumer demand of the market. He wondered if its service levels and frequency would be able to keep up with the demand, and effectively resolve any issues as and when they appeared. In addition, would the company be able to scale up soon after the launch, if required? Would leveraging its partners' networks curtail the extent of control Veriown could wield over customer experience on the ground?

Set in 2016, this case presents the ten-year long journey undertaken by SunMoon to transform its legacy business model that had led the company to become a loss-making, cost-inefficient and debt-ridden entity in 2007. Gary Loh, who joined the company in 2007, spearheaded the efforts to restructure the debt, modernise operations, and change the business model. However, the process was arduous, being besieged on one hand by financial issues such as capital inadequacy, downward spiral in revenues and increasing losses; and on the other hand by operational issues such as inter-personal conflicts, debt settlement challenges and labour unrest. The case further discusses how SunMoon, after having divested its non-performing assets and non-core businesses, set out to achieve its new strategic vision to be an asset-light, brand-focused, and consumer-oriented company. Its new business model centred on building and leveraging SunMoon's brand equity, developing a larger retail network across more geographies and dealing in a wider range of products. While SunMoon's deal with Yiguo (Alibaba backed) - the leading fresh food e-commerce company in China, was a testament to its new model, fruits being a commodity product and the highly fragmented nature of the industry raised various concerns: Would SunMoon be able to become the industry benchmark in quality for both buyers and growers, and provide an aggregator platform like Uber or Airbnb? Would it be able to create the last mile connectivity with end-consumers and provide brand differentiation among them?

This case is set in February 2016, when Paris Baguette (PB) has just been declared the winner at the most prestigious baking competition in the world held each year in Paris. PB had started operations in 1945 with a small bakery in Korea. By 2014, it boasted of 3,200 outlets in South Korea, and another 200 plus outlets across China, USA and Southeast Asia. Buoyed by its international appeal, the company entered France, opening its first store in 2014 and the second store in 2015. Positioned as a 'premium health conscious brand', PB quickly found resonance with the French by diligently following traditional baking standards, suitably localising the innovative menu and offering a café-style service. Its success in France was paving the way for further expansion into other European markets. This was significant given that the Korean domestic market was intensely competitive and heavily regulated against corporate bakeries - so future growth in all likelihood could only come from the international operations. The question now is to decide the appropriate strategy for the bakery brand when entering other European markets. Which country or countries should it go to after France? Should it leverage on its selling proposition of 'French-ness', or should it find a staple bread specific to each European country and replicate the strategy followed in France?

Based in 2016, this case presents the dilemma faced by Tiffany & Co. (Tiffany), the luxury jewellery and specialty retailer, about embarking upon an omni-channel retail (OCR) strategy. Although Tiffany had a strong social media presence globally, it offered e-commerce solutions only in a few select markets. Online sales accounted for just six percent of its total sales, and there was limited integration between its brick-and-mortar outlets and online presence. While the company recognised the growing significance of OCR, as a luxury brand it struggled with the idea of embracing the online medium wholeheartedly. Luxury brands, synonymous with being superior, elusive and premium, endeavoured to provide a sensory-rich experience meant for a privileged few, while the online world was a mass media platform representing low cost, democratisation and a ubiquitous experience for all. The fashion-oriented and affluent Singapore market, with its high levels of internet usage and mobile penetration, provided a perfect opportunity for Tiffany to experiment with a fully integrated omni-channel strategy. However, it raised significant concerns too: What did implementing such a strategy mean in terms of investment in resources and capabilities? What would be the key factors to success? How would this strategy enable the brand to differentiate itself from other luxury brands? How would it impact Tiffany's product lines, pricing strategies, store designs-physical and digital, service initiatives, and above all its brand equity?

In 2016, Inditex as a group with worldwide sales of US$24.9 billion, and Zara, as its flagship retail concept store, had recorded significant year-on-year growth in net sales at 11.5% and 13% respectively. However, despite a presence across 93 countries, Inditex's regional sales contributions were skewed. Europe, comprising only 26% of the global apparel market and exhibiting declining growth, accounted for 60.8% of Inditex revenues. The Americas, the second largest market in the world with 30% share, had the least contribution at 15.3%, and Asia Pacific, the fastest growing and largest market with 36% share of the global apparel market, contributed only 23.9%. Unlike other apparel producers, Zara manufactured 60% of its merchandise in the 'near markets' of Europe and North Africa, close to its logistics centres in Spain. The labour costs in these markets were substantially higher than Asia, where the bulk of global apparel production took place. Would this put Zara at a disadvantage in reaching out to the high growth Asian consumer markets of China and India? Moreover, while Zara had been online since 2010, its online sales in 2016 accounted for only 7% of its total sales. As consumers increasingly shopped online, would Zara with its reliance on stores and impulse purchases become another retail casualty of e-commerce?

Based in 2017, the case describes the entrepreneurial journey of a social enterprise (SE), Yangon Bakehouse (YBH), in Myanmar. Established in 2012, YBH's primary objective was to address the socio-economic development issues of disadvantaged women in Myanmar. The enterprise was based on a self-sustaining model, and ran a revenue-generating restaurant and catering business to help support its social mission. YBH recruited minimally educated women who lacked stable income for a seven-month multiskilling training programme that provided culinary skills for employability, and life skills related to healthcare and financial decision-making. The apprentices were also assisted in securing placement across cafes, restaurants and bakeries. The restaurant and catering business served a dual purpose by providing on-the-job training in a practical setting, and generating income to sustain the training program. The enterprise was a success, and by 2017, YBH had managed to train and place 91 women. Additionally, it ran two kiosks, one café, a centralised kitchen, a training centre and an office. However, sustaining this growth was proving to be a challenge given the highly skewed real estate market, restrictive loan policies, and lack of legal recognition of SEs in Myanmar. Furthermore, with three of its four partners' being expatriates, the longevity of the enterprise was under question. Would YBH be able to transition to local leadership and management? Most importantly, would the social enterprise model continue to be relevant in the changing Myanmar?

Set in 2016, the case explores the role of social media in the public transportation sector. It highlights how social media has emerged to be a dominant platform offering both opportunities and challenges for organisations. SMRT, a mass service provider in Singapore, counted amongst the best in the world was struggling to manage consumer expectations in face of a series of train breakdowns and disruptions that had seriously tarnished the company's reputation. The company had a presence on social media; however it largely relied on traditional media in its communication strategy. At the times of crisis, the inability of the traditional media to provide an interactive platform and live updates had often resulted in disgruntled customers. Lack of real- time engagement with the commuters had widened the chasm between their expectations and perceived performance of the transport system negating the painstaking technical and operational improvements done by SMRT over time to provide a more reliable service. Could SMRT better leverage social media in effectively engaging with riders during crises and otherwise? The case showcases the examples of other public transportation firms - KLM and South West Trains that have been successful in this endeavour. Could their social media experiences be applied to SMRT? Through this case, students will gain an understanding of the multi-dimensional impact of social media on an organisation. They will be able to analyse and compare its impact when adopted comprehensively versus a piece-meal approach. Students will also learn about the essential elements of an effective social media strategy and be able to assess the gap between an organization's social media goals and its resource allocation for the same. The case will help students to learn about the evolution of social media and evaluate its effectiveness versus that of traditional media especially in the services domain.

Set in 2013, this case discusses the challenges faced and overcome by JAL to turn around successfully from a situation of bankruptcy in 2009-2010. In 2009, JAL, Asia's largest airline by revenue and an icon of Japan Inc., was besieged by a severe cash crunch crisis. A skewed cost structure with too many aircraft, bloated workforce and unprofitable routes, aggressive expansion in non-core associated services, and the 2008 global economic crisis, had landed the airline with a debt load of over US$25 billion, an operating loss of US$518 million and a market valuation less than the price of a Boeing 747. Kazuo Inamori, founder of the electronics leader Kyocera Corp, was tabbed as the new Chairman of the airline and set out to restructure the organisation. Within two years JAL had revived to become the world's most profitable airline in 2011-12. In 2012, JAL's initial public offering (IPO) at US$8.5 billion was the world's largest after Facebook's IPO, and the company was valued at US$8.72 billion. Besides government intervention and support, three factors in particular contributed to JAL's remarkable recovery: rationalisation of the cost structure through supply management and operational restructuring; change in the corporate culture inculcating shared values among all the employees; and the new management accounting system 'AMOEBA', to drive accountability across all levels and divisions. However, Inamori's stepping down in 2013 raised a few concerns: would JAL be able to stay committed to Inamori's defined path of high profitability structure and people-oriented culture? Would it continue to learn from its mistakes in the past, and pursue sustainable growth?

In 2014, Singapore Management University (SMU) undertook the reworking of its ten-year-old legacy intranet web portal eWise, and successfully replaced it with the new intranet, iNet. At lower maintenance costs than eWise, iNet offered modern design, easy consolidation and renewal of content, better integrated core operational functions, vastly improved user interface, and opportunities to collaborate. The case presents an overview of the journey of this transformation at SMU, discussing the key challenges faced by Goh and his team in terms of choice of technology, skills required, resources management and change management, including cultural issues and resistance to change. It discusses the development process and the decisions taken regarding the technical platform, implementation approach, features incorporated, and the taxonomy and topology of the website. Given the sheer size of the organisation and its information and legacy structure, iNet was undoubtedly an achievement. Yet, issues remained: How to accelerate iNet's low adoption rate amongst users? Should the portal be expanded to unify the whole of SMU through a single integrated web portal? Would that bring in synergies across the university or would the different departments continue to operate in silos? What would be the right time for upgrading the intranet portal to ensure future readiness and scalability of the overall IT solution?

In 2011, Coca-Cola India recognised the opportunity to access the rural and remote markets of India in a more effective manner by launching the 'eKOCool', a solar power operated cooler. This innovation had the potential to expand the hitherto underserved and hard to penetrate Indian rural market, and even bring home the first time consumers who had never tasted the company's beverages. It also facilitated an integration of the company's business development goals with its social responsibility initiatives - in particular, contributing towards the global 5by20 initiative of enabling economic empowerment of five million women entrepreneurs by 2020. To make this innovative product affordable, the technical team worked through the supply chain and brought down the costs to US$779, more than a third of the original cost. However, the company's top management acknowledged that for long-term sustainable impact and the scalability of the innovation, it was imperative that the cost be brought down further. How could this best be done, and how could the golden triangle of business, government and civil society come together to develop similar initiatives that would develop value for communities?