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Provides an overview for students of the MBA elective course Managing Networked Businesses (MNB). MNB focuses on management challenges in businesses that exhibit network effects. The first section of the note explains that such businesses comprise a large and growing share of the global economy and confront distinctive management challenges. Due to the unusual microeconomic attributes of networked businesses, designing optimal business models is difficult, and managers often must cope with winner-take-all competitive dynamics. Winner-take-all outcomes have profound implications for strategy decisions, and choices about capital structure, organizational design, and government relations. For this reason, MNB employs a general management perspective. The second section of the note reviews a set of core concepts covered in MNB and provides definitions of networks, network effects, and platforms. The final section briefly describes the organization and contents of MNB's modules.

The management at Monster.com, the leading U.S. provider of online recruitment services, must decide how to proceed with Monster Networking (MN), a new business launched in late 2003. MN helps users identify other individuals who can offer career advice. Monster.com management views MN as: a vehicle for reducing the cost of attracting job seekers to its core matching services and a potential source of subscription revenue. As of early 2005, MN's performance has been mixed. Networkers were deeply engaged, but subscription revenue growth was disappointing. In the face of this performance, Monster.com management must decide whether to proceed with its original plan, eliminate subscription fees to boost traffic, augment MN's scale by acquiring an online social networking start-up, or simply terminate MN.

Describes Yahoo!'s management of the launch of version 6.0 of its Instant Messenger (IM) product, which incorporates features from 12 other Yahoo! properties, including Search, Music, Games, Photos, Personals, News, and Shopping. The integration of features from so many properties--all of which face urgent competitive priorities beyond their support of IM--presents a complex set of product and strategy development problems. Yahoo! has a distinctive approach for managing such "network integration," which it sees as its key competitive advantage vs. Google and Microsoft's MSN.

Managers of DoCoMo, Japan's largest mobile phone company, are formulating a strategy for mobile FeliCa: contactless integrated circuits that will be built into DoCoMo phones, allowing them to be used for quick and convenient retail or commuter fare payments, building entry, airline boarding passes, and other applications. DoCoMo's managers must determine how best to profit from mobile FeliCa. The options, which are not mutually exclusive, include: increasing mobile phone subscriber acquisition and retention rates by offering "sticky" differentiated new services; extracting monopoly rents from a joint venture (with Sony, FeliCa's inventor) that will license FeliCa technology to other mobile phone companies and application providers; and profiting from eMoney (retail payments) either through partnerships with incumbent financial services firms or by offering payment services directly.

Microsoft and IBM have excluded Sun Microsystems from the board of the Web Services Interoperability Organization (WS-I), an industry consortium that will shape the evolution of Web services standards. Sun managers must decide whether to join WS-I as a contributing member--a less influential role that lacks the veto and agenda-setting powers of a board position. Sun has recruited leading IT vendors--including several WS-I board members--to create technologies that compete with proposed standards jointly developed by Microsoft and IBM. Consequently, Sun could leverage fears of a protracted standards battle among IT users and vendors, who might pressure Microsoft and IBM to reverse their position regarding a WS-I board position for Sun. The stakes were high; Web services--software modules that exchange information over the Internet, within and between firms, interoperating across a range of hardware, operating system, and programming language platforms--were expected to become the dominant technology for enterprise computing.

Rakuten, a native Japanese, e-commerce start-up and highly successful company, is expanding into new categories and new countries. It must figure out how to continue its trajectory of growth and profitability. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Cox Communications, the third largest U.S. cable television system operator, is confronting strategy decisions in mid-2004. Cox managers must decide whether to speed its deployment of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), which offers capital and operating costs savings compared to the traditional circuit-switched technologies Cox has used to offer phone service. Cox has had great success in attacking incumbent phone companies with bundles that include TV, high-speed Internet, and telephone services. However, VoIP deployment will be capital intensive, and Wall Street is pressuring Cox, like other cable operators, to deliver free cash flow. At the same time, cable operators have been losing market share to satellite TV providers, and Cox managers must decide whether to accelerate the capital-intensive deployment of digital video recorders (DVRs) to address this competitive threat. Can Cox afford to offer both VoIP and DVRs? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Scientific-Atlantia (S-A), a leading manufacturer of cable TV equipment, is confronting strategic challenges in mid-2004. For decades, cable operators have faced high switching costs that have locked them into exclusive supply relationships with either S-A or its somewhat larger rival, Motorola. S-A has developed technology that substantially reduces switching costs, and it is positioned to capture market share because it has an 18-month lead over Motorola in developing cable set-top boxes that incorporate digital video recorders (DVRs). Cable operators are eager to offer DVRs to stem subscriber losses to satellite TV. The case asks whether S-A should aggressively pursue opportunities to overlay its set-tops in cable systems that previously employed only Motorola gear. If so, to what extent should S-A subsidize cable operators' remaining switching costs? Are there risks in introducing more competition into what had previously been a stable duopoly? Also explores S-A's strategic options for dealing with a transition to all-digital television technology and consumers' growing demand for solutions for managing their digital media files (photos, music, etc.). Asks whether S-A should continue to offer an integrated, proprietary, end-to-end transmission solution or, instead, embrace a more open "ecosystem," relying to a greater extent on third-party software and hardware providers and offering solution elements on an unbundled basis. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Examines RealNetwork's (Real's) strategy for the rapidly emerging online music market. In contrast to rivals who sell individual copies of songs, Real offers online music on a subscription basis. For a $10 monthly fee, subscribers to Real's Rhapsody service have unlimited rights to stream all songs from a 600,000-title library to any PC and can burn CD copies of these songs for 79 cents apiece. Real faces significant marketing challenges in persuading consumers to "rent" rather than own their music. The company must decide which channel partners--broadband access providers, consumer electronics retailers, PC manufacturers, or portals--are best equipped to help sell its services. Finally, Real must determine how to differentiate its services from those soon to be offered by a glut of new competitors poised to enter the online music market, including Wal-Mart, Viacom, Sony, Dell, and Microsoft.

On August 14, 2003, an electricity blackout cascaded throughout the northeastern United States and Canada. Describes the structure, technology, and economics of the electric utility industry and how gradual deregulation beginning in the 1970s placed unprecedented, and unintended, stress on the transmission grid. Discusses the government's role in trying to mitigate congestion along transmission lines and facilitate improved planning and operational coordination through the establishment of independent system operators and regional transmission organizations. Also describes the recent financial performance of the electricity industry, the potential costs of modernizing the U.S. transmission infrastructure, and the role of political contributions in shaping regulation.

As the leading content delivery network, Akamai helps Internet companies deliver Web site content to end users with fewer delays and lower costs. Describes the strategic management challenges facing Akamai in early 2004. The company is poised to offer its next generation of services for enterprise customers, which will allow them to run Internet-enabled applications ("Web services")--on demand, with minimal capital investment--from Akamai's network of 15,000 servers located in ISP facilities at the Internet's "edge"--close to end users. Many large enterprise software companies have developed proprietary platforms for creating and managing Web services. Akamai must decide which of these software companies would be attractive partners and whether it can and should remain uncommitted to a platform as it helps customers deploy Web services. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Electronic Arts (EA), the world's largest independent video-game publisher, must decide whether to support Microsoft's initiatives in online gaming. Historically, EA has been platform-agnostic, releasing versions of its titles for all major console platforms. However, its managers have serious concerns about Microsoft's strategy for its online gaming service, Xbox Live. Microsoft has maintained tight control over game features and customer relationships and has refused to share online gaming subscription revenues with game publishers. Sony has offered terms for Playstation2 online games that are acceptable to EA. Can EA afford to forfeit sales through Microsoft's platform?

Describes political and economic forces that influenced the development of an all-digital, high-definition television (HDTV) standard in the United States between 1986 and 1996. Outlines the stakes for various government and industry participants in the standard-setting process. Contrasts the market-led approach used in developing U.S. HDTV standards to the government-led processes employed in Japan and Europe, where billions of dollars were invested in R&D but the resulting analog standards were soon abandoned. Concludes with a series of unresolved policy issues facing U.S. regulators in 1996, for example, whether to intervene to resolve technical disputes between the broadcasting and computer industries, whether to mandate or simply authorize use of an HDTV standard, and whether to set specific deadlines for broadcasters' deployment of HDTV technology.

Describes plans for a failed project that proposed the use of 288 satellites to deliver high-speed data communications services anywhere in the world.

Examines factors that motivate a firm's race to acquire customers in newly emerging markets and explores conditions under which racing strategies are likely to yield attractive returns. Provides a definition of racing behavior, introduces the notion of an optimal level of investment in customer acquisition efforts, and considers reasons why firms might invest more or less than this optimal amount, including funding constraints and the impact of budgeting and compensation systems. Explains why firms may be motivated to race to acquire companies when they confront increasing returns to scale due to network effects and/or high fixed, up-front costs and/or high customer switching costs. Describes how the relative strength of the first and late mover advantages determines whether firms should seek to pioneer. New market opportunities often spark speculative bubbles and the case discusses why such bubbles may lead firms to overinvest in customer acquisition efforts. Presents frameworks for deciding: 1) whether to enter a new market in which rivals are likely to race to acquire customers and 2) how a company should respond when a competitor escalates a race.

NeoPets.com, a rapidly growing Internet start-up headed by Chairman and CEO Doug Dohring, faces decisions about its international expansion strategy--whether to enter a joint venture with a conglomerate in Singapore to exploit Asian markets as well as which other regions to target. NeoPets allows its users--mostly children and teens--to create and care for virtual pets in an online world. The Web site is free to users and is supported by advertising akin to product placement in movies. NeoPets reached profitability four months after launching operations in late 1999, largely due to the fact that it spends nothing for customer acquisition, relying strictly on word-of-mouth. As of July, 2001, the company had over 8 million unique users and was ranked #four among all U.S. Web sites for "stickiness," the average amount of time that users spend online.

In early 2002, XM and Sirius were fighting for control of the emerging U.S. market for satellite radio. Each company targeted consumers in automobiles, providing 100 channels of CD-quality audio for a monthly subscription fee of $10-$13. Wall Street analysts predicted that these companies would be profitable by 2005-2006, but investors were increasingly skeptical of ventures that required huge, irrevocable bets on customer acquisition and infrastructure. This case describes the business models of the satellite radio companies, the technology they employed, and their target markets. Poses questions about their pricing strategies, strategic partnerships with auto manufacturers, and whether they should develop interoperable radios that receive either company's signals.

Describes the evolution of Qwest from a small fiber-optic construction firm in 1996 to a global telecommunications giant in 2001. Focuses on Qwest's pivotal acquisition of "Baby Bell" US West, a regional Bell operating company many times Qwest's size. Discusses the rationale for the merger and its aftermath, including the cultural challenge of integrating a scrappy start-up with a bureaucratic, traditional firm.

Examines the Application Service Provider (ASP) business model. First, defines the ASP model and describes different ways to categorize ASPs. Next, summarizes the various ways that ASPs create value for their clients. Then, analyzes the economic model for ASPs, focusing on their revenue and cost drivers. Last, examines the payoff to ASPs from pursuing aggressive growth strategies.

Describes online brokers, companies that use the Internet to help clients identify prospective trading partners and sometimes help their clients complete transactions. First, summarizes the various ways that online brokers create value for their clients. Then analyzes the economic model for online brokers, focusing on their revenue and cost drivers. Building on that analysis, the next section examines the payoff to online brokers from pursuing aggressive growth strategies. Delineates the differences between and advantages of being a broker versus a retailer or a market maker, and explores some of the strategic challenges facing offline brokers as they move their businesses online, e.g., the risk of self-cannibalization and the threat of disintermediation by clients. Explores the value proposition offered by these companies and the economic imperatives they face. Finally, seeks to provide a framework to evaluate whether the adoption of aggressive growth strategies is prudent for online brokers.