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The Novartis Malaria Initiative was designed, as a result of a precedent-setting agreement with the World Health Organization in 2001, to provide a breakthrough treatment for malaria-"at no profit"-for public health systems. What had begun as an exemplary act of corporate responsibility had succeeded beyond any expectations. In 2012, for the second year in a row, Novartis had manufactured and distributed over 100 million units of the anti-malarial drug Coartem ®. But with the significantly increased volumes came increased costs, bringing into question the sustainability of the program. In 2013, Dr. Linus Igwemezie, executive vice president and head of the Novartis Malaria Initiative, reflected on the evolution of the program and the way forward. His goal was to expand access to Coartem in the private sector through a low-margin, high-volume social business model to eventually enable the Malaria Initiative to break even and become financially sustainable. Was this the right strategy?

This technical note provides information on the evolution and current state of angel investing in Europe. The note first describes the role and types of angel investors, focusing on their investment preferences and practices. It then details the new trends in the market, including the development of policy tools and the proliferation of incubators/accelerators to support angel investors. Finally, the note explores salient issues in angel investing for the future and pays particular attention to the recent developments in crowdfunding.

In 2013, Brigitte Baumann, founder of the Pan-European angel investing provider Go Beyond Investing, reflected on the evolution of her venture and the way forward. Her company, which offered deal flow and training to novice and experienced angel investors and ran investor groups in several European countries, had reached a critical size, and Baumann needed to make a strategic decision to ensure its future growth in an industry that was undergoing rapid competitive and regulatory change. Her options required a decision on whether to keep her venture independent, and use a financing round to grow and scale it to a European leader in early stage investing, or whether to cash out and/or have it evolve more quickly through a partnership or sale. Possibilities included a future sale to a private bank that was looking for ways to expand their investment offerings for high net worth individuals, or joining forces with one of the emerging crowdfunding networks that targeted small investors. All of these options would require adjustments to Go Beyond Investing's strategy, capabilities, financing, and organizational structure.

Nearly 27,000 people depended on Ilva Steel Taranto, the largest steel-making plant in Europe, for their livelihoods, but the plant's pollution fouled the environment and increased the incidence of tumors, respiratory illnesses and deaths. In July 2012, faced with a court-ordered partial shut-down and a possibly unaffordable remediation plan, the company's newly appointed head must decide what to do next.

In 2008, EADS, the European aerospace group that owns Airbus, was faced with the decision of how best to hedge a large and growing mismatch between its dollar revenues and its euro manufacturing costs. Specifically, the company needed to decide if it would continue hedging primarily with forward contracts, but in much higher volumes and at increasingly unfavorable rates, or to break with past practice and begin using foreign exchange option contracts. The decision would have consequences for EADS' profitability, cash flow, and its ability to fund strategic investment programs crucial to its ability to remain competitive with Boeing. Students must address questions concerning the proper way to measure foreign exchange exposures, the objectives of a rational risk management policy and program for a company like EADS competing in a duopoly with Boeing, the differences between hedging with FX options versus FX futures, counterparty risk, and hedge accounting, among other considerations.

The management of Germany's Brainlab AG, a leading provider of software-driven oncology and surgery solutions, needs to evaluate strategic options for proceeding without an exclusive hardware partner in its most profitable business segment.

It's 2008 and Spanish food retailer Superado is on course to miss its financial targets. According to company policy, this means that Superado should withhold all bonuses for the year. But the company has an unbroken tradition of paying out bonuses and treating its workforce well--and it enjoys low staff turnover and high productivity as a result. In this fictionalized case study, based on a Harvard Business School case by Zeynep Ton and Simon Harrow, CEO Luisa Fernandez faces a dilemma: Should Superado reward its employees for maintaining outstanding productivity in an economic crisis, or should it save its resources as a buffer against worse to come? Daniela Beyersdorfer, Vincent Dessain, and Zeynep Ton present this fictionalized case study with expert commentary provided by Nicolas Hollanders and Marcos Barberan.

It's 2008 and Spanish food retailer Superado is on course to miss its financial targets. According to company policy, this means that Superado should withhold all bonuses for the year. But the company has an unbroken tradition of paying out bonuses and treating its workforce well--and it enjoys low staff turnover and high productivity as a result. In this fictionalized case study, based on a Harvard Business School case by Zeynep Ton and Simon Harrow, CEO Luisa Fernandez faces a dilemma: Should Superado reward its employees for maintaining outstanding productivity in an economic crisis, or should it save its resources as a buffer against worse to come? Daniela Beyersdorfer, Vincent Dessain, and Zeynep Ton present this fictionalized case study.

It's 2008 and Spanish food retailer Superado is on course to miss its financial targets. According to company policy, this means that Superado should withhold all bonuses for the year. But the company has an unbroken tradition of paying out bonuses and treating its workforce well--and it enjoys low staff turnover and high productivity as a result. In this fictionalized case study, based on a Harvard Business School case by Zeynep Ton and Simon Harrow, CEO Luisa Fernandez faces a dilemma: Should Superado reward its employees for maintaining outstanding productivity in an economic crisis, or should it save its resources as a buffer against worse to come? Daniela Beyersdorfer, Vincent Dessain, and Zeynep Ton present this fictionalized case study with expert commentary provided by Nicolas Hollanders and Marcos Barberan.

In September 2008, the Polish State Treasury and the Dutch insurer Eureko were wondering if they were ready for reaching an amicable solution on PZU. If so, for how much and under what conditions should they settle so that they, as well as PZU, are satisfied? If not, what other potential alternatives might exist?

In October 2008, Andrzej Klesyk, CEO of Poland's largest insurer PZU, reflected on possible ways of resolving a decade-long cross-border shareholder conflict at his company. Owned 55% by the Polish State Treasury and 33% by the Dutch insurer Eureko as of October 2008, PZU was a highly profitable company and Poland's biggest asset holder. Eureko aimed at majority ownership of PZU as the building block of its Eastern European expansion strategy. The Treasury, however, was reluctant to forfeit control of the country's crown jewels. Several rounds of negotiations and international arbitration failed to resolve the conflict, leading to a progressive breach of trust. Was there anything Klesyk could do to break this international and multilateral stalemate?

After a decade-long dispute with the Polish State Treasury, in October 2009 the Dutch insurer Eureko agreed to exit PZU in exchange for compensation. Who was the biggest beneficiary of the settlement: Eureko, the Treasury, or PZU itself?

French advertising company JCDecaux and the city of Paris jointly developed Vélib', a wildly popular bicycle sharing system. Despite Vélib's public appeal, vandalism and theft led to ballooning operating costs-costs borne by JCDecaux alone. The two parties opted to renegotiate their contract, which would impact prices, revenue sharing, cost allocation, and the operation of the system as a whole. Could the parties agree on a common strategy that would meet their objectives, while still delivering a first class bicycle sharing service to the city of Paris?

This case is about the multinational company ABB’s development of a sustainability strategy, and its dilemmas in supplying hydropower dam projects. Adam Roscoe, head of sustainability at ABB Group, had to evaluate the content and business consequences of a letter written by the non-governmental organization (NGO) International Rivers. The letter discussed the alleged violations of sustainability criteria when building the Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos. Roscoe needed to assess what implications the letter had for ABB, which had a large stake in the outcomes of the project. Such a letter from a prominent NGO might affect ABB’s policies and practices in sustainability. <br><br>The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank had great interest in seeing the project’s success, as it would supply rural areas of Laos and Thailand with electricity, bring in a large source of revenue that would be used in poverty-reduction programs for Laos and, lastly, provide a non-carbon-based energy source. ABB also had to consider the position of its stakeholders including customers, investors, media, and NGOs. If ABB was associated with a dam project that did not comply with international regulations, this could lead to negative publicity and potential loss of business. <br><br>Roscoe thus faced two interweaved questions: Would International Rivers’ letter pose a reputation risk for ABB? What would this example mean for ABB’s sustainability criteria and objectives and would this need to be acknowledged and, if so, how?

This case is about the multinational company ABB, the development of its sustainability strategy, and its dilemmas in supplying hydropower dam projects. Adam Roscoe, head of sustainability at ABB Group, had to evaluate the content and the business consequences of a letter written by the non-profit organization (NGO) International Rivers. The letter discussed the alleged violations of sustainability criteria when building the Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos. Roscoe needed to assess what implications the letter had for ABB. ABB had a large stake in the outcomes of the project. As ABB had a well-developed sustainability practice in its core business, such a letter from a large well-known NGO might affect ABB's policies and practices in sustainability. On the one hand, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank had a large stake in seeing that the project was successful in its environmental and social aspects. The dam project would be providing the country with much needed economic development: supplying rural areas of Laos as well as Thailand with electricity, bringing in a large source of revenues that would be used in poverty reduction programs for Laos, and lastly providing a non-carbon-based energy source. On the other hand, ABB had to consider the position of its stakeholders including customers, investors, media and NGOs. If ABB was associated with a dam project that did not comply with international regulations outlined by the World Bank and the Equator Principles of financial institutions, the company could face a reputation risk associated with the project. This could lead to negative publicity and, potentially, loss of business. Adam thus faced two interweaved questions: Would the International Rivers' letter pose a reputation risk for ABB? What would this example mean for ABB's sustainability criteria and objectives and would this need to be acknowledged, and, if so, how?

Many luxury brands are able to command high prices because of their excellent quality, solid reputation, and limited availability. But it can be tricky both to maintain that cachet and continue to grow if the next generation of consumers is completely priced out of your market. Fictional winemaker Chateau de Vallois, a traditional estate with centuries of experience in producing luxury wines, faces that dilemma and is now considering whether to launch an affordable brand. A new wine of good quality at a lower price could attract younger fine-wine drinkers who might then upgrade to more expensive wines later on. On the other hand, the estate must be careful to preserve its exclusive image and avoid damaging the perceived value of its existing high-end wines. Should Chateau de Vallois stick with what it does best or branch out and begin producing a new brand? The authors of this fictional case study are Daniela Beyersdorfer, who is a research associate at Harvard Business School's Europe Research center, and Vincent Dessain, the center's executive director. Commentary is offered by Corinne Mentzelopoulos, the owner and CEO of Chateau Margaux, a first-growth estate in the Bordeaux region of France; Philippe Sereys de Rothschild, the vice chairman of Baron Philippe de Rothschild, a family firm that manages both first-growth and branded wines; and HBR's readers.

Many luxury brands are able to command high prices because of their excellent quality, solid reputation, and limited availability. But it can be tricky both to maintain that cachet and continue to grow if the next generation of consumers is completely priced out of your market. Fictional winemaker Chateau de Vallois, a traditional estate with centuries of experience in producing luxury wines, faces that dilemma and is now considering whether to launch an affordable brand. A new wine of good quality at a lower price could attract younger fine-wine drinkers who might then upgrade to more expensive wines later on. On the other hand, the estate must be careful to preserve its exclusive image and avoid damaging the perceived value of its existing high-end wines. Should Chateau de Vallois stick with what it does best or branch out and begin producing a new brand? The authors of this fictional case study are Daniela Beyersdorfer, who is a research associate at Harvard Business School's Europe Research center, and Vincent Dessain, the center's executive director. Commentary is offered by Corinne Mentzelopoulos, the owner and CEO of Chateau Margaux, a first-growth estate in the Bordeaux region of France; Philippe Sereys de Rothschild, the vice chairman of Baron Philippe de Rothschild, a family firm that manages both first-growth and branded wines; and HBR's readers.

Many luxury brands are able to command high prices because of their excellent quality, solid reputation, and limited availability. But it can be tricky both to maintain that cachet and continue to grow if the next generation of consumers is completely priced out of your market. Fictional winemaker Chateau de Vallois, a traditional estate with centuries of experience in producing luxury wines, faces that dilemma and is now considering whether to launch an affordable brand. A new wine of good quality at a lower price could attract younger fine-wine drinkers who might then upgrade to more expensive wines later on. On the other hand, the estate must be careful to preserve its exclusive image and avoid damaging the perceived value of its existing high-end wines. Should Chateau de Vallois stick with what it does best or branch out and begin producing a new brand? The authors of this fictional case study are Daniela Beyersdorfer, who is a research associate at Harvard Business School's Europe Research center, and Vincent Dessain, the center's executive director. Commentary is offered by Corinne Mentzelopoulos, the owner and CEO of Chateau Margaux, a first-growth estate in the Bordeaux region of France; Philippe Sereys de Rothschild, the vice chairman of Baron Philippe de Rothschild, a family firm that manages both first-growth and branded wines; and HBR's readers.